

POLIS EXPANSION AND ELITE POWER IN HELLENISTIC KARIA



JEREMY LABUFF

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POLIS EXPANSION AND ELITE POWER IN HELLENISTIC KARIA



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A close-up photograph of a textured, light-colored surface, possibly a book cover or endpaper. The texture is uneven, with visible fibers and small dark spots. Faint, illegible markings are visible in the upper left corner.

JEREMY LABUFF

Polis Expansion and Elite Power in Hellenistic Karia

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Polis Expansion and Elite Power in Hellenistic Karia

Jeremy LaBuff

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For No One in particular, who helps me sing my didn't and dance my did.

Und wenn ihr nicht Heilige der Erkenntnis sein könnt, so seid mir wenigstens deren Krieger. Das sind die Gefährten und Vorläufer solcher Heiligkeit.

And if you cannot be saints of knowledge, at least be for me its warriors. They are the companions and forerunners of such saintliness.

—Friedrich Nietzsche, *Also Sprach Zarathustra, Erster Teil*

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Preface

The Whisper That Cries for More

This book started as a poorly informed desire to go to graduate school and study Hellenistic history. Even then, with nary a Greek history course to my credit, I had an inkling that there was so much we still had to learn of this period, a prospect much less daunting than figuring out how to say something new about Herodotos or Thucydides. Luckily for me, the folks at the University of Pennsylvania were forgiving of vaguely formulated ambitions, and three years later I found myself swimming in folios of Hellenistic inscriptions. My inkling was of course confirmed, but what stood out to me more was that there seemed to be two versions of Hellenistic history, and they did not quite gel. First, there is the version I allude to at the start of the Introduction, one that plays vividly in the imagination of those looking for a good story. It is a slice of history ripe for exoticizing into the kind of tale that pretends to inspire more genuine forms of world-molding from Beleriand to Valyria. This version is outdated, and rarely appears in the writings of scholars today, unless they want to write for the general public (at least in English). Then, to the fore come glorious battles, palace intrigues, delicious decadence. We do not trust the crowd with much else, little realizing that they will soon start hoping for dragons.

The second version of Hellenistic history is based on new evidence or new ways of thinking about old evidence, and is more attentive to non-fabulous elements. Where it does not completely excise the first version, it seeks to augment it with the past of all those millions of people who were not royalty or elephants. As I researched this book, first as an advanced graduate student and then as a doctor now wise to the generosity of my dissertation committee, I wondered why we kept most of what we were actually doing from everyone else. Looking at Hellenism's more famous cousins, it was clear that non-specialists were interested the latest research on Spartan society, Athenian democracy, or Roman power-sharing and immigration policy, alongside more entertaining topics like the Persian and Peloponnesian

Wars and Roman conquests and gladiators. What seemed, and seems, to be missing from Hellenistic studies is the desire or the capacity to package more practical aspects of this period for public consumption. Given the dynamism of the field, this is a shameful deprivation.

The current study is not primarily intended to address this deficiency. Many of the debates will seem foreign and pedantic to the non-scholar. The Greek will be tedious to skim in locating translations, and s/he may find it advisable to omit the detailed consideration of evidence that dominates [chapters 2 and 3](#) in favor of their introductions and conclusions. Yet in the pages that follow, the attentive reader can find the story of communities committed to inclusive government but constrained by threats of violence, vast financial inequalities, and in some cases devastating climate change (e.g., Myous). This story is frustratingly full of holes, usually at the most exciting places, but it should also sound familiar. The challenges of maintaining traditions of shared government in the face of the need for decisiveness and strength are not peculiar to post-1800 nation-states, Classical Athens, or Republican Rome. It is time for this impression, which almost no scholar accepts despite its permanence in the popular imagination, to be laid to rest. Hellenistic democracies like the ones treated in this study offer parallels to today that are instructive as much for their differences as for their similarities. It is often assumed, for instance, that direct democracy is incompatible with the massive citizen bodies of modern nation-states, but even in states of a few thousand people, the difficulties enumerated above were constant problems to be solved. In short, the struggles of Karian *poleis* are ready to become part of a larger narrative that should dominate public perception of the Hellenistic period as much as the vanity of kings and the distortions of misogynists.

For the patient reader, another lure wades below the surface of explicit content. I hope that one impression given by this book is that it could not have been written without discoveries made within my lifetime. These discoveries hint at the vast amount of evidence still to be found, which will help to plug those frustrating holes and could radically change what we think we know about, well, everything Hellenistic. I look forward to the day when the sites of this study are surveyed and excavated in equal measure to Miletos, Aphrodisias, and Iasos, regardless of the impact on the conclusions of this book. That the work of Louis Robert is still fundamental to any discussion of Karia is a testament to both the greatness of his scholarship and the extent to which his legacy has not been lived up to. But rather than risk the undone, we should embrace the opportunities to rival the discoveries made often by chance with a systematic study of the whole region of Asia Minor. This is only possible if those outside the self-

drawn circle of specialization have a sense of the potential.

This book was written in four countries and a dissolving notebook, on four computers and countless scraps of paper, and above all upon generous ears. The owners of these latter lent not only their time, but invaluable thoughts, advice, knowledge, and patience. I am eternally grateful in this regard to Jeremy McNerney, Ralph Rosen, Gary Reger, Alain Bresson, Christof Schuler, Roberta Fabiani, and Massimo Nafissi. Ed Anson and several anonymous reviewers deserve special commendation for correcting many infelicities and helping to sharpen the argument throughout. I also wish to thank the wonderful Emily Modrall, Sarah Scullin, Jason Nethercut, and Seth Bernard for their input as colleagues and encouragement as friends. Matt McGuinness is to be commended as well for his time and effort in creating the maps for the book. Of course, this project would have remained inaccessible and incomplete without the benevolent support of the University of Pennsylvania, the Fulbright Foundations of Greece and Turkey, the Kommission für Alte Geschichte und Epigraphik, the American School of Classical Studies in Athens, the American Research Institute in Turkey, the Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism, the Louvre Museum, and Northern Arizona University. Therefore, since the above-named institutions are good and noble and continuously demonstrate their goodwill and friendship toward me, it seems good to me that they and their descendants be my guest-friends and benefactors, and that they be given gratitude and the rights of acknowledgment in which all supportive institutions have a share, so that I may have a reputation for gratitude and for honoring good people.

Finally, my partner Cristi tried her best to reduce to a tolerable amount my “howevers” and “thuses.” All errors and resulting displeasure are my responsibility alone.

Abbreviations¹

- ~~Arn~~Arnolds, Joyce and Kenan Erim. (1982). *Aphrodisias and Rome: documents from the excavation of the theatre at Aphrodisias conducted by Professor Kenan T. Erim, together with some related texts* (Journal of Roman studies monographs; no. 1). London: Society for the Promotion of Roman Studies, 1982.
- ~~Felix~~Felix, Felix. *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*. Berlin and Leiden: Brill, 1923–1962.
- ~~Rehder~~Rehder, Louis and W. Froehner. *Collection Froehner I. Inscriptions grecques*, Paris: E. de Boccard, 1936.
- ~~Varinlioğlu~~Varinlioğlu, Pierre and Ender. *Les hautes terres de Carie*. Bordeaux: Ausonius, 2001.
- ~~Didyma II~~Didyma II: *Die Inschriften*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1958.
- ~~Ephesos~~Ephesos, H. *Die Inschriften von Ephesos*. 10 vols. Bonn: Habelt, 1979–1984.
- ~~Insularum Maris Aegaei Praeter Delum~~Insularum Maris Aegaei Praeter Delum, K. *Inscriptiones Graecae: Insularum Maris Aegaei Praeter Delum*, vol. XII. Berlin: Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2000.
- ~~Keramos~~Keramos, Ender. *Die Inschriften von Keramos*. Bonn: Habelt, 1986.
- ~~Magnesia am Mäander~~Magnesia am Mäander, *Die Inschriften von Magnesia am Mäander*. Berlin, 1900.
- ~~Magnesia am Sipylos~~Magnesia am Sipylos, *Die Inschriften von Magnesia am Sipylos*. Bonn: Habelt, 1978.
- ~~Mylasa~~Mylasa, W. *Die Inschriften von Mylasa*. 2 vols. Bonn: Habelt, 1987–1988.
- ~~Stratonikeia~~Stratonikeia, *Die Inschriften von Stratonikeia*. 3 vols. Bonn: Habelt, 1981/1982/1990.
- ~~Labraunda~~Labraunda, Jonas. *Labraunda, Swedish excavations and researches*. vols. 3.1 and 3.2. Lund: Gleerup, 1969/1972.
- ~~Milet~~Milet, *Das Delphinion in Milet (Milet. Ergebnisse der Ausgrabungen und Untersuchungen seit dem Jahre 1899)*. edited by T. Wiegand, vol. I, fasc. 3). Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1914.
- ~~Orientis Graeci inscriptiones selectae. Supplementum sylloges inscriptionum Graecarum~~Orientis Graeci inscriptiones selectae. Supplementum sylloges inscriptionum Graecarum. 2 vols. Leipzig: Hirzel, 1903–1905.
- ~~Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft~~Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft. 10 vols. Stuttgart: Metzler, 1914–1972.

~~SEG~~ *Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum*. 60 vols. Leiden: Brill.
~~Syll~~ *Sylloge inscriptionum Graecarum*. 4 vols. 3rd edition.
Dittenberger, W. Leipzig: Hirzel, 1915–1924.

NOTE

1. Numbers that follow abbreviated references refer to inscription numbers rather than page numbers. To indicate pages I place “pp.” (or “p.”) before the numbers.

Introduction

The Implications of Sympoliteia for Identities in the Hellenistic Polis

The vitality of ancient history as a discipline depends on the discovery of new evidence and the reconsideration of old evidence through new lenses, two activities that are often complementary. This is no less true of the study of the Hellenistic world, where the old tales of glorious kingdoms battling over Alexander's legacy until too exhausted to withstand the rise of Rome, all while Greeks, deprived of their beloved freedom, turned to individualistic pursuits in the arts, sciences, literature, and philosophy, have continuously undergone modification. An influx of epigraphical and archaeological finds has made increasingly clear that many aspects of the Classical world continued to thrive long after Alexander's bones were hauled off to Egypt. The persistence of the city-state (*polis*) as an agent in history has become a major thrust of this revisionism, but with an emphasis on how continuity in institutions and ideals often produced change in terms of response to altered contexts. The *polis* evolved to survive.

The following study is of a phenomenon that embodies this type of reevaluation. The intrepid travails and epigraphical discoveries of Louis Robert in the mid-twentieth century brought to light the prevalence of *sympoliteia* in Karia and a summons by Robert himself, after providing preliminary and foundational observations, for a more in-depth study of this practice.¹ However, then, as now, federal *sympoliteiai*—the well-known leagues that asserted themselves in the Hellenistic period, were the focus of scholarly interest in political mergers. This imbalance meant neglect of “other” *sympoliteiai*, that is, agreements between two or more cities to combine into one state that did not thereby constitute a federation, and which preserved the identity of the larger partner in the arrangement, who, as Robert noted, essentially absorbed the smaller partner(s). Such neglect continued into the new millennium, with one exception, until the last decade. Thanks in large part to some new discoveries as well as the happy trend of placing increasing emphasis on the importance of the

polis in the post-Classical Mediterranean, bilateral *sympoliteiai* have become, as it were, *en vogue*.²

This recent work has not yet answered the challenge implied by Gary Reger's admission that his article was but a modest contribution to a topic that still merited (and merits) a comprehensive study (see previous note). The current investigation is a first attempt at such comprehensiveness. Since the relatively numerous examples of *sympoliteia* in Karia, at least 14, permit a careful consideration of these contexts, both at the individual and regional level, it seems reasonable to bound my study within these geographical limits. To be more precise, I take Karia to refer to the geographical region south of Ionia and Lydia, west of Phrygia and Pisidia, and northwest of Lykia, as well as to the supposed civilization that inhabited and, perhaps, defined this region. In what follows I give primacy to the geographical sense of the term.

The significance of Karian *sympoliteiai* above all depends on an explanation of why these agreements occurred, what motivated the participant communities to merge, and what effects this had on the political and social world both within Karia and in the broader world with which Karian communities interacted. Previous scholarship on the subject, in the context of either a specific agreement or as part of a geographically broader consideration of *sympoliteia*, has focused on a specific set of historical circumstances to explain why communities chose to merge. Favoring the perspective of the participant communities as a whole or, quite often, the more distant Hellenistic power that nominally held sway in the region, these explanations often center on a desire for protection or growth through conquest and/or centralization.³ This approach has certainly brought to light a politically active world of which we were hitherto ignorant, and as such emphasizes the need to consider the world of the Hellenistic *polis* as one that often operated independent of any influence from the political powers that usually attract the historian's eye. Yet by speaking only in terms of communal motives, previous treatments also raise a number of questions without providing answers. Why did a community wish to expand territorially? Why did this expansion take the form of a *sympoliteia* rather than, say, a military conquest or alliance? Who within the community was interested in which benefits of a *sympoliteia*?

It is my aim to provide answers to these questions by looking at *sympoliteia* from a perspective that represents interest groups *within* the community. The most visible such group, and the focus of this study, is the wealthy elite of a city. A consideration of the broader social context that informed the range of possible and desirable behaviors for wealthy citizens, especially with respect to inter-*polis*

interaction, reveals a more nuanced set of motivations at play in a *sympoliteia* agreement, motivations that implicate groups within a *polis*, rather than the entire community as a monolithic agent. Such group-specific concerns, if they can be detected in the evidence, would amplify the more entrenched explanations of *sympoliteia* that scholars have tended to present. The political aims of a community were not the only factors behind its actions. While these certainly played an important role, we must also consider the motivation and influence of groups, especially the elite, within the community. Such a holistic picture improves our understanding of the interplay between the political history of the Hellenistic *polis* and the very public behavior of its most prominent individuals that dominates the epigraphical record of the period.

PROBLEMS OF IDENTITY

A common denominator to emerge from this study of *sympoliteiai* is the problem of identity: the identity of a *polis* in relation to its neighbors; the identity of an absorbed community within the larger state; and the identity of the leading men of a community in relation to that community as well as to the larger community of Greek cities in exchange with each other. I will only touch secondarily on the issue of *polis* identity, at least insofar as this identity was expressed by a community's exchanges with foreign states and powers. Such exchanges form a crucial backdrop to the investigation of particular motives in the formation of a *sympoliteia*. As such, I will consistently refer to this context, after arguing for its validity and relevance in the first chapter.

In terms of the power dynamic between the partners of a *sympoliteia*, it is generally agreed upon that the larger community asserted itself as predominant, politically absorbing its counterpart. Assuming that prior to the merger both states were politically equivalent units, a *sympoliteia* involved the downgrading of the smaller community to sub-*polis* status. This inference seems to be confirmed by perhaps the earliest instance of *sympoliteia* in antiquity, the absorption of Helisson by Mantinea. Here, the fourth-century agreement stipulates that the "*polis*" of Helisson is to become a "*komê*" of the *polis* of Mantinea.⁴ Yet there are strong reasons for seeing this example as, if not atypical, at least an inadequate basis for generalization. Besides the 150 years and several hundred miles of mountains and sea that separate fourth-century Arkadia from Hellenistic Karia, we can observe the city of Olymos, the smaller partner in a *sympoliteia* with Mylasa, still granting *politeia* to

individuals after its absorption. Whether Olymos also underwent a reduction of status or not, this is not indicated by any explicit change in identity-marker, and the Karian community clearly retained more privileges than Helisson, which even forfeited the right to its own laws.⁵ If anything, the example from Arkadia alerts us to one possibility among many, but does not provide definitive insight into the status of the smaller community in a *sympoliteia*.

To discover the specific status of the smaller community post-*sympoliteia*, we need to understand the socio-political landscape of Karia. As a region with a long history of confluence among indigenous, Greek, and Persian populations and influence, Karia hosted a diverse settlement pattern. Beside the Hellenic *poleis* dotting the coastline, much of the hinterland consisted of villages, which belonged to private individuals or sanctuaries, lay within the *chôra basilikê* (inherited from the Persians by the Seleukids), or even existed as “independent” farmer communities.⁶ Indeed, one of the major (perceived) distinctions in antiquity between Greeks and Karians was the village lifestyle of the latter.⁷ Of course, things were not that simple, at least not by the fourth century. On the one hand, a number of inland communities began calling themselves *poleis* as early as the Hekatomnid period, and not just major settlements like Mylasa.⁸ On the other hand, we also find communities called *koina*, particularly in the third and second centuries, which seem to have been a collection of villages politically focused (often, though not exclusively) around an important sanctuary.⁹ Both these trends require comment and are, in fact, interrelated. Our best indicator that this terminology could be rather ambiguous is the language in which the communities of Koara(n)za, Pladasa, Hydai, and Hyllarima described themselves. Each of these polities called itself now “*polis*,” now “*koinon*.”¹⁰ How do we explain this?

The distinction between *polis* and *koinon* may in fact depend more on discursive context than settlement reality. At least on one level, the *koina* functioned as a means to organize settlements into political units capable of interacting with and defending against their neighbors, both other *koina* and Greek *poleis*. One might assume that the difference between a *koinon* and a *polis* was the lack of an urban center. How important was this distinction? From one Greek point of view, as expressed by Konon (see n. 7), Karians were different (from Greeks) because they lived in villages instead of cities. On the other hand, that Karians did not see much difference between the rural lifestyle of many Greeks—working property in the *chôra*—and their own, or the impact of this lifestyle on their political identity, is suggested by their claim to inhabit *poleis* in the mid-fourth century. True, many Karian communities lacked a substantial urban setting,

but the most visible aspect of a *polis* was not its cluster of houses and public buildings. A *polis* advertised itself most prominently through its decrees and other forms of communication, all expressed in a form particular to and shared by all communities that were considered *poleis*. If this is true, namely that the most significant element in the definition of a *polis* was the language of its self-representation, then claiming *polis* status for oneself simply meant adapting one's institutions to suit this language. This is precisely what the abundant epigraphical record from Karia presents: a multitude of communities speaking the language of a Greek *polis*. Some of these identify themselves as *koina*, others as *poleis*. Rather than attempt to find some difference in level of urbanization to distinguish Karian *poleis* from *koina*¹¹—are we really to believe that every community listed in the mid-fourth century treaties under Maussollos had become urbanized because they are called *poleis*?¹²—it might make more sense to see *poleis* as communities with a reason to choose this identity, and vice versa for *koina*. Thus Pidasa considered itself a *polis* perhaps because of the advantages—autonomy, prosperity, opportunities for prestige—that eventually led to the Pidaseans wanting not only to be like Milesians, but to be Milesians.

The terminological overlap of *polis* and *koinon* seems the best solution to the problem of communities that alternate between the two identities. Rather than postulate the coexistence of *poleis* and *koina* of the same name, we should examine the context of each identification in order to explain the difference. For example, inland Hyllarima calls itself a *polis* when Pleistarchos, brother of Kassandros, ruled Karia (ca. 301–295 BC; see [chapter 1](#)) and a *koinon* in the second century.¹³ In the early third century, competition among the successors of Alexander led a number of these rulers to promote freedom for Greek cities; hence, Hyllarima may have been attempting to lay claim to a status that meant more privileges (in particular, autonomy).¹⁴ On the other hand, most of inland Karia was subject to Rhodes for over twenty years in the early second century. Schuler has recently shown that, despite the unpopularity of its rule, Rhodes had a substantial impact on the political terminology of both Lykia and Karia. Thus, one witnesses a spread of the term *peripolion* from the Karian Chersonesos, controlled by Rhodes since the fourth century, to several towns in Lykia and the area around Stratonikeia in Karia.¹⁵ At the same time, the use of the term *koinon* in both the Chersonesos and the rest of Karia strongly suggests a link between Rhodes and the continent for this term as well.¹⁶ That these terms outlasted Rhodian domination could be due to their utility, not to mention the drastically different political situation following the Roman declaration of freedom for Karia and Lykia in 167 BC (see below). If our evidence

comes from the early part of the second century, then the term *koinon* could signify Hyllarima's subject status (and so, its failure to convince the powers that be of its right to Greek freedom), whereas a later date for the inscription could simply indicate the uselessness at this point of being considered a *polis* and not a *koinon*.¹⁷

As we have seen, however, villages need not be grouped in a *koinon* to mirror Greek political forms. Both "independent" villages and those attached to sanctuaries could be easily accommodated as subunits of an aggrandizing *polis*.¹⁸ In all cases, the importance of Karian village organization lies behind this translatability into a Greek political context, for it facilitated the expansion of boundaries—and the creation of new political spaces—without requiring invention, adaptation, or even the feeling of subordination—at least not necessarily. What this suggests for the status of the smaller partner in a *sympoliteia* is the irrelevance of the physical nature of a settlement, which determined and determines the typology of settlement in Karia for ancient and modern commentators (as opposed to the settlements themselves). In the context of the agreement, the smaller community easily assimilated institutionally within the larger city-state, but as an entity that was once on equal terms with the larger partner. This former peer relationship, implied in the word *συμπολιτεῖα* itself, is a crucial point in understanding the special status of absorbed communities like Olymos or Kalymna, who retained rights and privileges not shared by other subunits of Mylasa and Kos. In this context, a "reality" of village lifestyle is irrelevant.

Problems of identity are also at play when attempting to define interest groups within the *polis*. To define "elites" in a democratic political context (i.e., the context of the Karian cities in this study), it is perhaps easiest to first ascertain what this group was not. Elites were not a class defined legally or by inherited privileges, nor were they even a group that distinguished themselves with the name "elite" or any other single proper noun around which a distinct elite identity could form.¹⁹ Such being the case, we might question the existence of an elite in Hellenistic Karia as a conscious identity for those to whom we ascribe it.

To give in to such doubt would be to overlook much of the discourse from which elite identity could have been (and in fact was) constructed. In a city about which we are well informed (sc. Athens), notions of what constitutes a "leading group" of a community—education, skill, wealth—are expressed in Aristophanes' satirizing of specific individuals *qua* leaders of the *dēmos*, in Thucydides' characterization of demagogues in contrast to his Periklean ideal, or in the polemic of the Attic orators against their rivals.²⁰ These notions are all formulated and understood in comparison with an unspoken,

but equally understood, level of education, skill, and wealth of the “average” citizen. But we need not appeal to Athens, often the exception in the world of the Greek *polis*, to demonstrate the existence of the idea of an elite in ancient discourse. The plethora of honorific inscriptions and their formulaic language of praise and validation—and we will return to this corpus frequently—announced for the entire citizen body (or bodies) the identity of an individual in terms that distinguished his character, behavior, and prestige from that of others in the community. Most commonly, the honoree was described as exhibiting the actions and qualities of the *euergetês*, the civic benefactor, who gave of her/his personal fortune to assist, augment, or save the community.²¹ In this light—what made this distinction more than just the identity of a specific individual—the formulaic nature of this praise, combined with the fact that the actions deserving of such recognition were *de facto* predicated on the possession of wealth, provided the grounds on which each honored individual could identify with any other. This language of differences and similarities, played out as it was both within a community and between communities, served as a focal point for elite identity.²² At the same time, because elites were neither a legal class nor self-consciously “elite,” their group was both unstable and open to new “members.”²³ Sense of belonging was primarily a product of performance (i.e., of benefactions) and the reciprocating gratitude of one’s community. Based on these considerations, we are justified in speaking of “elites” to refer to a group within the citizen body that identified together on the basis of euergetism and its corresponding rewards.

Foucault’s insight into the relationship between morality and identity can also help us understand how elites formed a cohesive group in a democratic context. In particular, he notes that a moral action not only strives toward its own accomplishment, but also seeks conformity to a wider moral code. Conformity to this code, in turn, translates into a “mode of being” that is characteristic of the ethical subject. That is, consistently moral behavior contributes to one’s identity as an adherent to the morality that underlies this behavior. How a moral code, and thus the ethical subject, is comprised is also significant. When the dynamic element of a morality is in the practice and exercise of self-advertisement (“forms of subjectification”), a system of specific behavioral codes may be rudimentary.²⁴ This is precisely the situation that, as we will see, describes elite behavior in relation to the world of the *polis*. Their activity, at least insofar as it survives for us, consisted of benefaction (*euergesia*) and other services that were consistently expressed in moral terms—both in terms of frequency and the language being used. This discourse of morality was not a rigidly defined code, and it was up to the community expressing

gratitude to label an action or service good. Yet this “code” still informed the way in which those who behaved accordingly saw themselves and were seen by others, namely as an ethical subject—in relation to the specific morality of benefaction and good citizenship. As fellow ethical subjects excelling in a particular civic virtue similarly, elites could identify together.

TWILIGHT OF THE *DÊMOS*?

There is one final aspect of communal identity that this study touches on, namely the constitutional identity of the *poleis* involved in a *sympoliteia*. If elite interests are detectable in agreements where the nature and identity of the community was fundamentally altered, then to what extent did this group exert undue influence on political decision-making? Does the formulaic language of the evidence, in which the *dêmos* and *boulê* authorize all decrees, mask a situation where real power lay with a small minority? After all, Strabo refers to most *poleis* as democracies and Rhodes as an oligarchy despite their formal similarity on stone.²⁵ One tendency in modern scholarship has been to doubt even literary testimony in questioning the validity of the term “democracy” as used by a city to describe its government.²⁶ As Mann has cynically noted, if we take the ancients at their word, then of course they lived in democracies.²⁷ The issue is not, then, about the written use of *dêмократία* in a Hellenistic context, but about the different realities that such a term encompassed and their relationship to this context. Some work, though none of it especially recent, on the concept of *dêмократία* has identified three different stages in the term’s ancient history of usage. In the fifth century, the word referred more to the power of the *dêmos* within the *polis* than to a type of constitution, though it quickly developed a constitutional meaning.²⁸ This institutionally based definition, coupled with the spread of similar institutions throughout the Greek world in the fourth century, led to the term being used to describe almost any *polis* constitution (*politeia*) by the Hellenistic Age. Thus, as a type of *politeia* distinguished by its contrast with other types, namely oligarchy and tyranny, *dêмократία* lost its utility as a marker of constitutional variety once those contrasting types became rare or nonexistent.²⁹

In Asia Minor specifically, the consensus is that when *dêмократία* was used, it only referred to the external independence of a *polis*, rather than its internal constitution. The term was thus conceptually synonymous with *eleutheria* or *autonomia*, with which it was often coupled.³⁰ It is worth testing whether this consensus interpretation applies to the usage of *dêмократία* in Karian contexts. A Milesian

inscription identifies Hippomachos son of Athenaios as having brought back “freedom and democracy” to the city, and Iasos honors Antiochos III for preserving their “[democr]a[c]y and autonomy.”³¹ The Seleukid official Olympichos boasts of reestablishing Mylasa as “free and democratic,” while in the *isopoliteia* treaty between Miletos and Herakleia Latmia, the cities submit their territorial disputes to a “free and democratic” *polis* for adjudication, presumably establishing a standard that they felt they both met.³² Finally, an envoy of Antiocheia (Alabanda) praises and thanks Antiochos III “because he preserves the democracy and peace for the Antiocheians.”³³

All things considered, the evidence does not provide much confidence that Karian communities fit into the broader, and questionable, picture painted for Asia Minor by modern scholarship. For one, the pairing of *dēmokratia* with *eleutheria* or *autonomia* suggests the synonymity of the latter two terms only. Second, the example involving Antiocheia/Alabanda couples *dēmokratia* with peace rather than a “freedom word,” precisely because this city was an unfree subject to the Seleukids. Nonetheless, its internal government could still be described as a democracy, presumably because this term was not incompatible with lack of independence. By contrast, the distinction between external liberty and internal democratic institutions seems artificially drawn in the other cases. The “power of the *dēmos*” entailed both full citizen sovereignty and the scope of that sovereignty vis-à-vis the interference of foreign powers. In such contexts, *dēmokratia* was roughly synonymous with freedom and autonomy, but also more specific, in that it could express not only the liberty of the *polis*, but also the group (the *dēmos*) who exercised and enjoyed that liberty. In this regard, the ancient understanding conforms as closely as can be expected to Estlund’s definition of democracy as “the actual collective authorization of laws and policies by the people subject to them.”³⁴

The history of scholarly skepticism surrounding Hellenistic claims of democracy forms an influential background for interpreting the activity of elites in the Hellenistic period as a sign of democratic decay. For example, Quass argues in his study of honorific inscriptions in the Hellenistic period that this evidence displays a monopolization of the executive power by the elite.³⁵ Gauthier also equates euergetism with a system of government after the middle decades of the second century. This methodological similarity, as well as the fact that the evidence of the current study is different from that considered by both scholars, forces us to evaluate these claims anew.³⁶ Moreover, this debate continues to influence recent work on the subject. For example, Dreyer and Weber have inferred the erosion of the *Vorstellungen* of democracy from the observation that the expectations

for elites (in fact, one man) changed from being *polis*-centered to emphasizing the virtues of the benefactor in (one) city-state.³⁷ At a fundamental level, the inference from honorifics to the predominant position of those honored within the state is insecure for several reasons. First, socioeconomic inequality is not necessarily reducible to political inequality.³⁸ Second, the focus on the more visible activity of certain individuals in a *polis* ignores the dependent relationship of these men on the citizen body as a whole. Institutional controls held officials accountable in many, possibly most, cities, and rotation of office based on selection by lot ensured that the majority of magistracies were not only open to every citizen, but were filled by a representative cross section of the political community.³⁹ To be sure, no one but the rich could finance many of the offices, priesthoods, and embassies that the city relied on, but this was also the case in fourth-century Athens, if with regard to a different set of functions, where the flourishing of a democratic ideology has been ably demonstrated.⁴⁰ More importantly, the manner in which embassies and other offices were executed was determined not by the acting official but by the appointing body, namely the *dêmos*. This observation, which does not seem to factor in treatments even by scholars arguing for democracy after Alexander, is essential for understanding the continuity between the late Classical and Hellenistic worlds with respect to limitations on the power of the individual.⁴¹ It is not that wealthy citizens were unable to bypass these restrictions; euergetic activity by itself, or the ambition toward it, is simply insufficient to show this.⁴² Finally, it is imprudent to ignore the influence that popular expectations and a competitive ethos, strengthened by appeals to exemplarity, had on elite participation in a democratic government. As Ober has shown for fourth-century Athens, these factors, as much as any specific situation wherein an impoverished and helpless *dêmos* appeals to a wealthy citizen for salvation—a situation usually inferred by Quass from the formulaic language of honorifics—led to elite benefaction.⁴³ Moreover, to speak of the rich as distinct from the *ekklêsia* is to forget the basic truth that these men were also part of this decision-making body. It is hard to imagine that they would have had a small role during such meetings—quite the contrary, at least in Ober's Athens; at the same time, this involvement need not have been an entirely controlling one, even if elites dominated the *bema*. A democratic ideology was able to flourish precisely through the leadership of Athens' most wealthy citizens.⁴⁴

To return to the Hellenistic concept of "democracy," it is pertinent to the current discussion to ask, with Mann, what we mean by "democracy" if not what Hellenistic *politai* understood the term to

mean. The answer often seems to be the constitution of classical Athens, and despite the problems such comparison can create, this seems to be closest we can come to establishing and using a democratic standard grounded in ancient usage.⁴⁵ Yet caution here is needed, most importantly to avoid assuming a continuity or consistency of usage throughout the Greek world even within a given chronological period, which would only make sense within a self-conscious literary tradition. To make these assumptions would be to ignore the vastly different interests and perspectives of political philosophers, orators, historians, and magistrates.⁴⁶ The comparison between the Hellenistic *polis* and Classical Athens is more fruitful and less problematic where the evidence (especially epigraphical) coincides in attesting to similar institutions, practices, and ideologies, most importantly the establishment of a sovereign *dêmos*.⁴⁷

The alternative to understanding democracy as a concept based in ancient evidence is to use a definition of democracy formulated from a modern context, a distasteful option that smacks of gross anachronism. Yet I think we underestimate, and at times consciously downplay, the interaction between modern and ancient in the study of “democracy.” Apparent but unacknowledged is the difficulty in which any modern Western observer finds him- or herself when trying detachedly to weave an appraisal of ancient democracy into the fabric of how this phenomenon appears to us. It seems disingenuous to pretend that our own background and inclinations as supporters of democratic principles do not influence such an evaluation—in fact, this is the very reason we find the matter interesting! On the other hand, unrestrained estimation by the standards of some modern reality or ideal—even if, or especially because, this ideal is based on a particular instance from antiquity—echoes the pitfalls of nineteenth-century classicism from whose shadow we have still not fully emerged. To be clear, the problem is not that we apply a modern *definition* of democracy to the ancient past, but that we inject our own preoccupations about modern democracy into the questions we formulate of the ancient evidence and into the means we take to answer these questions.

Why is a distinction within “democracy” so important? Since the term seems above all to describe similar institutions, we cannot say that it encompasses a fifth-century notion of “oligarchy.” More nuanced thinking about the internal dynamics of politics is needed. Perhaps our own experiences within semantically meaningless modern democracies lead us to want to find where “authentic” democracy lived and died. If this is true, then how we think about ancient democracies depends on an oversimplified understanding of power as something that some people have and others do not. In any political

system, but especially in democracies, power comes from the relationships among members/citizens and the behaviors influenced by those decisions. The structure of these relationships is defined institutionally, but even where the institutional principle is representation of the many by the few (as in modern nation-states), power is exerted equally on both groups. This is all the more true when representation is of a less formal nature: when we imagine an institutionally sovereign *dêmos* being led by elites and construe this leadership as “control,” we ignore the prerequisites to such a position within the community. These include not only wealth and education, but most importantly a course of political action (*politeuein*) that speaks to the self-perceived interests of the larger community. Without this latter requirement, influence “over” the *dêmos* is unthinkable.⁴⁸ In other words, to influence the majority, one must be influenced by it.

A case in point: much of the dissatisfaction with Carlsson’s recent study of four Hellenistic democracies targets the approach of its author in privileging institutions at the expense of lived experience.⁴⁹ After establishing specific criteria for defining the concept “democracy,” she provides an empirical description of the institutions within a given city-state and its capabilities. She then evaluates the *polis* in question in terms of her criteria.⁵⁰ Ultimately, the disgruntled reader murmurs, we find ourselves back where we started: formally and “constitutionally,” we can say that most Hellenistic *poleis* were democracies, because this is how they represent themselves in official documents. At the same time, if real power was wielded by a small number of families and passed down within this circle, it seems counterintuitive to label these governments “democracies.”⁵¹ Nevertheless, I would maintain that such “intuition” is wrong-headed in that *de facto*, noninstitutionalized power cannot be evaluated trans-subjectively, that is, with consensus among a variety of (modern) perspectives. This is because the relations of power between individuals in any state, regardless of the type of government, are not unidirectional transmissions between rulers and ruled, but “manifold relationships of force . . . that run through the social body as a whole.”⁵² Since each member, family, and group within a community exerts force on each other—generates power—to identify “rulers” and “ruled” apart from these relationships, which in the case of the Hellenistic *polis* can only be detected at the institutional level, is an inherently personal statement.⁵³

The real trouble with Carlsson’s admirably detailed examination of Kos, Kalymna, Iasos, and Miletos is that she frames her discussion around the aim to provide an impartial judgment of the democratic nature of the cities in question.⁵⁴ As a result, she proposes to evaluate the institutions and *praxis* of each *polis* against an “objective”

definition culled from the political scientist Robert Dahl, as if the five criteria developed by Dahl were themselves based on her evidence or value-free, either in conception or in application to a given reality.⁵⁵ Thus she too operates according to the fiction of a reality of democracy that transcends time and space.

To conclude this section, understanding the implications of *sympoliteia* for the constitutional “identity” of those city-states involved in such agreements means first of all dispensing with the term “identity.” As far as we can tell, regardless of who exerted power in these communities, they all saw themselves as democracies. Instead, consideration of this question (in [chapter 3](#)) will be governed by an approach that is more concerned with describing the internal dynamics of each context, which were structurally defined by the institutions of each community to emphasize both collective and individual action. The question thus becomes: what limits on individual or group action on behalf of the community existed and to what extent were these limits ever transcended?

DEFINING AND EXCAVATING *SYMPOLITEIA* IN KARIA

Before proceeding too far with our discussion of the causes and implications of *sympoliteia*, we should first arrive at a precise understanding of the term. The problem can be approached from two angles. A philological study reveals that the term was used in the fourth century primarily to express a political relationship among fellow citizens.⁵⁶ In the following two centuries, the word referred more commonly to interstate agreements, either bilateral or in the context of a multistate league.⁵⁷ But this only raises a further question concerning the nature of these bilateral agreements, and for this we need to go beyond philology. An empirical approach arrives at an answer from the epigraphical instances of *sympoliteia* of which we are aware. We have already mentioned some of the aspects of this definition, but it will be useful to present them *in toto*. A *sympoliteia* is an agreement between two autonomous states, whereby one state (usually the smaller in size and, one presumes, population) agrees to forfeit its sovereignty for the rights of citizenship that pertain to the other state. This forfeiture does not involve (necessarily) the sacrifice of local autonomy—the ability to conduct and regulate the affairs of the smaller community—but encompasses civic identity in relation to third-party states. The example of Miletos and Pidasa provides evidence for most of this definition. We have also mentioned Olymos as proof that a smaller community continued to enjoy local autonomy after a *sympoliteia*. While we cannot be sure that this instance was

typical, the absence of any explicit evidence to the contrary gives us no reason to assume the opposite for any other case.

Sympoliteia is indeed little different from *synoikismos/synoikia*, at least as the term is generally used by modern-day ancient historians.⁵⁸ In ancient usage, however, *synoikia* in the fourth century described a situation very similar to that of third- and second-century *sympoliteiai*. For example, the *synoikia* between Orchomenos and Euaimnos in the fourth century allows the Euaimnians to preserve their own community (specifically τὰ ἱερὰ τὰ ἐν Εὐαίμονι), but also speaks of the allotment of land by decision of the combined new city.⁵⁹ A clearer distinction seems to have developed in the Hellenistic period, with the *synoikismoi* ordered by Alexander's successors. In Asia Minor, Antigonos I's forced merger of Teos and Lebedos directed the Lebadeians to move to Teos, and Lysimachos created a new site for Ephesos that involved an obligatory transfer of at least some of the population of the older settlements.⁶⁰ In fact, it has been shown that in the Hellenistic period, *synoikismos* came to refer to the physical resettlement or augmentation of a city's population.⁶¹ Thus, at least by the third century, this word represented a different reality than the term *sympoliteia*.⁶²

It remains to discuss the origin of *sympoliteia* in Karia. Was this institution borrowed and adapted from other areas of the Greek world, or did it develop out of circumstances peculiar to the region? If our consideration is limited to the history of *sympoliteiai*, both bilateral and federal, then there is a clear precedent on the mainland. The well-known examples of Classical and Hellenistic leagues need no introduction, while the fourth-century absorption of Helisson by Mantinea provides an epigraphic antecedent to arrangements like that between Latmos and Pidasas, later in the same century, and Miletos and Pidasas in the second century.⁶³ The text emphasizes the egalitarian inclusion of each Helissonian in the new polity and preserves the physical and sacred space of the smaller *polis*, while at the same time subordinating Helisson to a status within the Mantineian state. All three of these aspects reappear in the Hellenistic instances just mentioned.

Yet these early examples of political mergers are insufficient for explaining the prominence of *sympoliteiai* in Karia. For one thing, contacts between Karia and mainland Greece—especially Arkadia—are not attested as being especially close-knit. It is true that at least one federation, the Nesiotic League, lay much closer to Karia. But even if extensive communication could be proven or plausibly assumed, it remains unclear how the model of a federal structure would have inspired bilateral and unequal combinations. If we look to Asia Minor in the early Hellenistic period, *synoikismoi* like the

(re)founding of Alexandria Troas and Ephesos/Arsinoe from multiple autonomous communities, as well as the third-century mergers of Kyrbissos into Teos and Magnesia on the Sipylus into Smyrna, seem more appropriate forerunners to mergers in Karia.⁶⁴ These too prove unsatisfactory. An earlier example only has explanatory power if it either links the phenomenon it is supposed to explain to an even earlier “original cause” or is that “original cause” itself. Although the fourth-century *synoikismoi* provide this *proton aition* in the form of the will of Antigonos Monophthalmos and Lysimachos respectively, this image of *sympoliteiai* as the product of royal policy does not fit the arrangements in Karia, which were instigated by the *poleis* involved (see above and [chapter 2](#)). The Teian and Smyranean mergers, on the other hand, constitute neither an “original cause” nor point to any antecedent of such status. The accord between Teos and Kyrbissos is, in fact, not a *sympoliteia* at all, but an agreement between the central state and a community already *within* its territory.⁶⁵ As for the absorption of Magnesia on the Sipylus by Smyrna, the date (mid-third century) raises the same questions as the roughly contemporary Karian *sympoliteiai* without providing an answer. It is too isolated and unique a case to serve as a precedent for our subject. Magnesia’s status as a military colony, and the direct involvement of a Seleukid monarch, cautions us from drawing connections to cases involving different types of settlements.

In attempting to find an explanation for why *sympoliteiai* were so prevalent in Karia, it might make more sense to look to the Aegean Sea. There we find numerous instances of islands that were at the same time one state and many (at least two) *poleis*. Reger has made a compelling case for seeing the coexistence of multiple communities in a single island state in precisely the same relationship that will emerge in this study of the *sympoliteiai* in Karia.⁶⁶ To name the most prominent instances, Mykonos, Amorgos, Kos, Keos, and Rhodes witnessed a situation in which several *poleis* presented a solitary face to the outside world, a face that usually represented the dominant city of the state. The Athenian Tribute Lists, most literary sources, dedications at regionally influential sanctuaries (especially Delos), and even the coins minted by each island speak of Mykonians, Amorgians, Koans, Keans, and Rhodians (after 408).⁶⁷ At the same time, we have convincing evidence that these islands were once home to multiple independent polities: a Mykonian decree speaks of the time when “the cities entered into a *synoikismos*”; numerous inscriptions testify to the three *poleis* of Amorgos; two passages—one from Thucydides, the other from Pausanias—suggest a second settlement on the island of Kos; the Keian federation often broke up into its constituent *poleis*; finally, the three original cities on the island of Rhodes continued to

act as semi-autonomous communities.⁶⁸ All in all, during the Classical period and shading into the third and second centuries, we find a number of cases where one or more *poleis* (or small settlements of some other type) were dependent on a larger *polis*—that is, the latter defined the external identity of all communities within the state, and its bodies of government were primary. In some cases, this status of dependence was renegotiated, as when the cities of Mykonos merged in the early second century despite the fact that they appeared as “Mykonians” to the outside world even before *synoikismos*. Presumably, one city was dependent on the other initially, and was even further demoted or eliminated by the *synoikismos*.⁶⁹ The difference between the internal political situation on Mykonos before and after the *synoikismos* is crucial to envisioning the influence of this and other islands on Karia. While the post-*synoikismos* setup provides an interesting parallel to the gradual loss of identity which many smaller communities eventually experienced in *sympoliteiai*, the intermediate stage of dependence that preceded this compares to the early years of a *sympoliteia*. Since for many island states this period of coexistence stretched back to the fifth century, we have a continuity of *sympoliteia*-like circumstances from the Classical to the Hellenistic periods in a region “bordering” on Karia, offering a model for unions between cities that likely inspired the flurry of such combinations in the decades surrounding 200 BC. The “general impulse toward consolidation” for islanders in the fifth and fourth centuries, and for Karians in the Hellenistic period, may have come about in response to similar pressures, despite differences in historical detail. In his study on multi-*polis* islands, Reger speaks of external pressures like the “Athenian threat” (not to mention the Persian shadow) influencing decisions to merge, but also stresses the role of “shared identity as islanders.”⁷⁰ The external pressure of an international power quite obviously parallels the dangers posed by the ambitions of Seleukids, Ptolemies, etc. The notion of the attractive force of a shared identity is also strikingly analogous to my hypothesis concerning the appeal of the network of peer polity interaction, essentially defined by its set of *shared cultural values*, which ultimately translated into a form of identity. Whether or not the communities in Karia were aware of this similarity between the circumstances of the islanders and their own is irrelevant. What is clear is that the island *poleis* and the communities of Karia had similar responses to similar pressures.

The nodal points for the influence of the Aegean islands on Karia geographically, though not chronologically, are clearly the islands of Rhodes and Kos, which developed into one-*polis* states by 408/7 BC and 366 BC, respectively, despite the presence of multiple settlements (see above).⁷¹ Indeed, Kos later incorporated its neighboring island of

Kalymna by means of a *homopoliteia*. Thus, a centripetal tendency that initially was restricted to the island of Kos itself eventually came to include autonomous communities across the water. This is not to suggest that Kos understood its late third-century expansion to be of the same nature as its consolidation during the Classical period—certain features of Kalymna’s political status within the Koan state suggest otherwise.⁷² Likewise, we have already seen that Rhodes in all probability influenced the political language (and thus, to some extent, structure) of the Karian hinterland. We can go further in seeing a relationship of *sympoliteia* between Rhodes and its incorporated Peraia, which included the Karian Chersonesos. Inhabitants of these communities possessed Rhodian citizenship but continued to live in and identify with their local settlements.⁷³ This precedent for fourth-century expansion, and its preserved memory through the continued political rights of inhabitants of the incorporated Peraia, provides the most tempting explanation for the number of *sympoliteiai* in Karia. Yet we need not imagine that any one island served as a blueprint for a *sympoliteia*. The widespread presence itself of multiple *poleis* inside one state on the Aegean islands presents itself as a precedent for political combination, offering *exempla* of the benefits, opportunities, and drawbacks of such an option.⁷⁴

This precedent, however influential, would hardly have played a role in the political history of Karia without a situation conducive to *sympoliteia*. The disunity of the region needs to be stressed above all as the crucial factor in producing the series of mergers that is the subject of this study. The words of Schuler are worth quoting in this respect:

Karia was in the Classical period marked by extreme political fragmentation. Numerous independent communities existed in a narrow space next to each other. In the late classical/early Hellenistic period the territories of the existing cities were extended and new cities were founded, which had as a consequence the subordination of many previously independent settlements. Their tradition of autonomy and the communal identity that rested on this did not break off abruptly as a result, but continued under altered appearances, in which inhabited places became subdivisions of their polis.⁷⁵

The juxtaposition of a number of small autonomous settlements certainly did not demand the aggrandizement of some at the expense of others, but it did make this a likely scenario that was rendered even more probable by the political simplification that was occurring in the fourth century in the nearby Aegean. These are the two factors—the precedent of Aegean island *synoikismos* and the political diversity of Karia—that best explain the prevalence of Karian *sympoliteia*.⁷⁶

As my title suggests, the main aim of this work is to fully explore the causal past and future of the Karian *sympoliteiai*. A thorough understanding of the historical and topographical context, combined

with a close reading of the relevant textual evidence for each *sympoliteia*, forms the only acceptable foundation for inquiries into any other implications that these agreements may have. The first two chapters are devoted to this task. [Chapter 1](#) conceptualizes the history of Karia during the Hellenistic period on two levels. First, the more traditional narrative of the activities of the various Macedonian monarchies—Ptolemaic, Seleukid, Antigonid (plus Rhodes)—is treated in succession to convey the political instability of Karia at the level of imperial politics. The region was never controlled for very long by any one power, and was usually divided among various kings and Rhodes, with pockets of independent cities sprouting up amidst these rivalries. Political disunity became the rule. This is only half of the picture, however. If we limit our gaze to the events influencing (or influenced by) the larger states surrounding the eastern Mediterranean, we risk ignoring the majority of Karian history, namely that of its individual communities. Accordingly, the second half of the first chapter sketches the histories of the communities involved in one or more *sympoliteia* arrangements, emphasizing the extent to which each community's foreign activity implicated it in an Aegean network of *polis* interaction. The result of both parts is the first history of the region in English; more importantly, the conclusions of this chapter will constantly inform the discussion of the subsequent chapters.

One consequence of rethinking the history of Karia is greater skepticism with respect to the involvement of a Hellenistic ruler in most (though not all) of the *sympoliteiai* in Karia. Inferring such involvement depends in part on a theory of historical causality that attributes agency primarily to the “big men” of history and presents local histories as mere orbits that revolve around the will and whims of these dynamic leaders. To be fair, the allure of this theory has much to do with the history of the study of the Hellenistic world, whose earliest practitioners had at their disposal evidence that in large part supported it. More recent finds call for the questioning of this theory. At the same time, the search for a Hellenistic king behind many *sympoliteiai* also has its roots in the connection many scholars make between these arrangements and the policy of several of the Diadochs to enforce a *synoikismos* upon certain *poleis*.⁷⁷ While these mergers appear similar, by the Hellenistic period *synoikia/synoikismos* and *sympoliteia* are terms with important distinctions of meaning as used in the sources.

[Chapter 2](#) will be the first step in relating the historical background of Karia to the fourteen extant *sympoliteiai*. Each agreement will be treated in turn according to roughly the same template. After discussing the geographical relationship between the two participants, I examine the primarily epigraphical evidence closely to shed light on

the factors that may have motivated each community to enter into the merger. Taking into account the explanations of prior studies, I will attempt to resolve debates where they have arisen and suggest new interpretations, especially with respect to the involvement of Hellenistic rulers and the motives of local elites. Throughout the chapter, full text and translations of the relevant texts are provided, along with commentary, in many cases based on personal autopsy and study of the stones.

As stated, a central component of this exploration of causes will be a consideration of the extent to which elite motivation was behind the decision to effect a *sympoliteia*. But with certain cases we need not restrict ourselves to the evidence on and surrounding these agreements. [Chapter 3](#) seeks to buttress the results of the preceding chapter through a prosopographical study of the communities involved in a *sympoliteia* agreement, where possible. Typically, this approach is limited by the uneven nature of the evidence. As a result, I focus on the prosopography of Pidasa, focusing on the individuals granted citizenship in Miletos prior to the *sympoliteia*, and on that of Mylasa and Olymos, whose individuals suggest the influence of more local interests in addition to the benefits of involvement in peer polity interaction. These examples attest the specific ways in which “small-town” elites were successful in the goal that motivated them to push for union with a larger city. They also provide insight into the motives of the larger city’s elite. Was Miletos, for instance, driven by the interests of its prominent men to accept the offer of Pidasa in the same way that Mylasean elites wished to involve themselves in the local cult life of Olymos? These test cases serve to better illuminate the more scanty evidence from the rest of Karia with regard to elite activity. Finally, the results of this prosopographical analysis are inserted into the debate over the evolution of polis government during the Hellenistic period. Rejecting the terms in which this debate has been conducted heretofore, I will generate conclusions from the results of this chapter that more accurately define the power dynamic of the *poleis* of Karia.

The frequent occurrence of *sympoliteia* in Karia is not the only justification for limiting my study geographically. I have tried to hint that both Karia and *sympoliteia* have something to offer the other. The relative prominence of Karian *sympoliteiai* can help us make more accurate generalizations about the phenomenon that may then be compared to *sympoliteiai* elsewhere.⁷⁸ Conversely, the factors leading up to a *sympoliteia*, and the effects of such an agreement, can tell us interesting things about Karia itself: the nature of its communities, what motivated these communities to act, who was most influential within each community, how these communities interacted with each

other and the larger Greek-speaking world of which they came to form a part, and how this interaction affected the perceived internal and external identity of indigenous communities. Consequently, the issues of political landscape, historical causality, balance of power (or even, type of government) within the *polis*, interstate relations, and political and social identity are all illuminated by a study of Karian *sympoliteiai*.

NOTES

1. Louis Robert, *Villes d'Asie Mineure: Études de géographie ancienne* (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1962), 54–66; *idem* and Jeanne Robert, “Une inscription grecque de Téos en Ionie,” *Journal des Savants* 1976.3–4: 153–235.

2. Gary Reger set the tone for much of this discussion, including the current work, with his thorough study, “*Sympoliteiai* in Hellenistic Asia Minor,” in *The Greco-Roman East: Politics, Culture, Society*, ed. S. Colvin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 145–180. Reger tackled an agenda which he saw as having been intimated by Robert: the relationship between *synoikismos* and *sympoliteia*, motivation for the merger, the predominance of one party, the resistance or continued assertion of identity of the smaller partner, and, finally, an explanation for the rise and popularity of *sympoliteia* in Asia Minor, especially Karia, in the Hellenistic period. This agenda has more or less informed the treatments of the subject that have emanated from the Commission for Ancient History and Epigraphy, a branch of the German Archaeological Institute: A.V. Walser, “Sympolitien und Siedlungsentwicklung,” in *Die hellenistische Polis als Lebensform*, ed. M. Zimmermann (Berlin: Verlag Antike, 2009), 135–155 and Christof Schuler 2010, “Sympolitien in Lykien und Karien,” in *Hellenistic Karia*, ed. R. van Bremen and J.-M. Carbon (Bordeaux: Ausonius, 2010), 393–413. Both studies use Reger’s conclusions as a starting point before going on to examine the effects of *sympoliteia* on settlement patterns and the constitutional structures of *sympoliteiai* in Lykia and Karia, respectively. For an important intermediate contribution between the work of Robert and Reger, see H. Schmitt, “Überlegungen zur Sympolitie,” in *Symposion 1993: Vorträge zur griechischen und hellenistischen Rechtsgeschichte*, ed. G. Thür (Köln: Böhlau, 1994), 35–44.

3. See note 1 for references.

4. G. te Riele, “Hélisson entre en sympolitie avec Mantinée,” *Bulletin de Correspondence Hellénique* 111 (1987): 167–190.

5. Olymos, unlike Helisson, may have never called itself a *polis*, unless we can restore Ὀλυμπεῖς in line 2 of *HTC* #91, a fourth-century list of members of Karian *poleis*. By the third century, Olymos is calling itself a *koinon* (*IMylasa* 866), but interestingly enough, it is at this time still independent of Mylasa (see chapter 2). The former *polis* of Hydai also later called itself a *koinon* (*IMylasa* 903, second half of the 2nd c.).

6. Christof Schuler, *Ländliche Siedlungen und Gemeinden im hellenistischen und römischen Kleinasien* (München: C. H. Beck, 1998), 137–145 convincingly rejects the position that all land not attached to a *polis* belonged to the king.

7. *FrGH* 26 F1 (Konon): Κάρεις, ἔθνος μέγα κωμηδὸν οἰκοῦντες. Cf. Strabo’s description of the Chrysaorean League (14.2.25), described as συνεσθηκὸς ἐκ κωμῶν.

8. At least 21 *poleis* are attested in *HTC* nos. 90 & 91.

9. Such a term should not be confused with the word used by H. Beck, *Polis und*

Koinon (Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 1991) to describe the Greek federations/leagues of the Classical period in his monumental study on the subject; cf. Emily Mackil, *Creating a Common Polity: Religion, Economy, and Politics in the Making of the Greek Koinon* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013). Note, however, that *koinon* did refer to an association of *poleis* instead of villages in the case of the Chrysaorean League, as rightly pointed out by Victor Gabrielsen, “The Chrysaoreis of Caria,” in *Labraunda and Karia*, ed. L. Karlsson and S. Carlsson (Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, 2011), 334–35.

10. Koranza as a *koinon*: P.-F. Foucart, “Inscriptions de la Carie,” *Bulletin de Correspondence Hellenique* 14 (1890): 373f.; cf. Simon Hornblower, *Mausolus* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 64 n. 86; Koranza as a *polis*: SEG 26.1228, ll. 8–9; Pladasa as a *koinon*: HTC 1 et al.; Pladasa as a *polis*: *Labraunda* III.1 42 and Hornblower, *Mausolus*, 65. cf. chapter 2 below; Hyllarima as a *koinon*: Froehner 92; Hyllarima as a *polis*: P. Roos, “Alte und neue Inschriftenfunde aus Zentralkarien,” *Istanbuler Mitteilungen* 25 (1975): 339. For Hydai see chapter 2.

11. Walser, “Sympolitien und Siedlungsentwicklung,” (esp. 154–55) draws attention to the lack of urban development in most of the self-styled *poleis* who were involved in *sympoliteiai* as the lesser partner.

12. W. Blümel, “Zwei neue Inschriften aus Mylasa aus der Zeit des Maussollos,” *Epigraphica Anatolica* 16 (1988): 29–32.

13. See n. 10 for citations.

14. As examples of such grants: OGIS 3.55, 61 (Antigonos Monophthalmos, though the right to freedom is expressed in terms of Greek identity rather than being a *polis*); SIG3 344.89 (*idem*); OGIS 223.22f. (Antiochos II referencing the policy of Alexander and Antigonos toward Erythrai).

15. Schuler, “Sympolitien in Lykien und Karien,” 393–413.

16. See H. Wiemer, “Structure and Development of the Rhodian Peraia: Evidence and Models,” in *Hellenistic Karia*, ed. R. van Bremen and J.-M. Carbon (Bordeaux: Ausonius, 2010), 415–34.

17. Riet van Bremen 2009, “Networks of Rhodians in Karia,” in *Greek and Roman Networks in the Mediterranean*, ed. I. Malkin, C. Constantakopoulou, and K. Panagopoulou (New York: Routledge, 2009), 113 in fact argues that the term *koinon* was specific to the context of the Rhodian subject *peraia* (areas controlled by Rhodes but not given citizenship; see chapter 1 for the definition of this term). Given that the term also serves to identify communities under Ptolemaic and Antigonid rule (see Wiemer, *op. cit.*, 424), it seems better to maintain that Rhodian influence, rather than direct control, was the primary impetus for adoption of the term.

18. Although we lack any positive evidence for a single village merging with a *polis* in Karia, we cannot rule this interpretation out in the case of communities that never called themselves a *koinon*. For instance, Olymos may have been a single village community that developed into a *polis* and then was absorbed by Mylasa (cf. N. Jones 1987, *Public Organization in Ancient Greece* (New York: Routledge, 2009), *passim*). Conversely, Schuler, *Ländliche Siedlungen* sees the 25 Kaunian demotics derived from toponyms in the city’s *Umland* as suggestive of this type of expansion.

19. Cf. P. Grandinetti, “Le élites cittadine di Mileto, Priene, e Kyme,” 81, and A. Fouchard, “Comment reconnaître les élites en Grèce ancienne?” 359, in *La cité et ses élites: Pratiques et représentation des formes de domination et de contrôle social dans les cités grecques*, ed. L. Capdetrey and Y. Lafond (Bordeaux: Ausonius, 2010).

20. Josiah Ober and B. Strauss, “Drama, Political Rhetoric, and the Discourse of Athenian Democracy,” in *Nothing to do with Dionysos? Athenian Drama in its Social Context*, ed. J. Winkler and F. Zeitlin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 237–70.

21. See especially Gauthier, *Les cités grecques et leurs bienfaiteurs*, 16–39.

22. Likewise, Grandinetti and Fouchard (see n. 17) emphasize the need to identify a “ricercha di stime” and outstanding social practice, respectively.

23. P. Hamon, “Élites dirigeants et processus d’aristocratisation à l’époque hellénistique,” in *Aristocratie antique: modèles et exemplarité sociale*, ed. H.-L. Fernoux and C. Stein (Dijon: Editions universitaires de Dijon, 2007), 84, who points also to the role of competition in keeping the group non-static.

24. Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction* (New York: Random House, 1978), 15–73.

25. 14.2.5; cf. P. Rhodes and D. Lewis, *The Decrees of the Greek States* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 274f. Grieb, *Hellenistische Demokratie*, 344–53 contests Strabo’s differentiation of Rhodes from other poleis. In a recent presentation focusing on the 6th and 5th centuries, R. Wallace has suggested much greater institutional similarities between democracy and oligarchy, including rule by the citizen body and a probouleutic council (“Greek Oligarchic Government and Democracies,” presented at the AAH Annual Meeting, 2013, Columbus). Unfortunately, until this project reaches a more definitive stage, it is impossible to gauge to what extent these preliminary conclusions are valid for the Hellenistic period.

26. Runciman, “Doomed to Extinction”; J. Bleicken, *Die Athenische Demokratie* (Paderborn: Utb für Wissenschaft, 1994). J. O’Neil, *The Origins and Development of Ancient Greek Democracy* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1995), 105–07 speaks of Hellenistic cities as being “less democratic.”

27. “Gleichheiten und Ungleichheiten,” 21 (my translation).

28. Meier, *Entstehung des Begriffs “Demokratie,”* 49–68.

29. Quass, “Verfassung des griechischen Städte.” Cf. Mann, *op. cit.*, 21.

30. Ma, *Antiochos III*, 161 & n. 193; Ferrary, *Philhellénisme et impérialisme: aspects idéologique de la conquête romaine du monde hellénistique* (Rome: École française de Rome, 1988), 158–70, 186.

31. OGIS 226.7: κατήγ[α]γεν τ[ῆ]ν τ[ε] ἐλ[ε]υθερίαν καὶ δημοκρατίαν; OGIS 237.1: [τὴν δημοκρ]α[τ]ίαν καὶ αὐτονομίαν διαφυλάσσειν. The restoration of the Iasian decree is less insecure than it seems; the *alpha* on the stone precludes most other candidates that were usually paired with *autonomia*.

32. *Labraunda* 8.14; *Milet* I.150.84. In both cases the phrase is ἐλευθέραν καὶ δημοκρατουμένην.

33. OGIS 234, ll. 20–22: διότι τὰν δημοκρατίαν καὶ τὰν εἰράναν . . . τοῖς Ἀντιοχεῦσιν διαφυλάσσει (trans. Ma, *op. cit.*, 307).

34. David Estlund, *Democratic Authority* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 38.

35. Quass, *Honoratiorenschicht*, 349ff.; cf. Louis Robert, “Recherches épigraphiques,” *Revue des Études Anciennes* 62 (1960): 325f.

36. Gauthier, *Les cités grecques*, 3 et *passim*, followed by Crowther 1992, “The Decline of Greek Democracy?”; Rhodes 1993, “The Greek *poleis*”; Grieb 2008, *Hellenistische Demokratie*. For the equation of euergetism and government, see esp. *Ibid.*, 72–74. This assumption is also made by more recent assessments of the “aristocratisation” of the Hellenistic elite: Hamon, “Élites dirigeants,” 91–98; Savalli-Lastrade, “Remarques sur les élites,” 51–64.

37. B. Dreyer and G. Weber, “Lokale Eliten griechischer Städte und königliche Herrschaft,” in *Lokale Eliten und hellenistische Könige*, ed. Dreyer and Mittag (Heidelberg: Verlag Antike, 2011), 31–46.

38. For the framing of the issue of Hellenistic Democracy in terms of whether there was still tension between political equality and socioeconomic inequality, see Mann, “Gleichheiten und Ungleichheiten,” 25–27 and, more generally, the contributions in Mann and Scholz, “*Demokratie.*”

39. For institutional controls, see Pierre Fröhlich, *Les cités grecques et le contrôle des magistrats* (Genève: Droz, 2004); for rotation of office, see the detailed discussions of Athens, Kos, Miletos, and Rhodes in Grieb, *Hellenistische Demokratie*.

40. As noted by Habicht, "Honoratiorenregime," 88 and Grieb, *op. cit.*, 22–23. See Josiah Ober, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Power of the People* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989) for democratic ideology in 4th c. Athens.

41. It is, however, a central tenet of Ma's study of honorific portraits (Ma, *Statues and Cities*), where he consistently appeals to civic ideology as a determinant for elite behavior and approval.

42. Similarly, studies that reveal how service as a *bouleutês* emerged as a mark of distinction beginning in the late second century (Hamon, "Le Conseil," 121–44; Helmut Müller, "Bemerkungen zu Funktion und Bedeutung des Rats in den hellenistischen Städten," in *Stadt und Bürgerbild im Hellenismus Kolloquium*, ed. M. Wörrle and P. Zanker (München: C. H. Beck, 1995), 41–54) are inadequate proof that the *boulê* superseded the assembly until the institutional changes imposed by Sulla and Pompey.

43. Ober, *Mass and Elite*, 231ff., with an emphasis on the elite's need to publicize (in moderation) its benefaction to the state. His view is echoed with respect to the (early) Hellenistic period by Hamon, *Élites dirigeants*, 82f.

44. Ober, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

45. See Mann, *op. cit.*, 22–24, who argues that comparisons with Athens are often superficial and do not take into account the asymmetry of the evidence on which the classical Athenian and Hellenistic political pictures are drawn.

46. Cf. Dreyer and Weber, "Lokale Eliten griechischer Städte," 26–31, for the idea that *dēmokratia* was not a fixed heuristic category in antiquity. Mann's own examples of democracy's loss of a contrasting concept against which to define itself (*op. cit.*, 21) betray these problems. That Demetrios of Phaleron called his reforms democratic (Strabo 9.1.20) certainly speaks to the greater valence of the term in establishing legitimacy, but not to the acceptance of these forms as democratic in nature by his contemporaries. In fact, the other testimonia (Plutarch, *Demetrios* 10.2; Paus. 1.25.6) and even Strabo's own text (the Athenians forced Demetrios to flee, "so strong was the envy and hatred for oligarchy" suggest the opposite.

47. Mann's attempt ("Gleichheiten und Ungleichheiten," 22–23) to problematize the use of Athens as comparanda for the Hellenistic *polis* is disingenuous. He asserts that the prominence of an Athenian elite could lead to the conclusion that classical Athens was also an oligarchy, referencing a debate over the true nature of Athenian democracy, but he fails to acknowledge his own position within this "debate" in favor of the democratic nature of Athens (for which, see *idem*, *Die Demagogen und das Volk* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2007)), and a look at his references ("Gleichheiten und Ungleichheiten," n. 28) shows that the last proponent of Athens as oligarchy was published in 1981. More prudent is his observation about the different types of evidence from which constitutional arguments have been made concerning the two cases (*Ibid.*, 23–24). Our understanding of Classical Athens is based primarily on literary sources, while the Hellenistic *polis* is known almost entirely from inscriptions. Yet even here there is imprecision (beyond the fact that classical Athens is also known from a large body of epigraphical texts). Each body of evidence has its own unique problems of interpretation, it is true, but the glimpses they give us of a particular situation can intersect. Both literature and epigraphy can, for example, speak of institutions or reveal ideology. Moreover, the uniqueness of Athens as a protest against comparative study only goes so far, since much of this uniqueness is one of textual survival. The fact that we have a literary record for Athens and not for Hellenistic *poleis* is more due to judgments in later centuries

about quality and authenticity rather than because of any difference in the nature of Athenian ideologies, for example. In the end, Athens shows us what is possible in the Hellenistic *polis* given institutional similarities. The comparison does not allow us to go beyond this, but neither is it invalid in bringing us that far.

48. Except, of course, in the minds of ideologues who imagine the majority can be tricked into acting against their own interest, an inference that dangerously mirrors the anti-democratic bias of ancient narratives of democratic decision-making.

49. Carlsson runs into trouble because she applies criteria for evaluating democracy to a body of evidence that is entirely too ambiguous to support a clear-cut answer to the questions she poses. She ignores the fact that her texts are official versions that present a face of consensus, completely obliterating (for us at least) any voices of dissent and, more importantly, the words and actions of individuals and interest-groups leading up to the final decision. For the critical reception of Carlsson's study, see Mann, *op. cit.*, 18 n. 16.

50. Carlsson, *Hellenistic Democracies*.

51. This is the force of Grieb's criticism of Carlsson (*Hellenistische Demokratie*, 18f.), who attempts to extend his analysis to the praxis that overlay the institutional structure.

52. Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: Volume I*, 94.

53. This is precisely the point of Foucault's development of his definition of power in *The Care of the Self*. His genealogical approach seeks to explore the different techniques whereby authorities seek to conduct conduct, but he is equally aware of the subjectification of authorities themselves, in particular in regimes whose ideal of governance is institutionalized. Cf. Rose, "Identity, Genealogy, History," 128–50.

54. On Carlsson's ignoring of the relationship between *dêmos* and elite (referring to her 2005 dissertation), see Grieb, *op. cit.*, 18.

55. Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989). The qualitative wording of the criteria betrays its subjective nature: *effective* participation, voting equality at the *decisive* stage of decision-making, an *enlightened* understanding leading up to the decisive vote, control of the agenda by the *dêmos*, and *inclusiveness* (italics mine). It is clear that different understandings of most of these criteria are possible depending on a person's inclination and ideology.

56. Isocrates: *de bigis* 44; *Encom. Hel.* 32, 36; *Nikokles* 4; *Antidosis* 132, 153, 161, 218, 278, 316; *Philip.* 20; *Panath.* 29, 246; *Myt. Bas.* 3, 6; *Timoth.* 8; *Alexander* 3. Dêmosthenes: *Exord.* 21.1. Aischines: *Tim.* 17. Aristotle: *Pol.* 1324a. [Lysias]: *Hyper Strat.* 21; [Plato]: *Letters* 309a5. This meaning was first extended to citizens of two different states by Xenophon, *Hell.* 5.2.12 (in reference to the Chalkidian League), and Hellanikos F 25, F 171 (in reference to the admission of the Plataians to Athens).

57. Our main literary source, Polybios, uses the term almost exclusively to describe leagues (2.41.13; 2.44.5; 2.46.2; 3.5.6; 4.3.6; 18.3.12; 18.38.6; 18.47.10; 20.6.7; 22.8.7; 23.17.1, 3, 6, 9; 27.2.10; 28.4.4). Potential exceptions are 18.2.4 (if Byzantion and Perinthos were the only participants in the merger) and 28.14.3 (which Reger 2004 thinks is an *isopoliteia*). This is in marked contrast to the inscriptions, which only call bilateral arrangements *sympoliteiai*, while every league refer to itself as a *koinon*.

58. Some even conflate the two terms, for example Adalberto Giovannini, *Untersuchungen über die Natur und die Anfänge der bundesstaatlichen Sympolitie in Griechenland* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1971).

59. Dusanic, "Notes épigraphiques sur l'histoire arcadienne du IV^e siècle," *Bulletin de Correspondence Hellénique* 102 (1978): 333–46. The term συνοικία is used in ll. 2, 60f., and 79f. The stipulations on the sacred rites and land allotment can be found at

ll. 6–10 and 14–18, respectively.

60. For continuity of settlement at “synoikized” sites, see Boehm, “Catastrophe or Resilience? Destruction and *Synoikismos* in the Hellenistic World,” in *Destruction. Archaeological, Philological, and Historical Perspectives*, ed. J. Driessen (Louvain, Presses Universitaires de Louvain, 2013), 319–27.

61. Walser, “Sympolitien und Siedlungsentwicklung,” 137f. Cf. Reger, “*Sympoliteiai* in Hellenistic Asia Minor,” 149 & n. 19 and Jeanne Robert and Louis Robert, “Bulletin épigraphique,” *Revue des Études Grecques* 71 (1958): 251.

62. Walser, *op. cit.*, argues that *sympoliteia* emphasizes political merger while *synoikismos* stresses physical combination, and thus that the two terms overlap and can refer to the same event. This is, however, to assume a static meaning for the terms, which our brief survey speaks against, and ignores the clearly political meaning of *synoikia/synoikismos* in certain cases (and not just at Athens and Rhodes, as he would have it, but in Arkadia—the unions of Orchomenos with Euaimnos and Mantinea with Helisson—and Karia—the union of Latmos and Pidasas—as well). That the *synoikismos* referred to in the 2nd c. by Mykonos (SIG³ 1024) has a political emphasis is improbable, since the cities of the island appeared to the outside world as a single polity before this (see below).

63. Riele, “Hélisson entre en sympolitie,” 167–90.

64. Alexandria: M. Riel, *The Inscriptions of Alexandria Troas* (Bonn: Habelt, 1997), 4–9; Ephesos: Louis Robert and Jeanne Robert, *The Mykonian Synoikismos* (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1989), 78–84; Magnesia: *IMagnesia am Sipylus* 1; Robert and Robert “Une inscription grecque de Téos,” 153–235. Cf. *Ibid.*, 175–88 for an inscription attesting the granting of Teian citizenship to an unknown group. While the document provides valuable comparanda in terms of both language and content, the impossibility of identifying this group as a community, rather than a guild or a segment of a community limits its utility to the current discussion.

65. As Robert & Robert observe (“Une inscription grecque de Téos,” 189), Kyrbissos exists in the inscription only as a toponym and a place of habitation, not as an ethnic. Whether the continued existence and habitation of Kyrbissos implies a prior *sympoliteia* with Teos hinges on whether we can equate the two phrases used to denote the inhabitants of Kyrbissos: οἱ πολῖται οἱ ἐν Κυρβισσῷ κατοικοῦντες and οἱ ἐν Κυρβισσῷ κατοικοῦντες. Since Kyrbissos is never attested as an independent community (see *Ibid.*, 160–64 for the reasons for identifying the Kyrbissos on the Athenian Tribute Lists as a city in the Karian Chersonesos), we can only infer a previously autonomous city and subsequent *sympoliteia* if there is evidence that suggests that “the citizens dwelling in Kyrbissos” were once Kyrbisseans that were granted Teian citizenship with the absorption of their community. This is the implication of “those dwelling in Kyrbissos” simply being shorthand for “the citizens dwelling in Kyrbissos.” The two phrases appear in close succession at three distinct points in the inscription, with the citizen denotation preceding its shorter counterpart the first two times (ll. 4–5; ll. 43 & 46; ll. 56 & 58). Yet the reverse order of the two phrases in the third pairing calls the abbreviating function of the shorter phrase into question. Moreover, a look at the context in which each phrase is used reveals a pattern that cannot be explained by the demands of verbal economy alone. Whenever the specification of “citizens” occurs, those intended are the recipients of a privilege, whether the protection of their homes by Teos and the garrison commander or the inscription of their names as oath-swearers in the *bouleterion*. When all the inhabitants are referenced, the action involved is the swearing of the oath itself. Thus, one can identify a distinction between all the inhabitants of Kyrbissos, whose assent is required for the arrangement to take practical effect, and the Teian citizens who live in Kyrbissos, who alone merited the privileges of protection by the city, and perhaps for whose sake the protection of

Kyrbissos was justifiable. If this distinction was not made in terms of free and slave, then it implies that Kyrbissos was a territory inhabited by “natives” and settled by certain Teians rather than an independent community whose members entered the Teian civic body through a *sympoliteia*.

66. Gary Reger 2001, “The Mykonian Synoikismos,” *Revue des Études Anciennes* 103.1–2 (2001): 157–81, even hinting (163) at a similarity with the *sympoliteia* between Mylasa and Olymos. cf. *idem*, “Islands with One Polis versus Islands with Several Poleis,” in *The Polis as an Urban Centre and as a Political Community*, ed. M. Hansen (Copenhagen: Special Trykkeriet Viborg, 1997), 450–92.

67. See Reger, “Mykonian Synoikismos,” notes 63–76 for references. For the recent work on the coinage of Keos especially, see Papageorgiadou-Banis, *The Coinage of Kea* (Athens, 1997), 42–49 and Reger and Risser, “Coinage and Federation on Hellenistic Keos,” in *Landscape Archaeology as Long-Term History. Northern Keos in the Cycladic Islands*, eds. Cherry, Davis, and Mantzourani (Los Angeles, 1991), 307–8.

68. Mykonos: SIG³ 1024; Amorgos: IG 12.7 and Suppl. pp. 142–46; Kos: discussion in Reger 2001, 171–74, though his assertion that Merops constituted another *polis*, rather than just another settlement, is far from secure. I wonder if it should rather be compared to Halasarna, a Koan deme capable of issuing decrees as late as the late third century; Keos: Patrice Brun 1989, “L’île de Kéos et ses cites au I^{er} siècle av. J.-C.,” *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 76 (1989): 121–38; Gary Reger, “The historical and archaeological background to the disappearance of Koresia and Poiessa on Keos,” in *Kea-Kythnos: History and Archaeology*, ed. L. Mendoni and A. Mazarakis-Ainian (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1998), 633–41; and Walser, “Sympolitien und Siedlungsentwicklung,” 145–48; Rhodes: Victor Gabrielsen 2000, “The synoikized ‘polis’ of Rhodes,” in *Polis and Politics: Studies in Ancient Greek History Presented to Mogens Herman Hansen on his Sixtieth Birthday*, ed. P. Flensted-Jensen, T. Nielsen, and L. Rubinstein (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2000), 177–205; Cf. Reger, “*Sympoliteiai* in Hellenistic Asia Minor,” 177f.

69. See Reger, “Mykonian Synoikismos” for dating and difficulties surrounding the archaeological evidence for the two cities of Mykonos.

70. *Ibid.*, 478, *et passim*.

71. Reger, “*Sympoliteiai* in Hellenistic Asia Minor,” 177–78, advocates the role of Rhodes as a potential model for Kos and Karia, but without considering the broader context of island centralization that he explores elsewhere.

72. To be discussed in detail in chapter 2.

73. W. Held, “Die Karer und die Rhodische Peraia,” in *Die Karer und die Anderen*, ed. F. Rumscheid (Bonn: Habelt, 2009), 122; Wiemer, “Rhodian Peraia,” 416–19; cf. Schuler, “Sympolitien in Lykien und Karien,” 403.

74. For potential Koan influence on the political terminology of Karia and Lykia, in particular the office of *demarchos*, see Schuler, “Sympolitien in Lykien und Karien,” 405–6.

75. Schuler, *Ländliche Siedlungen*, 208f. (my translation from the German).

76. These are also suggested as important factors by Reger, “*Sympoliteiai* in Hellenistic Asia Minor,” 180.

77. For example, *Ibid.*, 150–56.


78. This possibility lies outside of the scope of the present work.

Chapter 1

Histories of Karia

Any study of historical phenomena demands contextualization, and the complexity of the situation in Hellenistic Karia merits particularly detailed treatment. This region was a major arena for the constant push and pull between imperial powers, especially the Seleukids, Ptolemies, Rhodes, and (sporadically) the Antigonids. This positioning resulted in ever-shifting boundaries, alliances, and statuses; moreover, at the local level, an increasing number of communities (*poleis*) were able to achieve a freedom of action beyond the need to accommodate the will of a Hellenistic king. However, this latter development, in the broader context of the Aegean, has often been ignored, marginalized or devalued as a meaningless and superficial relic of “the glory that was Greece.”¹ Only recently has the viability of the Hellenistic *polis* begun to be taken seriously as an essential component of the period.² Yet crucial to a full understanding of this issue is a study not only of the evidence pertaining to an autonomous and active city-state, but also the relationship between a *polis* and the larger powers with which it came into contact, to whatever extent.³

I have found it convenient to distinguish the high and low political histories of Karia, treating each in a separate part: after a narrative summarizing the involvement of the major Hellenistic kingdoms (and Rhodes) in Karia,⁴ I will focus on uncovering significant patterns in the foreign policies of the communities involved in *sympoliteiai*. A brief concluding section will consider both sections in light of the prominent developments most relevant to our study, and will discuss the relationship between *polis* and empire, especially at the level of discourse and negotiation. Most importantly, I will evaluate the extent to which the diplomatic activities of the *poleis* of Karia confirm or problematize the model of “peer polity interaction” that has been used to describe the Hellenistic Aegean in which Karian communities found themselves situated.⁵



Map 1.1 Karia. Source: Tina Ross Archaeological Illustrations.

For the purposes of this chapter (and for the book as a whole), we have defined Karia in a geographically broad sense to include the area south of the Meander river valley and as far east as the Dandalos river valley. The disadvantage of including in Karia regions that were not considered at various points in antiquity as Karian is outweighed by the advantage of thereby avoiding any controversies about how to define Karia at particular moments in the past. Such debates assume a continuity of thought among ancients (both temporally and spatially) about what constituted Karia, an assumption that ignores both the largely Greek perspective of our sources and the possibility—dare I say probability—that these sources were not always aware of and responding to each other.⁶ It seems unlikely, for instance, that Strabo was aware of the early third-century inscription at Xystis that suggested an eastern boundary at the Harpasos River, and thus represents a reformulation of the “general” understanding of Karia to include communities farther east, such as Aphrodisias and Antiocheia on the Maiandros.⁷ Strabo’s scholarly interests were not equivalent to, say, administrative definitions of empire, nor can we assume that the Persian satrapy of Karia was equivalent to its Seleukid or Rhodian counterparts.⁸ It seems better, then, to include in our history of Karia all places that were, at one time or another, included in Karia, even if not consistently. This includes towns in the east like Aphrodisias, but also communities north of the Maiandros River, such as Tralles and Nysa, and cities in the south like Kaunos that are excluded from Karia by Herodotos (see below). It also includes traditionally Greek cities whose histories are interwoven to varying degrees with the inhabitants of the region, whether coastal—Miletos, Myous,

Halikarnassos, Knidos—or island—Rhodes, Kos, and Kalymna. This is not to claim that these cities were Karian in every sense, merely to refuse the assumption that they were not Karian in any sense.⁹

Table 1.1 Chronological Table of Karia's High Political History

Date	Halikarnassos, Myndos, & Kaunos	West & Central Karia	East Karia	South Karia
540s–392		Part of Persian satrapy of Lydia		
392–early 320s		Hekatomnid Dynasty		Rhodes*
Early 320s–323		Philoxenos Satrap of Karia		Rhodes
323–313		Asandros Satrap of Karia		Rhodes
313–309		Antigonid Control of Karia		Rhodes
309–301	Ptolemies	Antigonids (coast)	Antigonid control	Rhodes
301–294	Ptolemies	Eupolemos, then Pleistarchos (299)	Eupolemos, then Pleistarchos (299)	Rhodes
294–287	Ptolemies	Lysimachos?	Lysimachos?	Rhodes
		Demetrios (coast)		
287–285	Ptolemies?		Demetrios	Rhodes
285–281	Ptolemies?		Lysimachos	Rhodes
281–ca. 260		Ptolemies	Seleukids	
260–ca. 240	Ptolemies	Ptolemies, Seleukids	Ptolemies, Seleukids	
240–228	Ptolemies	Antiochos Hierax	Antiochos Hierax	Gradual Acquisition of Subject Peralia by Rhodes
		Ptolemies		
227–203	Ptolemies	Ptolemies?	Seleukids	Rhodes
		Rhodes		
		Antigonids/Olympichos		
203–197	Ptolemies	Antigonids	Seleukids	Antigonids
		Rhodes		Rhodes
		Seleukids		
197–188	Ptolemies & Rhodes	Seleukids	Seleukids	Rhodes
		Rhodes		
188–167		Rhodian control of Karia (except free cities)		
167–88		Declared free until incorporation into Roman province		

*Karian Chersonese only.

The most important period for our study is the latter half of the third century up to the end of the second century BC, since all but one of the Karian *sympoliteiai* fall within this chronological range. Nevertheless, the accord between Latmos and Pidasa in the late fourth century necessitates a broader survey commencing with the death of Alexander in 323 BC. Nor will a consideration of the preceding periods be disadvantageous to our purposes, and the contrast between the first half of the third century and the second will serve to emphasize the significance of the conditions in which *sympoliteiai* became more prevalent.

SECTION 1: KARIA IN THE HIGH POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE HELLENISTIC WORLD

Judging by the behavior of the imperial claimants elaborated below, Karia was worth fighting for. An explicit rationale is rarely given in our sources, but the evidence points to financial benefits as the main reason for risking lives to control Karia. As discussed below Rhodes was willing to pay Ptolemy V 200 talents for the city of Kaunos alone. This figure suggests first of all the productivity of one area in the southeast of Karia, since presumably the Rhodians would have expected to recoup their investment in a reasonable period of time,

which, even if as long as 20 years, still suggests an income of 10 talents per year. Second, the figure also suggests, albeit more ambiguously, the productivity of the other areas of Karia controlled by Rhodes leading up to the purchase. It is true that Rhodes was also enriched by its status as an important harbor for sea trade in the eastern Mediterranean, but surely imperial income from its Karian possessions, which included much of southern Karia as well as Stratonikeia, also helped in coming up with the 200 talents needed to expand its hold in Asia Minor. Regardless, most of the region of Karia is not implicated in the financial desirability of Kaunos to Rhodes, which is not to say that the rest of Karia was not fertile grounds for imperial control, but on the contrary was a worthwhile dominion even if one could not conquer and exploit the whole.

This inference is supported by the ability of several dynasts to support their power economically while only controlling part of Karia, including Eupolemos and Olympichos (see below). The latter seems to have only controlled west-central Karia and still controlled enough resources to maintain garrisons at Alinda and Labraunda, and thus prevent his economic basis from revolting. Two areas within Karia seem to have been particularly fertile agriculturally, the Tabai plateau in eastern Karia and the Maiandros valley, which sometimes functioned as a northern “boundary.”¹⁰ Productivity, both here and elsewhere—the valleys of the Sarı Çay, the Euromos River, the Marsyas River, and the Morsynos/Dandalos river are discussed in [chapter 2](#)—translated into income via directly owned royal land and, for subject cities, taxation, though we lack evidence for the extent of the former or the amounts of the latter. Grants of exemption from tribute (*aphorologêton einai*) that accompanied declarations of autonomy guarantee that for other communities tribute was the norm, and inscriptions attest to the presence of Seleukid and Ptolemaic officials stationed to ensure effective collection.¹¹ So while we cannot put a figure on the value of (even parts of) Karia to Hellenistic empires, we can be certain that this value existed economically.

This is not to say that economics alone drove kings and one island to fight over Karia. As we will see, grants of freedom from, among other things, tribute were not uncommon, and at face value meant a financial loss for the empire. Yet grants of freedom and autonomy did not entail complete liberation from imperial control.¹² In cases where an empire’s actual resources for compelling subject communities to pay tribute were diluted or non-existent, cases which as we shall see were not infrequent, it may have made more sense to retain influence with a revocable “loss” without incurring the costs of asserting direct domination. This points also to the ideological value of Karia as a region whose political diversity meant that discourses of benefaction

and freedom could be used as effectively as military force in extending and cementing one's sphere of influence at the expense of rival powers.¹³ Of course, grants of freedom usually were made in, or led to, contexts of the relative absence of an imperial presence, during which a habit of *polis* agency was able to develop, as we will see in the second half of this chapter.

A. Before Alexander

The rule of the Hekatomnid satrapy dynasty dominates the modern perception of Karia in the Classical period, and rightly so. A number of important developments, among which feature prominently a regional sense of unity/identity and a push toward Hellenic forms of settlement and architecture (to steer clear of the term “Hellenization”), seem to have originated in the policies of these rulers, Maussollos in particular. Yet we should not lose sight of the fact that this era was the exception to a history defined more by political diversity, both locally and in terms of foreign influence over the region. In part, this was due to geographical features common to most of western Asia Minor, whose landscape created natural boundaries conducive to the rise of numerous settlements—whether *poleis* on the coast or villages inland—in a small area.¹⁴

Ethnic and political allegiances mirrored this geographical fragmentation. Ethnic distinctions, where they were made, provide the modern observer with no easy task of decipherment, as Herodotos' description of the region shows. He contrasts the customs of the Karians and the Kaunians (a city in southern Karia), and speaks of peoples who speak the Karian language but are not Karian, while elsewhere challenging the notion of the Ionian purity due to inbreeding with Karian women.¹⁵ At the same time, political circumstances played a tremendous role: in addition to the various autonomous city-states, it seems likely that the hinterland communities also often placed local identity above a regional sense of commonality.¹⁶ Although Herodotos often speaks of “the Karians” as acting in concert, this is in the context of facing a foreign enemy (the Persians), and even in these descriptions specific peoples like the Pedaseans emerge as Karian but not part of the “Karians” who revolted from Persia.¹⁷ Furthermore, Athens dealt with the communities in Karia, whether Greek or native, separately, as is attested by the Athenian Tribute Lists. While this does not mean the absence of any capacity for common action—Herodotos' Karians, however defined, possessed this ability at the beginning of the fifth century, and later we learn of the *koinon* of Karians¹⁸—it does guarantee that each settlement, whether *polis* or village commune, had

to interact with Athens independently of one another. It should also be noted that during the supremacy of the Athenian empire much of inland Karia was still under the authority of Persia, thus dividing the region between two political loyalties. Moreover, in Persian-controlled territory (before the accession of Hekatomnos as satrap in 392 BC) “sovereignty was parceled out among a plethora of hill-top dynasts,” representing an equal challenge to the integrity of Karia.¹⁹ With the defeat of Athens in 404 BC and the failure of Sparta to assert its authority in Asia Minor, Persian control returned to all of Karia. Even in the Hekatomnid period, ambivalence between particularism and unity persisted, as is suggested by two treaties made during the reign of Maussollos, in which representatives from a myriad of local *poleis* bore witness to a bilateral agreement.²⁰ The impression is one of coexisting autonomous, yet dependent, communities intricately bound together, perhaps by an implicit common interest. It is not clear whether the origin for this unspoken unifying force was Maussollos or shared cultural, political, and religious assumptions that pre-existed the reign of his family (or a combination of both), but the fact remains that a politically diverse landscape was the norm for most, if not all of Karian history during the Archaic and Classical periods.²¹ It should also be noted that the extent of Maussollos’ sovereignty probably did not include all of Karia (and in some places, such as Xanthos, spanned beyond it). While the lack of evidence for Hekatomnid control in eastern Karia does not warrant certainty (what evidence would that be, if the inhabitants were not accustomed to publish inscriptions or mint coins?), a distinction in terms of institutional and cultural forms, if not political control, probably existed with respect to the numerous settlements in the region.²²

B. Diadoch Period

When Alexander annexed Karia at the start of his momentous reign of conquests, he re-introduced an important division in the region. As Diodoros tells us, he made it a point to free the Greek cities, while bringing all cities into subjection through *philanthropia*, before turning rule of the area over to Ada, daughter of Hekatomnos and ousted ruler.²³ The implication is that Greek cities formerly under Hekatomnid domain were no longer part of Ada’s *archê*, and presumably this situation continued after Ada’s death when governance of Karia was given to Philoxenos, and then after Alexander’s death when Asandros was assigned as satrap by both Perdikkas and the agreement made at Triparadeisos in 320 BC, a post he remained in until 313.²⁴ Regardless, a relatively peaceful decade came to an end when Polemaios, nephew of Antigonos, invaded Karia,

leading Asandros to seek military support from both Ptolemy and Kassandros.²⁵ Unfortunately for Asandros, Kassandros' general Eupolemos was captured with a significant portion of the army, and despite some minor successes—the capture of Miletos, Tralles, and Kaunos—the satrap was forced to capitulate to Polemaios in 313.²⁶ With the Antigonid takeover of Karia, many of its *poleis* (presumably only Greek ones) received freedom and autonomy, possibly for the first time in nearly a century.²⁷ For our purposes, it is important to note that independence, whatever its force, was achieved in the specific context of conflict between two larger external powers, creating a precedent both in terms of privilege and circumstance.

Antigonid control of Karia did not remain uncontested for long. In 309 BC Ptolemy captured Kaunos, Myndos, and Kos, and struck an alliance with Iasos, which he later garrisoned.²⁸ Further boundary shifts may have occurred after this, but we remain ignorant, since our sources are silent on Karia until Ipsos. In the aftermath of Antigonos' defeat and death, most of Karia, along with Kilikia and perhaps other areas on the southern coast of Asia Minor, seems to have been assigned to Eupolemos until 299.²⁹ After this it was ceded to Pleistarchos, brother of Kassandros, who ruled the region until around 295/94.³⁰ Yet Demetrios was able to retain control of a number of cities on the coast of Asia Minor, including Miletos, and no doubt others as well on the Karian coast.³¹ Around 295/94, Lysimachos assaulted and captured a number of these cities.³² These did not include Miletos, which he was able to take only somewhat later.³³ At the same time, Ptolemy may have attacked Demetrios' possessions on the southern coast of Asia Minor, taking in Karia the city of Kaunos.³⁴ Of the hinterland we remain ignorant, though Lysimachos seems the most likely candidate, unless Billows is correct in assigning Eupolemos' rule to this period (see above), since we hear of Demetrios invading Karia in 287, which would make little sense if he already controlled it. With three major powers (Ptolemy, Demetrios, and Lysimachos) possessing segments of Karia, Poliorketes, as stated, attacked Karia as well as Lydia, capturing most of the country, including Miletos and Kaunos, and held it until his defeat and imprisonment in 285 BC.³⁵ The next two years saw the (re)assertion of control over most of Karia by Lysimachos, in the case of Miletos imposing heavy fines for its recalcitrance in the face of Demetrios' army.³⁶ Until the battle of Korupedion, Karia found itself unevenly divided between Lysimachos and Ptolemy.

A couple of points are worth emphasizing about the period of the Diadochoi before continuing the narrative. First, the integrity of Karia that the Hekatomnids and the Macedonian satraps had maintained for almost 90 years came to an end definitively with the rise of Antigonos

Monophthalmos, though it is worth noting that as early as Alexander important divisions were established between free cities and the satrapy. His commitment to the freedom of the Greeks translated a cultural divide into a political one by granting privileges and status to certain inhabitants of the region but not to others. This disunity at the local level in turn facilitated the partition of Karia between international powers, since an autonomous city could be attacked (or “freed”) without challenging the authority of whoever controlled “non-Greek” Karia. This is what enabled the coastal intrusion of Ptolemy before Ipsos and the uneasy three-power arrangement of the first two decades of the third century. By the time of Lysimachos’ defeat at the hands of Seleukos Nikator, Karia’s position as the crossroads of the major Hellenistic powers had become secure, especially since Egypt, Macedon, and Syria now possessed “ancestral claims” to the region.³⁷ Second, the struggles between the major powers left a strong impression of impermanence, both for empires, whose borders were constantly changing or which, in the case of Lysimachos’ kingdom, could cease to exist entirely, and for the *poleis*, who were ever reminded that their newly acquired autonomy and freedom were contingent upon the compatibility of this independence with a ruler’s interests, and thus could only be maintained by appeasement or disloyalty, that is, appealing to another great power. This game, as it were, is essential for understanding the persistence with which the phrases “freedom” and “autonomy” continued to have value, since no matter how harsh a period of subjection might be, the possibility always remained (until the advent of Rome) of reacquiring some measure of independence. At the same time, such precariousness should engender in the modern observer a suspicion of the very distinction “free-unfree” with respect to the Greek city-states, rather than of the legitimacy of the claim to freedom when propagated. The gray area between independence and subjection seems to have been the norm in Asia Minor; hence, it is more appropriate to explore a more nuanced depiction of each city’s status.

C. From Korupedion to Apamea

The period from 280 to 220 BC has the misfortune of being underrepresented by our literary sources, and has proved a notorious thorn in the side of anyone attempting a narrative history of these years. After this, Polybios (with Livy) provides a fuller history, but Karia enters his scope of interest only rarely. With this in mind, rather than attempt to follow in the footsteps of scholars far more adept at such a task, I propose to discuss separately the empires that controlled Karia before Antiochos III’s defeat at Magnesia, beginning with

Ptolemaic possessions and then dealing with Seleukid power in the area. This has the advantage of avoiding the entangling dating controversies that riddle treatments of the period, while still conveying the idea of the constant, if fluctuating, presence of two hostile powers with a vested interest in Karia. Finally, I treat the brief reinsertion of an Antigonid presence in Karia in the last quarter of the third century, since Antigonos Doson's campaign of this year set the stage for the complex political situation at the turn of the century. I postpone a discussion of Rhodian power to the next section, since it extends past the Rome-enforced departure of the Hellenistic kings.

i. Ptolemies in Karia

Although, as we have seen, Ptolemy Soter was able to establish himself in several locations on the Karian coast, at least temporarily, his possessions in the region only became considerable with the collapse of Lysimachos' Thracian kingdom following the latter's death in 281 BC. This vacuum facilitated a takeover of what by rights should have fallen to Seleukos Nikator. Opportunely for the Lagid empire, the victor of Korupedion was himself killed the following year, and his successor Antiochos I was in the eastern portion of his vast realm, forced to deal with a rebellion in the upper satrapies before being able to settle affairs in Asia Minor. Consequently, Ptolemy Philadelphos, himself fresh on the throne, was able to seize a number of coastal sites and enough territory inland to justify the presence of imperial officials and the inclusion of Karia in Theokritos' list of the sovereign's conquests.³⁸ Possessions for which we have evidence include Miletos, Myndos, Halikarnassos, Herakleia on the Latmos, Kaunos, Kalymna, Iasos, Kalynda, Amyzon, Lagina (future area of Stratonikeia), Euromos, and Mylasa.³⁹ In addition, Philadelphos was able to establish at least hegemony over Kos and Knidos.⁴⁰ That being said, it is unsafe to generalize overmuch from the certain cases to assume control of everything in between. The advertised commitment of the Ptolemies to Greek freedom could have led to completely autonomous enclaves where direct control would have taxed the resources of the central government, as the king's relationship with Kos and Knidos suggests, nor should one rule out the persistence of Seleukid pockets of control.⁴¹ At the same time, we need not follow Mastrocinque's efforts to prove a concerted counterattack to Ptolemaic incursions by Antiochos I, since the evidence for a Seleukid presence before 260 BC is limited to eastern Karia (see below).⁴²

The Ptolemies' ability to hold on to all these possessions, directly or otherwise, varied during the third century. Some cities, like Halikarnassos, Myndos, Kaunos, and possibly Kalynda, remained part of the empire until the 190s, when Lagid influence completely

disappeared from the area.⁴³ Other settlements like Amyzon, Herakleia, and Euromos likely remained Ptolemaic until at least 227 BC, and possibly later in the case of Herakleia and Amyzon.⁴⁴ In addition, hegemony continued in Kos and Kalymna long after Philadelphos' naval defeat at the hands of Antigonos Gonatas in around 262 BC, as is clear from the clause in the *homopoliteia* oath at the end of the third century, which obligated the oath-taker to abide by "the friendship and alliance with King Ptolemy" (see [chapter 2](#)).⁴⁵ Although Miletos escaped from Ptolemaic overlordship in 260 BC—briefly falling under a tyranny before entering the Seleukid sphere of influence—it seems to have enjoyed good relations with the Ptolemies in the last quarter of the third century.⁴⁶ Yet Mylasa was definitively lost to the Ptolemies as early as 259, and the founding of Stratonikeia (on whose date, see below) demands the withdrawal of Lagid power from this valley around this time as well.⁴⁷ Thus, although the Ptolemies penetrated significantly inland for about two decades, their presence was for the most part limited henceforth to the southern and western coasts of Karia.

ii. Seleukids in Karia

Victory at Korupedion should have meant uncontested control of Karia for the Seleukid Empire, but as we have seen, Ptolemy Philadelphos took advantage of the upheaval following Seleukos Nikator's death to capture significant portions of the region. It seems probable that Antiochos I still maintained control of the eastern areas of the hinterland: in 269/68 BC Tabai was in his hands, as was Hyllarima in 263/262.⁴⁸ That his boundaries with the Ptolemaic empire were rather fluid at this time is suggested by the reappearance of a Seleukid presence in the Stratonikeian valley: a decree honoring a member of the future deme of Stratonikeia, Koliorga, is dated by Antiochos I's reign.⁴⁹ However, Antiochos Theos' accession to the throne in 260 BC signaled a major shift in the high political situation in Karia. We have already discussed this from the standpoint of Ptolemaic losses in the area, most of which passed into Seleukid hands as a result of an offensive that coincided with the revolt of Ptolemy II's son (who possibly then entered Antiochos' service).⁵⁰ This son, also named Ptolemy, was co-regent in the Aegean but revolted against his father with the help of Timarchos, an Aitolian mercenary captain and, briefly, tyrant of Miletos. Cities that transferred allegiance included Miletos (for whom Antiochos dispensed of Timarchos, thus earning the name "Theos"), Mylasa, Alabanda, Bargylia, and (doubtfully) Herakleia on the Latmos.⁵¹ In addition, Antiochos II took extensive measures to insure that his gains were not transient, founding a number of cities in Karia and perhaps installing powerful generals like

Olympichos as permanent fixtures of imperial administration.⁵² Alabanda was renamed Antiocheia, Nysa on the Maiandros was founded from three communities, and Stratonikeia was possibly created at this time.⁵³

Yet Antiochos Theos' gains only partially survived his death. The Hellenistic tradition of a dynastic struggle exploited by an ambitious foreign power was celebrated when Ptolemy III intervened in the conflict between Seleukos II and his father's infant son (the Laodikeian War), initiating the Third Syrian War (246–241 BC). The difficulties faced by Seleukos II, who lost much territory outside of Karia to Ptolemy, led to a reliance on the loyalty of local communities that often resulted in freedom. Thus, Mylasa was liberated around this time (246/45 BC), while cities like Miletos, already nominally independent, were granted privileges and became less restricted by *de facto* hegemony.⁵⁴ Although a Ptolemaic presence was largely kept from expanding into Seleukid-held Karia, inroads do seem to have been made at Kildara—unless this city was never lost during the reconquest of Antiochos II, which seems unlikely given Seleukid control of nearby coastal Bargylia.⁵⁵ However, Seleukos' losses did not end with the peace of 241 BC. Shortly thereafter, Antiochos Hierax, Seleukos' younger brother and governor of cis-Tauric Asia Minor, revolted and defeated the attempt to subdue him at the battle of Ankyra.⁵⁶ As a result, most of Karia (i.e., except for communities that were free or under Ptolemaic control) became part of the independent kingdom of Hierax, advertised by his own coinage.⁵⁷ This situation persisted until 229/28 BC, when the usurper's wars with the Attalid kingdom led to a series of defeats, including one in Karia (OGIS 280), followed by an ill-fated invasion of Mesopotamia, evoking a successful counterattack by Seleukos and the reestablishment of some Seleukid authority in Asia Minor. Attalos I may have followed up on his success over Hierax to briefly assert control over parts of northern Karia, as the cult of Attalos Soter in Herakleia on the Latmos suggests.⁵⁸ That being said, the Karian campaign of Antigonos Doson in 227 BC, and in particular his ability to subordinate and incorporate the Seleukid official Olympichos into his imperial administration, not to mention the quasi-independence of Olympichos prior to the arrival of Antigonos, creates a strong impression of a weak Seleukid authority, most likely worsened by the death of Seleukos II in 226 BC.⁵⁹

While we cannot speak in terms of specific cities lost or held, it seems likely that much of Western Karia at least was permanently lost to Seleukos by the end of his reign. The grant of Stratonikeia to the Rhodians may date to this period (if not prior to the Brothers' War) to prevent the city from falling into hostile hands—a tacit acknowledgment of the empire's incapacity to rule the area.⁶⁰ Rhodes'

establishment of an extensive “subject Peraia” must also date to this period (see below). Seleukid territory may, then, have been limited to the lines of communication between the east and places like Sardis, which for a time struck coins of Seleukos II.⁶¹ At the same time, the instability caused by such drastic shifts in imperial power make it possible that a number of communities simply began acting as independent cities/*koina* in the absence of a consistent higher authority. This option will be considered in more detail below.

Karia was to experience one final surge of Seleukid authority with Antiochos III. This was a rather gradual process, which began at the beginning of his reign with the campaigning of his cousin Achaïos, already stationed in Asia Minor by Antiochos’ predecessor, Seleukos III (Polyb. 4.48.7–10). Achaïos’ activity was largely directed at Attalos I, and so little affected Karia; likewise, Antiochos III’s invasion of Asia Minor in 216 to deal with the now rebellious Achaïos took place in other areas of the peninsula. The expansion of the Antiochos’ borders into Western Karia had to await the completion of the great eastern *anabasis*. With this campaign at an end, the now famous king conducted a brief invasion of southwestern Karia (or commanded his governor at Sardis, Zeuxis, to do so) before turning his attention to Koile-Syria. As a result, Amyzon, Antiocheia (Alabanda), Alinda, and Mylasa returned to the Seleukid Empire.⁶² Finally, in 197 BC Antiochos himself led an expedition, ostensibly against the Attalid kingdom alone, which resulted in further expansion into Karia, including the acquisition of Kildara, Herakleia on the Latmos, and Iasos. At the same time, the king formed an alliance with Antigonid-held Euromos/Phillipoi.⁶³ Bargylia and Theangela were potentially two additional conquests.⁶⁴ Yet Antiochos’ diplomacy kept Karia politically fragmented. The king’s friendly relations with both Philip V and the Rhodians prevented him from attacking the possessions of these powers (on which see below), which included the Ptolemaic cities under the protection of Rhodes: Kaunos, Halikarnassos, and Myndos.

Ultimately, however, Antiochos the Great’s gains in Karia, as in the rest of Asia Minor, were short-lived. Rome’s victory over Philip led to the famous proclamation of liberty for all Greeks, including cities captured by Antiochos like Bargylia, Iasos, and Pidasa.⁶⁵ The conflict of interest created by this *senatus consultum* contributed to the outbreak of war between the two powers in 192 BC, which culminated in another victory for the Romans and the effacement of Seleukid power from any morsel of Karia. Yet before we may turn to this chapter in the history of the region, we must discuss the brief return of an Antigonid presence in Karia at the end of the third century, as well as the advent of Rhodes as a conquering power.

iii. Antigonos Doson and Philip V

Much is obscure regarding the Karian expedition of Antigonos Doson in 227 BC. Rather than attempt to resolve the numerous quandaries surrounding this event, it seems preferable to simply identify the communities that may have fallen under Macedonian authority at this time. It is likely that Doson sought to take advantage of the upheaval surrounding the fall of Antiochos Hierax, striking precisely where the victorious Attalos I seems to have had no interest, and perhaps also aimed to deliver a blow to Ptolemaic interests in the Aegean.⁶⁶ The extent of Antigonos' success does not appear, in the case of Karia, to go beyond the figure of Olympichos, who exchanged his Seleukid post for allegiance to the Macedonian crown.⁶⁷ Hence, the Antigonid sphere of influence/control covered at least the areas surrounding Alinda (Olympichos' capital) and Mylasa (a free city), and may have included Euromos.⁶⁸ Regardless of whether this translated these communities into dependencies or "free" allies, Doson's expedition reaffirmed the Antigonid belief in its right to possess Karia.⁶⁹ His successor, Philip V, sought to expand upon this foothold. Having established Olympichos' subordinate position at the outset of his reign (see above), the king was unable to follow up on his interests in Karia until the end of the century. As a result, during the time between 215 and 203 BC, the Antigonid "province" had broken up, most likely after the death of the governor Olympichos, and genuine independence or Ptolemaic overlordship for the Karian communities in this area are equally plausible consequences of this power vacuum.⁷⁰ In any event, Philip's gaze returned to the Aegean and Karia at the conclusion of the First Macedonian War, and his support of the Kretans in their war against Rhodes and Kos can be seen as a prelude to invasion.⁷¹ This campaign, which spanned much of the coast of Asia Minor and the surrounding islands, included a major naval battle near Miletos (Polyb. 16.15), followed by its capture, assaults on Knidos and Kos (in the latter case detaching Kalymna from the island), and conquest of the subject Rhodian Peraia (including Stratonikeia), Herakleia on the Latmos, Euromos, Pidasia, Iasos, Bargylia, Kildara, and possibly Theangela. He was also active around Mylasa, Alabanda, and Myous, assaulting the first, plundering the second, and giving the third to Magnesia on the Maiandros.⁷² However, once Philip V returned to Macedon in 200 BC, the Rhodians commenced a three-year campaign to win back the Peraia. More importantly, Philip's defeat by Rome at Kynoskephalai forced him to relinquish all of his holdings in Karia, freeing the cities and returning the Peraia to Rhodes. This marked the end of an Antigonid presence in Karia.

D. Rhodes: From Peraia to Province

In discussing Rhodian possessions in Karia, I follow the common distinction between the incorporated Peraia, whose inhabitants were citizens of the Rhodian state, and the subject Peraia, which consisted of communities external to but dependent on Rhodes, to varying degrees.⁷³ Rhodian possession of the mainland seems to have predated the *synoikismos* and expanded gradually to include the entire Chersonesos peninsula by the end of the fourth century.⁷⁴ These acquisitions constituted the incorporated, or integrated, Peraia.⁷⁵ Yet it is the evolution of the subject Peraia that concerns us here. The traditional view that most of this territory had been acquired by 281 BC, with the exception of Stratonikeia and Kaunos, has been called into question, and it now seems likely that Rhodian expansion in southwestern Karia was a more gradual process, spanning the whole of the third century and not necessarily following the principle of contiguity that governs modern reconstructions of conquest.⁷⁶ This is suggested most strongly by the inconsistent meaning of “peraiā” in our sources, and supported by historical circumstance. Polybios and Livy understand the term as referring to all Rhodian-held territory in Karia, while Rhodian inscriptions exclude certain towns, or even the entire “subject” Peraia, from the phrase *to peran*, even though the island still controlled these areas.⁷⁷ Such ambiguity reveals a swathe of territory difficult to define and thus a target for different forms of generalization. Moreover, it seems unlikely that Rhodes would have been able to compete with the aggression of Ptolemy I, Seleukos I, and Lysimachos before Korupedion, nor would Philadelphos likely have accepted any territorial acquisitions made by the Rhodians following Seleukos’ assassination, uncontested as the Egyptian monarch was in the area until the Seleukid accession of Antiochos II.⁷⁸ It is only with the Seleukid resurgence around 260 BC that Rhodes would have been able to play the two empires against each other to expand militarily or diplomatically. The disintegration of Seleukos II’s hold on Asia Minor proved an especially good opportunity for Rhodes, probably resulting in the acquisition by gift of Stratonikeia around 220—if so, presumably by protecting Seleukid interests elsewhere in Karia, as the Rhodians were later to do for the Ptolemies, resulting in an agreement allowing the island to purchase Kaunos.⁷⁹ By the end of the century, and possibly before the obtainment of Stratonikeia, the subject Peraia also came to include the territories of Pisye, Idyma, and Kyllandia/Kallipolis.⁸⁰

Thus, before the invasion of Philip V in 201 BC, Rhodes seems to have controlled a significant portion of Karia east of the Knidian peninsula, stretching as far as Stratonikeia to the north, with an uncertain eastern boundary. In addition, the Rhodian sphere of

influence had come to include coastal sites outside its direct control. In 215 BC, Rhodes assisted Iasos in its defense against the Antigonid dynast, Olympichos, and more impressively, protected the Ptolemaic possessions in Karia, including Kaunos and Halikarnassos, from conquest at the hands of Antiochos the Great.⁸¹ After the brief but significant setback inflicted by Philip, who captured Stratonikeia and much of the subject Peraia, Rhodes was able to recover its position, and in 191 BC purchased Kaunos from Ptolemy V for 200 talents.⁸² By the time of Apamea, the island had established itself as a power worthy of inheriting Karia (and Lykia), replacing the void created by the weakened Hellenistic states.

* * *

It is worth interrupting our narrative to consider the state of affairs in Karia from 230 to 188 BC. Four powers (to ignore the brief Attalid presence) controlled territory in the region: the Ptolemies preserved enclaves on the west coast and on the border with Lykia; the Seleukids held some of the interior, and came to reconquer most of Karia under Antiochos III; the Antigonids carved out a small province around Mylasa and Alinda; finally, Rhodes continually expanded in the southwest. The boundaries during this period were ever shifting, as was the extent of control exerted over the communities within each sphere. Consequently, the political map was further complicated by the advent and spread of independent communities, such as Mylasa, Miletos, Iasos, and possibly Euromos, a development intensified by the rivalry between the “players” of the high political “game.” It is this period of over 40 years, then, that paved the way for the apex of freedom for the cities of Karia (and Asia Minor) in the second century, just as much as the Roman stipulation at Apamea.⁸³

After the defeat of Antiochos III, Rome granted or reaffirmed full liberty—full in that the guarantor of this freedom had no political interest in Karia, for the time being—for Miletos, Alabanda, Herakleia on the Latmos, Knidos, Myndos, Halikarnassos, Iasos, and surely other cities as well.⁸⁴ It is from this perspective that the Rhodian province of Karia, granted to the island in return for their assistance to the Romans against Antiochos, should be considered. Since the free cities controlled much of western Karia, Rhodian expansion would only have been significant in the eastern half of the region.⁸⁵ This perhaps explains the contrasting responses of Karia and neighboring Lykia, who violently opposed the Rhodian takeover. Karia appeared a more passive subject of its new master because, on the one hand, many of its inhabitants were not in fact subject; on the other hand, a large portion of “Rhodian Karia” was already accustomed to a state of dependency, leaving a much smaller population to resist dominion

than the entire province of Lykia. This may also explain the venting of animosity just before and after the withdrawal of the Rhodians in places like Kaunos, Amyzon and Panamara, where the name of the Rhodian *epistates* was chiseled off.⁸⁶ Such hostility is understandable considering that the latter two communities were only a short journey away from independent cities like Alabanda and Mylasa, which must have served as a constant reminder of a more privileged status.

At the same time, Rhodes surely considered the free cities of Karia to be within its sphere of influence, and effected a number of treaties with these communities to ensure that its interests were kept, much in the same way that the Hellenistic kings since Antigonos Monophthalmos had used diplomacy to exercise some measure of control without reneging on their claims to uphold Greek autonomy.⁸⁷ Indeed, forms of Rhodian coinage circulated or were imitated throughout the region.⁸⁸ More impressively, the Rhodians feature prominently as arbiters in several local disputes during this period, and were the subject of some hostility, since Mylasa and Alabanda fought a war against them in 167.⁸⁹ It is important to keep this fact in mind when considering the factors involved in a city's behavior, even if liberated. In any case, in the same year as its war with Mylasa, Rhodes was punished for its wishy-washy stance in the Third Macedonian War, and both Karia and Lykia were freed, effectively ending the involvement of any high political power in Karia south of the Maiandros, other than Rome.

E. From liberty to Roman province

From 167 to 133 BC, Karia essentially lacked a high political history. It was not part of any empire, since there is no evidence for Pergamene expansion south of the Maiandros following Rhodes' forced withdrawal. Attalid attention was diverted by a successful Gallic revolt, though they did receive assistance from a warlord from Tabai in northeastern Karia, and later a bitter war with Prusias. Where they were granted new territories at this time, these seem to have been only in Thrace.⁹⁰ True, many communities maintained good relations with Rome, which no doubt limited their foreign policy to actions in the interest of the Republic.⁹¹ Still, most affairs of the cities and *koina* of Karia fell outside the gambit of Roman concern—especially with attention focused on Spain, mainland Greece, and Karthage—resulting in a diverse and disintegrated political landscape. Karian history, then, is equivalent to its local histories for these forty years.

More difficult to determine is the region's status following the death of Attalos III and the creation of the Roman province of Asia. If this

consisted roughly of the Pergamene kingdom, then it would seem that the Karian communities continued to enjoy their independence until their gradual incorporation (likely during the Mithridatic Wars) into the administration of the empire. However, the involvement of certain Karian cities in the rebellion of Aristonikos, mostly on the side of Rome, complicates the issue and may have given the Romans the opportunity to expand their direct rule now that they had abandoned their policy of noninvolvement.⁹² To add to the confusion, it is not even certain if all of Karia was provincially governed by 88 BC. In gratitude for Stratonikeia's assistance against Mithridates, Sulla granted the city Keramos and Themissos.⁹³ This act could be an internal reorganization of Roman territory, but it is just as plausible that the general was rewarding an autonomous ally in the same way that the Romans rewarded Attalos and Rhodes a century earlier. The suggestion that the region entered the empire in 85 BC, since Mithridates' conquest gave Rome the pretext for annexation, still seems the most plausible, and is followed by the majority of scholars.⁹⁴

SECTION 2: LOCAL KARIAN HISTORIES

The second section of this chapter will trace the local history of each community involved in a *sympoliteia*, except where the evidence for a community does not exceed that for the *sympoliteia* itself.⁹⁵ By "local history" I mean the events and behavior that involved the settlements of Karia without reference (primarily) to the players of the high political game sketched above. The resulting account, in combination with [chapter 2](#), will reveal a highly active world at the level of the *polis* (and *koinon*). A narrative relating the progress of each city from a status of subjection to freedom, however, has no place here. Indeed, the issue of when a city became liberated in more than just name alone is best avoided. It is impossible to decide such matters without reference to some criterion of "freedom" that is imposed on the ancient Greeks from without.⁹⁶ More importantly, it will become clear that cities like Miletos appear no different epigraphically before and after such liberating moments as the treaty of Apamea, at least in terms of political institutions and behavior. Milesians were just as capable of passing decrees and making decisions with regard to foreign affairs when only "nominally free" as during their complete independence. The nature, then, of what follows will be less a narrative relating an increase or decline in autonomy than an impressionistic study and an attempt at identifying patterns of political behavior. This will still help us contextualize the event of a

sympoliteia without doing injustice to the lacunose quality of our evidence.

Before discussing each community individually, two comments on Karian topography and one on non-*polis* communities are necessary. First, as in the rest of western Asia Minor, the mountainous nature of the region promoted the rise of a large number of small communities within a rather small area, each in control of one of the many small plains formed by these mountains, or in some cases, sharing the same, larger plain.⁹⁷ This latter scenario seems to have been the case in the “Euromid” (the plain containing Euromos and several other cities) as well as around the future site of Stratonikeia, whose *demes* were originally independent settlements (see below).⁹⁸ Our second observation is that these same mountains facilitated east-west communication but hindered north-south communication in Karia. As a result, contacts between coast and hinterland, and among coastal sites (by boat), were more common than communication along inland communities not along the major roads.⁹⁹ It is important to keep this in mind when discussing foreign relations, as well as direction of expansion (or in our case, direction of *sympoliteia* formation). Finally, it is essential to remember just how little we know of the status of non-*polis* communities within an empire. Much more than the controversies surrounding the *polis*-empire power dynamic, the position of villages, and even *koina*, vis-à-vis a Hellenistic ruler permits a number of possibilities, which severely complicates the local political history of Karia and poses particular problems for our picture of regional communication and, subsequently, urban expansion into non-civic areas.¹⁰⁰ What sort of access, trade or otherwise, did a Greek *polis* have to a nearby village controlled by a king? With respect to territorial expansion, one imagines that a village in the *chôra basileôs* would have been much less susceptible to voluntary incorporation than an autonomous but dependent settlement: the former would have been an act of aggression against the king, while the latter could have been justified as an expression of his subjects’ will, and ultimately would not have jeopardized his control of the community, while possibly extending his influence over the incorporating city.¹⁰¹ However, with the removal of any imperial presence in Karia after 167 BC, the situation becomes entirely opaque. Did every village, no matter how small, enjoy Rome’s gift of freedom? This seems highly doubtful. It seems safer to confess our ignorance and to keep in mind the susceptibility of the Karian landscape to an ever-changing dynamic, but to identify a community as lacking autonomy only in concrete cases of political absorption.

A. Latmos/Herakleia on the Latmos

Epigraphical texts being rather scanty, treatment of these two sites has focused on particular moments in the cities' history, such as its relationship to Antiochos III or the *sympoliteia* with Pidasa (see [chapter 2](#)), or on the archaeological material, especially the impressive fortifications, and the question of when Latmos was abandoned and Herakleia founded.¹⁰² The settlement of Latmos arose on the shores of the synonymous gulf (now a lake) some time in the sixth century, and persisted at least until our evidence for the *sympoliteia* it sought to form with Pidasa (late fourth century).¹⁰³ At this time, the city was dismantled to help found the new city of Herakleia. Peschlow, following Krischen's comparison of Herakleia's walls with those of Priene and Ephesos, dates this foundation to ca. 300 BC, that is, in association with Pleistarchos' rule over Karia and the city's former name of Pleistarcheia.¹⁰⁴ Hüllden's emphasis on the military nature of Herakleia's material remains in the early third century strongly suggests that this site functioned as a capital, or even a citadel, for Pleistarchos and his successor, Eupolemos, especially since public structures like an agora and the *bouleuterion* appear only in the second century.¹⁰⁵ This raises questions about the consequences of the foundation of Pleistarcheia/Herakleia for the inhabitants of Latmos. Did they become citizens of the new city, and in what sense, if the site's essential purpose was to house a large army? If the dismantling of Latmos was only undertaken with respect to the old city's walls, then perhaps the formation of Herakleia as a city was more a gradual development involving the parallel withdrawal of armed forces and transfer of the Latmian population. If this is the case, then the late appearance of public buildings in the city, as well as the absence of foreign relations until the late third century, make more sense. In any event, the city seems to have flourished in the second century, experiencing marked urbanization and forming ties with local communities, Miletos in particular, with whom it fought a war and, in the wake of this conflict, enjoyed an alliance.¹⁰⁶ In the post-Rhodian period we also find the city in treaty with Amyzon, its northern neighbor.¹⁰⁷ Hopefully, continuing excavations will help to illuminate this picture.

B. Miletos

The amount of material uncovered at Miletos by the excavations of the Deutsches Archäologisches Institut has given us a much greater understanding of this city than most of the rest of Karia (or indeed Asia Minor). Peter Herrmann has amply treated the political history of the polis in the second century, but it is the epigraphic output of the *Milet* volumes that will most inform our interest in the diplomatic

history of Miletos.¹⁰⁸ The inscriptions reveal continuity between the Classical and Hellenistic periods in terms of relations with other Greek states. Parallel to its *isopoliteia* treaties with Sardis, Olbia, Kyzikos, and Phygela in the fourth century, the city fostered a series of good relationships with other communities in the period leading up to Apamea. The Milesian *dêmos* voted honors for Knidos in 282 BC, made a treaty with the cities of Krete in the mid-third century, and established *isopoliteia* with Kios, Seleukeia/Tralles, and Mylasa in the closing decades.¹⁰⁹ Good relations with Athens also commenced around 200 BC.¹¹⁰ This output matches, if not exceeds the city's decrees involving Hellenistic monarchs, suggesting the importance to Miletos of healthy connections with the neighbors in its peer group, both nearby and farther afield. It also proves the unsuitability of the high political map as a gage for predicting or explaining the activity of a settlement within one sphere of influence. For example, Miletos' dealings with Krete, an island entirely outside the confines of Seleukid power, requires an explanation (probably protection from piracy) that does not take into account the will of a Hellenistic ruler. Even the treaty with the significantly renamed Seleukeia (Tralles) seems an act of local politics, since it occurred at a time (218/217 BC) when Seleukid power was at its weakest in Karia, if it was existent at all (see above).¹¹¹

What motivated Miletos in these instances? P. Herrmann identifies two aims in Milesian politics beyond a desire for good relations with other states. On the one hand, the city's interaction with Krete, through both treaty and mercenary recruitment, as well as the increased appearance of magistrates such as the *hêiromenoi epi tēi phulakêi* and the *teichopoi*, suggest a concern for military security. On the other hand, expansion seems to drive actions such as the absorptions of Myous and Pidasia (see [chapter 2](#)) and the increase of the citizenry through *politeia* grants. In addition to enfranchising and settling a group of Kretan mercenaries in their territory, Miletos issued individual grants of citizenship to at least 190 individuals from 60 different communities during the third and second centuries.¹¹² While these grants may have individually occurred under specific conditions that had little to do with general Milesian policy, they also suggest an interest in augmenting the population, and thus the resources on which the city could draw. Such territorial and demographic expansion can also be inferred from the tensions it produced: in the early second century, Miletos fought wars with Herakleia on the Latmos, which neighbored Pidasia, and Magnesia on the Maiandros, which bordered and had possessed the territory of Myous for a time.¹¹³ Since Milesian foreign policy remained consistent both before and after Apamea, we can deduce a tendency toward independent

action precisely during the time when the high political map of Karia was divided between several powers, none of which held any real advantage. One might note the relatively uncontested influence of Rhodes, at least before 167, which can be demonstrated by the arbitration of the island power in Miletos' war with Magnesia (see above).¹¹⁴ Rhodian power, however, was not sufficient (or concerned enough) to prevent these wars from occurring, or from bringing the conflict to an end without including 13 other states in the arbitration process. The freedom declared by the Romans, then, was significant insofar as it eliminated the possibility of interference from a Hellenistic king in the city's internal and external politics—especially a territorial “theft” like that of Philip V's transfer of Myous to Magnesia, and limited the ways in which Rhodian influence could exert itself.¹¹⁵ However, a tradition of pragmatic autonomy was established well before 188 BC, and continued apace. The main difference in the second century lay in the new opportunities for action that a mosaic of free communities permitted: local wars with neighbors such as Herakleia and Magnesia would no longer attract the intervention of a Seleukid, Antigonid, or Ptolemaic army (and apparently not a Roman one either).

At the same time, ties with communities on both sides of the Aegean became even more intensified in the wake of Antiochos' defeat by Rome. Miletos seems to have enjoyed a certain level of respect throughout this world, and often supplied judges to resolve disputes within or between foreign cities.¹¹⁶ It is worth noting that Miletos' diplomatic foreign policy tended in two directions, insofar as it is visible. First, the city heavily favored dealings with traditionally Greek cities like Byzantion, Eretria, Epidauros, Sparta, and Smyrna. On the other hand, efforts at forming more local ties—the *isopoliteia* treaties with Seleukeia and Mylasa, the *sympoliteia* with Pidasas, and the war/alliance with Herakleia—can either be explained as symptomatic of territorial ambition—not only *sympoliteia* but *isopoliteia*, if the partner community was close enough, could result in an increased population and resources—or indicate the inclusion of certain Karian cities within the “community” of *poleis*. The interaction with historically Greek communities does not suggest a one-sided interest in interaction with Greeks, but instead implies the importance of certain behavior and the advertising of this conduct in relation to Greek communities, whereas the city's ambitions in Karia, clear from the stipulations of the treaty with Pidasas (see [Chapter 2](#)), could often be pursued without reference to publication. One imagines that trade relations were maintained with a number of hinterland communities.

Finally, it should be noted that, contrary to the rest of Karia, Miletos' epigraphical record suggests that the war with Aristonikos

brought about a significant change in the city's independence. The absence of decrees from this time for about a century bears convincing witness to what seems to have been a curtailment of the once highly active *polis*. Although such a gap could be due to the chance nature of discovery, the richness of the Milesian corpus makes the contrast with earlier (and later) periods all the more striking.¹¹⁷ On the other hand, the only positive evidence that Miletos may have become part of the province of Asia is the *Kultesgesetz* from ca. 130 BC regulating the worship of the Roman *dēmos* and Rome.¹¹⁸ At first glance, this seems too much of a coincidence to not be a powerful statement of Roman overlordship in the city. Yet there are problems with such an interpretation. First, we cannot precisely date the inscription because it falls within the period for which we lack the list of Milesian eponymous *stephanephoroi*. Rehm argues for the above-mentioned date on the probability that Kratinos son of Diogenes was the son of Diogenes son of Kratinos, *stephanephoros* in 170 BC.¹¹⁹ While 40 years is not an impossible distance between the terms of father and son, it is extreme, and it is just as plausible that Kratinos was the great-grandson of our securely dated Diogenes. This would push the date of the text into the last decade of the second century or, more probably, the early first century. In this case the setting up of a cult to the Roman people and their city can obviously be tied to the Mithridatic Wars, but does little to explain the Milesian dearth of decrees from the mid-second century. If, however, the Kratinos of the sacred law is in fact the son of Diogenes, then I find it more credible to date the text to *before* the Aristonikeian War, which would then make the text a means to good relations with a hegemonic, though not necessarily imperial or even directly present Rome. In fact, such an interpretation is possible regardless of how we date the inscription. In the end, it is the lack of decrees in the late second and early first centuries that speaks most loudly of the end of Milesian independence.

C. Mylasa

Despite its relative prominence in the region, Mylasa still has not received a synoptic treatment, although much good scholarship has been done on its epigraphic corpus.¹²⁰ The presence of the modern town over the ancient ruins prevents substantial archaeological investigation. Although Mylasa was already publishing decrees under Maussollos, its history as a community capable of participating in the activities and discourse of a city-state really does not commence until it ceased to house the satrap of the province of Karia, that is, with the downfall of Eupolemos in the mid-280s BC (see above).¹²¹ This “change” in status may not have been acknowledged as a significant

development at the time—in other words, recognition of a new potential for action may have evolved slowly. At the same time, Mylasa’s “insignificance” may also be due to its loss of a viable harbor as a result of a decision by Alexander in favor of Iasos. We learn from *Iasos* 30 that the conquering king was persuaded by two Iasians to return (ἀπέδοσαν) the “Little Sea” to Iasos, and Reger has convincingly argued that this refers to a small bay, now a swampy marsh due to alluviation, which was Mylasa’s only outlet to the sea.¹²² Mylasa’s reemergence in the epigraphical record is best tied to its grant of freedom in 246/45, which, though this did not eliminate its relations with the Seleukids, comes out most fully in the ties that the city began forming with *poleis* such as Rhodes and Miletos.¹²³ Moreover, evidence for Mylasean international relations increases in the second century, revealing interaction with Krete, Priene, Magnesia, Tralles, and Teos, as well as three inscriptions in which the name of the foreign state has been lost.¹²⁴ This is largely coincidental to Mylasa’s more local push toward expansion, largely through *sympoliteiai*, at the end of the third century and first half of the second century, to be discussed in detail in the following chapter. Not included in this later discussion is Mylasa’s control of the sanctuary of Labraunda, the third-century assertion of which was not the result of an expansionist policy, but instead portrayed as the reclamation of already held property.¹²⁵ Here we need only note the active, if slightly less prominent nature of Mylasa’s foreign relations with other *poleis*, at least in comparison with a city like Miletos.

D. Iasos

Our knowledge the history of Iasos’ foreign relations is possible in large part due to the hearty and ongoing archaeological and survey work of the Scuola Archeologica di Atene.¹²⁶ The city entertained, like Miletos, a vast array of connections with other states throughout the Hellenistic period, both Greek and Karian.¹²⁷ In addition, more recent epigraphical finds bear witness to a series of honorary citizenship grants by Iasos to individuals from a host of cities, which attests to a similar range of interaction.¹²⁸ The ties with inland Karian communities like Theangela, Alabanda, Labraunda, and Hydisos (as well as three unaffiliated sons of Peldemis) are particularly interesting, first because they commence at around the same time as Iasos’ relations with other Aegean *poleis*—in at least one case earlier¹²⁹—and on account of the relatively small size of these communities, Chalketor and Hydisos in particular.¹³⁰ This suggests an interest in the Karian hinterland different from (and more invested than) that of Miletos, who rarely treated with its inland neighbors as

equals (see above). Iasos' *modus operandi* was a continuation of their attentive relations with the Hekatomnids.¹³¹ Of course, our conclusion could stem from an imbalanced perspective of the evidence. Yet the rich epigraphical representation in both cities makes this unlikely. Nor did the city neglect to cast a broader "net" of diplomatic relations, fostering ties with both the prestigious (Athens, Sparta, Argos), and the remote (Samothrake, Naukratis, Kyrene).

E. Stratonikeia Area (and the Chrysaoric League)

Ongoing Turkish excavations at Stratonikeia and the work of M. Çetin Şahin, Pierre Debord, and Riet van Bremen have shed light on the complex internal history of the city.¹³² Located in a rather large (for Karia) plain that juts out fingers into the surrounding mountains, Stratonikeia offers an ideal setting for a site from which to control the number of communities situated in the foothills and possessing various sections of the plain. The city is unique among the communities considered here, because it was founded by a Seleukid king (probably Antiochos II, see above) and thus from its inception was conceived of as a royal possession. It is unclear what this meant in terms of the colony's demographics, some scholars seeing a predominantly Macedonian settlement, while others argue for a large indigenous population from the beginning.¹³³ From an imperial standpoint, Stratonikeia was no doubt intended to serve as a local administrative center for Seleukid holdings in Karia. To elaborate on this statement is difficult, but if we consider the different forms of control exercised by Hellenistic kings over village settlements (see Introduction), it seems reasonable to think of the city as a nodal point for this control: from Stratonikeia royal officials could manage the tribute owed by the surrounding villages, whether these were located in the *chôra basileôs*, part of a private (Macedonian?) estate, or members in a *koinon*.

The plausibility of this scenario bears directly on an important aspect of Stratonikeian history: expansion.¹³⁴ Seven demotics are attested for the city in the imperial period, but only five in abundance, so that it is assumed that the other two, Panamara and Londarga, were outlying areas and probably later additions.¹³⁵ Since at least three of the five "main" demes of the city were formerly independent communities (Koraza, Hierakome, Koliorga), it stands to reason that they were absorbed into Stratonikeia.¹³⁶ The question is when. Debord favors immediate incorporation at the city's foundation.¹³⁷ However, Gabrielsen points to the disparity in date between the evidence for Stratonikeia's deme names (late 2nd c.) and the foundation of the city. Moreover, a decree by the Korazeis (*IStratonikeia* 549), which does not

use a dating formula based on the Stratonikeian *stephanephoros*, suggests that this community was still an independent settlement until 167 BC.¹³⁸ Gabrielsen concludes from this evidence that none of the five “later” demes existed until the late second century.¹³⁹ While such a position seems extreme—for one, it involves generalizing about locales (Koraia and Lobolda) for which we have no evidence until they appear as demes—Gabrielsen does seem right in imagining a dependent status of the surrounding communities prior to their complete absorption. This dependence was likely conceived in terms of Stratonikeia’s role as a Seleukid governmental center, and thus would not have involved shared citizenship. Such a dynamic doubtless continued when the city was given to Rhodes. That Stratonikeia did not entirely subsume its neighbors can be attributed to its own dependent status within the Seleukid and Rhodian empires. However, with independence in 167 BC, Stratonikeia was in a position, both pragmatically and conceptually, to strive for direct territorial expansion. Prior to this, we should not rule out the possibility that Rhodes encouraged, or the communities themselves sought, an extension of political rights, yet given our ignorance of the original make-up of Stratonikeia, we cannot do more than rule out this possibility for Koraza at least.¹⁴⁰ On the other hand, that an independent Stratonikeia persuaded Koraza, Panamara, and possibly other communities as well, to become incorporated into the city as a deme through a *sympoliteia*, is a consideration that we will discuss in [chapter 2](#).

This “late blooming” of Stratonikeia as an autonomous *polis* finds corroboration in the epigraphic record. Inscriptions from the city are far overshadowed by stelai from nearby sanctuaries like Lagina and Panamara. In fact, before the first century BC, there is little evidence for contacts with the Greek world, or any foreign state, for that matter. When these contacts do emerge, the dating of the evidence is uncertain. An honorific for a judge from Assos and similar decrees for men from Alabanda and Smyrna remain undated and could be post-Hellenistic.¹⁴¹ Of course, the incomplete and ongoing excavation of the site, in particular the sanctuary of Zeus Chrysaoreus, may account for this dearth, but until new evidence suggests otherwise, the invisibility of Stratonikeia before Roman rule remains striking.

Such a low profile must be considered when determining the city’s role in the Chrysaoric League. This federation continues to be a source of confusion and argument. What we can be certain of is that the league, first attested in 267 BC, consisted of cities, *pace* Strabo, and was primarily a religious body.¹⁴² Gabrielsen’s attempt to see the league as an “artificially created political community” has no basis, other than in speculation spawned from lack of evidence. The one

quasi-political event in which the league was involved was its dispute with Mylasa regarding control over the sanctuary at Labraunda. However, this dispute did not necessarily occur at the same level as territorial conflicts, since, for one, the league cannot be said to have had any territory. In fact, the language of the inscription informing us of the dispute, *Labraunda* III.1 #5, suggests that it was not the Chrysaoric League *in toto* that sought to appropriate the sanctuary, but one (or some) of its members. The Mylaseans voted to exclude το[ὺς δ]ὲ Χ[ρυσ]σαορεῖς ζητοῦντας ἐ[ξ]ιδιάσθαι from the sanctuary (ll.16f.). Now the position of ζητοῦντας seems to justify Crampa's interpretation of the participle as circumstantial: "the Chrysaoreis . . . as they were seeking to appropriate it for themselves." However, elsewhere in the inscription (ll. 7, 15), Χ[ρυσ]σαορεῖς appears unprecedented by an article. This suggests that the article in line 16 specifies a subset of Chrysaoreans trying to control the sanctuary and hence deprived of access to it, and was not repeated in front of ζητοῦντας for the sake of brevity. Thus, this passage should be translated, "the Chrysaoreis who sought to appropriate it for themselves," which makes better sense given the fact that Mylaseans were themselves Chrysaoreans! Rather than excluding all members of the league from Labraunda, a place of worship ancestral to many Karian communities (cf. Her. 1.171), the Mylaseans had refuted any claim to possession of the sanctuary based on membership in the Chrysaoric League and were punishing those Chrysaoreis—whether these were individuals or communities is unclear—who had challenged their authority. Furthermore, "ownership" of the sanctuary seems to have amounted to a share in temple revenues, since this is the only concrete benefit to be garnered from the inscription.¹⁴³ Even if the entire league was laying claim to the material profits of Labraunda, evidence of finances is not enough to warrant the label of "political community."

If, then, the Chrysaoric League did not have a specific political agenda (in the ancient sense of this phrase), then it is doubtful that a city's position of power within the league would have provided a major impetus to incorporate villages (which determined the voting power of each member according to Strabo). In the context of second-century Karia the influence of a religious federation apart from its rites and festivals would have been minimal. No attested connection between Rhodes and the league survives, and, with no external threats looming after 167 BC, free communities would have had little reason to support a political federation. Returning to Stratonikeia, which controlled the sanctuary of Zeus Chrysaoreus and, by Strabo's time, held the most votes in the league on account of the number of villages it possessed, we should not assume that the city benefited greatly from

its relationship to the league before the first century. For one, many of these villages were likely still autonomous in the second century; moreover, it is possible that the Chrysaoric League took on a more significant role only after direct incorporation into the Roman Empire, no doubt eager to take advantage of any centralized body as an administrative tool.

F. Keramos

The fullest, and only, treatment of the city of Keramos, is the fortunate monograph by Marcello Spanu.¹⁴⁴ Keramos is a settlement on the southern coast of Karia, just before the protrusion of the Halikarnassan peninsula begins to jut out past Kos and Kalymna. It possesses an excellent harbor 2 km from the town, and its main stream has created a rather fertile valley (especially in comparison to the surrounding area) of 30–40 miles in length leading to sources near Stratonikeia.¹⁴⁵ It is unclear where the city fell in terms of the high politics of the region: its location would suggest control or at least influence by the Ptolemies—a presumption slightly strengthened by the presence of a Serapeion in the town¹⁴⁶—but the possibility of a relationship with Rhodes, perhaps through an alliance, cannot be excluded due to the proximity of the Peraia.¹⁴⁷ Quite possibly, both options were true at different periods, the pro-Ptolemaic Rhodians filling the shoes of the weakened Lagid Empire. Ties with the Greek world seem to have been mediated largely through Rhodes in the early second century, the earliest date of our inscriptional evidence. After 167, the port of Keramos gained importance as a commercial harbor, now that Rhodian dominance of trade routes was at an end. Nonetheless, any prosperity the city may have enjoyed was terminated when the Roman Senate awarded it to Stratonikeia in 81 BC for the latter's support during the Mithridatic War. By the time of Strabo, Keramos' relationship to Stratonikeia was conceived of by the geographer in terms of the Chrysaoric *systema* that the latter city controlled (14.2.25).

G. Kos and Kalymna

This history of Kos, amply illuminated by Sherwin-White's monumental *Ancient Cos*, contains two events of relevance to the development of *sympoliteiai* in Karia.¹⁴⁸ The first, the *synoikismos* of the island's *poleis* into the single city of Kos in 366 BC, will be discussed in [chapter 2](#).¹⁴⁹ The second is the incorporation of the island into Maussollos' satrapy of Karia. At first an ally of Kos (by the late 360s), Maussollos was able to assert direct control over the island by

the end of the Social War (355 BC), a situation that lasted until the city's liberation in 332 BC.¹⁵⁰ The most lasting implication of this conquest was the establishment, or strengthening, of ties between the island and the Karian mainland. Diodoros tells of the benefits enjoyed by Kos from its trade with the new capital of Halikarnassos, and the coincidental rise of the Koan wine trade at this time suggests that a substantial new market had opened up.¹⁵¹ No doubt these lines of communication persisted into the Hellenistic period.

Not surprisingly, Kos maintained good relations with a number of Greek states throughout the Aegean. Teos and Lebedos, in their failed *synoikismos* under Antigonos Monophthalmos, requested to use the Koan law code until they had drafted their own.¹⁵² Favorable ties are also in evidence in the late fourth/early third century with Samos, Ephesos, Miletos, Phokaia, Chios, Athens, and Hamaxitos and Gryneion (these latter two located in the Troad and Aiolis).¹⁵³ In 282 BC, Kos began sending *theoroi* to Delos, thus establishing connections with the Cyclades (and probably the Nesiotic League) that persisted into the second century.¹⁵⁴ The city sought to capitalize on these wide-ranging relations when in 242 BC it sought international recognition for the sanctuary and festival of Asklepios on the island. *Asylia* was granted by *poleis* from Thessaly, the Peloponnese, Krete, Korkyra, Sicily, Italy, Kios, Iasos, Chios, and Samothrake.¹⁵⁵ Another connection that was important to the Koans was their relationship with Rhodes. Although evidence from the early part of the third century is lacking, there seems to have been a tight-knit bond between the two states by 220 and lasting until 167 BC. Kos consistently followed Rhodes' lead with regard to acts of alliance and war. Accordingly, it was the only other city to aid Sinope against Mithridates II of Pontos, sided with Rhodes in its war against the Kretan states and then Philip V (see above and [chapter 2](#)), and joined the larger island in befriending Rome in the second century.¹⁵⁶ Thus, we can safely say that contact with the Greek world was an important and prevalent occurrence on Kos.

As for Kalymna, relations seem to have been limited to states on nearby islands or the coast of Asia Minor.¹⁵⁷ *Proxenia* and citizenship were thus awarded to individuals from Lampsakos, Knidos, Kardias, and Halikarnassos, and a Iasian judge settled a dispute on the island.¹⁵⁸ In addition, Kalymna made a few vase dedications at Delos, suggesting favorable ties with the Kyklades.¹⁵⁹ However, the small island did not possess as extensive a network of connections as its neighbor and eventual partner in *homopoliteia*.

Conclusion

A comparison of the above surveys—of the high political history of Karia and the patterns of foreign activity in the individual cities, respectively—reveals two major developments that are directly relevant to a study of *sympoliteiai*. First, starting from around 230 BC and continuing through the second century, that is, precisely when most Karian *sympoliteiai* occurred, autonomy tended to proliferate, both in communities already nominally free and in settlements without any prior pretension to such status, at the ideological and practical levels. Thus cities like Miletos and Mylasa, one liberated as early as 314 BC by Antigonos Monophthalmos, the other freed considerably later, were able to pursue legitimate foreign policies by the end of the third century, forming numerous alliances and expanding territorial boundaries. Similar free reign was achieved, albeit somewhat later, by less traditional *poleis*, Stratonikeia for example. This Seleukid colony and Rhodian possession became the most powerful inland Karian city in the first century as a result of the independence and, eventually, additional territory granted by Rome. Even non-*poleis* communities came to adopt the language and expectations of the city-state: as we will see in [chapter 2](#), certain *koina* (Pisye-Pladasa, Panamara) spoke the language of autonomy prior to their inclusion in larger states.

At the same time, our evidence attests continuity in terms of the commitment to maintaining good relations with other Greek states, even if this was sometimes limited to the exchange of honors. Where this priority existed in the fourth century, it also persisted in later centuries, at times becoming even more prevalent (Miletos), though not always (Iasos). Where little contact existed previously, this situation did not radically change, even when a city became prominent (Stratonikeia).¹⁶⁰ Moreover, larger cities tended to spread their ties farther afield (Miletos, Kos), while smaller, but active, cities participated in a geographically focused network (Iasos, Kalymna). Finally, coastal settlements unsurprisingly fostered considerably more relations with foreign states than cities and villages of the hinterland.

A closer look at the language of these interactions provides insight into the specific nature of such international exchange. When describing individuals or whole communities, every *polis* under consideration expressed themselves in highly similar terms. Given the amount of evidence in question and its formulaic nature, a few examples will suffice to demonstrate this observation. When Knossos renewed its agreement (ὁμολογία) with Miletos, it promised that all its actions toward the latter city would be benevolent (πάντα τὰ φιλόανθρωπα), and described the relationship as a just and long-lasting friendship and good will (τὰμ φιλίαν καὶ τὰν εὖνοιαν τὰν ὑπαρχοῦσαν ἐκ τῶν πρότερον χρόνων πρὸς ἀλλήλους καθάπερ

δίκαιόν ἐστιν).¹⁶¹ When Mylasa sent a foreign judge to Tralles, the Tralleans called them well disposed (εὐ<ν>όως διακείμεν<ο>[ι]) and spoke of their benefaction (εὐεργεσίας) and other virtuous qualities.¹⁶² Just as common was the representation of specific representatives of a friendly *polis*, albeit in like manner. In the inscription just cited, the Mylasean judge Dionysios is called noble and good and distinguished by his trustworthiness and intelligence (καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν [καὶ π]ίστει καὶ συνέσει διαφέρ[οντα]).¹⁶³ Kos honored Kallikles of Halikarnassos as a benefactor of the city (εὐεργέταν τῆς πόλιος) for being εὐ[ν]ου[ς] to them and doing and saying what benefits all Koans (τὰ συμφέροντα πᾶσι Κωιοις).¹⁶⁴ The Ionian League publicized its gratitude to Hippostratos the Milesian by claiming that he ever treated them φιλανθρώπως and displayed ἀρετή (excellence) and εὐνοία.¹⁶⁵ Lastly, Mylasean judges in a dispute between Magnesia and Priene are called καλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοὶ who acted with all zeal and eagerness (μετὰ πάσης σπουδῆς καὶ προθυμίας).¹⁶⁶ Such language is consistently sprinkled throughout much, though not all,¹⁶⁷ of the documentary evidence attesting to relations between various Karian communities and *poleis* throughout the Aegean, just as it was for interactions between Hellenistic city-states more generally, as John Ma has amply established for this period.¹⁶⁸

It is worth exploring in detail the implications of this diplomatic context, namely the participation to varying degrees of many of the Karian communities involved in *sympoliteiai* in “peer polity interaction,” the term Ma borrows from archaeologists noting a similar context of exchange during the Archaic period. Of particular importance for thinking about the motives that may have driven elites within a community are the moral terms in which the behavior that drove these interactions was characterized. Communities and individuals are defined in terms of their good will, their eagerness, their benevolence, their friendliness, and their goodness. For individuals this is almost always summed up by the publicized title of *euergetês*. This terminology, while of necessity ambiguous to allow for the uniqueness of each particular situation to be subsumed under it, also suggests a commonly understood and shared set of values and code of behavior, the attainment of which was determined by an external judge (usually the citizen-body of a foreign *polis*), who nonetheless rendered its judgment in conformity with similar judgments by other communities. Such conformity not only emerges from the formulaic language of the evidence, but also from the fact that this evidence was intentionally displayed in public spaces available to non-local observers, such as the *dêmosion* of the Panionian sanctuary, in the case of Hippostratos of Miletos, and the Magnesian

agora, in the case of the Mylasean judges. Such uniform language in such “globalized” contexts would have been without significance unless a common understanding of the meaning of these terms underlay their use.

Thus, this underlying morality both shaped the aims and actions of its adherents and defined these actors as ethical subjects of this particular morality, that is, it formed the basis for an identity.¹⁶⁹ Moreover, it served to regulate and sustain the connections between the communities involved. As such, interactions between cities not only propagated and affirmed these values, but institutionalized the forum in which these values could be accessed. The emphasis here is on a stable and uniform system that establishes parity between each member of the network and forms a sense of relation between two cities. This image of inter-city relations in the Hellenistic world illuminates two aspects of our study. Most obviously, it can offer additional context for explaining why smaller towns sought to become part of larger, well-connected cities: to gain improved access to the network of interaction that defined value and status.¹⁷⁰ Of course, this hypothesis demands corroboration in the evidence, and this will be the task of the following chapter.

At the same time, the peer polity interaction model provides further justification for distinguishing an elite from the rest of the citizen body.¹⁷¹ When speaking of peer polity interaction, we must not allow ourselves to speak about the community as a monolithic agent whose members make decisions unanimously based on shared interests and concerns. Ma’s discussion of cities as participants in a peer polity network needs to be more precise about what and who was behind this participation. He is right to stress that elite activity, however “international,” was embedded in a particular city, which, as the site for honors, shaped every individual’s identity within civic parameters. Thus, in his view, membership in a *polis* was the *sine qua non* for elite participation in the network, which evaluated and rewarded behavior and from which one derived his sense of self-worth. But this should not obscure the fact that almost every form of inter-state communication was conducted by means of a small minority of citizens, who were, as we have seen, distinguished by the honors gained from serving as foreign ambassadors, benefactors, and judges.¹⁷² Moreover, these honors were not only marks of distinction that an individual shared with other honorees, but symbols and privileged expressions of the morality which came to define elite behavior and identity.¹⁷³ In Foucauldian terms, an (elite) individual’s praiseworthy action committed him toward conformity to a mode of being characteristic of the civic ethical subject.

This formulation of the relationship of a city’s elite to its foreign

policy has two important implications. First, because the dynamic element of the morality underlying peer polity interaction (and all public elite behavior, as we have seen) lay in its forms of subjectification—that is, in elites’ real behavior in relation to the value system that informed this behavior—the focus of this morality is on exercises of self-advertisement and practices of being an ethical subject.¹⁷⁴ To be worthy of honor meant performing worthily and publicizing this action for the entire community (both local and international) to see. Secondly, since the value system in which elites operated was rooted in civic and democratic values, elites were refused authoritative status not only in relation to specific instances of state policy, but also with regard to the truth of the value system itself. In other words, elites did not determine the morality to which they sought to conform in order to gain recognition as virtuous leading citizens. This in turn delimited the realm of possible aims and actions of any individual or group, as well as imposing an ideal of leadership predicated on notions of egalitarianism (submission of individual/group interests to the *dêmos*) and euergetism (the responsibilities of being wealthy). We will consider further the implications of this embeddedness in [chapter 3](#).

The different levels of exchange in which Karian cities were involved demands that we not assume a homogeneous participation in, or attraction to, the discursive network of Greek cities. Nonetheless, the decision of every historically visible community to express itself in the language and manner of Greek decrees makes it possible that such attraction did exist, most specifically as an incentive for wealthy individuals, either as members of “authentic” Greek *poleis* or as *xenoi* of smaller settlements hoping to gain citizenship through a *politeia* grant or a *sympoliteia* between their *patria* and another *polis*. As is considered in [chapter 2](#), this may explain the appeal of absorption by a larger or coastal city.¹⁷⁵ In addition, the interaction with Karian settlements and cities farther afield shows how each community’s claim to autonomy could survive and even coexist with the often domineering presence of a Hellenistic king (or Rhodes). Since these rulers communicated with cities in the same language in which cities communicated with each other, *poleis* in a sense controlled the image of a ruler’s power and were thereby able to preserve their dignity as autonomous and “genuine interlocutors.”¹⁷⁶ In other words, a monarch, however powerful, had to cast himself as a “peer polity” in order to interact with even the most insignificant Greek city. This “leveling effect” may have impressed smaller communities that were treated with less consideration, and provided impetus for at least the ambitious citizens therein to become involved in this world.

1. Most recently, and influentially, E. Will, *Histoire politique du monde hellénistique* (Nancy: Le Seuil, 1979), 329–35; Peter Green, *Alexander to Actium: the Historical Evolution of the Hellenistic Age* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 80, 337, 343–44, 382, 394, 453, 587, 589; and W. Runciman 1990, “Doomed to Extinction: The Polis as an Evolutionary Dead-End,” in *The Greek City: from Homer to Alexander*, ed. O. Murray and S. Price (New York: Clarendon Press, 1990), 347–67. For similar views in earlier scholarship, see n. 1 in Erich Gruen, “The Polis in the Hellenistic World,” in *Nomodeiktēs: Greek studies in honor of Martin Ostwald*, ed. R. Rosen and J. Farrell (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993).

2. See, for example, Gruen, “Polis in Hellenistic World,” 339–54 and J.-C. Couvenhes and H.-L. Fernoux, *Les cites grecques et la guerre en Asie mineure à l’époque hellénistique* (Paris: Presses universitaires François-Rabelais, 2004); cf. John Ma, “Fighting poleis of the Hellenistic World,” in *War and Violence in Ancient Greece*, ed. H. van Wees (London: Duckworth and Classical Press of Wales, 2000), 337–76.

3. This is also a major focus of John Ma’s work, *Antiochos III and the Cities of Western Asia Minor* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999 (reprint 2002)).

4. This narrative is indebted to, but moves beyond in synthesizing, the invaluable contributions of, among others, Hornblower, *Mausolus*; A. Mastrocinque, *La Caria e la Ionia meridionale in epoca ellenistica* (Roma: L’Erma di Bretschneider, 1979); Ma, *op. cit.*; the innumerable studies of Louis and Jean Robert (see bibliography); and the results of German excavations in Miletos, Italian excavations in Iasos, and French survey work in southern Karia.

5. Ma 2003, “Peer Polity Interaction in the Hellenistic World,” 9–39. Ma adopts the phrase/model from its original implementation by archaeologists of the Archaic Period (see especially Renfrew & Cherry 1986, *Peer Polity Interaction and Socio-Political Change*). He is, however, the first to apply this model to the world of the Hellenistic polis.

6. For a concise summary of the conflicting and confused definitions of Karia in antiquity, see Gary Reger, “Karia: a Case Study,” in *Regionalism in Hellenistic and Roman Asia Minor*, ed. H.W. Elton and G. Reger (Bordeaux: Ausonius, 2007), 92.

7. Strabo 14.29 says that the town of Karura, east of Antiocheia, marks the boundary between Karia and Phrygia. For the still (to my knowledge) unpublished inscription from Xystis, see Alain Bresson, “Les Cariens ou la mauvaise conscience du barbare,” in *Tra Oriente ed Occidente: Indigeni, Greci, e Romani in Asia Minore*, ed. G. Urso (Pisa: ETS, 2007), 209–28.

8. Laurent Capdetrey, *Le pouvoir séleucide: territoire, administration, finances d’un royaume hellénistique* (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2007), 236–41, infers this structural continuity from Polybios’ listing of all the regions in Asia Minor and their allotment to the Pergamene or Rhodian powers by Rome (21.46.9–11), but Polybios’ list still allows for an ambiguity of boundaries that could be interpreted more specifically and differently by the Romans without contradicting the basic structures indicated by these names.

9. The question of what it meant to be “Karian” in the Hellenistic period is a complex and under-researched topic that demands a full-length treatment of its own, which I intend to pursue in a future study. For the current goal of understanding the various levels of Karian history, it will suffice to leave this question open and focus on the *polis* identities of the various communities that appear in the evidence.

10. Tabai plateau: J. and L. Robert, *La Carie: le plateau de Tabai et ses environs* (Paris: Maisonneuve, 1937), 22–40; Maiandros valley: L. Robert, *Études Anatoliennes*, 415–417; cf. Ma, *Antiochos III*, 116 and n. 37.

11. Freedom from tribute: Ma, *Antiochos III*, 160–63; Seleukid tax-collecting

official: J. and L. Robert, *Amyzon*, 188; Ptolemaic *oikonomos*: *Labraunda* 43. Ma, *op. cit.*, 160–67 provides a thorough discussion of the Seleukid fiscal administration of Asia Minor, using much evidence from Karia.

12. Ma, *op. cit.*, 163–65.

13. *Ibid.*, 168–73.

14. Ernst Kirsten and Herbert Lehmann, *Die griechische Polis als historisch-geographisches Problem des Mittelmeerraumes* (Bonn: F. Dümmler, 1956) and, more focused on the Halikarnassian peninsula, Wolfgang Radt, *Siedlungen und Bauten auf der Halbinsel von Halikarnassos* (Tübingen: E. Wasmuth, 1970). For the predominance of village settlement in the hinterland of Karia, see Konon *FGrH* 26 F 1 and Strabo 660. cf. Hornblower, *Mausolus*, 10.

15. Her. 1.146, 171–72. The extent to which the Lelegians represented another ethnic group in Karia is both complex and irrelevant to the current discussion, since their identity seems to have been defined purely in terms of social status by the Hellenistic period. Philip of Theangela (*FGrH* 741 F 2) equates these people to helots and Penestai (from Thessaly). cf. Hornblower, *Mausolus*, 11–14, for a traditionalist interpretation. For a thorough discussion of the archaeological evidence see I. Pimouget-Pédarros and E. Geny, *L'archéologie de la défense* (Paris: Presses universitaires Franc-Comtoises, 2000), 136–60 and Frank Rumscheid, “Die Leleger: Karer oder Andere?” in *Die Karer und die Anderen*, ed. F. Rumscheid (Bonn: Habelt, 2009), 173–94.

16. Bresson, “Les Cariens,” 212–14 nicely summarizes the material and, implicitly, institutional similarities between Greek and Karian settlements.

17. Her. 6.20. Given that the Persians granted Milesian territory to these Pedeseans, it is clear that they did not participate with other Karians in the revolt.

18. Hornblower, *Mausolus*, 55–62. One might, however, question the received wisdom of equating the league with the term *Kares* in every case, since in Herodotos, for instance, it refers also to an externally identified ethnic group and can thus serve as convenient shorthand for the actions of any subset of that group. The league itself is only clearly identified by the term *koinon* in a third-century inscription (Robert 1937 #2), though mention of Arlissis, envoy of the *Kares* in a fourth-century document must also refer to the same body (*Syll.*³ 167). These examples of self-representation are a far cry from the outside perspectives of Herodotos and Diodoros.

19. Hornblower, *Mausolus*, 10. Cf. Bresson, “Les Cariens,” 212–215.

20. Blümel, “Zwei neue Inschriften aus Mylasa,” 29–42.

21. For the suggestion, however, that such joint action of independent communities represents the act of the Karian League, see R. Descat, “*Argyriion symmachikon* et l’histoire de la Carie à la fin du IV^e siècle a.C.,” in *Hellenistic Karia*, ed. R. van Bremen and J.-M. Carbon (Bordeaux: Ausonius, 2010), 142f.

22. Hornblower, *Mausolus*, 2 more confidently excludes the Hekatomnids from Karia east of the Tralles-Physkos road.

23. Diod. 17.23–24. Cf. Arrian 1.23.

24. For Philoxenos as satrap of Karia, Ps-Aristotle *Econ.* 2.32; Arrian 7.23.1; cf. Laurent Capdetrey, “Le roi, le satrape et le *koinon*: la question du pouvoir en Carie à la fin du IV^e siècle,” in *Stephanéphoros: de l’économie antique à l’Asie mineure*, ed. K. Konuk (Bordeaux: Ausonius, 2012), 232f. Against the possibility that Eumenes temporarily deprived Asandros of his position during his Asia Minor campaign in 321, Capdetrey adduces *FGrH* 156 F10 & 11. Cf. Mastrocinque, *La Caria*, 17.

25. Diod. 19.68.5.

26. Diod. 19.75.1–5

27. For a much fuller discussion of this issue, see Richard Billows, *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State* (Berkeley: University of California

Press, 1990), 189–236.

28. Plut. *Dem.* 7.5; for early relations between Iasos and Ptolemy I, see Roger Bagnall, *The Administration of the Ptolemaic Possessions outside Egypt* (Leiden: Brill, 1976), 89–91, who places the imposition of a garrison after 305. Cf. Adalberto Giovannini, “La traité entre Iasos et Ptolémée Ier (IK 28, 1, 2–3) et les relations entre les cités grecques d’Asie Mineure et les souverains hellénistiques,” *Epigraphica Anatolica* 37 (2004): 69–87. The assertion of Mastrocinque, *La Caria*, 24 that Ptolemy had taken Iasos in 313 seems without basis.

29. I follow Capdetrey, “Le roi, le satrape et le *koinon*,” 239–44 in assigning Eupolemos to the period immediately following Ipsos, which expands on the argument by Louis Robert, *Le sanctuaire de Sinuri près de Mylasa* (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1945), 57–62 (contested by Mastrocinque, *La Caria*, 37–40) that Pleistarchos took over Karia only when expelled from Kilikia by Demetrios in 299 BC (Plut. *Dem.* 31.6). This solution has all the advantages of the suggestion by Billows (“Anatolian Dynasts: The Case of Macedonian Eupolemos in Karia,” *Classical Antiquity* 8.2 (1989): 173–203) that Eupolemos ruled *after* Pleistarchos—it makes sense of what was in earlier scholarship an incongruity between Asandros’ rule in Mylasa (and Karia) and the apparently contemporary dominance of Eupolemos in the same area, as attested by *CIG* 2675, *Labraunda* 42, and a number of coins (*BMCCaria* 11)—without the oddity of Eupolemos reappearing almost 20 years after his last mention in the sources (Capdetrey, “Le roi, le satrape, et le *koinon*,” n. 141). Other proposals seem less satisfactory: 315–13 BC (R. Descat, “La carrière d’Eupolémios, stratège macédonien en Asie Mineure,” *Revue des Études Anciennes* 100 (1998): 167–90) ignores the overlap in authority between Asandros and Eupolemos, and makes much of a distinction between dynast and general that seems to have meant little in practice to the ancients; 311–2 BC (K. Buraselis, *Das hellenistische Makedonien und die Ägäis* (München: C.H. Beck, 1982), 11–22) assumes that Antigonos would have been content to allow a former enemy to retain much-contested territory despite having been the victor in every engagement in Karia leading up to the peace of 311; 298–90 BC (Gregory 1995, “A Macedonian *dynastēs*,” *Historia* 44 (1995): 11–28) depends on an unprecedented and ill-defined partition of Karia between the allied Pleistarchos and Eupolemos.

30. Pleistarchos is attested in Herakleia on the Latmos, renamed (and refounded?) after himself (see below): Steph. Byz. s.v. *Pleistarchia*; Sinuri (and thus probably Mylasa): Robert, *Sinuri*, no. 44; Hyllarima: Roos, “Inschriftenfunde aus Zentralkarien,” 339; Tralles and Euromos: R. Merkelbach, “Ein Zeugnis aus Tralles über Pleistarchos,” *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 16 (1975): 163. Beloch 1924, *Griechische Geschichte* (Berlin: K.J. Trübner, 1924), 318, argues that Pleistarchos never ruled Karia apart from Herakleia on the Latmos, pointing out that Lysimachos could not have attained control of this region without attacking his allies. Besides the evidence of inscriptions which Beloch (and Robert) did not know about, his position fails to consider that Lysimachos could have taken advantage of the disarray following Kassandros’ death, when an alliance would have been less useful, or simply inherited control of Karia.

31. Mastrocinque, *La Caria*, 37. That Demetrios also held Kaunos is a possible inference from Ptolemy’s capture of this city in 295/4 (see just below).

32. Plut. *Dem.* 35.5; cf. Mastrocinque, *La Caria* 42 n. 146.

33. *Milet* I.3 p.261; cf. *Syll.*³ 289 for Lysimachos’ control of both Miletos and Myous in 289/88.

34. Polyainos 3.16, though it is unclear if this invasion occurred in 295/94 or as late as 280. See Mastrocinque, *La Caria* 44–47.

35. Plut. *Dem.* 46–52. It is entirely unclear whether Demetrios’ invasion coincided with the end of Eupolemos’ reign (and life?), or was itself the cause of the latter’s

downfall.

36. *Milet* I.3 138 and pp. 261, 297.

37. The key to understanding how these rulers could feel that this claim was justified lies in the oft-quoted concept of “spear-won territory.” If a ruler or his predecessor(s) had conquered a land, it was theirs “by right.” The classic expression of this principle is Antiochos III’s justification for invading Asia Minor and Thrace: Polyb. 18.51.6. Cf. Ma, *Antiochos III*, 29f.

38. *IG XII.6.1.120* (*stratēgos epi Karias*: “general in charge of Karia”); *Labraunda* 43.5 (*oikonomos*: “financial minister?”); Theokr. 17.89. The best treatment of the Ptolemies in Karia is still Bagnall, *Ptolemaic Possessions*, 89–105. See also Mastrocinque, *La Caria* 66–80 for a more strictly chronological approach.

39. Miletos (from 279 BC): *SEG* 1.363 and *Syll.*³ 322; Halikarnassos and Myndos: *SEG* 1.363; Herakleia on the Latmos (277–62 BC): *OGIS* 24; Kaunos: G. Bean 1953, “Notes and Inscriptions from Caunos,” *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 73 (1953): 21, 26–27; Kalyrna and Iasos: *Tit.Cal.* 17; Kalynda: Louis Robert, *Hellenica* vol. VII (Limoges, 1949), 189–90 and Zenon papyrus 59341 (discussed in Bagnall, *op. cit.*, 99–101); Amyzon (275/74 BC): Jeanne Robert and Louis Robert, *Fouilles d’Amyzon en Carie* (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1983), 118ff. (#3) Cf. 127 (#5). Robert assumes the mention of “King Ptolemy” in #6 without any parentage must refer to Ptolemy Soter, but this seems rather tenuous (cf. A. Meadows, “Fouilles d’Amyzon Reconsidered,” *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 166 (2008): 115–20); Lagina (274 BC): *SEG* 15.652; Euromos: R. Errington 1993, “Inscriben von Euromos,” *Epigraphica Anatolica* 21 (1993): #3; Mylasa: *Labraunda* 43, 44.

40. Kos: *OGIS* 42, 43; Knidos: *OGIS* 66. Although Mastrocinque, *La Caria*, 69 assumes direct rule over these cities as well, Bagnall remains more cautious, pointing out that there is no evidence to guarantee anything more than a strong Ptolemaic influence (*Ptolemaic Possessions*, 98, 103–05).

41. The possibility of “real” independence at this time for certain Karian cities is suggested by the terms “alliance” and “friendship” used to describe Miletos’ relationship with Ptolemy Philadelphos (Bagnall, *Ptolemaic Possessions*, 173–75).

42. Mastrocinque, *La Caria*, 75–77, who argues from *Syll.*³ 426 that Antiochos I controlled both Bargylia and Teos. Yet the mention of Antiochos Soter in this inscription comes in the context of games held in his honor, while elsewhere “Antiochos” is simply identified as “king.” The obvious inference is that the games were a posthumous honor and that the ruler was the son, Antiochos Theos. See below for further discussion.

43. Based on Livy 33.20, where Halikarnassos, Myndos, and Kaunos are among the Ptolemaic possessions defended by Rhodes from Antiochos III. Kalynda is less certain but a late date for its detachment from the Ptolemies is suggested by its proximity to Lykia. Iasos, which was Seleukid in 197, and Herakleia likely escaped Ptolemaic control long before this, but a precise date is elusive (Bagnall, *Ptolemaic Possessions*, 89–92 and Ma, *Antiochos III*, 85f.).

44. *RC* 38 contains a letter from the Seleukid general Zeuxis in c. 203 BC referring only to Ptolemaic precedent for Amyzon, despite the presence of the Seleukid-turned-Antigonid dynast Olympichos residing in nearby Alinda. P. Derow, J. Ma and A. Meadows, “*RC* 38 (Amyzon) Reconsidered,” *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 109 (1995): 71–80 deduce that either Ptolemy IV reconquered these Karian possessions ca. 214–3 BC and direct evidence for the attack simply does not survive, or that the Seleukids actually did attack Antigonid possessions in Karia, contrary to traditional thinking on the relationship between Philip V and Antiochos III (see below). It is to my mind more likely that the Ptolemies retained at least nominal control over at least Herakleia (on whose relationship with the Attalids at this time, see below) and Amyzon until 203, given their good relations with Miletos

at this time (see below), despite Ma et al.'s pronouncement that this is inconceivable given the topographical relationship between the two cities. Topography, however, is not a determinant cause by itself, especially in the mountainous area of north-central Karia. Cf. Reger, "The Relations between Rhodes and Caria from 246 to 167 BC," In *Hellenistic Rhodes: Politics, Culture, and Society*, ed. V. Gabrielsen (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1999), 76 and Meadows, "Fouilles d'Amyzon"; for Herakleia: M. Wörrle, "Inscripfen von Herakleia am Latmos I," *Chiron* 18 (1988): 434–36; For Euromos: Errington, "Inscripfen von Euromos," #9.

45. For the battle of Kos, Plut. *de se ipsum laudando* 16; Athen. 5.209; cf. E. Bickerman 1938, "Sur les batailles navales de Cos et d'Andros," *Revue des Études Ancienne* 40 (1938): 379f.

46. M. Marcellesi, *Milet des Hécatomnides à la domination romaine* (Mainz am Rhein: Philipp von Zabern, 2004), 106–7. Cf. Will, *Du monde hellénistique*, 260.

47. For a discussion of the volatile changes in Miletos, see below and especially Mastrocinque, *La Caria*, 81–92 and Will, *Du monde hellénistique*, 208ff.; Mylasa: *Labraunda* 1.3; cf. Bagnall, *Ptolemaic Possessions*, 92f., who gives a *terminus ante quem* of the Laodikean War for the loss of this city.

48. Tabai: Louis Robert, *Études anatoliennes* (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1937), 321; Hyllarima: I. I.-J. Adiego, P. Debord, and E. Varinlioğlu, "La stèle caro-grecque d'Hyllarima," *Revue des Études Anciennes* 107.2 (2005): 621, 627; cf. A. Laumonier, "Inscriptions de Carie," *Bulletin de Correspondence Hellénique* 58 (1934): 345–76 for the original publication.

49. *IStratonikeia* 1030 (268 BC); although this document has often been used as a *terminus post quem* for the foundation of Stratonikeia, such a conclusion founders on the faulty assumption that Stratonikeia is the decreeing community. That this is not the case is clear from two features of the inscription. First, the heading includes no decree language (ἔδοξε, δεδόχθαι), simply the name of the proposer of the motion, a *hierokerux*. Second, the individual is honored as a foreigner by his ethnic, Koliorgeus. That this is not simply a demotic is guaranteed by the fact that the proposer is only mentioned by his name. Clearly this decree was issued by a body that had not developed the institutional apparatus of the *polis* that any Hellenistic foundation would have had. It is very likely, given the title *hierokerux*, that we are dealing here with a religious body. See, however, the mention of *hierokerukes* in the polis of Koaranza as making decisions alongside the assembly (*IStratonikeia* 503, 318 BC). Ma's desire to see *IStratonikeia* 1030 as an errant stone from eastern Karia is methodologically unsound.

50. I follow Mastrocinque's discussion of the evidence relating to this peculiar episode (*La Caria*, 81–90), although I think it unlikely that Timarchos became tyrant of Miletos *before* the revolt, that is, with the approval of the freedom-touting Philadelphos. Moreover, the attempt to explain the survival of Ptolemy the son (suggested by *Labraunda* III.1 3, dated to 227 BC and mentioning Ptolemy, brother of Ptolemy (III)) as a Seleukid associate is less than satisfactory. Why would an ambitious Ptolemaic heir dissatisfied with an Aegean command (but named as coregent) settle for a similar command and no hope to inherit the throne of the Seleukids? Yet see M. Gygas, "Ptolemaios, Bruder des Königs Ptolemaios III. Euergetes, und Mylasa," *Chiron* 30 (2000): 353–66 for the unsuitability of the other known Ptolemy (Andromachou) as "the brother." No appealing solution is apparent.

51. Miletos: *OGIS* 226 and Appian Syr. 65. cf. Mastrocinque, *La Caria*, 90–91; Mylasa: Le Rider, "Antiochos II à Mylasa," *Bulletin de Correspondence Hellénique* 114 (1990): 543–51; Alabanda: *OGIS* 234 (cf. L. Robert, *Opera minora selecta* (Amsterdam: A. M. Hakkert, 1969), 228–29; M. Holleaux and L. Robert, *Études d'épigraphie et d'histoire grecques* III (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1938), 141f., and Steph. Byz. s.v. *Alabanda*); Bargylia: *Syll.*³ 426 and above, n. 51; Herakleia: Wörrle,

"Inscripfen von Herakleia I," 421–76 (II.8–9), discussing an inscription which speaks of the city as being restored to Antiochos III and having belonged to his ancestors, though this could refer to the rewards of Korupedion. The attempt by Ma, *Antiochos III*, 42, n. 50 to infer the same thing about Iasos from the verb ἀνακτάομαι (in G. Pugliese Carratelli, "Supplemento epigrafico di Iasos," *Annuario della Scuola Archeologica di Atene* 29/30 (1967/1968): #2) ignores the likelihood that this word means that Antiochos obtaining the city for the Iasians. cf. V. Gabrielsen, "The Rhodian Peraia in the Third and Second Centuries BC," *Classica et Mediaevalia* 51 (2000): 155–56's exploration of this meaning.

52. As suggested by Ma, *Antiochos III*, 42. Cf. *Labraunda* 1, 3, 4 and Robert and Robert, *Amyzon*, 149–50. Mastrocinque, *La Caria*, 122–23 and 128–33, places Olympichos' appointment during the reign of Seleukos II.

53. In all three cases, certainty is unattainable with respect to a date. Alabanda/Antiocheia: Robert, "Sur des inscriptions de Délos," *Bulletin de Correspondence Hellénique Supplement* 1 (1973): 458ff., Mastrocinque, *La Caria*, 94; Nysa: Strabo 14.1.46 and Steph. Byz. s.v. *Antiocheia*. Following Ma 1999, Appendix 5, I favor the view that Stratonikeia was founded by Antiochos II. Although Seleukid influence or control is attested in the area in 268 BC (*I Stratonikeia* 1030), the precariousness of Antiochos I's hold on an area so near Ptolemaic possessions makes it more likely that a colony was planted only after the more stable situation created by his son. cf. R. van Bremen, "Leon Son of Chrysaor and the Religious Identity of Stratonikeia in Caria," in *The Greco-Roman East: Politics, Culture, Society*, ed. S. Colvin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), n. 20 and Mastrocinque, *La Caria*, 76f.

54. Mylasa: *Labraunda* III.1, pp. 82–85, and now, more securely, *Labraunda* III.1 #134 (S. Isager and L. Karlsson, "A New Inscription from Labraunda," *Epigraphica Anatolica* 41 (2008): 39–52). Cf. G. Reger, "Mylasa and its Territory," in *Hellenistic Karia*, ed. Riet van Bremen and J.-M. Carbon (Bordeaux: Ausonius, 2010), 49–50 and A. Bencivenni, *Progetti di reiforme costituzionali nelle epigrafi greche dei secoli IV-II a.C.* (Bologna: Lo Scarabeo editrice, 2003), 259–62; Miletos: RC 22 (though this is an inference). Ma's claim (*Antiochos III*, 44) that Ptolemy III reconquered Miletos appears to be an inadvertent error, since he omits any evidence in the footnote. Bagnall, *Ptolemaic Possessions*, 173ff. rightly notes that the only "evidence" for such a reconquest is Ptolemy III's blanket claim to have reconquered Ionia (*OGIS* 54).

55. W. Blümel 1992, "Brief des ptolemäischen Ministers Tlepolemos an die Stadt Kildara in Karien," *Epigraphica Anatolica* 20 (1992): 127–33. cf. P. Gauthier, "Bulletin épigraphique," *Revue des Études Grecque* 107 (1994): 528.

56. The date of both the war and the battle are uncertain. Most scholars favor 241/40 for the inception of hostilities (E. Bickerman 1934, "Notes sur la chronologie de la XXXe Dynastie," in *Mélanges Maspero, I: Orient Ancien*, ed. M. Gaston (Le Caire: Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale du Caire, 1938), 76–78; D. Magie, *Roman Rule in Asia Minor* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), 736ff.; Will, *Du monde hellénistique*, 265).

57. G. Le Rider, "Numismatique grecque," *Annuaire de l'école pratique des Hautes études, IV^e section, Sciences historique et philologique* (1971): 232–8 and *idem*, "Numismatique grecque," *Annuaire de l'école pratique des Hautes études, IV^e section, Sciences historique et philologique* (1972): 251f., though none of these come from Karia itself.

58. Haussoulrier, "Inscriptions d'Héraclée du Latmos," *Revue de Philologie, de littérature, et d'histoire anciennes* 23 (1899): nos. 5, 6. It is noteworthy that Attalos only declared himself an independent king alongside Hierax. See B. Chrubasik, "The Attalids and the Seleukid Kings, 281–175 BC," in *Attalid Asia Minor: Money, International Relations, and the State*, ed. P. Thonemann (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 95.

59. *Iasos* 150 (215 BC) speaks of attacks on the city by Olympichos as a representative of Philip V. For Olympichos' dynastic behavior, see Polyb. 5.90.1, where he sends aid to the Rhodians following an earthquake on his own initiative, and Billows, *Antigonos One-Eyed*, 96 and n. 47. Capdetrey, "Le roi, le satrape, et le *koinon*," 240–241 supposes that because Olympichos' activities are restricted to western (in his words, "Chrysaorian") Karia, the general's authority probably did not extend beyond the Harpasos river, leaving eastern Karia to be attached to either Lydia or Great Phrygia administratively. See below for Antigonos Doson's campaign.

60. See Ma, *Antiochos III*, Appendix 5 for a concise treatment of this issue.

61. *Ibid.*, 47.

62. *Ibid.*, 66–68 and *GIBM* 1035 (Amyzon, 203 BC), Couve 1894, "Inscriptions de Delphes," *Bulletin de Correspondence Hellénique* 18 (1894): 235–47, #2 (Alabanda) (Alinda) *Labraunda* 46 (Mylasa area, 203 BC). Ma presumes that Mylasa's autonomy was formally respected. Seleukia/Tralles, if it had ever left the empire, likely also was reacquired at this time, cf. *RC* 41

63. On the invasion in general, Livy 33.19.8–11; Kildara: Robert and Robert, *Amyzon*, 181–7; Herakleia: Wörrle, "Inscripfen von Herakleia I"; Iasos: Pugliese Carratelli, "Epigrafo di Iasos," 445–53, #2; Euromos: Errington 1986, "Antiochos III, Zeuxis and Euromos." *Epigraphica Anatolica* 8 (1986): 1–8. Ma, *Antiochos III*, 85f. (following Robert and Robert, *Amyzon*, 178 n. 127) argues that these cities were taken by (or allied with) Zeuxis in 197, operating out of Mylasa.

64. Ma, *Antiochos III*, 90.

65. Polyb. 18.44.

66. Will, *Du monde hellénistique*, 367. Polybios (20.5.7ff) alludes to the expedition and Trogus Pompeius speaks of Antigonos conquering Karia (*Prol.* 28)

67. Will, *Du monde hellénistique*, 370 and *Labraunda* I.3 #7, which shows Olympichos obeying the orders of Philip V in 220; ergo, the young Antigonid must have inherited his position in Karia from Doson. cf. *Ibid.*, 31ff.

68. Ma, *Antiochos III*, 69, who also suggests that Amyzon was taken, but see above.

69. See Mastrocinque, *La Caria*, 147–48, for the position that Mylasa (and other free cities) retained their independence even though they often appealed to Macedonian authority to resolve administrative matters.

70. Ma, *Antiochos III*, 70f., specifically mentioning the possible independence of Euromos and Amyzon.

71. *Ibid.*, 74. As can the infamous pact with Antiochos III, on which, see *ibid.*, 74ff.

72. Knidos: *FD* 3.1 #308; Kos: P. Baker, *Cos et Calymna*, 205–200 *a.C.*: *esprit civique et défense nationale*. (Québec: Éditions du Sphinx, 1991), *passim*; Peraia: Polyb. 16.11.2–6, cf. 18.2.3, 18.6.3, 18.8.9, App. *Mac.* 4.1, *ILindos* 151; Stratonikeia: cf. Liv. 33.18.4–7; 33.18.19; 33.18.21–2 (*IStratonikeia* 3 and 4 attest to Macedonian control of nearby, yet still independent, Panamara); Herakleia: Wörrle, "Inscripfen von Herakleia I," 433–4; Euromos: Errington, "Inscripfen von Euromos," #4; Pedasa, Iasos and Bargylia: Polyb. 18.44.4, cf. 18.2.3; Kildara: Robert and Robert, *Amyzon*, 187; Theangela: R. Descat 1997, "À propos d'un citoyen de Philippes à Théangela," *Revue des Études Anciennes* 99 (1997): 411–13; Mylasa and Alabanda: Polyb. 16.24.7; Myous: Polyb. 16.24.4

73. See P. Fraser and G. Bean, *The Rhodian Peraea and Islands* (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), 53, for the classic formulation of this view.

74. A. Bresson, "Les intérêts rhodiens en Carie à l'époque hellénistiques, jusqu'à 167 *a.C.*," in *L'Orient méditerranéen de la mort d'Alexandre aux campagnes de Pompée*, ed. F. Prost (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2003), 172 places the acquisition of the Chersonese just after the Peloponnesian War, though he

acknowledges that our first evidence for the civic incorporation of this area into the Rhodian state does not come until 325 BC (*Ilindos* II.51).

75. See Wiemer, “Rhodian Peraia,” 416–19 for a useful summary.

76. Reger, “Rhodes and Caria,” 76–78; cf. Gabrielsen, “Rhodian Peraea,” and Bresson, “Les intérêts rhodiens,” 179; for the traditional view, see Fraser and Bean, *Rhodian Peraea*, 99–101.

77. Reger, “Rhodes and Caria,” 79–81, discussing Polyb. 18.2.3 and 18.8.9, Livy 33.18, *IG XIII* 1036, and twelve other Rhodian inscriptions (for which, see his n. 13).

78. Though this does not speak against Rhodian influence in Karia, as suggested by the presence of Rhodian coinage in Miletos in the 280s and 270s, perfectly consonant with the island’s positive relationship with the Ptolemies. For this evidence, see Marcellesi, *Milet des Hécatomnides*, 145–55.

79. According to Polybios, the Rhodians acquired the city “from Antiochos and Seleukos” (30.31.6), which, assuming this refers to the king and his son, must refer to either Antiochos II or III. The latter’s rather weak hold on western Asia Minor at the beginning of his reign (preoccupied as he was elsewhere) seems to me the most plausible scenario, as opposed to strong position of both kings after their campaigns in the area. Bresson, “Les intérêts rhodiens,” 180–81 favors a date of 204/203 for the giving of Stratonikeia to Rhodes (following Meadows, “Fouilles d’Amyzon 6,” 118–19), whereby it would form part of the *rapprochement* between Antiochos and Philip V (but this would involve the Rhodians’ cooperation with their enemy, Philip), or alternately during the Second Syrian War (ending in 253), which found Rhodes on the side of the Seleukids (Polyaen. strat. 5.18 & *Lindos* II.26.37). These options are, however, ultimately unresolvable given the evidence at present.

80. Pisye, Idyma, and Kyllandia were “re-obtained” (ἀνακτάομαι) by the Rhodian general Nikagoras from Philip V, according to *IG XIII* 1036. Gabrielsen’s interpretation (*op. cit.*) of this verb as meaning “to win back for another” ignores the dissimilar contexts of the parallels that he cites. Reger’s assertion (“Rhodes and Caria,” 78f.) that Pisye and Kallipolis/Kyllandia were still independent in the mid-third century, while possible, rests on the assumption that dependence on Rhodes was inconsistent with the ability to issue decrees and be called a *polis*. Yet Rhodes was able to exert a certain measure of control on some Karian communities through relationships (alliances, for example) that did not impinge upon a practical notion of autonomy, as Reger himself acknowledges (*ibid.*, 89). R. van Bremen, “Networks of Rhodians in Karia,” in *Greek and Roman Networks in the Mediterranean*, ed. I. Malkin, C. Constantakopoulou, and K. Panagopoulou (New York: Routledge, 2009), 109–28, on the other hand, argues that control of Pisye was necessary for Rhodes to accept the grant of Stratonikeia (cf. Bresson, *op. cit.*, 179). For decrees of Pisye and Kallipolis, see *HTC* #1 and #84, respectively.

81. Iasos: *Ilasos* 150, cf. 76; Kaunos and Halikarnassos: Livy 33.20.11–13.

82. Polyb. 30.31.6.

83. Such increased independence is also suggested by coinage developments, where these have been studied in detail. At Miletos, for example, this period witnesses the emergence of civic (as opposed to royal) coinage for the first time in at least 100 years (more if the *argyriion symmachikon* is not a civic mint), lasting through the first half of the second century: Marcellesi, *Milet des Hécatomnides*, chapter 4. Cf. Descat, “*Argyriion symmachikon*,” 133–44.

84. Miletos and Herakleia: *Milet* I.3 150 (ca. 185 BC treaty between the two cities resolving their war without recourse to a foreign power); Mylasa and Alabanda: Polyb. 30.4.11–15; Knidos, Myndos, and Halikarnassos: *Milet* I.3 148, ll. 8–11 (act as third-party witnesses to treaty between Miletos and Magnesia on the Maiandros, dating shortly after peace of Apamea); Iasos: *SEG* 41.930 and cf. Reger, “Rhodes and

Caria,” 89 n. 47.

85. We now know from two newly discovered inscriptions that the area around Aphrodisias was included under Rhodian rule as τόποι κατὰ Καρίαν. The inscriptions are yet to be published but are ably discussed by A. Chaniotis, “New Evidence from Aphrodisias concerning the Rhodian Occupation of Karia and the Early History of Aphrodisias,” in *Hellenistic Karia*, ed. R. van Bremen and J.-M. Carbon (Bordeaux: Ausonius, 2010), 455–67.

86. *IStratonikeia* 9 (l. 5). The Kaunians revolted from Rhodes in 167 (Polyb. 30.5.11).

87. Reger, “Rhodes and Caria,” 89 and Bresson, “Les intérêts rhodiens,” 185.

88. We know the most about Miletos in this regard: Marcellesi, *Milet des Hécatomnides*, 155–65 and A. Bresson, “Drachmes rhodiennes et imitations,” *Revue des Études Anciennes* 98 (1996): 65–77.

89. Polyb. 30.5.11–15. See Bresson, “Les intérêts rhodiens,” 185–88 for discussion. Rhodes arbitrated disputes between Priene and Samos, as well as between Bargylia and an unnamed community (for which see H. Wiemer “Karien am Vorabend des 2. Makedonischen Krieges,” *Epigraphica Anatolica* 33 (2001): 7–9), and acted as one of 14 arbitrating *poleis* for the war between Miletos and Magnesia. Baranowski, “The Status of the Greek Cities of Asia Minor after 190 B.C.,” *Hermes* 119 (1991): 450–63 focuses on evidence for the cities in the Attalid sphere and applies his conclusions to Rhodes without much that is specific to this latter context.

90. Pol. 29.22.4; 30.1–3, 28; 32.15–16; *SEG* 57.1109. Pol. 33.12.8–9 is particularly suggestive that the Pergamene sphere of influence did not extend south of the Maiandros even after 167/66 BC, as the Roman legates go to Ionia, the Hellespont, and Byzantium, but nowhere south of these regions, to encourage the inhabitants to ally with Attalus instead of Prusias. Cf. Thonemann, “The Attalid State, 188–133 BC,” in *Attalid Asia Minor: Money, International Relations, and the State*, ed. *idem* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013), 10, citing evidence (*SEG* 46.1434) for an Attalid *strategos* “of Karia and the parts of Lydia around Ephesos,” with a probable capital at Tralles.

91. The evidence for this mostly relates to the presence of Roman cults, from which it is difficult to infer the precise political consequences, that is, to decide the level of influence/hegemony exerted through the medium of good relations (and possibly a direct alliance). See especially R. Errington, “θεὰ Πώμη and römischer Einfluss südlich des Mäanders im 2. Jh. v. Ch.,” *Chiron* 17 (1987): 97–114.

92. Brun, “Les cités grecques et la guerre,” in *Les cités grecques et la guerre en Asie mineure à l’époque hellénistique*, ed. J.-C. Couvenhes and H.-L. Fernoux (Paris: Presses universitaires François-Rabelais, 2004), 21–54; the relevant inscriptional evidence comes from Bargylia (*Ilasos* 613), Bargasa (*Ilasos* 612), and Halikarnassos (A. Wilhelm, “Inschriften aus Halikarnassos und Theangela,” *Jahreshefte des Österreichischen Archäologischen Institutes* 11 (1908): #6).

93. *IStratonikeia* 505.

94. A. Sherwin-White, *Roman Foreign Policy in the East, 168 B.C. to A.D. 1* (Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1984), 89f.; C. Marek 1988, “Karien im ersten Mithridatischen Krieg,” in *Alte Geschichte und Wissenschaftsgeschichte*, ed. P. Kneissl, K. Christ, and V. Losemann (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1988) 296–99, 303–8; R. Kallet-Marx, *Hegemony to Empire: the Development of the Roman Imperium in the East from 148 to 62 B.C.* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 113–14, 265 (discussing App. *Mith.* 118); D. Baranowski, “Caria and the Roman Province of Asia,” n *Pouvoir et ‘imperium’ (Ille av. J.-C.–Ier ap. J.-C.)*, ed. E. Hermon (Napoli: E. Jovene, 1996) 242–44; cf. J.-L. Ferrary, “Rome et les cités grecques d’Asie Mineure au IIe siècle,” in *Les cités d’Asie mineure occidentale au IIe siècle a.C.*, ed. A. Bresson and R. Descat (Bordeaux: Ausonius, 2001), 97–100.

95. These cases, for which see chapter 2, include Pidasa, Myous, Chalketor, Euromos, Hydai, Olymos, Kildara, Theangela, Panamara, Pisyē/Pladasa, and Aphrodisias/Plarasa.

96. See Capdetrey, *Le pouvoir seleucide*, 195–212 for a schema that distinguishes between “real” and “dependent” statuses of freedom while allowing for ambiguity on the ground between them.

97. Kirsten and Lehmann, *Die griechische Polis*, 77–83; *HTC* 11–75. cf. Schuler, *Ländliche Siedlungen*, 208–11; Bresson, “Les Cariens,” 212.

98. For the Euromid, see the reference by Polybios (30.5.11–15) to *tas en tōi Euromōi poleis*, as well as the evidence of *Milet* I.3 149 that Pidasa possessed territory in this plain (called *Euromis* here).

99. A. Greaves, *Miletos: A History* (London: Routledge, 2002), 10–12.

100. Schuler, *Ländliche Siedlungen*, 137–94, identifies four major forms: villages as part of royal lands or private landed estates, independent farmer communities with both settlers and natives, and villages on sacred land.

101. Capdetrey, *Le pouvoir seleucide*, 195–98, insists on an essential division between royal lands and city lands.

102. Most of the inscriptions are collected in M. Wörrle, “Inschriften von Herakleia am Latmos I–III,” *Chiron* 18, 20, 33 (1988, 1990, 2003). For a summary of the early history of Latmos, see *idem*, “Pidasa du Grion et Héraclée du Latmos,” *Comptes rendus des séances de l’année. Académie des inscriptions et belles lettres* 4 (2003): 1371f. On Latmos’ walls: A. Peschlow, “Die Befestigung von Latmos,” *Revue des Études Anciennes* 96 (1994): 155–72 and A. Peschlow-Bindokat and U. Peschlow, *Der Latmos: eine ungekannnte Gebirgslandschaft an der türkischen Westküste* (Mainz am Rhein: Philipp von Zabern, 1996). On Herakleia’s walls: Pimouguet-Pédarros and Geny, *L’archéologie de la defense*, 357–67.

103. On the matter of Latmos’ foundation, see A. Peschlow-Bindokat, “Zur Gründung der karischen Stadt Latmos,” in *Frühes Ionien. Eine Bestandsaufnahme*, ed. J. Cobet et al. (Mainz am Rhein: Philipp von Zabern, 2007), 419–28.

104. Peschlow-Bindokat and Peschlow, *Der Latmos*, 23f.; cf. Krischen, *Milet* III.2. See above for Pleistarchos’ reign in Karia.

105. O. Hülten, “Pleistarchos und die Befestigungsanlagen von Herakleia am Latmos,” *Klio* 82 (2000): 382–408 (esp. 405–7). His further contention that the city was founded during the Antigonid rule of Karia by Demetrios (in the period between Asandros and Pleistarchos) is possible, but I am more inclined to credit Pleistarchos and interpret Stephanus Byzantius’ notice that the city was named Herakleia *before* as well as after Pleistarcheia as stemming from a tradition which sought to distance Herakleia’s origins from a dynastic act. Since the area was inhabited before this time (at nearby Latmos), it was possible to create the memory of a Herakleia antecedent to the interference of a foreign despot.

106. The *isopoliteia* treaty/alliance with Miletos (*Milet* I.3 150), the Milesian citizenship-grant lists (see below), a list of soldiers from Tralles that includes two Herakleians (*ITralles* 33, 3rd c.), as well as a letter from Zeuxis (Wörrle, “Inschriften von Herakleia I,” 421–76), all reveal the activity of Herakleians at this time. The contention of Wörrle, “Pidasa du Grion,” 1378 that Herakleia was a nominal dependent of Miletos following its treaty with the latter is contradicted by Herakleia’s continued autonomous activity, which included the minting of coins and a dispute with Euromos (see chapter 2).

107. *IPriene* 51 and Robert and Robert, *Amyzon*, 277–79.

108. P. Herrmann, “Milet au IIe siècle a.C.,” in *Les cités d’Asie mineure occidentale au IIe siècle a.C.*, ed. A. Bresson and R. Descat (Bordeaux: Ausonius, 2001), 109–16. Cf. Greaves, *Miletus*, *passim*. The inscriptions of the city are collected in *Milet* I.3 and VI.1–3.

109. All inscriptions are from *Milet* I.3: Sardis (#135), Olbia (#136), Kyzikos (#137), Phygeia (#142), Knidos (#138), Kretan cities (#140), Kios (#141, ca. 228 BC), Seleukeia (#143, 218/217 BC), and Mylasa (#146, 215/14 BC). Robert & Robert 1970 (*BE* #502) speculated that the highly fragmentary *Milet* I.3 144 also constituted an *isopoliteia* treaty with Antiocheia on the Maiander, without providing reasons.

110. W. Günther, “Milet und Athen im zweiten Jahrhundert v. Chr.,” *Chiron* 28 (1998): 21–34.

111. R. Mazzucchi, “Mileto et la Sympoliteia con Miunte,” *Studi Ellenistici* 20 (2008): 387–88 sees the *isopoliteia* alliance with Tralles as a means to protect Miletos from the Seleukid rebel, Achaïos. As we have seen, there is no evidence that Achaïos was active in Karia.

112. Kretan mercenaries: *Milet* I.3 33 (234/33 BC), 37 (229/28 BC); the *politeia* grants: *Milet* I. 3 40–93 and VI.3 1055–64, which are discussed more fully in terms of their social implications in chapter 3.

113. Herrmann, “Milet au II^e siècle a.C.,” 109–16; war with Herakleia: *Milet* I.3 150 (185/84 BC); with Magnesia: *Milet* I.3 148 (late 180s BC). Cf. A. Heller, “*Les bêtises des Grecs*”: *conflits et rivalités entre cités d’Asie et de Bithynie à l’époque romain* (129 a.C.- 235 d.C.) (Bourdeaux: Ausonius, 2006), 55.

114. Cf. Bresson, “Les intérêts rhodiens,” 186–87. Rhodes is also mentioned in the treaty between Miletos and Herakleia, in which both cities swear not to violate “the alliance with Rhodes,” similar to later oaths mentioning a mutually held Roman alliance. This testifies to Rhodian hegemony, but not to its active involvement in this conflict.

115. In terms of Capdetrey’s schema (*Le pouvoir seleucide*, 209), Miletos became truly free and autonomous, rather than depending on the will of a king for this status.

116. All second century: *Milet* I.3 153–55 (Byzantion, Eretria, Apollonia on the Rhyndakos); *SEG* 31.328 (Epidauros & Hermione); *Syll.*³ 683 (Messenia & Sparta; *ISmyrna* 583 (Smyrna); A. Chaniotis, *Die Verträge zwischen kretischen Poleis in der hellenistischen Zeit* (Stuttgart, Franz Steiner, 1996), 330 t.c (Lato & Olos in Krete). Honorific decrees for foreign individuals: *Milet* VI.1 1023 (Mylasa); *Ibid.*, 1028 (Ephesos). Honorific decrees by foreign states for Milesians: *Ibid.*, 1038 (Athens); *Ibid.*, 1085 (Ionian League). Treaties: *Ibid.*, 1031 (Aitolia).

117. The entire corpus is conveniently collected in *Milet* VI.1–3. No decree can be securely dated past the middle of the second century, and there are surprisingly few texts that are entirely undatable and thus candidates for the “missing period.” Decrees begin appearing again around the middle of the first century, but in much more abbreviated form. Cf. S. Carlsson, *Hellenistic Democracies: Freedom, Independence and Political Procedure in some East Greek City-States* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2010), 348ff.

118. *Milet* VI.1 203 (*Milet* VII p. 16f.).

119. *Ibid.*, p. 26.

120. The corpus is collected in *IMylasa*, 2 vols. Reger’s proposed monograph on Mylasa is still eagerly anticipated.

121. Mylasa’s *kyria ekklesia* passed three decrees relating to Maussollos (*IMylasa* 1–3), as well as two involving land purchases from Kindye (*HTC* nos. 90, 91, 354/53 BC).

122. Reger, “Mylasa,” 43–49, following a suggestion by A. Bresson, “Knidos: Topography for a Battle,” in *Hellenistic Karia*, ed. R. van Bremen and J.-M. Carbon (Bordeaux: Ausonius, 2010), 435–51 about the location of the Little Sea.

123. *IMylasa* 126; see above for the *isopoliteia* agreement with Miletos. Cf. the number of decrees for foreign judges (*ibid.*, 125–32), not all of which, however, can

be securely dated to the third century.

124. Krete: *IMylasa* 641–59; Priene and Magnesia: *IMagnesia* 93 (143 BC); Tralles: *IMylasa* 631 (late 2nd/early 1st c.); Teos: *ibid.*, 634 (late 2nd/early 1st c.); anonymous cities: *ibid.*, 632–33, 635.

125. *Labraunda* nos. 3–7 (pp. 13–52). When the city came to possess this sanctuary, by what means, and in what context, are entirely obscure, since we never find *Labraunda* unattached to *Mylasa*. Our earliest mention of the sanctuary, Herodotos' discussion of the cult of *Zeux Karios*, gives little indication of who actually was in control, though his placement of the cult at *Mylasa* is suggestive (1.171). While it is still possible that the shrine was locally run, the historian's silence on this matter could also reflect his own ignorance, or mean that the situation did not correspond to his understanding of political control (e.g., a powerful *Mylasean* could have dominated the priesthood, and yet not expressed this privilege in terms of his homeland's control. Indeed, according to this latter scenario, *Labraunda*'s later attempt to free itself of *Mylasa* could have been in actuality the claim by the family who controlled the priesthood to distinguish their ancestral privilege from what had developed into the now more centralized state's asserted right to possess what any of its citizens possessed).

126. The inscriptions were collected in the two volumes of *Iasos* in 1985, but significant inscriptions (in quality and quantity) have continuously been published since then. See, for example, Pugliese Carratelli, "Epigrafi onorarie di Iasos," *Atti della Accademia nazionale dei Lincei. Classe di scienze morali, storiche, e filologiche* 9.4 (1993): 266–69; *idem*, "Un' epigrafe onoraria di Iasos," *Atti della Accademia nazionale dei Lincei. Classe di scienze morali, storiche, e filologiche* 9.6 (1995): 673–75; G. Maddoli, "Epigrafi di Iasos: Nuovi supplementi I," *Parola del Passato* 62 (2007): 193–372.

127. Kos: *Iasos* 21 (242 BC), 51 (end of 2nd c.); Miletos: *ibid.*, 36 (224/23 BC), 39 (late 4th/early 3rd c.); Halikarnassos: *ibid.*, 37 (late 4th/early 3rd c.), 48; Rhodes: *ibid.*, 150 (240–200 BC), 40, 76; Kallipolis: *ibid.*, 59; Kalymna: *ibid.*, 82; Kal[-ymna? -lipolis?]: *ibid.*, 43; Kaunos: *ibid.*, 45 (late 4th/early 3rd c.); Theangela: *ibid.*, 50 (late 4th/early 3rd c.); *Mylasa*: *ibid.*, 77; Hydissos: *ibid.*, 56; Euromos: *ibid.*, 151; Priene: *ibid.*, 73, 74 (mid-2nd c.); Kolophon: *ibid.*, 80, 81 (second half of 3rd c.); Teos: *ibid.*, 152; Krete: *ibid.*, 53 (late 4th/early 3rd c.); Samothrake: *ibid.*, 153 (early 2nd c.); Athens: *ibid.*, 42 (late 4th c.); Syennis (late 5th c. dynast of Kilikia): Maddoli 2007, #1.1; Knidos: Blümel, "Neue Inschriften aus Karien III," *Epigraphica Anatolica* 40 (2007): #2 (early 2nd c.).

128. G. Maddoli, "Epigrafi di Iasos," nos. 1–25. The inscriptions date from the late 5th through the mid-3rd c. BC, and include individuals from Argos, Magnesia, Naukratis, Chalkedon (5th and 4th c.); Samos, Kalymna, Alabanda, Theangela, Amphipolis, Ephesos, the priest of *Labraunda*, Kyrene, Sikyon, and Sparta. No doubt Fabiani's forthcoming book, *I decreti onorari di Iasos tra cronologia e storia* will shed even further light on the diplomatic activity of the city.

129. SEG 36.982A: Iasos honors a Chalketorean benefactor. For further discussion of this inscription, see our study of the *sympoliteia* between Iasos and Chalketor in chapter 2.

130. Proxeny decree for the sons of Peldemis: SEG 38.1059. For the description of the site near the village of Karacahisar, identified with Hydissos, see Louis Robert, "Rapport sommaire sur un premiere voyage en Carie," *American Journal of Archaeology* 39.3 (1935): 339–40.

131. On which see, most recently, Roberta Fabiani, "Iasos between Mausolos and Athens," and M. Nafissi, "Sur un nouveau monument de Iasos pour les Hécatomnides," in *Euploia: La Lycie et la Carie antiques*, ed. P. Brun et al. (Bordeaux: Ausonius, 2013), 303–30.

132. The inscriptions are collected and commented on by Mehmet Şahin in *Istratonikeia*, vols 1–3 (most recently published in 2010) and analyzed, variously, by Pierre Debord, “Essai sur la géographie historique de la région de Stratonikée,” in *Mélanges Pierre Lévêque 8: Religion, anthropologie et société*, ed. M. Mactoux and E. Geny (Paris: Centre de Recherches d’Histoire ancienne, 1994), 107–21, Riet van Bremen, “The Demes and Phylai of Stratonikeia of Karia,” *Chiron* 30 (2000): 389–402, and *idem*, “Leon son of Chrysaor,” 207–44. Cf. M. Şahin, *The Political and Religious Structure in the Territory of Stratonikeia in Caria* (Ankara: Safak Matbaası, 1976).

133. The debate largely centers on the relationship between Stratonikeia and the surrounding communities, some of which are later attested as demes of the city. See below and chapter 2.

134. This issue will be addressed with respect to Panamara in chapter 2.

135. *Istratonikeia* III, pp. 1–8. The evidence for Panamara as both outlying and a later addition also rests on its geographical location (Londarga remains undiscovered) and on inscriptions attesting to its continued autonomy of action as a sub-unit of Stratonikeia (for which, chapter 2).

136. Koraza: *Istratonikeia* 503 (318 BC), Roos 1975, 339 (early 3rd c.), *Istratonikeia* 549 (early 2nd c.); Hierakome: *ibid.*, 1503 (323–313 BC), 1001, 1002, (277 BC); Koliorga: *ibid.*, 1030 (268 BC). All three cities are mentioned as *poleis* in HTC nos. 90 & 91. For these communities as demes, see *ibid.*, 601ff.

137. Debord, “La région de Stratonikée”; cf. van Bremen, “Demes and Phylai,” 389–402, and *idem*, “Leon son of Chrysaor,” 214f., who calls the foundation a *sympoliteia*. Şahin, in *Istratonikeia* III, pp. 2–3, argues that all 7 demotics were probably *koina* before 167, and then became *phylai* thereafter. The first suggestion is implausible, since none of the five central demes was ever called a *koinon* (in *Istratonikeia* 549 the word is entirely restored, and *polis* is an equally likely restoration), and the second suggestion is incorrect, since our only evidence for the name of a Stratonikeian *phyle* is Korolos (*Istratonikeia* 510). This clearly indicates that the *phylai* were different than the “demes,” which, it should be noted, is a term used by modern scholars to describe the demotic forms found in the inscriptions. The bodies they refer to were, as far as I am aware, never labeled.

138. The text is instead dated by the office of the *archwn*, as is a 4th c. decree by the self-declared polis of Koaranza (*Istratonikeia* 503, 318 BC).

139. Gabrielsen, “Rhodian Peraea,” 161–71.

140. van Bremen, “Leon son of Chrysaor,” following Şahin (*Istratonikeia* III, pp. 2–3), seems right in supposing that the majority of the settlement was drawn local communities, but this does not mean that all five communities/demes were involved in this. Perhaps only one, but likely more, contributed to the foundation, with the others incorporated later, synoicistically or, as with Panamara, via *sympoliteia* (see below).

141. *IAssos* 8, dated to “nach 166 v. Chr.”; Alabanda: *Istratonikeia* 1022; Smyrna: *ibid.*, 1040.

142. Known *polis* members included Mylasa (*Labraunda* 43), Amyzon (Robert and Robert, *Amyzon*, nos. 16, 28), Alabanda (*OGIS* 111), Alinda (*IG* VII 420), Thera (*IG* XII.5 977), Stratonikeia (T. Klee, *Zur Geschichte der gymnischen Agone an griechischen Festen* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1918), I C.23), Keramos (Strabo 14.2.25), and possibly Pisye & Plarasa (*Istratonikeia* 1418). Strabo’s account, which calls the league a *systema* consisting of villages, is the result of either a later development of the league under Rome, lack of information, or a more rigid definition of what constituted a *polis* (cf. his assertion that inland Karia only contains three noteworthy cities, 14.2.22); for the league’s religious focus, see Robert & Robert 1983, #28, which refers to the *Chrysaorika* as *hiera*.

143. Gabrielsen, "Rhodian Peraea," 159. His argument, however, that this text provides evidence of the Chrysaoric League as a political federation relies on an ideal definition of a federal state, which he wields without justifying its relevance to the Chrysaoreis, and instead uses to fill the vast holes in our knowledge about the Chrysaoreis without justification.
144. M. Spanu, *Keramos di Caria: storia e monumenti* (Roma: L'Erma di Bretschneider, 1997).
145. Based on *Ibid.* and E. Hicks, "Ceramus (Κέραμος) and Its Inscriptions," *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 11 (1890): 110–13.
146. *IKeramos* 4.
147. Spanu, *Keramos*, 15–21. I include this brief excursus on high politics since mention of Keramos in the first part of this chapter is completely absent.
148. S. Sherwin-White, *Ancient Cos: an Historical Study from the Dorian Settlement to the Imperial Period* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1978). For a history of the island focused on the end of the third century, see also Baker, *Cos et Calymna*.
149. For a general discussion of this event, see Sherwin-White, *Ancient Cos*, 43–72.
150. *Ibid.*, 68–77; see Dem. XV.27 Maussollos' occupation of the island.
151. Diod. 15.76.2; cf. Sherwin-White, *Ancient Cos*, 69 and 236ff.
152. *Syll.*³ 344.
153. Samos: *SEG* 1.354, Habicht 1957, #3; Chios: G. Dunst, "Ein neues chiisches Dekret aus Kos," *Klio* 37 (1959): 63–68; Athens: W. Paton and E. Hicks, *Inscriptions of Cos* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1891), #17; evidence for all other cities remains unpublished, but see Sherwin-White, *Ancient Cos*, 86 n. 30.
154. Sherwin-White, *Ancient Cos*, 91 and n. 50
155. *SEG* 12.371, 372, 377–82; cf. Sherwin-White, *Ancient Cos*, 113f.
156. Sherwin-White, *Ancient Cos*, 118–24, 131ff. After the Third Macedonian War, Kos' main ally became the Roman Republic.
157. No study dedicated to the history of Kalymna has of yet emerged.
158. *Tituli Calymnii* 28 (Lampsakos), 29 (Knidos), 34 (Kardia), 53 (Halikarnassos), 17 (Iasos). More far reaching ties can be attributed either to Ptolemaic influence in Kalymna (Kyrene and Berenike: nos. 18, 57, 58) or to the Doric affiliation of island (Amathousa: no. 30).
159. *IG* XI.2 161, 287.
160. Mylasa is an exception to this generalization.
161. *Milet* I 3.140A, esp. ll. 11–15.
162. *IMylasa* 631. This document is rife with possible or actual moral terms applied to Mylasa: l. 11 καλοκάγ]αθιας?; l. 19 προ]θυμίαν; l. 22 σπου]δὴν καὶ ἐκτένειαν ἐ<π>αύξο[ντες
163. *Ibid.*, l. 25.
164. *IG* XII 4.1.50.
165. *Milet* I 2.10; cf. *ISmyrna* 577.
166. *IMagnesia* 93.
167. Many honorifics for individuals are especially economical in expression, merely identifying the honoree and the privileges granted. Yet even in these the granting of the title of *euergetês* implicates them in the value system we are describing.
168. John Ma, "Peer Polity Interaction in the Hellenistic World," *Past & Present* 180 (2003): 9–40. See esp. 16–17 on Karia.
169. I am using "morality" in the Foucauldian sense of a set of values and rules of action recommended (dogmatically or diffusely) to individuals, as well as the real behavior in relation to this code (M. Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Volume 2: The Use of Pleasure* (New York: Random House, 1985)).
170. Similarly, Ma discusses of "quasi-PPI," characterized by the attraction of non-

participant communities to the *polis* network (“Peer Polity Interaction,” 38).

171. See Introduction for further reasons.

172. Cf. the conclusions of I. Savalli-Lestrade, “Collections de citoyenneté et internationalisation des élites,” in *Patrie de l’origine et patries électives: les citoyennetés multiples dans le monde grec d’époque romaine*, ed. A. Heller and A.-V. Pont (Bordeaux: Ausonius, 2012), 58–59, asserting that garnering multiple grants of citizenship was “means to reinforce their prestige among their fellow citizens” (my translation). J. Ma, *Statues and Cities: Honorific Portraits and Civic Identity in the Hellenistic World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), *passim* seems to acknowledge the more central role of elites in discussing the tensions inherent in Hellenistic political institutions and spaces between a communitarian ideology and pressures toward “elite capture” of these institutions.

173. The contention of Clifford Ando, review of *Statues and Cities*, by John Ma, *Bryn Mawr Classical Review* 2014.02.21 that non-elites were thereby seen to possess a defective citizenship ignores and downplays the other aspects of citizenship to which all had actual access.

174. See the discussion above on the meaning of these Foucauldian terms.

175. Of course, models and theories that have their roots in modern anthropological and sociological thought involve the serious risk of preferring theory to historical data, of adapting the evidence to conveniently fit the patterns and constructs that we wish to see. Especially given that terms like “connectivity,” “network,” and “interaction” find no equivalents in the Ancient Greek world, we run the danger of constructing a world that has no real basis in the Hellenistic past. My use of the “peer polity interaction” model circumvents this danger most obviously by grounding it in the evidence—the local histories of Karian communities—and, in the next chapter, only applying it where the evidence suggests the involvement of a distinct elite group. Beyond Karia, the model itself rests on a rather secure empirical foundation: the intense interaction among *poleis* is an undisputed reality, an unquestionably *desired* behavior by those involved. (In addition to Ma, “Peer Polity Interaction,” see also John Tully’s unpublished Princeton dissertation on proxeny networks in the Cyclades) Thus, considering the possibility that such forces were at play in a *sympoliteia*, where the evidence suggests this, becomes no different than informed speculation about the involvement of a king, for example.

176. Ma, *Antiochos III*, 214ff.

Chapter 2

The *sympoliteiai*

The purpose of this chapter is to present what evidence we have for the cases of *sympoliteia* in Karia and to discuss the motives that we can infer from this evidence. A main focus of this discussion will be the attempt to detect motives at the sub-*polis* level, that is, to locate evidence that suggests the interests of intra-communal groups (usually the elite) in connection with each *sympoliteia*. As demonstrated in the Introduction and [chapter 1](#), the Aegean world provides an important context for thinking about such interests: larger coastal cities in Karia would have offered an opportunity to members of smaller communities to participate not only in social and civic world that included new avenues for prestige and status. A less obvious, but no less important, implication of the bonds formed via *sympoliteia* is the opportunity for involvement in the smaller community by citizens of the larger. This seemingly counterintuitive possibility finds plausibility in contexts where the smaller partner in the merger possessed something the larger community did not: a regionally important sanctuary. Thus, in considering potential group interests we must be attuned to a variety of motives depending on the precise circumstances in which a *sympoliteia* occurred.

Alongside this original focus, a comprehensive understanding of the causes behind *sympoliteia* demands a synthetic consideration of motivation. The evidence cannot support the idea that elite motives were sufficient to bring about any merger; rather, they coexisted with and complemented other interests, many of which have been proposed by earlier studies. It is, accordingly, the task of this chapter is not simply to offer a new perspective but to reevaluate the old, thus providing a holistic account of the topic. As should come as no surprise, several motives will appear in our analysis frequently, due to their general applicability to any circumstance in which a larger state and a smaller state combine to form one political entity centered on the former. For example, issues of defense, security, and power are

easily imaginable in such situations. The same can be said for the factors of over- or under-population and economic disparity. Although these aims and forces are in a sense independent of the specific cases to which they are applied, since it is possible to formulate them *a priori*, nevertheless they work quite well as at least partial explanations of the *sympoliteiai* in Karia. The role of security and expansion in particular has been well examined in both the individual publications of the relevant inscriptions and in more general treatments of the phenomenon.¹ Many communities in Karia must have felt threatened not only by the power struggles between large empires that frequently occurred on their soil, but also by the ambitions of their neighbors, whose aggrandizing policy may itself have been a reaction to the insecurities of the Hellenistic period.² It is important, then, to understand *sympoliteia* as the result of both aggressive and defensive impulses.

This last point needs explaining. We have seen from [chapter 1](#) how Karia was often the intersection of the spheres of influence of the major Hellenistic powers (Ptolemaic, Seleukid, Antigonid, Rhodian, and eventually Roman), a situation which eventually led to the freedom, whether explicitly granted or simply *de facto*, of a number of communities within this area, first in 188, then in 167. This observation has been frequently made in treatments of the region, as well as in accounts for the expansionist activities of free *poleis* like Miletos or Mylasa.³ When we look at the history of the latter, for example, we see how the former capital of Karia exercised control over the neighboring sanctuaries of Labraunda and Sinuri and formed *sympoliteiai* with Olymos, Hydai, and Euromos (though the latter accord did not endure). One can observe a trend, if not a policy, toward expansion in these actions, which speaks to the defensive and aggressive tendencies of Mylasa.⁴ We do not need to deny the truth of such an explanation, while at the same time anticipating a more complex interplay of causes. For one thing, if these *sympoliteiai* were simply about the growth of Mylasean power, we would expect unilateral incorporation. Clearly the smaller cities were concerned with maintaining not only their identity, but also their existence as a separate community. At the same time, a *sympoliteia* seems for the smaller community an excessive solution to the problem of protection. An alliance was a much less disruptive means to gain the support of a stronger state, which was still able thereby to control at least one part of a partner's foreign policy, offering a strong motive to make such pacts with smaller cities.⁵ Unless we imagine that in every case the larger state in a *sympoliteia* agreement refused an alliance and demanded only *sympoliteia* as the terms for their relationship, it seems that we need to go beyond state power and security in our assessment

of the phenomenon.

We have already noted how Karia was the arena for many of the power struggles between Hellenistic powers, in particular at the end of the third century and beginning of the second, and that this often resulted in certain cities achieving some measure of real independence. Yet the same can be said for a number of regions in Asia Minor that, however, did not experience the same kind of rush toward local expansion.⁶ What is peculiar about Karia is the presence of cities with a strong Greek pedigree (Miletos, Halikarnassos, Kos, Rhodes) juxtaposed with a hinterland population in the midst of developing an urban lifestyle. Once “freedom and autonomy” became an essential component of the discourse, and often the reality, between kings and cities, this gave non-*polis* settlements reason to claim civic status (whatever that entailed), or at least to become part of a community that was already a *polis*. The events of the late third century up to the mid-second century offered especial impetus to such behavior. Several cities had already acquired their freedom due to the withdrawal of Seleukid power and weakening of Ptolemaic influence in the region during the 240s and 230s, Miletos and Mylasa among them. In 188, the benefits of this independence became all too clear, as only *poleis* were exempt from the Rhodian control imposed on Karia by Roman fiat. From this perspective, a *sympoliteia* might arise as a means for a small community to escape strict dependence on a foreign power.

This hypothesis appears to ignore the fact that by fleeing the clutches of Rhodes, a community absorbed by *sympoliteia* was merely trading one master for another. Yet a *sympoliteia* offered several advantages that made it by far preferable to outright subjection. It was able to preserve its local institutions and identity, and its inhabitants became full citizens of the larger state. And in many cases, as we shall emphasize, elite groups within the communities of one or both partners were able to negotiate conditions favorable to the furthering of their ambitions.

Reger and the Roberts have emphasized the role of the Hellenistic kings in several of the agreements, and in what follows we will question the plausibility of this explanation. In unique cases—for example, the merger involving Chalketor—the presence of a monarch or dynast is unquestionable. Still, even here our understanding of the causes of the *sympoliteia* benefits little. In the first place, while we can speculate on how the combination of two cities worked toward the interests of the monarch involved, I will argue that these speculations are often ill defined and that it is more likely that the impetus for the arrangement came from one or both of the cities themselves. This was true for the countless disputes and status negotiations submitted to

Rome after Apamea—these matters originated in the concerns and interests of the Greek states, not the growing empire—and the situation before this time was certainly no different. Focusing primarily on the motives of the Hellenistic kings thus risks neglecting more local, and often more important, interests. Secondly, the strongest support for seeing royal imperative behind a local political combination has been the *synoikismoi* mandated by Antigonos Monophthalmos and Lysimachos.⁷ However, as intimated in the Introduction, the similarities between these instances and the *sympoliteiai* considered in this study are only superficial. In the cases of Alexandria Troas and Ephesos, both were foundations named (or renamed) after members of the royal family (Antigonos initially called his new city Antigoneia) and involved forcible transfers of population, in marked contrast to the voluntarism exhibited in the *sympoliteia* agreements from Karia. Lysimachos even compelled the larger member of his new civic creation, the Ephesians, to move to a new site. This is clearly different from the transactions discussed below, where both cities come to a mutual agreement that is politically and, to a limited extent, physically centered on the city of the dominant partner.⁸ The *synoikismos* of Teos and Lebedos is even less typical for city combinations. The mention of severe damage in Lebedos makes it likely that this city was at least partially uninhabitable due to some disaster; thus, the *synoikismos* was a specific response to extraordinary circumstances that demanded a settlement reconfiguration.⁹ In any case, most of the *sympoliteiai* considered in this study lack any overt reference to a Hellenistic ruler, and since it is possible to infer similar motives across the entire range of cases without recourse to an unmentioned royal policy, it seems more sensible to begin with explanations that treat the involved cities independently.

This chapter will also help to test the typology for *sympoliteiai* developed by Schmitt, in particular because many of his examples are taken from Karia.¹⁰ This scholar offers three categories for “incorporating sympolities”—as distinct from federal “sympolities” like the Achaian and Aitolian Leagues—only two of which apply to the current study. The first involves the absorption of the smaller community by a larger one (Miletos-Pidasa and Kos-Kalymna are provided as examples). The second type of *sympoliteia* allows each participant to preserve its own identity, as is clear from a community which preserves both names of its constituents (e.g., Plarasa/Aphrodisias).¹¹ From the evidence I will argue that a distinction between these two “types” is invalid, both because in all other respects *sympoliteiai* that preserve the name of both partners resemble ones that do not, and because there are strong reasons for inferring the identity-preservation of the smaller partner even in Schmitt’s

incorporating mergers.

I have arranged the 14 potential instances of *sympoliteiai* in Karia primarily according to geography and secondarily according to chronology, the exception being the accord between Latmos and Pidasa, which I have placed first, since it comes a full century before the other combinations. Geographically I group the cases based on the larger partner of each agreement, beginning at the northwestern coast of the region and progressing southward before moving on to the inland and southern coastal communities. Within these geographical groupings, I attempt to discuss the earliest *sympoliteia(i)* first, where this is possible. Thus, after Latmos and Pidasa, I begin with Miletos, treating the absorption of Myous before that of Pidasa, and likewise with the three *sympoliteiai* centered on Mylasa. Next, I consider the communities southward but still oriented to the coast, followed by more hinterland locales such as Stratonikeia and Plarasa/Aphrodisias. Finally, I discuss the *homopoliteia* of Kos and Kalymna, which completely evades the coastal-hinterland distinction and lacks an overtly Karian element in either community.¹² As topography and spatial relationships are just as important for understanding the origin and nature of a *sympoliteia* as textual evidence, I preface my discussion of each case with an account of the location of each partner in relation to one another.¹³ This account is followed by publication, translation and discussion of the major text(s) that serves as evidence for the *sympoliteia* in question. At the end of this procession of evidence and commentary, I conclude with a summary of the major points to be taken away from the chapter, stressing any similarities, acknowledging peculiarities, and modifying the *opinio communis* when possible.

The nature of the evidence for each *sympoliteia* varies greatly. In some cases, a relatively full text of the agreement survives, as in the accords between Miletos and Pidasa and Kos and Kalymna. Unfortunately, this is the exception in Karia. We are normally alerted to the existence of a *sympoliteia* by a passing mention in a decree or by inference from less direct evidence. Thus, while I have attempted to focus the discussion on issues of motivation, it has often been necessary to provide a detailed treatment of all pertinent evidence on each *sympoliteia*. I have also attempted to address any unclear or controversial matter that is raised by previous publications of the evidence and its implications. Thus, for instance, issues of textual restoration and interpretation feature prominently in the discussion of Killara and its unnamed partner, while dating controversies must frequently be resolved as a prerequisite for considering motives. In several cases, a decision on the very existence of the *sympoliteia* in question is required before we can attempt to draw further

conclusions. Consideration of these issues, however, will serve not only to facilitate our exploration of motivation, but is intended as a contribution to our knowledge of these particular aspects in their own right as well.

Latmos (Herakleia) and Pidasa

Visiting the site of Latmos/Herakleia does little to alter the impression given by Robert's thorough treatment of the site's landscape and adjoining territory.¹⁴ The city sat on the northeastern corner of the Latmian gulf, ensconced in a terrain of granite described by Rehm as a desert of rock.¹⁵ Some olive trees grow on the lower slopes of the mountain that rises behind the site, but these could in no way support a significant population agriculturally. One these grounds, and noting an inscription found in the Bafa plain abutting the Latmian coast to the south dated by the Herakleian stephanephorate, Robert conclusively argued that this plain was "la partie cultivable et riche du territoire d'Héraclée," and presumably this would have held true for Latmos as well.¹⁶ In this plain still grow (since Robert's visit) corn, wheat, cotton, and tobacco, its soil able to support viticulture as well, while the surrounding hills are home to olive grows and pine trees amenable to apiculture. Thus, the city would have had a southern orientation economically, both as a port and in connection to its *chôra*. The city and the Bafa plain are both delineated from the surrounding landscape by the mountainous geography. From *Milet* I.3 150 we learn that Herakleia claimed the mountainous area to the northwest of the city as sacred that was also claimed (by the Milesians at least) as part of the territory of Myous, which was still independent in the fourth century. Seemingly impassable terrain separated Latmos' northeastern neighbor, Amyzon, although an ancient network of roads leading to this inland city has been discovered, which makes sense of the treaty between the two cities forged in the second century and mentioned in [chapter 1](#).¹⁷ To the south, the passes through the lower, but still steep—the modern road goes through a tunnel at one point—hills separating the Bafa plain from the Euromid plain to the southwest define the border with Pidasa, whose *acropoleis* were situated on Laba Dağ (Mount Grion) overlooking the northeastern extension of the Euromid valley, which Pidasa controlled according to *Milet* I.3 149 (on which see below).¹⁸ Finally, to the east of the Bafa plain, Latmos' boundary with Miletos must have been located where the terrain slopes upward toward the northern edges of the Grion, close to the harbor town of Ioniapolis. Because Pidasa also bordered Ioniapolis, a significant part of its territory included the hills and mountainous pass between the valley and the gulf.¹⁹ In the late fourth century, then,

Latmos and Pidasas were each other's closest neighbors in terms of centralized settlement and the accessibility of the land routes that connected them. Given either the size or the inapproachability of its other neighbors, the logical direction of expansion for Latmos would have been into Pidasian territory.



Map 2.1 Latmian Gulf and Surroundings. *Source:* Tina Ross Archaeological Illustrations.

Such a move is not only explainable in terms of accessibility, however. The ruins of the site are positioned several miles to the southwest of the aforementioned modern tunnel,²⁰ situated, in other words, to control both the mountains and well watered hills to the north, which support both pine (thus apiculture) and olive growth, and the slopes leading down into the Euromid plain. As indicated by *Milet* I.3 149, Pidasas controlled some of this plain as well, and its territory produced, in addition to olive oil and honey, sheep and wine, the latter particularly associated with the city's territory in the Euromid, whose most prominent crop today is corn. The extent of this territory and the relatively small size of Pidasas itself suggest a largely dispersed population, bound together by the defensive capability of the two *acropoleis* and certain sacred areas, and inhabiting a sufficiently productive territory.²¹

The position of both towns in relation to each other helps to contextualize our earliest evidence for a *sympoliteia* in Karia, a late fourth-century inscription recording the terms and conditions of established by the city of Latmos and its neighbor Pidasas.

I. Blümel 1997, 135–42; *SEG* 47.1563; Wörrle 2003, 121–43.

Cf. Habicht 1998, 9–10; Blümel 1998, 185; Gauthier 1999, 462; Jones 1999, 1–7; Bencivenni 2003, 151–68; Saba 2007, 125–34; LaBuff 2010, 115–24.

Found: In the shed of Ali Burnak on the shore of ancient Latmos,
brought from nearby island

Currently: Milas Museum #2657

Description: Fragment of a marble stele lightly tapered on the top,
broken on top and bottom, and trimmed on the edges.

Measurements: H .60m × W .415m × D .09m

[-----δ]ίκαία ἀπ[ο-----] ΑΠ -----

[]AN: προσαγαγεῖν δὲ καὶ θυσίαν [τῇι Ἀθη]-

[v]ᾱι τοὺς τιμούχους ἤδη ὅπως ἂν ἡ πόλι[ς ὁ-]

- 4 μονοιῇ· προσκατατάξαι δὲ καὶ φυλὴν μία[ν]
 [π]ρὸς ταῖς ὑπαρχούσαις καὶ ὀνομάζεσθαι αὐ-
 [τ]ὴν Ἀσανδρίδα· ἐπικληρῶσαι δ' εἰς αὐτὴν ἐκ πα-
 [σ]ων τῶν φυλῶν καὶ τῶν φρατοριῶν τῶν τε ἐν Λά-
 8 [τ]μωι ὑπαρχόντων καὶ τῶν ἐμ Πιδάσοις· τοὺς δὲ λο[ι]-
 πούς Πιδασείων ἐπικληρῶσαι ἐπὶ τὰς ὑπαρχού-
 σας φυλάς ὥς ισότατα· τοὺς δὲ λαχόντας Πιδ-
 12 [ρ]ας τῶν φρατορικῶν, τὰς δὲ φυλάς τῶν φυλετ[ι]-
 [κ]ῶν, οὗ ἂν ἕκαστοι λάχωσιν· τὰς δὲ προσόδους
 [τὰς] ὑπαρχούσας Πιδασεῦσιν καὶ Λατμίαις
 [τῶν] ἱερῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων εἶναι κοι-
 16 νὰς, ἴδιον δὲ μηθὲν εἶναι μηδετέραι τῶν πό-
 λεων· τὰ δὲ χρέα τὰ προὔπαχοντα ἐν ἑκατ[ε]-
 ραι τῶμ πόλεων εἰὼς μηνὸς Δίου διορθώσασθα[ι]
 τὰ ἴδια ἑκατέραν τὰ αὐτῶν· σταθμούς δὲ παρέ-
 20 χειν Πιδασεῦσιν ἱκανοὺς Λατμίους ἐνιαυτόν·
 [δ]ίπῳ δ' ἂν καὶ ἐπιγαμίας ποιῶνται πρὸς ἀλλή-
 λους, μὴ ἐξέστω Λάτμιον Λατμίωι διδόναι
 θυγατέρα μηδὲ λαμβάνειν μηδὲ Πιδασέ<a> Πιδ-
 24 ασεῖ, ἀλλὰ διδόναι καὶ λαμβάνειν Λάτμιον μὲν
 Πιδασεῖ, Πιδασέα δὲ Λατμίωι ἐφ' ἔτη ἕξ· τὰ δὲ [ἀρ]-
 χεῖα κατιστάναι κοινῇ ἐκ Πιδασείων καὶ Λατμί[ων]·
 εἶναι δὲ Πιδασεῦσιν οἰκοδομεῖσθαι οἰκίσε[ις]
 28 ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐν τῇ δημοσίᾳ οὗ ἂν βούλωνται· [ὁ]-
 μόσαι δὲ Πιδασείων ἄνδρας ἑκατόν, οὓς ἂν Λ[ά]-
 τμιοι γράψωσιν, καὶ Λατμίων διακοσίους, οὓς ἂν
 Πιδασεῖς γράψωσιν ταύρωι καὶ κάπρῳ ἐν τῇ ἀγ[ο]-
 32 ρᾷ ἐμμένειν ἐν τῷ ψηφίσματι καὶ τῷ πολιτεύμα-
 τι τῷδε· τὸ δὲ δόγμα ἀναγράψαι εἰς στήλας λι-
 θίνας καὶ τῇ μίαν ἀναθεῖναι εἰς τὸ τοῦ Διὸς το-
 ῦ Λαμβραύνδου, τὴν δὲ μίαν ἐν Λάτμωι ἐν
 36 τῷ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς ἱερῷ· ἐπιμεληθῆναι δὲ τοὺς ἄρ-
 χόντας τοὺς κατασταθέντας ἐπ' Ἀρόπου· νας.
 [δρ]κος ὃν δεῖ ὁμόσα[ι] Λ[α]τμίους· ὁμνύω Δία Γῆν Ἥλι-
 [ον] Ποσειδῶ Ἀθη[νᾶν] Ἀρεῖαν καὶ τὴν Ταυροπόλον
 40 [καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους θεοῦς· πολιτεύσομαι μετὰ Πι-
 [δασείων] πολιτεύματι τῷ αὐ-
 [τῷ] [τῷ] κοινῷ καὶ οὕτε
 [οὕ]τε ἄλλω[ι]




Figure 2.1 Inscription I. *Source:* Photo by Jeremy LaBuff.

The text is Wörrle's except where noted. L. 1: KAI, Blümel 1997.—L. 2: N, Blümel 1997. —L. 2–3: [ὁ-]μονοιῆ, Blümel 1997; [ὁ]μονοιῆ, Wörrle 2003. —L. 6–7: πα|[1–2]ων, Blümel 1997. —L. 7: φρατοριῶν, Blümel 1997; φρατορίων, Blümel 1998; ΦΡΑΤΟΡΙΩΝ, Wörrle 2003. —L. 27: οἰκήσι[μ]α, Blümel 1997; οἰκησι[ν], Jones 1999. —L. 41: A, Blümel 1997. —L. 42: οὐ TE-, Blümel 1997. —L. 43: τε, Blümel 1997. —L. 44: [ἐπιτρέψω], Jones 1999.

Translation:

- . . . and that the office-holders now lead forth a sacrifice so that the ci[ty] be of one mind.
- And to arrange in addition to the existing tribes a new one and to name it Asandris; and to allot [sc. members] in it from all the tribes and phratries that exist in Latmos and in Pidasa
- And to allot the rest of the Pidaseans in the existing tribes as equally as possible.
- That the Pidaseans receive a lot and have a share in all sacred rites, as phratry members in rites of the phratries, as tribesmen in rites of the tribes, which each man obtains by lot.
- That the Pidaseans' income and that of the Latmians, both sacred and from all other sources, be common, and that nothing be particular to either city.
- That each city settle the private debts incurred previously in it by the month of Zeus.
- That the Latmians provide sufficient dwellings for the Pidaseans for one year.
- In order that they might intermarry, let it be forbidden for a Latmian to give his daughter to a Latmian or take a Latmian girl in marriage, nor for a Pidasean to act likewise with a Pidasean, but a Latmian is to give to and receive from a Pidasean and a Pidaseans likewise to and from a Latmian for six years.
- That the magistracies consist in common of Pidaseans and Latmians.
- That the Pidaseans be allowed to build houses in the public sector of the city wherever they wish.
- That 100 Pidasean men, whom the Latmians are to record, and 200 Latmians, whom the Pidaseans are to record, swear to abide by the decree and this constitution (sacrificing) with a bull and a boar in the agora.
- To inscribe the decision on stone stelai, placing one in the temple of Zeus Labraundos and one in the temple of Athena in Latmos.
- That the archons established during Aropos' term take care of these matters.

The oath which the Latmians must swear: I swear by Zeus, Gê, Helios, Poseidon, and Areian and Tauropolitan Athena, [and the other gods]: I will be in a polity with the P[idaseans] . . . by the constitution/civic body . . . in common and neither . . . nor otherwise . . .

Commentary: Letter forms 4th/3rd c. BC

- 2καί: indicates that this stipulation was not the first of the agreement.
 A clause declaring the Pidaseans citizens of Latmos no doubt was among those broken off at the top (cf. *I. Magnesia am Sipylus* 1b; *Milet* I.3 149).
- 3τμούχους: taken by Blümel as a general term for all officials, attested elsewhere with special authority at Teos and Priene (McCabe Teos 31, *I. Priene* 4, 6, 8, 10–11).
- 4μόνουι: Blümel and Wörrle read ὁμονοίη despite all other iotas being adscript in the inscription (cf. κοινῇι at line 23, for example). More consistent with the rest of the text is to take the word as a variant of ὁμονοός, with an added iota like that in l. 18 εἶως and with the genitive plural form Πιδασείων. The fact that the adjective normally has the same ending for masculine and feminine genders does not present a problem, since the text presents us with a version of Greek that is noticeably different from, and at times seems awkward next to, its Attic counterpart (see comments below for further examples).
- 7, 11–12φρατοριῶν, φράτορας: See Jones 1999, 3–6 for arguments against φρατορίων. Wörrle 2003, 126f. finds his arguments unconvincing and seems to favor Petzl’s suggestion (reported by Jones) of φρατόρ(ι)ων, though he does not publish this. Except for Petzl’s suggestion, none of the forms is attested in Attic, while φρατερικός is a *hapax*. (cf. Threatte, *Grammar of Attic Inscriptions* II (1996): 117). My translation most closely follows that of Jones (5), finding the skepticism of Wörrle regarding whether Pidasa had tribes as well as phratries before the merger unwarranted.
- 17–19τὰ δὲ χρέα . . . ἑκατέραν τὰ αὐτῶν: The repetitiveness of this clause suggests uncertainty of composition. The τὰ αὐτῶν seems entirely superfluous after already specifying that the debts had occurred in each of the cities, while the adjective ἴδια comes unnecessarily late, almost as if this vital qualifier had been temporarily forgotten.
- 27οικήσεις: Wörrle’s observation of the traces of the middle bar of the epsilon, which my own reading confirms, invalidates Blümel’s assertion that the stone rendered this reading impossible (cf. Jones 1999, 6).
- 37Ἄροπος: The name is attested in Attika (Osborne & Byrne, *LGPN* II), Rhodes (*IG* XII.1 586.3), and recently in Miletos (*Milet* VI 2 809).

A number of important points are raised by this text. First, the new tribe of Asandris has led some scholars to infer Asandros, satrap of Karia, as the force behind the *sympoliteia*. According to this view, he would have wanted to secure access between his residence in Mylasa and Miletos.²² I have argued elsewhere that the naming of the tribe

after Asandros, however, makes better sense if we assume that the act originated in one or both of the cities affected. The absence of the satrap from the rest of the agreement, as well as the parallel naming of tribes after Hellenistic rulers at Athens, suggests that this naming was a gesture of goodwill rather than a sign of external interference.²³ At the same time, a close inspection of the text of the agreement reveals motives particular to the two cities involved.

At first glance, the terms of the *sympoliteia* seem to aim at the total absorption of Pidasa as a separate community by Latmos: all Pidaseans not enrolled in the new tribe are to be assigned a Latmian tribe; neither city is to possess anything that does not belong to the other, including magistracies; the Latmians must house the Pidaseans; citizens of one city can only marry those from the other for six years. The remarkable clause on forced intermarriage, combined with the injunction to settle the Pidaseans in Latmos, leads Reger to conclude that “Pidasa as a *polis* would cease to exist by the terms of this agreement.”²⁴ This would speak to the motives of Latmos in the agreement, at least, namely the desire to absorb a smaller neighbor who, as we learned from the later *sympoliteia* of Miletos and Pidasa, possessed fertile agricultural land and access to central Karia, in particular Mylasa. According to this view, Latmos sought to expand territorially, economically, and perhaps commercially as well. On the other hand, perhaps Pidasa was simply getting the best deal out of an unavoidable situation: the equality of status within the community would have certainly been preferable to conquest or some other form of dependence.

I have argued elsewhere that a closer reading of the text suggests that Pidasa was able to maintain its identity under the terms of the agreement more than has been argued. First, the complete sharing between the two cities refers to sacred and secular income, not all institutions that might constitute a separate Pidasean sphere of control. Second, the housing clause, like similar stipulations in *isopoliteia* agreements, served to “incentivize” a move to Latmos, but the limited window of time within which such a move could occur (one year) makes it unlikely that any thought of complete absorption lay behind the clause.²⁵ Finally, the stipulation restricting marriages in the new polity to those between Latmians and Pidaseans would not have eradicated Pidasean identity, since the six years of enforcement would still leave an overwhelming majority of “unmixed” marriages within the community. Instead, this stipulation is tied to the privilege of *epigamia* and the maintenance of an exclusive Latmian civic identity. If the Pidaseans were to now be Latmians, it was important that they channel their marital attentions more toward their new community.²⁶

These considerations permit the modification of Pidasas's expectations with respect to the *sympoliteia*. Rather than negotiating the best conditions for an inevitable incorporation from an overpowering neighbor, Pidasas seems to have been able to assert its interests and preserve the most important aspects of its communal identity. This creates the serious possibility that Pidasas entered the arrangement willingly. Among the potential aims this inland town might have had, access to a port is most tempting. Such access could have provided wider markets for Pidasian agricultural goods, about which we hear much more in its second-century *sympoliteia* with Miletos. A harbor also entailed contact with the outside world of a non-economic nature. Although we lack any evidence that Latmos enjoyed relations with other states in the Aegean at this time, the city had dedicated statues at Didyma in the sixth century, paid as much tribute to Athens as Myous and Priene in the 5th, and sent ambassadors to mediate a treaty between Mylasa and Kindya under Maussollos.²⁷ The community's international activity in the Hellenistic period, as Herakleia, has already been discussed (see [chapter 1](#)). It is at least possible, then, that the city's prestige, and hence that of its leading citizens, was substantial enough to attract the attention of a smaller neighbor like Pidasas. The point should not be pressed. In addition, Latmos may have offered an improved place of refuge in the face of an invading or raiding army. Although the looming walls that still define the descendant of Latmos, Herakleia, had not been built yet, the anecdotes about both Maussollos and Artemesia needing ruses to take the city suggest a rather defensible site.²⁸

Finally, the text allows us to summarize some of the formal aspects of a *sympoliteia* agreement. The arrangement consists of a number of clauses that set up procedures for the admission of the Pidasians into the communal life of Latmos (sacrifices, enrollment in Latmian tribes) and defines the scope of the *sympoliteia* (offices, finances). The inscription also includes several provisions to encourage unity between the two communities (*epigamia*, dwellings for a year, permission to settle in public sector of Latmos), and culminates in the procedures for taking and publicizing the oaths that will effect the arrangement. Although the beginning of the text is missing, one presumes that the first clause declares the Pidasians to be Latmians in the same way that Latmians are.²⁹ We will have the opportunity to compare these aspects with the components of other *sympoliteiai* below.

MILETOS AND MYOUS

We have already mentioned above that Milesian territory extended southwestward to Ioniapolis on the southern coast of the Latmian gulf. It also included the entire peninsula on whose northern tip its fairly large urban center was situated, as well as some small islands off the coast. This rather large swathe of territory, nonetheless, was in large part unfertile, supporting a moderate amount of olive cultivation.³⁰ One imagines that trade, both maritime and inland, was the city's main means to flourish.³¹ Separating Miletos from Myous, placed to control the mouth of the Maeander River, was the mouth of the gulf itself. Due to the silting of the river, however, the Myesian *chôra* had become marshy, which forced the inhabitants by Vitruvius' day to abandon the site.³² This silting process, which eventually turned the Latmian gulf into a lake, makes a comparison with the modern landscape impossible. Weber supposes that, in addition to the mountainous areas to the northwest that abutted the territory of Herakleia, Myous must have controlled the fertile entrance of the Maiandros valley.³³ In the 3rd and 2nd centuries, we are still uncertain as to the effect the silting had on the fertility of the land Myous controlled, but it seems safe to assume that the real damage done by the silting to Myous' prosperity was the loss of its harbor, and that agriculturally it still produced enough to maintain the community and, no doubt, possessed resources that made annexation an attractive option for Miletos to the southwest.³⁴

The combination of Miletos and Myous is one of the few *sympoliteiai* for which we have direct literary evidence: Strabo uses the verb συμπεπόλισται to describe the incorporation into Miletos of Myous due to the latter city's lack of men (ὀλιγανδρία, 14.636). What this passage does not tell us, among other things, is when the agreement occurred, and on what exact terms. For this we turn to inscriptions, which give us a *terminus post quem* of 289/88 BC, when Myous appears as an independent member of the Ionic League (Syll.³ 368). The *sympoliteia* seems to have taken place before the end of the same century, since in 201 Philip V gave Myous to Magnesia (Polyb. 16.24.9), and then the Romans gave it back (ἀποκατέστησαν; *ibid.*, 21.45.5) to the Milesians, implying that the Myous was already considered a dependent community of Miletos before Philip's Karian campaign.³⁵ Contrary to the recent argument by Mazzucchi, the Milesian decree ordering the ΜΥΟ—to give land for some Cretan mercenaries in 234/33 fails to give an earlier *terminus ante quem* because the omicron is uncertain—Rehm allows that it could just as easily be a theta—and since, even if the omicron were secure, this form of the ethnic, ΜΥΟΥΣΙΟΣ, is only found in authors from the second century AD onward.³⁶ The subsequent history of the arrangement has been summarized already (see [chapter 1](#)), and I

merely wish to add that Pausanias' note on the abandonment of Myous due to mosquitos (7.2.11) must refer to an event much later than the context of the original *sympoliteia*, and thus has no relevance for the present discussion.³⁷

While we have no information on the details of the *sympoliteia* between Miletos and Myous, we can deduce several facts. First, Miletos was clearly the dominant partner, and to the outside world Myous was considered part of Milesian territory.³⁸ This subordinate status clearly meant a renunciation (if tacit) of any legitimate claim to independence, as Philip's behavior showed. Nevertheless, that Myous was still a viable and autonomous community is clear from a pair of inscriptions from the early second centuries, both on the same stone, which I present here:

II. Herrmann 1965, 90–103 = *SEG* 36.1047 + 1048; *Milet* VI.3 1029 + 1040.

Cf. Robert 1966; Gauthier 1989; Günther 1995; Mazzucchi 2008.

Found: In terrace wall under east parados of theater (15m E of archaic tower)

Currently: yard of Miletos Museum (squeeze #462)

Description: White marble (fragile) block, preserved on all sides. As a result of reuse (for the theater of Miletos), back side and side surfaces are largely lost. Top side shows anathyrosis, as well as a Klammerloch for linking from behind and a peg hole for linking from above. Text (a) is on the front, text (b) on the right side. Block from ante (probably) of temple of Apollo Terminus in Myous, before reuse, and was found in 1903, left *in situ* until 1963.

Dimensions: H .83m × W .735m × D .115m

- a)
- [ἐπειδὴ]
Ἀπολλόδωρος Μητροφάνου προαιρ[οῦμενος *ca.* 15 τῶι δή-]
μοι ἔν τε τοῖς πρότερον χρόνοις εὖνου[ν ἑαντὸν διε]τέ[λ]ει παρεχό[μ]ε-
4 νος κοινῇ τε καὶ ἰδίαι τοῖς ἀπαντῶσιν αὐτῶι Μυησίων καὶ νῦν τὴν αὐ-
τὴν αἴρεσιν ἔχων ἀνατίθησι τῶι Ἀπόλλωνι τῶι Τερμινθεῖ φιάλας τέσ-
σερας ὅλην ἄγουσιν ἐκάστην δραχμὰς Μιλησίας ἑκατόν, δε-
[δό]χθαι τῶι δήμῳ Ἀπολλόδωρον μὲν ἐπινηθῆσαι τῆς τε πρὸς τὸν
[θε]ὸν εὐσεβείας ἔνε<κ>εν κα *vacat*

Text is that of Herrmann. L.8: The stone reads ENEBENKA. The text ends without any apparent erasure, meaning that the inscriber simply

stopped chiseling (Herrmann 92). It would be strange if he refused to continue because of the erroneous beta, but it is hard to guess the real reason behind the abandonment.

Translation:

[Since] Apollodoros son of Metrophanes willingly . . . continued to offer himself with good will [to the de]mos both in previous times, publicly and in private with those of the Myesians who approached him, and now with the same resolve (he) dedicates to Apollo Terminusus four *phialai* to the value of 100 Milesian drachmas each, it has been decided by the *dêmos* to praise Apollodoros on account of his piety toward the god and . . .

Commentary: Lettering late third century

1. As Herrmann remarks, it is uncertain whether this is the actual first line of the inscription, since we cannot be sure that the top of the stone was not reworked in its later use.
2. Apollodoros son of Metrophanes was stephanephoros in 212/11 (Günther 1985, 88 and n.15, revising Rehm's date of 206/05 (*Milet* I.3.46, 124)).

- b)
- [...] ΔΗΜΟ [5-6] ΕΣ . [...] ΑΕ . [ca. 6] ΟΝΕΧ . . ΣΑ []
- φιλοδοξίαν· τὸ δὲ συναχθὲν π[λ]ήθος ἐγδανείσουσιν, ὅπως ἢ πίπτουσ[α ἀπ' αὐτοῦ]
πρόσδοδος ὑπάρχῃ εἰς τὰ διὰ τοῦ ψηφίσματος ἀποτεταγμένα· τὸν δὲ[]
- 4 τον γραμματέα προνοῖσαι ἐν ἀρχαιρεσίαις ὅπως ἱερῶσύνῃ πραθ[ῇ ἢ]
Εὐμένους θεοῦ, αἰρεθῶσι δὲ καὶ ἄνδρες οἵτινες διαγραφὴν τε εἰσοίσουσιν περὶ τῆς]
ἱερῶσύνης καὶ τὰ ἐψηφισμένα εἰς τοὺς νόμους κατατάξουσιν τοὺς[]
- 8 ὑπάρχοντας Μυησίους, ἀναγραφῇ δὲ καὶ τότε τὸ ψηφισμα εἰς τε τὸ βῆ[μα ἐφ' οὗ]
σταθίσεται ἢ τοῦ βασιλέως εἰκὼν καὶ εἰς τὴν παραστάδα τοῦ ναοῦ[τοῦ Ἀπόλλω-]
νος το[ῦ Τ]ερμινθέως· τὸ δὲ ἐσόμενον εἰς ταῦτα ἀνίλωμα ὑπηρετήσ[αι τὸν τα-]
μίαν ἀ[πὸ ἀ]πάσης τῆς προσόδου καὶ ἐγγράψασθαι εἰς τὸν λόγον· ἐλέ[σθαι δὲ δύο]
πρεσβ[ευτ]άς, τοὺς δὲ αἰρεθέντας ἀφικομένους πρὸς τὸν [βασιλέα τὸ τε ψηφισ-]
- 12 [μα] ἀποδοῦναι καὶ πρακαλεῖν τὸν βασιλέα ὅπως προν[οιησάμενος τῶν ἑαυ-]
[τοῦ] τιμῶν καὶ τῶν τοῦ δήμου ἐνδόξων ἀεὶ τινος ἀγαθοῦ[παραίτιος γένηται ἢ-]
[μῖν]· προνοῖσαι δὲ καὶ ὅπως ἀνασταθῇ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὁ περὶ τ[15-18]
[καθ]ότι καὶ διὰ τοῦ πρότερον ψηφίσματος ὁ δῆμος τῇμ π[]
- 16 [...][ο καὶ Εἰρηνίας δὲ τοὺς καθήκοντας λόγους πράσσει[ν ὑπέσχετο, καὶ ποιεῖν]
[ὅτι ἄν]ἀγαθὸν δύνωνται τῷ δήμῳ. Ἐρέθησαν Εἰρηνίας Εἰ[ρηνίου, 10]
[.....]ίδου.

The text is that of Herrmann.

Translation:

b) . . . love of glory; And they will loan out the collected amount, so that the income resulting [from it] be in accordance with the commands of the decree; and let the secretary take thought in the election of offices for how the priesthood of divine Eumenes is sold, and let men be chosen who will bring in the ordinance concerning the priesthood and arrange what has been decreed according to the laws which are Myesian, and let this decree be inscribed on the be[ma, on which] will be placed the statue of the king, as well as on the vestibule of the temple of [Apollo] Termintheus; and let the treasurer take care of the expense that will be for these things from all the income and let him record it in the accounts; and let two envoys be chosen, who upon selection shall go to the [king] and give [the decree] to him and invite him to consider how, by taking thought of [his own] glories and the honors of the *dêmos* he is ever the [cause] of some good [to us]; and let them also take thought as to how the . . . be set up by him, just as also through the earlier decree the *dêmos* . . . and also Eirenias [promised] to deliver fitting words [and to do whatever] good they are able for the *dêmos*. Eirenias son of Ei[renias and] . . . were chosen.

Commentary: Lettering first half of second century

Herrmann (97f.) estimates that the entire motivation section (“die ἐπειδὴ-Konstruktion”) and a large part of the stipulations have been lost in the reworking of the stone. Since I am primarily concerned with Eirenias’ role in the embassy, I only comment on the latter part of the decree. For commentary on the whole stone, see Herrmann, 97–103.

16 It is noteworthy that Eirenias emerges as the dominant force in the two-man embassy, alone promising to make a speech on the *dêmos*’ behalf. That his anonymous partner did not make a similar promise is guaranteed by the omicron at the beginning of the line, which must belong to an aorist/imperfect middle verb governing the lost accusative and having as its subject ὁ δῆμος. Eirenias attested as Milesian delegate to Eumenes (as well as Antiochos IV) in two inscriptions published in the same article by Herrmann (72–90).

In the first text, the Myesian *dêmos* praises Apollodoros son of Metrophanes, Milesian stephanephoros in 212/11, for his good will to its citizens and for a dedication to the city’s main deity, Apollo Termintheus.³⁹ The second decree gives various orders for the upkeep of a cult to Eumenes II, advising that everything be done “according to the laws which are Myesian” and appointing two envoys to announce the decree at the Pergamene court, one of whom, Eirenias son of Eirenias (the other envoy’s name is lost), appears in Milesian inscriptions as a delegate to both Eumenes and Antiochus IV.⁴⁰ From these two texts it appears that Myos continued to enjoy its own laws and even an assembly that was capable of self-representation outside of Miletos.⁴¹ On the other hand, the presence of prominent Milesians

in the decrees is a stark reminder of the limits imposed by the *sympoliteia* on the sovereignty of the city.

Given that the second decree specifies the laws as Milesian, one might be tempted to question whether this is a Myesian decree at all. Indeed, Herrmann, uncomfortable with the idea that Myous could continue to form ties with international powers while subordinate to Miletos, argues that this decree must be a ratification of a Milesian decree.⁴² Certainly, the specification suggests an alternate source of legal authority from which these laws needed to be distinguished, and since Miletos also maintained good relations with Eumenes, it almost certain that this decree was issued alongside a similar enactment in Miletos. Yet to see the decision to establish a cult to Eumenes *in Myous* as Milesian is to ignore the absence of any plausible explanation for why Miletos would be interested in doing so—unless the *polis* was motivated by interference for its own sake, which seems to be the tacit assumption of the top-down approach to historical analysis. Miletos would ensure amicable relations with the Attalids by instituting a cult in their own city, thus showing their goodwill (*eunoia*) to the king. Forcing another subordinate community to show goodwill is unparalleled in the history of the *polis*. Instead, the decree shows both the continued vitality of the Myesian community in offering similar honors to Eumenes (thus, as it were, competing with the *dêmos* of Miletos) and its recognition of Miletos as sovereign over it: specifying the laws as Myesian alludes to other laws to which the community was subordinate, namely those of Miletos.

Yet are these the only conclusions to be derived from these two inscriptions? I would like to suggest the possibility that either Apollodoros or Eirenias, or both, could have hailed from Myous originally.⁴³ No evidence precludes it, since both men would have identified themselves as Milesians on the international sphere regardless of their city of origin (Miletos or Myous). The fact that neither individual is identified with an ethnic in the Myesian decrees has been taken to indicate the citizenship rights that Milesians possessed in Myous as a result of the *sympoliteia*, but this is not a stipulation in any of the *sympoliteia* agreements that we possess in Asia Minor. In fact, the only other *sympoliteia* embarked upon by Miletos grants Milesian citizenship to Pidasa but not vice versa (see Introduction and below). Moreover, looking at the *sympoliteia* between Mylasa and Olymos (see below), it was even possible for the subordinate community to grant *politeia* to a citizen of the larger partner after the *sympoliteia* (though in this case the “foreigner” lacked an ethnic). Eirenias in particular seems to have been a member of the Myesian assembly, promising to deliver fitting words to Eumenes on Myous’ behalf *before* being chosen as an envoy. This suggests

participation in the deliberative session of the *dêmos*. Thus, it may make more sense to see him as a prominent Myesian who flourished in the *sympoliteia* enough to achieve the eponymous office of Miletos. The same can be said for Apollodoros.

This intriguing possibility suggests the attractiveness of a *sympoliteia* for Myous. The potential presence of certain Myesians at the highest level of Milesian society and politics may reflect back on the aims of the Myesian elite in effecting the accord. The status that Eirenias in particular was able to achieve at the international level is especially impressive, and while his career post-dates the formation of the *sympoliteia* considerably, such success may have well been in the mind of his social, if not hereditary, ancestors. The temporary inclusion of Myous within the Magnesian state might imply a history of aggression between the two cities prior to the *sympoliteia*, but this is speculative. In terms of Milesian motives for the arrangement, it is difficult to go beyond the general factors of population increase and economic opportunity that seem to have driven its foreign policy at then end of the third and beginning of the second centuries. With the influx of new citizens and an increasingly prosperous harbor trade, access to a more productive territory than the Milesian *chôra* proper may have become a priority. At the same time, Miletos' willingness to go to war with Magnesia over this acquisition suggests its importance.

MILETOS AND PIDASA

We have introduced above the common, if narrow, border between Miletos and Pidasa, skirting the Bafa plain controlled by Herakleia (Latmos in the fourth century) along the Grion mountain that juts up against the Latmian gulf. We have also drawn attention to Miletos' relatively poor soil and Pidasa's access to a variety of agricultural resources both internally and via its connection to Euromos to the southeast. Based on this disparity in resources, as well as an inverse disparity in size, renown, and ambition (see [chapter 1](#)), it is possible to see the arrangement as a means for the larger city to expand at the expense of its smaller neighbor. The increase in population and, consequently, military capability would have balanced the responsibility and inconvenience of securing the territory of Pidasa.⁴⁴ Not only did this allow for improved defense or even aggression against neighbors like Herakleia and Magnesia, with whom Miletos fought separate wars around this time, but the agreement augmented the city's position *vis-à-vis* more international powers, such as Rhodes, Pergamon, and, of course, Rome.⁴⁵ No doubt Miletos also foresaw the economic benefits of annexing the Pidasean *chôra*, whose productivity

is suggested by the tax exemptions on produce that take up a good deal of agreement between the two cities.⁴⁶ Let us consider whether these preliminary suppositions are borne out by the textual evidence. I provide a full text and translation of the inscription recording the *sympoliteia*:

III. Rehm 1906, 226–33 (350–57) = *Milet* I.3 149.

Cf. Robert, 1962, 62 n. 7; Wörrle 1988, 428–48; Errington 1989, 279–88; Gauthier 2001; Migeotte 2001.

Found: 1903 in the Delphinion of Miletos

Currently: Berlin #657

Description: Stele of white marble. Stone face blank .04m above and .385m below the text. The letters are not of uniform height, with round letters not filling the row and ρ, υ, φ, and γ extending a bit beneath it. Even the same letters (e.g. α) vary in size, tending to be larger in the middle of the text. The left border of the text is uniform; as expected, the right border is uneven based on the words at the end of each line.

Dimensions: H 1.64m × W .685-.754m × D .15m

- 1 Ἀγαθῇ τύχῃ· ἐπὶ στεφανηφόρου Πασικλείους μηνὸς Ἀνθεστηριῶνος
τάδε ὁμολόγησαν καὶ συνέθεντο Μιλήσιοι καὶ Πιδασεῖς, ὑπὲρ μὲν τοῦ
δήμου τοῦ Μιλησίων οἱ πρυτάνεις καὶ οἱ εἰρεμένοι ἐπὶ τῇ φυλακῇ καὶ οἱ
ἀποδει-
χθέντες σύνεδροι Μιννίαν Λεωδάμαντος, Θεογένης Λεωδάμαντος, Πολύξε-

- 5 νος Μελησίππου, Μενέστρατος Αναξίλεω, Ηρώδης Ζήνωνος, Αντίγονος
 Ἐκαταίου, Μύρμηξ Ἐκαταίου, Ἡρώδης Μιννίανος, Φιλίσκος Λυσιμάχου,
 Δημήτριος
 Ἀρτέμωνος, ὑπὲρ δὲ τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Πιδασέων οἱ πεμφθέντες ὑφ' αὐτῶν αὐτο-
 κράτορες πρεσβευταὶ Μενέξενος Ἀριστέου, Δημήτριος Πολίτου, Ἀρτέμων
 Μενίπ-
 9 που, Μέλανθος Πολίτου, Ἑρμίας Πολίτου, Μελάνθος Πολίτου, Μενεσθεὺς
 Ἀριστέου,
 Αἴσαν Ἑρμίου, Πολίτης Ἑρμίου, Πολίτης Μενίππου· εἶναι Πιδασεῖς Μιλησίαν
 πο-
 λίτας καὶ τέκνα καὶ γυναῖκες, ὅσαι ἂν ᾧσιν φύσει Πιδασίδες ἢ πόλεως Ἑλλη-
 νίδος πολῖτιδες· παραδόναι δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ βουλευτήριον τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀναγρα-
 φὴν τοὺς αἰρεθέντας ὑπὸ Μιλησίων ἄνδρας καὶ μετεῖναι τοῖς ὁμόσασιν καὶ
 14 ἀνενεχθεῖσιν ἱερῶν καὶ ἀρχείων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὧν καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς μετε-
 στι Μιλησίους· πέμπειν δὲ Μιλησίους εἰς Πίδασα τὸν λαχόντα τῶν πολιτῶν
 φρουράρχον καὶ φρουροὺς, ὅσους ἂν ἱκανοὺς εἶναι φαίνεται, καὶ προνοεῖν,
 ὅπως
 τὰ τεῖχη ἐπισκευάζεται καὶ κατὰ χώραν μένη, καὶ τῆς φυλακῆς ἐπιμε-
 λεῖσθαι, καθότι ἂν κρίνωσι συμφέρειν. τῶν δὲ ἐκφορίων τῶν γινομένων
 ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ τῇ Πιδασέων τὸ μὲν ἔλαϊον εἶναι ἐπιτελὲς τῶν τελῶ-
 20 ν, ὧν καὶ Μιλήσιοι τιθέασιν. τῶν δὲ ἄλλων τελεῖν χαλκοῦν ἐφ' ἑτῇ πέν-
 τε ἄρχοντος στεφανηφόρου Φιλίδου, καὶ τῶν κτηνῶν τῶν ἱσταμένων
 ἐν τῇ Πιδασίδι, ὅσα ἐστὶν Πιδασέων τῶν ἐμ Πιδάσοις κατοικούντων
 καὶ ζυμνῶν τὸ ἴσον [ἐ]φ' ἑτῇ τρία ἄρχοντος τοῦ αὐτοῦ στεφανηφόρου,
 24 διελθόντος δὲ τοῦ προειρημένου χρόνου τελεῖν εἰς Μίλητον Πιδασεῖς
 τὰ αὐτὰ τέλη, καθότι ἂν καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ Μιλήσιοι τελωνῶνται. δοῦναι δὲ
 τὸν δῆμον τὸν Μιλησίων Πιδασεῦσιν τοῖς κατοικηκόσιν καὶ ἐνμεμε-
 νηκόσιν μέχρι τοῦ νῦν χρόνου ἐμ Πιδάσοις ἢ τῇ χώρᾳ τῇ Πιδασέων
 οἰκ(ή)σεις εἰς κλινῶν λόγον τριακοσίων καὶ ἐνενήκοντα. νέμεσθαι δὲ
 Πιδασεῖς τὰς τε ὑπαρχούσας ἱεράς κτήσεις καὶ δημοσίας καὶ ἂν τι-
 30 νες ἄλλαι προσγίνωνται τοῖς θεοῖς ἢ τῷ δήμῳ πέντε μὲν ἑτῇ ἄρ-
 χοντος στεφανηφόρου Φιλίδου τελούντας τῶν ἐκφορίων χαλκοῦν,
 διελθόντος δὲ τοῦ προειρημένου χρόνου τὰ ἴσα τέλη, ὅσα καὶ Μιλήσ[ιοι]
 φέρουσιν. τοῦ δὲ ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς ὄρεσιν τοῖς περιορισμένοις γινομένου[ν]
 34 σίτου τελεῖν αὐτοὺς διελθόντων τῶν πέντε ἐτῶν ἑκατοστήν
 εἰς τὸν αἰεὶ χρόνον. εἶναι δὲ Πιδασέων τοὺς προσγραφησομένους
 ἀτελεῖς λειτουργίῳ ἐφ' ἑτῇ δέκα ἄρχοντος στεφανηφόρου
 Φιλίδου. ἐγδικῆσαι δὲ τὸν δῆμον τὸμ Μιλησίων καὶ περὶ τῆς χώρας
 τῆς ἀποκαθεσταμένης αὐτοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν στρατηγῶν, ἐάν τις γίνῃ-
 40 ται διάκρισις, συγκεχωρήσθαι δὲ Πιδασέων τοῖς προσγραφησομένοις
 πρὸς τὸ πολίτευμα καὶ ἐνεκτεμένοις ἐν τῇ Εὐρωμίδι εἰσάγειν ἀπὸ τοῦ
 γεινομένου οἰνικοῦ γενήματος ἐν ταῖς ἰδίαις κτήσεσιν ἕως πλείστων
 μετρητῶν χιλίων ἀπὸ μηνὸς Ποσιδεῶνος τοῦ ἐπὶ Φιλίδου τελοῦσιν ἐλ-
 λιμένιον χαλκοῦν εἰς τὸν αἰεὶ χρόνον ἀπογραφεμένων ἐπὶ τὸ τῆς βουλῆς
 44 ἀρχεῖον τῶν ἐνεκτεμένων ἐν τῇ Εὐρωμίδι. κατασκευάσαι δὲ Μιλησίους
 ὁδὸν ἐκ τῆς Πιδασίδος ζυγίοις πορευτήν εἰς Ἰωνίαν πόλιν. μετέχειν δὲ
 Πιδασέων καὶ τοὺς πεπολιτογραφημένους πρότερον τῶν αὐτῶν πᾶσ[ιν]

Translation:

With Good Fortune

In the stephanephorate of Pasikles in the month of Anthesterion, the

Milesians and Pidaseans agreed to and arranged the following, the Milesian *dêmos* through the prytaneis and those chosen for the garrison and the appointed councilors Minnion son of Leodamon, Theogenes son of Leodamon, Polyxenos son of Melisippos, Menestratos son of Anaxiles, Herodes son of Zenon, Antigonos son of Hekataios, Myrmex son of Hekataios, Herodes son of Minnion, Philiskos son of Lysimachos, and Demetrios son of Artemon, and the Pidasean *dêmos* through the envoys sent by them with full power, Menexenos son of Aristestas, Demetrios son of Polites, Artemon son of Menippos, Melanthos son of Polites, Hermias son of Polites, Melanthios son of Polites, Menestheus son of Aristestas, Aison son of Hermias, and Polites son of Menippos:

1. That the Pidaseans be Milesian citizens (Μιλησίων πολίτας), as well as their children and as many of their wives as are Pidaseans by nature or citizenesses (πολίτιδες) of a Greek city.
2. That men chosen by the Milesians produce a list of names in the Bouleuterion and that those who have sworn the oath and been considered have a share in the sacred rites and offices and other things in which the rest of the Milesians have a share.
3. That the Milesians send to Pidasa a citizen chosen by lot as commander and garrison soldiers, as many as seem to be sufficient, and that they make sure that the walls are maintained and remain in the land, and that they be concerned with the garrison as they deem beneficial.
4. Of the exports which are produced in the Pidaseans' land, that olive oil be exempt from the taxes that the Milesians enforce; but from the rest (of the imports), that they be taxed a bronze coin for five years from the beginning of Philides' stephanephorate; from the flocks established in Pidasean territory, as many as belong to the Pidaseans living in Pidasa, as well as from the beehives, that they pay the same tax for three years from the start of the same man's stephanephorate; and when the aforementioned time has passed, that the Pidaseans pay the same taxes in Miletos, just as the rest of the Milesians do.
5. That the *dêmos* of the Milesians give dwellings for up to 390 beds (εἰς κλινῶν λόγον τριακοσίων καὶ ἐνενήκοντα) to the Pidaseans who have dwelt and remain in Pidasa or its territory until now.
6. That the Pidaseans tend their existing property, whether sacred, public, or any other property belonging to the gods or the *dêmos*, paying a bronze coin from the exports for five years from the start of Philides' stephanephorate, and when the aforementioned time has passed, that they pay the same taxes that the Milesians do. And from the grain produced in the sacred mountains that have been delineated, that they pay a 100th part after five years from then on and forever.
7. That the Pidaseans who will be enrolled be free from liturgies for 10 years from the start of Philides' stephanephorate.

8. That the *dêmos* of the Milesians settle any decision still pending about the land restored to them (Pidaseans?) by the generals.
9. That it be conceded to those Pidaseans who will be enrolled in the polity (τὸ πολίτευμα) and who possess land in Euromos' territory (ἐν τῇ Εὐρωμίδι) to transport from the existing wine harvest in their private property as much as 1000 measures from the month of Poseideon during Philides' term, paying as tax a bronze coin for all time, once those who possess land in Euromos' territory are recorded in the archive of the Council.
10. That the Milesians build a road passable for carts that leads from the territory of Pidasa to Ioniapolis.
11. That the Pidaseans who have been enrolled previously have a share in the same things as all Pidaseans, except for the exemption from liturgies.
12. That the other things set down in the decree that was written about what is fitting for the *sympoliteia* be authoritative and fully effected, just as has been agreed on when the Pidaseans offered (us) their city, its territory, and the public revenue from these.
13. Let the stephanephoros with the sacred herald swear in the envoys of the Pidaseans who have come and the prytaneis and the men chosen for the garrison and the elected councilors with this oath:

“I will forever abide by what has been agreed on and recorded and I will not transgress it by any device or contrivance nor will I suffer one who does transgress the arrangement, and if I learn that someone else chooses to transgress the agreements, I will not suffer him as far as it is in my power, but I will expose him to the council and *dêmos*. This is the truth, by Hestia Boulaia and the other gods. And may I prosper if I should uphold my oath, but if I should break my oath, may I be destroyed with my things.”

Let (those) in Pidasa and the other Pidaseans who are abroad and are of age swear this same oath, swearing in addition by the gods who inhabit their city.

14. That whoever does not abide by the things set down in this arrangement be unjust to the gods by whom they have sworn, and that those not abiding pay a fine of 30 talents to those who do abide

Commentary:⁴⁷

- 1 Rehm associates this Pasikles with the son of Philidas who served as envoy to Herakleia in no. 150 (from the same volume), based on a reference to this same man's stephanephorate, complete with

patronymic, in *CIG* 2856.

3εἰρεμένοι . . . ἀποδειχθέντες: The reality behind and distinction between these two terms is suggested later in the inscription. Line 16 specifies that the *phourarch* is chosen by lot, and in the following line his command is called a *phylakê*. It seems likely that the manner of choosing οἱ . . . ἐπὶ τῇ φυλακῇι was the same. Conversely, the councilors are “elected” in line 53, presumably by a vote of the Assembly (cf. τοὺς αἰρεθέντας ὑπὸ Μιλησίων, l. 13.

4-7 Of the representatives from Miletos, Theogenes acts as an ambassador in the treaties with Magnesia and Herakleia (nos. 148 and 150), Antigonos serves the same function in the former, Minnion in the latter, while Menestratos was stephanephoros in 199/198 BC. Both Herodes and Demetrios appear in name lists elsewhere (nos. 147 and 151 respectively). Minnion, Polyxenos, and Antigonos all possibly appear on Milesian coins (Deppert-Lippitz, *Die Münzprägung von Milet* (1984): 99, 100, 102.

18 καθότι ἄν κρίνωσι συμφέρειν: At first glance, this seems like a surprisingly one-sided concession by the Pidasians of any control over the Milesian garrison. In actuality, however, since the garrison’s only power is in relation to itself and the walls it will man, the measure is actually protecting the soldiers and their commander from the interference of locals.

22 Πιδασίδι: The question arises as to whether this term refers to a different (though still overlapping) territory as the χώρα of the Pidasians, or whether they are synonyms. Insofar as the latter term is used first, Πιδασίς could just be a space-saving form, but why then use the longer version again only five lines later? On the other hand, it is difficult to imagine what exactly the difference would be, unless some of the Πιδασίς was not owned by Pidasia (but rather a king or sanctuary), yet was worked by some of its citizens. At the same time, we should probably not impose strict rules of lexical consistency on the text and thereby read too much into the interchange of usage. All in all, it is most probable that both terms refer to Pidasian territory (see comments on line 40 for a further argument).

37-38 ἐγδικῆσαι . . . στρατηγῶν: Robert, *Villes d’Asie Mineure* (1962): 62 n.7 takes this to refer to some aspect of the Roman settlement of the region following Apamea.

40 Εὐρωμίδι: As with Πιδασίδι, this term is ambiguous, but appears to refer to Euromos’ territory, rather than the entire valley (which, as we have seen, contained multiple *poleis* according to Polybios 30.5). This is implicit in the term ἐνεκτημένοις, which refers to land acquired in a foreign territory (*LSJ* s.v. ἐγκτάομαι).

45 Ἰωνίαν πόλιν: This port town controlled by Miletos gave Pidasia

access to the sea, and it is significant that we have here a provision specifically guaranteeing that access. Cf. L. Robert, *RPhil* 31 (1957): 10f. and 32 (1958): 56; J. Cook, *BSA* 56 (1961): 96–98; L. Robert *BCH* 102 (1978): 508–14.

As might be expected, a close reading of this document yields a more nuanced picture than our prefatory remarks above.⁴⁸ The final clause of the arrangement informs us that “the Pidaseans offered their city, territory, and the public revenue from these” to the Milesians (ll. 50f.). So despite the juxtaposition of growing local power and minor city, the inclusion of Pidasa in Miletos was not initiated by the larger *polis*. This fact forces us to consider the situation, aims, and capability for action of the smaller town. Gauthier observes that the third clause, “that the Milesians send to Pidasa a citizen chosen by lot as commander with garrison soldiers” (ll. 15f.), contains a clue as to why Pidasa sent envoys to request such an arrangement with their larger neighbor. A garrison implies that Pidasa faced threats to its security that it could no longer repel alone, and invoked Milesian protection as a result.⁴⁹ That this stipulation comes so early in the text, preceded only by the procedures for incorporating Pidaseans into the civic body of Miletos, speaks to the importance of this factor. Moreover, the extension of Rhodian power over all of Karia in 188 may have played a role in Pidasa’s decision to request a *sympoliteia*. Although the cities granted freedom by the Romans were exempt from the dictates of Rhodes, it is possible that small inland communities like Pidasa were not among the free; if so, the decision could have been a preventative measure against a less desirable status under Rhodes.⁵⁰ At the same time, Pidasa was not so desperate as to concede all claims to self-survival. According to clause 6 (ll. 28–30), they were able to remain settled in Pidasa, worship their peculiar gods, and remain a *dêmos*, that is, they were not allotted into Milesian tribes.⁵¹ Furthermore, the tax reduction on certain grains and tax exemption on olive oil and wine (ll. 18–20, 33–35, 39–44) were permanent privileges restricted, so far as we know, to the Pidaseans, and thus another focal point for self-identity. In other words, the Pidaseans kept the structures necessary for the persistence of their self-identity and way of life despite political absorption.

Another aspect of the agreement that requires emphasis is the economic benefit that Pidasa would reap from the *sympoliteia*. Not only would the city enjoy a merely nominal tax for up to five years on everything except olive oil, but, more importantly, the Milesians undertook to build a road from Pidasa to the sea, thereby giving them access to shipping, and thus an increased number of markets for their products. It is significant that Miletos promised to construct the road,

and did not simply permit the Pidaseans to do so, the implication being that such a task was either too difficult for the resources of the Pidasean community, or at least taxing enough that not having to do so was on par with the other exemptions conceded by the Milesians. Finally, we have already mentioned how the ten-year exemption from liturgies would have only benefited elite Pidaseans (though not all of them, since those who already were Milesian citizens were still under this obligation).

The analysis thus far has focused on the perspectives of Miletos and Pidasa respectively, emphasizing the need for both a comprehensive appraisal of the historical context surrounding the *sympoliteia* and an attentive reading of the text of the agreement itself. These are not especially objectionable approaches to the question of motivation in the arrangement between the two communities, and can even be seen as complementary. Yet inscribed decrees convey the impression of unified action by the whole assembly, masking any debate and variety of opinion within the citizen body. It is important to keep in mind that communities were not unanimous actors, especially where the evidence suggests the possibility for a more nuanced picture. In fact, certain aspects of *Milet* I.3 149, which have not received as much attention in the scholarship, point in this direction. First, a rather noticeable list of individuals from both cities heads the inscription, and certain of the envoys from Pidasa seem related, suggesting a prominent standing within the community (assuming the wealthier elements of the city were more likely to marry within their social “class”).⁵² More strikingly, the Pidaseans obtained a ten-year exemption from liturgies—a clause only affecting the wealthy—and we learn that some Pidaseans had already become citizens of Miletos.⁵³

From this evidence, it seems clear that the Pidasean elite (or certain elites, at least) sought to become part of the large network of interaction, shared values, and status-markers that characterized every Greek *polis qua* visible community. While this aim corresponded to the objectives of the Pidasean *dêmos*, which sought to gain from the merger with Miletos in terms of security at the least, it also can be specifically identified with the leading elements of the community. And one can hardly imagine a better city in which to access this network than Miletos, whose epigraphical record attests to almost constant activity in the realm of inter-city relations. In this way, the peer polity interaction model provides a useful tool for understanding elite motivations in *sympoliteiai*. As we will see, the attraction of this network was a key factor in the formation of a several other, though by no means all, political unions in Karia.⁵⁴

We should not, of course, attempt to explain all of Pidasa’s motives

in terms of the aims of the city's elite. The language of the inscription forbids this, since it only refers to this group in certain stipulations. Rather, it is necessary to distinguish between motives of shared interest among all members of a community, such as security and/or survival, and motives peculiar to subsets of the community—for example, the elite, or the beekeepers and olive farmers who are granted tax exemptions. According to this kind of analysis, security might be a decisive factor in bringing about the union of two cities, but it need not be the only significant cause. In other words, we can still imagine a threat to Pidasa impelling her to seek a union with Miletos, but in the context of other pre-existing motives.⁵⁵ Economically, farmers of certain products, especially wine, may have sought access to wider markets via a port. More generally, wealthy Pidaseans seem to have desired the opportunities available to rich citizens of Miletos. These segments of the Pidasean community were likely the main proponents of the *sympoliteia*, and perhaps some of the envoys listed in the inscription; yet it took arguments that appealed to the interests of the whole community, perhaps spurred on by a specific event, to persuade the rest of the Pidaseans to approve the arrangement.

The next thing to notice is the probability that multiple members of the same family are listed among the Pidasean envoys. As Rehm noted, we could be dealing with men from just three families, if Polites is the son of Hermias, brother of Aison, and father of Melanthos, Hermias, and Melanthios and Demetrios (though I am inclined to think that Demetrios is the son of a different Polites, given the separation of his name from the other three), if Menexenos and Menestheus are the sons of Aristetas, and if Menippos is the father of Artemon and another Polites.⁵⁶ There is some family prominence among the Milesian representatives as well. One assumes that Leodamon is the father of both Minnion and Theogenes and that Antigonos and Myrmex are sons of the same Hekataios, while perhaps the same Minnion is father to Herodes.⁵⁷ The lack of creativity in Pidasean nomenclature makes it difficult to be too confident about inferences from the repetition of names, but it seems likely that the most prominent men from both cities were chosen to conclude the details of the agreement.


In what fashion these men were prominent, and what role they played in effecting both the *sympoliteia* and their respective communities' decision to unify are also suggested by the text of the inscription. We learn from clause 10 that certain Pidaseans had already received Milesian citizenship, and that these men will not share in the 10-year exemption from liturgies granted to the rest of the Pidaseans. The first fact is confirmed by a number of other

inscriptions involving individual grants of Milesian *politeia* to Pidaseans in the third and (possibly) second centuries.⁵⁸ The second fact implies a wealthy status among these individuals, as the award of *politeia* to a foreigner expressed gratitude for past benefaction or created the expectation of such, and we can safely assume that the men and women alluded to in *Milet* I.3 149 were among the elite of Pidasean society.⁵⁹ It is in this context that I would also like to understand clause 5 of the agreement, whereby housing was to be provided for those Pidaseans who still lived in Pidasa. This has been interpreted as an attempt by Miletos to physically incorporate a segment of the Pidasean population into its civic body, thus more effectively effacing the self-identity of the lesser city.⁶⁰ However, if we assume the opposite, namely that the provision represents Pidasean self-interest, then the 390 beds become symbolic of the desire of certain Pidaseans to live in Miletos. Moreover, if we can associate at least some of the *pepolitographêmenoi* of clause 10 with the Pidaseans who had already moved to Miletos according to clause 5 (implicitly), then it follows that certain Pidasean elites dwelt in Miletos **and** that other elites wished to do so as well, whether they were Milesian citizens before the *sympoliteia* or not. The number of beds could be a response to several different scenarios. It could suggest a small number of large households or a mixture of large, elite households and smaller, but more numerous, households. Nor should we rule out the possibility that neither party to the agreement expected all the beds to be filled, and 390 was simply the most that the Milesians were willing to offer, though we might expect a more “rounded” figure in this case. Perhaps the Pidaseans insisted that the Milesians specify the number in response to the vague language of the failed *sympoliteia* between the former and Herakleia: what exactly counted as “sufficient” lodgings was open to interpretation, whereas the number 390 was not.⁶¹

Nonetheless, the suppressed presence of the Pidasean elite is striking. By emphasizing the Pidaseans “who live in Pidasa” in clause 4 and 5, the text makes a silent reference to those who do not, primarily emigrants to Miletos. Yet this distinction between Pidaseans based on residence draws two separate lines. In clause 4, the Pidaseans are clearly farmers and cultivators, the “working men” of the city. In clause 5, however, the force of the distinction seems much more back-handed, culminating in the phrase “until now” in clause 5. It is as if the authors of the inscription were telling those still in Pidasa to get with the program; this would only make sense if “those” were not all Pidaseans, but citizens felt to belong in, not just to, the larger city, that is, members of the elite. This limited group of Pidaseans residing in Pidasa is also addressed in clause 7, since most Pidaseans

would have been exempt from liturgies by virtue of their lack of wealth. This stipulation would clearly have only appealed to Pidaseans of a certain social stratum. Thus, the participation of the Pidasean elite in the decision to unite their city with Miletos seems prominent. We will further explore the activities and motives of this elite in [chapter 3](#).

It will also be useful to compare the form and content of this agreement with the fourth-century arrangement between Latmos and Pidasa. The latter has the actual grant of citizenship that we assumed was at the beginning of the fourth-century inscription, but only has one “procedural” stipulation, whereas Latmos and Pidasa go to some length prescribing the enrollment of the smaller community. Both are followed by a series of clauses defining the scope of the agreement, and conclude with the swearing of oaths. Significantly, there is a shift in terminology. Whereas the Latmian document referred to the arrangement as a *πολίτευμα*, the Milesians use *συμπολιτεία*. The second-century inscription does use *πολίτευμα* (l. 40), but to refer to the state itself (and thus functions as a synonym—or replacement—of the more familiar *πολιτεία*). Also interesting is the fact that Miletos gives no injunctions for setting up stelai in prominent locations, while the Latmian document specifies two such inscriptions.



Map 2.2 Mylasa and Surroundings. *Source:* Tina Ross Archaeological Illustrations.

The biggest difficulty in understanding the spatial relationship between Mylasa and its neighbors is our ignorance concerning the extent of its territory. The ancient (and modern) city sit at the foot of a mountain looking out eastward over a plain that is surrounded by hills and mountains on all sides, but with outlets to the northwest and north, so that the terrain formed a natural if easily passable boundary with the territory of Olymos. Astride the northward outlet, slightly to the east, is the steep ascent to Labraunda. More daunting mountains to the east make this the least accessible direction for communication from Mylasa. These mountains wrap around the southern edge of the plain but accommodate less steep modern roads. Thus the city's external communication would have been oriented on a north-south axis. That Mylasa dominated more than this plain is also clear from the fact that it controlled the mountain sanctuaries of Labraunda to the northeast and Sinuri to the southeast.⁶² It is thus possible that other areas as well, such as the plain to the southeast, where the modern village of Çamköy is located, on the modern road to Keramos, identified by Debord as a major route of communication in antiquity.⁶³ Moreover, if Reger is right in identifying Mylasa's port as Physkos, then the city also "controlled the entire expanse of the plain shared by the Sarı Çay and the Hamzabey Çay," an area that covers the western and southern sides of the mountain (the Sodra dağ) on whose slopes sits Mylasa, and stretches to the south toward Bargylia, Kindya, and Sinuri.⁶⁴ The somewhat narrow extension of this plain northward between Mount Grion and the Sodra dağ must have been controlled by Hydai, possibly situated on the slopes of Mount Grion, immediately to the west of Mylasa. Hydai's southern (and northern) borders are not clear from the topography: the plain connects to the southern Euromid plain to the north, which was controlled by Chalketor (see below) and forms part of the greater Sarı Çay-Hamzabey Çay plain to the south, and there seems to have been contact to the northeast over the hills leading to Olymos.⁶⁵ Despite this ambiguity, it is safe to say that Mylasa, even before its expansion via *sympoliteiai*, controlled a much larger territory than any other *polis* in the region except Halikarnassos and Miletos, including several fertile and substantial agricultural zones. To the northeast, at the modern village of Kafaca, lay Olymos, a mere 90-minute walk from Mylasa.⁶⁶ Although situated in a rather small plain, the landscape of rolling hills makes it likely that the city also controlled the small plain directly to the south and, more importantly, the larger stretch of fields to the east, surrounding the modern village of Bahçeburun and skirting the sacred road to Labraunda. As with Hydai, the border

between Mylasa and Olymos is not ascertainable with any precision from the landscape itself. Nevertheless, it is important to note Labraunda's much closer location to Olymos, so that the latter was as much in a position to control the sacred way to the sanctuary as Mylasa.⁶⁷

The main evidence for a union between Mylasa and Olymos comes from a recently published inscription. Potentially relevant is another text mentioning a συμπολι]τεία, though the tau is insecure and the restoration remains the subject of an unresolved dispute. Both are presented below:

IVa. *IMylasa* 892 (Blümel 1988, 98). Rumscheid 2004, 55–56

Cf. Robert 1962, 55 n. 3

Found: Unknown

Currently: Bodrum Museum #6651

Description: Gray marble with small crystals. Smoothed on front, top, and bottom, broken on sides and back.

Dimensions: H .28m × W .42m × D .15m

	Ἐπὶ στεφανηφόρου	] Μηνοφίλου, μην[ὸς
	ἔδοξεν τῷ δήμῳ τῷ	Ἰ Ὀλυμέων, γνώμην ἀποφην[αμένου
		Κορμοσ]κωνέως· ἐπειδὴ Σολωνεῖς
4	συγγεν]είας δὲ τῆς Κανδηβέων [	
		] τοῦ αὐτοῦ δήμου καὶ Υ[
	καθ' ὃν καιρὸν ἐγένετο συμπο[λιτεία	
	τὰ]ς φυλὰς Σολων-	
8	]Ο τοῖς ἄλλοις Κ[	
	]Ν ὑποστησαμ[εν-	
	ἔβ]δομον μέρος [	
	ἀ]λλα ἐχειρίζο . [	
12	]ΩΝ τε ἱερεῖ . [	
	]Μ[	

The text is that of Rumscheid. L. 6: χρόν]ον, Robert; καιρ]όν, Blümel. No omicron is visible in Rumscheid's photograph.

Translation:

[In the stefanephorate of ____] son of Menophilos, in the month of ____, it seemed good to the *dêmos* of Olymos, proposed by the distinguished ____ of the Kormoskoneans: Since the Soloneis . . . and since the [*syngen*]eia of the

Kandêbeans...of the same *dêmos* and . . . [in which time] the *sympo[liteia]* occurred . . . the tribes . . . the Soloneis . . . to the rest . . . supporting . . . a seventh portion . . . but appointed . . . and to the priest . . .

Commentary:

3 Σολωνεῖς: This was a fourth Olymean *syngeneia* known only from *I. Mylasa* 817. I can think of no explanation for why it is not listed in *I. Mylasa* 861 with the other *syngeneiai* unless it had ceased to exist (perhaps as a result of Mylasean interference connected with or subsequent to the *sympoliteia*) or remained a tribe (see commentary on line 7). The impossibility of dating any of these texts more precisely makes these suppositions frustratingly speculative.

4 συγγεν]εῖας: The Kandêbeis were an Olymean *syngeneia*, formerly a tribe during Olymos' independence (see *I. Mylasa* 861 above).

7 φυλὰς: The juxtaposition of this word and a form of Soloneis makes it tempting to think that the Soloneis did in fact remain a tribe. However, the plural form of the noun makes such an association uncertain. Clearly "the tribes" are being related to the Soloneis in some way, but whether the Soloneis are being counted as one of the tribes, or being partitioned into them, or some other alternative, is entirely opaque.

IVB. *IMylasa* 861 (Blümel 1988, 77–78): Le Bas & Waddington #339; Froehner 1865, 65–68; Judeich 1889, 390–93 (followed by Michel 1900, #476); Sokolowski 1955, 146–48; *SEG* 15.645.

Cf. Wilhelm 1900, *Gött. Gel. Anz.* 90; Wächter 1910, 119–20; Guarducci 1938, *Mem. Acc. Naz. Lincei* 6: 102; Tod 1956, 459; Laumonier 1958, 143f. Robert & Robert 1983, 223 n. 14.

Found: Karaova by Mumcular (SE of Milas)

Currently: Louvre #2946

Description: Block of white marble

Dimensions: H .26m × W .91m × D .011m

- [Ἐπὶ στεφαν]ηφόρου Ἰατροκ[λέο]υς τοῦ Λεοντος τοῦ Μέλανος, μηνὸς Ἀρτεμίου εἰκάδι
vac. ἔδοξεν τῷ Ὀλυμέων δήμ[ω]ι, γνώμην ἀποφηνάμενου Δη-]
- 2 [μητρί]ου τοῦ Ἑρμίου τοῦ Ἀντιπάτρου καθ' υἰοθεσίαν δὲ Αἰνέου Παρεμβωρδέως
vac.
 ἐπειδὴ καθήκει ὑπάρχειν τ[ὴν] μετουσίαν τῶν παρ']
 [Ὀλυμ]εῦσιν κοινῶν ἱερῶν κατ' ἀνδρογένειαν, τοῖς τε οὖσιν ἀπογόνοις τῶν ἐπι-
 κληρωθέντων διὰ τὴν προϋπάρ[χουσαν] μετὰ Μυλασέων συμ-]
- 4 [πολι]τεῖαν *vac.* ἔτι δὲ καὶ τοῖς τετιμημένοις ἢ μετουσίαν εἰληφόσιν *vac.* ὁμοίως
 δὲ καὶ
 τοῖς γεγεννημένοις υἰοθέτοις [τῶν *vacat* κατὰ]
 [δὲ τα]υτὰ καὶ τοῖς ἐψηφισμένοις ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου καὶ διὰ τὴν υἰοθεσίαν
 μετεἰληφόσιν ἢ
 καὶ μεταλαμβάνουσιν τῶ[ν] κοινῶν ὄντων ἱερῶν, νῦν]
- 6 [δὲ τι]νες κατ' οὐθένα τρόπον τῶν προγεγραμμένων ὑπαρχούσης αὐτοῖς τῆς
 μετουσίας
 τῶν ἱερῶν μεταλαμβάνουσιν τῶν ἱερῶν τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἀπόλλων-]
 [να κα]ὶ τὴν Ἀρτεμιν *vac.* οἷς θεοῖς οὐ μόνον πρόσοδοι ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου
 καθειέρωνται καὶ
 αἱ θυσίαι καὶ αἱ ὑποδοχαὶ συντελ[οῦνται] κατ' ἐνιαυτόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ προσ-]
- 8 [ήκοντα] καὶ ἀνήκοντα πρὸς τιμὴν καὶ δόξαν διοικεῖται κατὰ τὰ πάτρια *vac.*
 πρὸς δὲ
 τοῦτοις ὑπαρχουσὼν τοῦ Ὀλυμ[έων] δήμου τῶν τριῶν πρότερον μὲν φυ-]
 [λῶν κα]λουμένων, νῦν δὲ συγγενειῶν, τῆς τε Μοσσέων καὶ Κυβιμέων καὶ
 Κανδηβέων
vac. τούτων δὲ ἐν ἐκάστη ὑπαρχουσ[ῶν] θυσιῶν καὶ ἱεουργιῶν]
- 10 [ιδίαν οὐσ]ῶν ἐν ἐκάστη καὶ προσόδων οὐσῶν ιδίαν *vac.* τινὲς λαβόντες κατὰ
 συνχώρημα τὴν μετουσίαν ἐν συγγεν[εῖαις] τῶν ἱερῶν, ἀξιοῦντες αὐτοῖς
 μετουσίαν καὶ ἐν ταῖς]
 [τῶν]σκότων συνόδοις ὑπάρχειν, τετολμήκασιν ἐπὶ τὰ διοικούμενα ὑπὸ τοῦ
 Ὀλυμέων
 δήμου, οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τὰς θυσίας μόνον ἵεναι, οἱ δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς τι-]
- 12 [μὰς τῆς τε ἱερου]ργίας καὶ ἱερωσύνης καὶ προφητείας, καὶ ἐκ τῆς τῶν μηθὲν
 προσηκόντων ἀναιδοῦς ἀμφιζήτησεως [πολλὰ ἀσεβήματα συνέβη κατὰ τῶν
 δι-]
 [καίων τῶν πολιτ]ῶν καὶ κατὰ τῆς προστασίας τῶν θεῶν κατασκευάζεσθαι *vac.*
 ἵνα οὖν
 εἰς δύναμιν πᾶσα μοχθηρὰ παρεύρεσις περὶ τούτων ἀναιρῆται τὸ λοιπόν·]
- 14 [ἀγαθῇ τύχη]ν*vac.* δεδόχθαι τῷ Ὀλυμέων δήμ[ω]ι *vac.* ἀν[αγρ[ά]ν]ναι τοὺς
 διεστῶτας
 ταμίας ἐν τῷ ἐπ[ὶ] δεξιᾷ] προ[πυλαί]ωι το[ῦ] τεμένους τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος καὶ τῆς]
 [Ἀρτέμιδος τὰ ὀνόματα



Figure 2.2 Inscription of IVB. *Source:* Printed with permission from Art Resource.

The text follows that of Blümel, except where noted. L.1: Ἰατροκλ[εῖου]ς, Froehner; Ἰατροκ[..ο]ύς, Judeich; Ἰατροκλ[εῖ]ους, Sokolowski; Ἰατροκ<λ>ε[ι]ους, Blümel. From photograph generously provided by the Louvre I have been unable to make out any clear trace of an epsilon or omicron in Iatrokles name, and therefore see no reason why the lambda could not have been in the damaged section of the line. –L. 2: Blümel's restoration follows Wilhelm; [πᾶσι τοῖς], Le Bas & Waddington; [..... μετουσίαν σὺν τοῖς], Froehner; τ[ὴν μετουσίαν τοῖς τε οὖσι], Judeich. –L. 4: [τῶν γνησίων πολιτῶν], Le Bas & Waddington; [τῶν προγεγραμμένων, κατὰ], Judeich. –L. 5: [ιερῶν κοινῶν τὴν μετουσίαν], Froehner; [κοινῶν ὄντων ιερῶν, ὁμως], Judeich; [κοινῶν ὄντων ιερῶν, ὁμοίως], Sokolowski. –L. 7: καθιερωῦνται, Le Bas & Waddington; καθιέρωνται, Wilhelm. –L. 9–10: Blümel's restoration follows Wilhelm; [πατριῶν καὶ | νομίμων ὄντ]ων, Le Bas & Waddington; [..... ὑπ[αρχού]σων, Froehner; [ιδίων καὶ προστατῶν ἰδίων ὄντ]ων, Judeich. –L. 12: Blümel tentatively suggests ἱερ]ωκότων. ἀμφοισθητήσεως, Froehner, Judeich, Sokolowski. –L. 13–14: [ἀ|γαθῇ τύχηι ταῦτα], Judeich, doubted by Tod. –L. 14: ἀνα|γρ[ά]ψαι, Le Bas & Waddington. ἐνεστώτας, Judeich, Sokolowski. Restoration at end from Wilhelm; ΕΝΤΩΙΕΡ, Le Bas & Waddington; ἐν τῷ ἐπ[ιστάντι?] προ[πύλῳι?] τῷ τοῦ τεμένους, Judeich.

Translation:

In the stephanophorate of Iatrokles son of Leon son of Melan, on the 20th of the month of Artemision; Decided by the *dēmos* of Olymos, [motioned by the eminent Demetrios] son of Hermias son of Antipater and adopted son of Aineas, of the *syngeneia* Panembordeus:

Since it is fitting that there be [a share] of the sacred rites common [among the Olym]jeans based on lineage, both to the descendants of those who received a share through the pre-existing [sympoli]teia [with Mylasa], and also to those who have been honored or bought a share, and similarly also to those who

have been adopted [. . .] and to those who have been approved by decree of the *dêmos* and through adoption have taken or even are taking part in the [common sacred rites, but (since) now] some of those enrolled are in no way taking part in the share that belongs to them of the rites [concerning Apollo and] Artemis, gods to whom not only are the processions devoted by the *dêmos* and sacrifices and banquets performed [each year, but also what is fitting] and appropriate for honor and fame is managed according to our ancestral customs; in addition to these matters, since there are what were called [previously the three tribes] of the Olymean *dêmos*, but now are *syngeneiai*, those of the Mosseans, Kubimeans, and Kandebeans, and since in each of these there exists [sacrifices and private sacred duties] and private processions, some men, because they took part by agreement within the *syngeneia* in [the sacred rites, thinking it right that they have a share also in] the meetings of [. . .?] have dared to infiltrate what is managed by the *dêmos* of Olymos, some of them [only in the sacrifices, but others even in the privileges] of performing the sacrifice, holding the priesthood, and acting as seer; and because of the shameless dispute over completely inappropriate matters, [much sacrilege against just citizens] and against the guardianship of the gods has come to be arranged; therefore, in order that every wretched pretense [about these matters be removed in the future] as is possible, it has been decided by the *dêmos* of Olymos [with good fortune: to in]scr[i]be the current treasurers on the [right-hand] pro[pyl]on of [the sanctuary of Apollo and Artemis . . .]

Commentary: Lettering second half of second century

*A note on restorations: I have already mentioned the incongruity among editors of this text regarding the number of letter spaces that should be restored at the end of line 3. In fact, this holds true of every line, because, as Blümel's photograph reveals, the right side of the stone is considerably, if rather evenly, broken off. The restorations from line to line, however, show a general inconsistency in terms of letter space quantity. The surviving portions of lines 2–9 are of approximately the same size (give or take a letter), yet Blümel's right-side restorations give 17, 21, an uncertain number, 20, 27, 30, 29, 21 letter spaces respectively. Now the photograph clearly shows line six and line two as the longest on the right side, so that either 17 or 27 (or both) is wrong. All the other lines should have more spaces restored than these two; this happens with lines 7 and 8, but with line 9 we are down to 21 even though the stone is broken off slightly farther to the left. I make these observations not to critique the restorations—pure hypocrisy since I do not offer my own—but to emphasize just how uncertain these words are and, as such, how unfitting they are as historical evidence. I produced the restorations as found in Blümel, which are in turn taken from Judeich, J. and L. Robert, Sokolowski, or from the editor himself.

ΘΟΥΥΓΕΝΕΙΩΝ: the preservation of the nu reveals a different spelling tradition than *koinê*. Cf. l. 10 συνχώρημα and συνγενε[ε]ίας

While these texts provide fairly unambiguous proof for the *sympoliteia* between Mylasa and Olymos, further information can be gleaned from four decrees by the latter community, all in the third century, which honor individuals with, among other rewards, a citizenship grant. In *IMylasa* 866, whose letter-forms seem earliest, the decree is passed by the *kyria ekklēsia* and identifies the recipient by his home city (Terssogassa) before allotting him to an Olymean tribe (*phylē*). This situation contrasts markedly with that of the three later decrees, all of which lack the stamp of the *kyria ekklēsia*—the community is called both *dēmos* and *koinon*—and instead are headed by the name of the (Mylasean) *stephanephoros*.⁶⁸ Moreover, the honorees are enrolled in *syngeneiai* instead of *phylai*. These developments from the language of *IMylasa* 866 reveal the demoted status of Olymos: the main subgroups of the city have been downgraded from *phylai* to *syngeneiai*, as is confirmed by a reference to the “*syngeneia* of Mossaians in Olymos, formerly called a tribe” in *IMylasa* 806 (l. 11).⁶⁹ As for the matter of a date, we can attempt to more precisely locate the *sympoliteia* in the second half of the third century, if Mylasa’s attainment of freedom in 246 BC is an acceptable *terminus post quem*.⁷⁰

The very capacity to pass decrees speaks to a certain level of Olymean autonomy and persistent identity, even as a member within the Mylasean polity. In fact, the three decrees post-*sympoliteia* are expressions of group solidarity directed at Mylasa. Reger argues that the individuals in each decree receive no ethnic designation because they are Mylasean, and so both fellow-citizens and foreigners. If this is right, the message intended by the gesture of a *politeia* grant to a “fellow-citizen” (beyond one of gratitude) seems to be an assertion of local authority. That these decrees are, in a sense, singling out Mylaseans is further suggested by the fact that Olymeans, when honored by their own community, were designated by their (Mylasean) tribe. By contrast, Mylaseans being granted citizenship lacked even this marker in the decrees of Olymos. The Olymean *dēmos*, then, still preserved the right to decide who was a member of its community even if it had forfeited any other expression of foreign policy.⁷¹ At the same time, however, Olymeans wore their new Mylasean identity on their epigraphical sleeve, so to speak: even in presumably self-contained publications, such as a decree to honor an Olymean, individuals were labeled with a tribal ethnic from the sovereign *polis*.

The evidence for the union of Mylasa and Olymos is less helpful for a discussion of motives. As I will argue in [chapter 3](#) from the body of

prosopographical evidence from Mylasa, prominent members of the larger city exhibited a keen interest in the Apollo sanctuary at Olymos in the second century BC, and their activities may have been the fulfillment of anticipatory projects leading up to the *sympoliteia*. Otherwise, since a specific historical context is absent, one can look at Olymos' location in relation to both Mylasa and Labraunda. Since Mylasa's control of the sanctuary was contested in the last quarter of the third century, perhaps the merger with Olymos was a parallel move to help ensure prevent any future loss of the sanctuary.⁷² Control of Olymos would help secure access to the shrine. Another, though not necessarily competing, motive for absorbing Olymos could have been an interest in trade connections with the fertile Euromid plain and, farther beyond, Miletos, with whom it established a relationship of *isopoliteia* in 215.⁷³ We have already seen Milesian, and possibly Herakleian/Latmian, interest in the Euromid, part of which belonged to Pidasia; accordingly, it is tempting to see in the incorporation of Olymos a precursor to the second-century *sympoliteia* between Mylasa and Euromos (see below). Moreover, might Miletos, as a free city, have offered a more suitable trade harbor for Mylasa than Iasos, which, though closer, was perhaps hostile, given Alexander's decision to grant Mylasa's former harbor to the latter city?⁷⁴ We should also keep in mind that Iasos saw the constant presence of Ptolemaic and Antigonid forces at the end of the third century, as well as the infiltration of Antiochos III at the beginning of the second.⁷⁵

From the perspective of Olymos, it is unclear how a semi-autonomous status within Mylasa, doubtless a concession rather than a desirable outcome, was preferable to complete independence (at the local level). Again, we could suppose that the agreement meant an increase in the security of the territory, especially if to reject the *sympoliteia* meant facing invasion from Mylasa, but without exact historical circumstances this would be a mere guess. It should be noted, however, that in terms of elite motivations, new opportunities only ran one way. In other words, elites from the smaller community could participate in the civic and social life of the larger community, but members of the larger community possessed no share in the privileges of the smaller community, except by specific fiat of the latter.⁷⁶ This was probably the case in every *sympoliteia* in which the smaller partner retained its own peculiar citizenry, since the agreements are always expressed as unilateral inductions (citizens of the smaller city become citizens of the larger city). Whether this suggests a lack of interest in the smaller "markets" of the lesser partner, or the smaller community's commitment to maintain a separate identity⁷⁷—or both—is difficult to determine.

MYLASA AND HYDAI

As discussed above, our vague understanding of Mylasa's territory and Hydai's exact location makes it difficult to know where the two communities shared a border. The large mountain looming above Mylasa on its western flank separated it from Hydai and its territory, and so served as a partial border. To the northeast of Hydai, where a small stretch of Hydai's plain intersects the mountains and leads to Olymos, the two communities would only have been contiguous after Mylasa's incorporation of Olymos.⁷⁸ To the south, however, the issue depends on who controlled what part of the vast plain stretching south from Hydai's territory to the hills leading up to Kindya.⁷⁹ With the specific location of boundaries within this plain being hypothetical, we can only with certainty assert that Hydai possessed a relatively fertile swath of territory to the west of Mylasa and that its boundary with its larger neighbor was far removed from Mylasa's urban center.⁸⁰ At the same time, Reger's arguments concerning Mylasa's possession of a harbor, along with Iasos' control of the northern coast of the "Little Sea," make it likely that Hydai's territory remained rather limited within the larger plain of which it was a part, making it a much smaller community in comparison with its neighbor to the east.⁸¹

We know from a fourth-century inscribed list of envoys from Karian cities that Hydai was still independent at this time.⁸² Evidence for Mylasean incorporation of the city comes from a now badly damaged inscription, still *in situ*, in a bridge near Hydai, which has recently been republished based on the squeeze and drawings from the Fonds Louis Robert.⁸³

V. Boulay and Pont 2014, D.1–9

Cf. Robert 1935, 338 + Robert 1945, 34 = *IMylasa* 902 (Blümel 1988, 100).

Found: arch of bridge over Sari Çay

Currently: *in situ*

Description: Block of white marble crosscut by a black vein

Dimensions: H .24m × W 1.16m

[ἐπι] στεφανηφόρου [--- ca. 17 ----]Υ ἱερέως Ἄρε-
 ως, μηνὸς Λώου ἐμβολί[μ]ου εἰκ[άδι· ἔδοξ]εν τῷ δήμῳ
 [τ]ῷ Ὑδαέων· γνώμην ἀποφηνάμε[νων τῶ]ν ταμιῶν Διοδό-
 4 του τοῦ Διονυσόδωρου Τετραφύλ[ου, Ἰα]τροκλέους τοῦ
 Ἀντιπάτρου Κορμοσκωνέως, [Ἑκ]α[ταίου] τοῦ Θρασέου τοῦ
 Μέλανος Μασσωνεύς· ἐπειδὴ τ[ῶν κ]αθιδρυμέν[ω]ν
 [ἐν τῷ ἱ]ερῷ ἡμῶν προγονικῶν θεῶν [.....]ΙΝΩΝ Απόλλωνος
 8 [καὶ Ἀρτέμ]ιδος συμβέβηκεν τοὺς [τοῦ ἀ]γάλματος τοῦ Ἀ-
 [πόλλωνος?]Ω.ΟΝΚΑΙΤΩΙ[.....]ΛΟΝΙΔΡΟΥΜΟΠΩ

Translation:

In the stephanephroate of ____ priest of Ares, on the 20th(?) day of the intercalary month of Lōos, the *dēmos* of the Hydaeis decreed: proposition of the appointed treasurers Diodotos son of Dionysodoros of the tribe Tetraphylos, Iatrokles son of Antipatros of the tribe Kormoskoneus, and [Hekataios] son of Thraseas son of Melas of the tribe Massōneus; whereas, since our ancestral __ gods Apollo and Artemis have settled in our sanctuary, it has been agreed that the . . . of the statue of (Apollo?) . . .

Commentary: Late third/early second century (lettering?)

7: Boulay and Pont tentatively propose [καὶ κο]ινῶν

This decree of the *dēmos* includes mention of three tribes, all of which are Mylasean. Robert inferred from this that Hydai, because still a separate community capable of passing decrees, was, like Olymos, joined to Mylasa through a *sympoliteia*, a supposition that gains support from another decree of Hydai that uses Mylasa's stephanephorate dating and refers to itself as a *koinon*.⁸⁴ Two additional features from these documents deserve comment. The quoted decree is concerned with setting up statues “of our ancestral gods,” and thus indicates a strong desire on the part of the Hydieis to preserve institutions around which their local identity could persist.⁸⁵ Indeed, both inscriptions attest to the political vitality of the community of Hydai even after its loss of autonomy. Furthermore, two individuals from *IMylasa* 903 also show up in Mylasean documents. Hermias son of Polites is known as a Mylasean priest of Apollo Pytheas (*IMylasa* 338) and is surely originally from Mylasa, since such priesthoods usually depended on hereditary rights. The implications of Hermias' presence in Hydai will be elaborated in the discussion of Olymeans in Mylasa ([chapter 3](#)). Aristetas son of Leon son of Aristetas

appears to be the father of a Mylasean archon by the name of Leon son of Aristetas son of Leon son of Aristetas in a late second-century decree.⁸⁶ This could suggest that the *sympoliteia* enabled at least one elite family from a smaller community to achieve success, and perhaps gain access to further opportunities for prestige, in a larger city. Nonetheless, there is nothing in either inscription to guarantee that this family was from Hydai as opposed to Mylasa, nor is it certain whether such crossover was an aim that influenced the arrangement between Mylasa and Hydai. This alluring possibility is still one to be kept in mind in light of similar scenarios in other *sympoliteiai*.

MYLASA AND EUROMOS

Euromos was situated to dominate the majority of the Euromos river valley, on the eastern side of the elongated plain and facing southwards, as a small fold of the mountain range to the east-northeast covers its northern flank. The city was thus oriented toward Chalketor and the road to the southeast toward Olymos and Mylasa.⁸⁷ The boundary with Olymos (and eventually Mylasa) was marked by the rolling hills mentioned above, but geography does not indicate the division between Euromos and Chalketor, which must have controlled some of the southern Euromid plain in addition to the small strip of agricultural land extending toward Hydai to the south. To the north, the Euromid plain extends north and then bends in a northwesterly direction toward the Latmian Gulf. Euromos must have controlled most of this plain, but as we have seen, Pidasas controlled the northern portions. As discussed below, it is also clear that it shared a northern border with Herakleia, defined by the mountains rising off the plain in this direction.⁸⁸ Communication to the west was sharply limited by Mount Grion. Based on these observations, it is clear that Euromos did not neighbor Mylasa until the latter's merger with Olymos. In addition to rich agricultural resources, Euromos also stood on the road to Miletos, and as of 188 BC was an immediate neighbor of the coastal city, due to the latter's *sympoliteia* with Pidasas.⁸⁹

We know of the *sympoliteia* between Mylasa and Euromos from a decree of the Mylaseans honoring Moschion son of Aristides:




Figure 2.3 Inscription VI. *Source:* Printed with permission from Art Resource.

VI. Le Bas & Waddington #394; Froehner 1965, 127–31; Michel, 1900, #472; *IMylasa* 102 (Blümel 1987, 26–27).

Cf. Robert 1962, 59f.; Robert 1978, 515–18 (= *SEG* 28.847); Errington 1986, 1–8; Errington 1993, 15–32; Gabrielsen 2000, 168–69.

Found: Melasso
 Currently: Louvre #2941
 Description Unavailable
 Dimensions: H .50m × W .60m × D .012m

- [Ἐπὶ στ]εφανηφόρου Ἑκαταίου τοῦ Ἑκαταίου[υ τοῦ] Μενεζένου *vac.*
 [γραμμ]ατεύοντος βουλῆι Κόρριδος τοῦ Ἑκα[τόμν]ω ἱερέως Διὸς Λα-
 [βραύν]δου, καὶ ἀρχόντων Ἑκατόμνω τοῦ Ἀριστέου τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου,
 4 [Λέον]τος τοῦ Ἀριστέου τοῦ Λέοντος τοῦ Ἀριστέου, Διογένου τοῦ
 [Ξεν]ομένου· Ξανδοκοῦ πεντεκαίδεκάτη: ἐπιστατοῦντος ἀρχο[ν]-
 [τος] Διογένου τοῦ Ξενομένου *vac.* ἔδοξεν τῇ βουλῇ καὶ τῷ δήμῳ· γν[ώ-]
 [μη] ἀρχόντων Ἑκατόμνω, Λέοντος, Διογένου ν. περὶ ὧν εἰσεγράφατο
 8 [Ἑκα]ταῖος Μέλανος τοῦ Ὑψικλείους Κορμοσκωνεύς *vac.* ἐπειδὴ Μοσ-
 [χίω]ν Ἀριστείδου ἱερεὺς Διὸς Κρηταγενοῦς καὶ Κουρήτων, ἐξ ἀρ-
 [χ]ῆς εἰρημένος τὰ βέλτιστα ἐπιτηδεύειν καὶ προτεθειμένος ἀπὸ
 τῆς πρώτης ἡλικίας ἰδίαι μὲν ἐκάσται τῶν πολιῶν εὐχρηστος γ[ί-]
 12 νεσθαι, κατὰ κοινὴν δὲ τῷ σύμπαντι δήμῳ τὰ συμφέροντα συνκα-
 τασκευ<α>άζειν, ἐν ἀρχείοις τε γενόμενος διεξαγείωχεν πάντα μι-
 σοπονῆρως καὶ ἀξίως τοῦ σύμπαντος δήμου ν. Εὐρωμέων τε συμ-
 πολιτευομένων τῷ δήμῳ, τῶν τε ἱερῶν κατασκευασμάτων ἔτ[ι]
 16 δὲ καὶ τῶν ἰδίων ἐκάστου ὑπαρχόντων κατεχομένων ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ[ι],
 ἐξαποσταλεις πρὸς Ἡρακλεώτας κατακονομήσατο τὰ συμφέροντα
 τῇ πόλει *vac.* Λεοντέως τε τῶν πολιτῶν κατασάντος ἐπὶ τὴν βουλὴν
 καὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας περὶ τῶν συντετελεσμένων εἰς αὐτὸν ἀδικημά-
 20 των, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀπαχθέντων αὐτοῦ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐξ Ἡρακλείας, ἐ-
 ξαποσταλεις εἰς τὴν τῶν Ἡρακλεωτῶν πόλιν καὶ πᾶσαν κακοπάθιαν
 εἰσενεγκάμενος προενοίησεν εἰς τὸ τῷ πλημμεληθέντι ἀποκατασ[τα-]
 θῆναι πάντα τὰ αὐτοῦ *vac.* Φιλίππου τε τοῦ Διοφάντου ἐπελθόντος [ἐπι]
 24 τὴν βουλὴν καὶ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, δηλώσαντός τε διότι σῶμα αὐτοῦ
 ἐνυχαγωγημένον ἦκται εἰς Μύνδον, αἰρεθείς πρεσβευτὴς πρὸς Μυν-
 δίους καὶ ἐγδημήσας ἐφιλοτιμήθη εἰς τὸ τυχεῖν τὸν Φίλιππον τῷ[ν]
 [δικαίων

The text follows that of Blümel except where noted. L. 1: [τ]οῦ, Froehner, Michel, Blümel. Μενεζένου, Blümel. –L. 8–9: restoration follows Michel; Μόσ|[χ]ω]ν, Froehner. –L. 9–10: ἀρ|[χ]ῆς, Froehner; ἀρ|[χ]ῆς, Michel, Blümel. –L. 13: All other editors of the text have ignored the extra alpha on the stone, which has been chiseled away and appears only faintly. –L. 18: τῇ βουλῇ, Le Bas & Waddington; THIBOYΛΗ corrected by the stonemason to τὴν βουλῇ[ν], Michel, Blümel; τὴν βουλὴν, Robert 1978 (from photograph). From the photograph generously provided to me by the Louvre, I can also make out the traces of the nu restored by Blümel and Michel, though not confidently enough to leave it undotted. –L. 22: ἀποκατα[τε-], Froehner; ἀποκατατ[ε-], Michel; ἀποκαταστα-, Robert; the photograph confirms Blümel's reading. –L. 23: [εἰς], Froehner. –L. 24: αὐτο[ῦ], Froehner, Michel, Blümel

Translation:

In the stephanephorate of Hekataios son of Hekataios son of Menexenes, when Korris son of Hekatomnos, priest of Zeus Labraundos was secretary to the council, and Hekatomnos son of Aristetas son of Alexander, Leon son of Aristetas son of Leon son of Aristetas, and Diogenes son of Xenomenes were archons; on the 15th of Xandikes, when Diogenes son of Xenomenes was presiding archon. Decided by the council and the *dêmos*, a motion of the archons Hekatomnos, Leon, and Diogenes about that which Hekataios son of Melan son of Hypsikleios, of the *syngeneia* of Kouroiskon, recorded: Since Moschion son of Aristides, priest of Zeus Kretagenes and of the Kouretes, having been chosen from the first to provide the best things and having prepared himself from the beginning of manhood to be most useful to each of the citizens privately, while publicly to arrange for what was beneficial to the whole *dêmos*, coming into office he conducted everything in a manner hostile to wickedness and worthy of the whole *dêmos*. And when the Euromeans entered into *sympoliteia* with the *dêmos*, and the sacred equipment as well as everyone's personal effects were still kept in Herakleia, he was sent to the Herakleians and managed matters to the benefit of the city. And when Leonteus, a citizen, stood before the council and the archons about the injustices committed against him, and about his possessions that were carried off by men from Herakleia, he (Moschion) was sent to the city of the Herakleians, bringing forth every grievance, and took care of the restoration of all belongings to the offended party. And when Philip son of Diophantes came before the council and the assembly, and showed that his slave had been kidnapped and brought to Myndos, he (Moschion) was chosen as envoy to the Myndians, and going abroad he strove for Philip to obtain [what was just? . . .

Commentary:

- 1The stephanephors seems to be the son of one of the archons in *IMylasa* 103 (l. 4).
- 2Korris is also named in *IMylasa* 841, an Olymean text.
- 4Leon's father is named in *IMylasa* 903, a stone from Hydai. Diogenes is named in *IMylasa* 205.
- 8Κορμοσκωνεύς: Members of this *syngeneia* are largely known from Olymean inscriptions (Blümel 27), but is also attested in *IMylasa* 226, 422, and *ILabraunda* 85.
- 9The priesthood of Zeus Kretagenes and the Kouretai is also attested in *IMylasa* 107 and 806.
- 12σὺμπάντῳ δήμῳ: This term also shows up in Mylasean official language in *IMylasa* 109 (76 BC) and 106.

Unfortunately, this interesting document has given birth to several controversies. First, although the inscription is almost certainly from the second century, argument has arisen over whether it was published at the beginning or the end of the century. Proponents of the later date relate the inscription to *IMylasa* 103, in which one of the archons is Hekataios son of Menexenes, the father of the stephanephoros in *IMylasa* 102. Since they date the earlier inscription

to the second half of the second century BC, they are quite comfortable with a late second-century/early first-century date for the text from which we have quoted.⁹⁰ However, no reason is given for the date of *IMylasa* 103, and one can only assume that the basis is letter style. Reger, on the other hand, favors an early second-century date for the honorific decree.⁹¹ Although he provides no argument for his position, the relationship between the decree and a fragmentary inscription referring to a dispute between Euromos and Mylasa seems to be the keystone.⁹² This text relates how the dispute was first referred to a *strategos*, who then passed the matter on to Rhodes, who was to act as arbiter. The nature of the dispute involved a demand by the Mylaseans of fifty Attic talents, which Robert saw, in my opinion correctly, as the penalty for breaking the *sympoliteia*.⁹³ If this connection is valid, then the decree honoring Moschion must be earlier or at least contemporary with the *SEG* inscription, since the former would have been published no later than the end of Moschion's lifetime, and one assumes that he would not have lived many more decades after the commencement of the *sympoliteia*. Since, then, the involvement of both the Roman *strategos* and Rhodes in the dispute, acting in cooperation, suggests that this text was inscribed between 189 and 167, the date of the honorific for Moschion, as well as the *sympoliteia* mentioned in it, would thus fall in the early part of the second century.⁹⁴ This seems a more likely conclusion than that of a late-second-century date. While both positions rest on unprovable assumptions, it is preferable to rely on inferences from the historical context rather than on letter-forms alone.

Another difficulty presented by the evidence involves Herakleia on the Latmos. It is generally agreed that the personal belongings and sacred *kataskeumata* were taken to this city in reaction to the *sympoliteia*.⁹⁵ However, the Herakleians' behavior may not have been so aggressive and unethical. Robert notes that elsewhere, mention of (sacred) equipment occurs in the context of pledges, which makes possible a more peaceful transfer of the objects to Herakleia.⁹⁶ More to the point, the manner in which Moschion resolved the situation—a peacefully conducted ambassadorial exchange with the community—suggests that, regardless of how the private property and sacred equipment came to Herakleia, this relocation did not come about as a result of a hostile action on the part of Herakleia against Mylasa (or Euromos as part of Mylasa). In fact, the summary nature in which Moschion's mission is described implies that there was nothing spectacular about the settlement: surely an honorific decree would jump at the chance at least to mention the concessions that Moschion had won from Herakleia, unless the matter merely involved the unexciting clarification of a misunderstanding or, more likely, the

censure by Herakleia of the wayward actions of certain of its citizens. The term *hekastou* instead of *pantos* in the text suggests that several Euromeans, but not all, were affected by the removal of their property, and it is not difficult to imagine border violence occurring independently of the state policy of Herakleia. Yet even if cynicism does not allow such a generous view of Herakleia, any aggression must have occurred before the *sympoliteia*, and thus was directed at Euromos only, since the inscription makes no attempt to depict the Herakleians as anything but cooperative in their dealings with Moschion and his fellow Mylasean envoys.⁹⁷

From this conclusion it is possible to infer at least one motive for the *sympoliteia*. Euromos clearly felt itself incapable of protecting its citizens' property, whether from isolated raiders or an overtly hostile northern neighbor, and hoped that the prestige and power of Mylasa would be more effective to this end.⁹⁸ These expectations were, it seems, reasonable, and Mylasa's friendly relationship with and capacity to threaten Herakleia resolved the issue of Euromean security. The improved protection offered by Mylasa is also seen in a decree of Euromos honoring a garrison commander and granting him *metousia* with the rest of its citizens, displaying an appreciation for the role of Mylasean troops for the city's safety. That this decree dates to the time of the *sympoliteia* is guaranteed by the honoree's lack of an ethnic and suggested by the fact that the announcement of the decree was to be made in front of "the *dêmos*" by envoys (ll. 16–19). If this stipulation does not refer to a formal *kerugma* declared before the Euromean community, then it could very well mean that Euromos was making arrangements to publicize their gratitude to the sovereign assembly at Mylasa.⁹⁹ A discussion of the motives of Mylasa, on the other hand, is based more on plausibility than textual inference. The city would have seen an opportunity to expand ever closer to Miletos, possibly even making the two cities contiguous, depending on the relative chronology of this *sympoliteia* and the one arranged between Miletos and Pidasas. This possibility to expand trade (and perhaps social) networks would have been augmented by the now direct access to much of the fertile Euromid plain, a part of which had helped to convince Miletos to accept Pidasas's offer of incorporation, as we have seen. The allure of this land even led Mylasa to invade in 167 BC, which is consequently another argument for an early second-century date for the *sympoliteia*: not only would Mylasa thereby have been attempting to recover what it had lost when Euromos ended the arrangement, but, more decisively, this interpretation avoids the unlikely and unprecedented scenario of Euromos agreeing to a *sympoliteia* with a city that had formerly tried to conquer it.¹⁰⁰

CHALKETOR AND IASOS

As mentioned above, Chalketor shared a northeastern boundary with Euromos in the Euromos river valley, with Chalketor controlling the southwestern extension of the plain,¹⁰¹ which connected it to Hydai's territory to the south. Chalketor was separated from Iasos to the west by the southern spur of Grion, which today can be traversed by roads winding through the passes that follow the route of an ancient road.¹⁰² In fact, there were only two points of access eastward from Iasos inland: one passed through what was in antiquity Chalketor's territory, and the other skirted the northern shores of the "Little Sea" and led to Hydai and Mylasean territory.¹⁰³ It is important to note that, from a geographical standpoint, while its fertile territory most closely adjoined that of Euromos, it is also probably that it represented the most important political unit linking coastal Iasos with the hinterland. As we have seen from [chapter 1](#), Iasos' foreign activity evinces interest in such connections, including with Chalketor. Chalketor would also have shared a border with Mylasa by the second century, after the *sympoliteia* with Hydai.

An inscription found in Chalketor attests to a directly ordered *sympoliteia*, presumably by a king or his representative:

VII. Paton & Myres 1896, #29; Cousin 1889, #16; Welles 1934, 134–35; *IMylasa* 913 (Blümel 1988, 109f.).

Cf. Robert 1969, 1574; *idem* 1978, 517; Robert & Robert 1970, 555; *idem* 1983, 401; *SEG* 32.1109; Marek 1992, 119–23.

Found: field belonging to Kara-Ali-oglu Khalil, near temple of Apollo at Chalketor

Currently: Unknown

Description: Marble wall block in two fragments.

[]ΣΑΙ ἰὸν []ΕΝΕ[]ΑΙ[]Ι[] θέσει καὶ ΙΟΙ[]
 [περὶ] πλείστου ποιούμεν[ο]ς γέγραφεν τῇ βου-
 λῇ καὶ τῷ δήμῳ ὅτι προσ[ο]ρίζει τῇ πόλει τὸν
 4 τῶν Χαλκητορέων δῆμον ἵνα συμπεπολειτευ-
 όμενος ἐπ' ἴσῃ καὶ ὁμοίαι τ[ῶ]ν αὐτῶν ἡμῖν μετέ-
 χῃ, [το]ῖς ὅ[λ]οις τε ὅσα ἂν προσδέηται τινος ο[ἱ]-
 [κ]ονο<μ>ίας Τάσσονά φησιν διεξάξειν τὸν στρατη-
 8 [γόν τε καὶ] λέγ[ει] τοὺς πολίτας πάντας ὁμονο-
 ήσαντας ὀνμύ]ειν τὴν τε πόλιν καὶ τοὺς νό-
 [μους κατὰ τὰ συγ]κείμενα πρὸς αὐτὸν διαφυλά-
 [ξειν φιλοτίμῳ]ς καὶ τὴν εὖνοιαν καὶ φιλίαν
 12 [τὴν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐξ ἴ]σου διασώζειν τὴν τ[ε]
 [----- περὶ] τῆς συμφ[ω]νίας ἡ[μῶν]

The text follows that of Blümel, except where indicated. The only version of the whole original stone is Cousin's facsimile. L. 1:σαι [τ]ὸν..ΕΝΕ...ΑΙ[Ν]Ι.Θέσ[ε]ι καὶ [τ]ο., Cousin; [τὴν τῆς πο|λέως εὐ]δαι[μ]ον[ίαν] ἐν ἐ[κ]άστ]ῃ [δ]ι[α]θέσ[ε]ι κατ[ρ]ῶν, Welles.¹⁰⁴— L. 6: Ο[]ΟΙΣ restored as [ἄλλ]οις, Cousin; (ἄ)[λλ]οις, Blümel. Based on Cousin's drawing, the space in between the omicrons seems too small to accommodate two lamdas. The correction of the omicron to an alpha does inadvisable and unnecessary violence to the text. —L. 6-7: Ο|.ΟΝΟΥΙΑΣ restored as ὁ|[μ]ο(λ)ογίας, Cousin; ο[ἱ|κ]ονομίας, Robert & Robert 1983. —L. 8: ΛΕΓ[Ε], Cousin; [καὶ κε]λε(ύ)[ει], Welles, Blümel. The latter restoration again does violence to the text by changing a gamma to an epsilon unnecessarily. —L. 9-13: restorations from Welles. —L. 12: ἐξ ἴ[?]σου, Blümel. —L. 13: [τὸ περὶ], Blümel.

Translation:

valuing he has written to the council and *dêmos* that he is adding the *dêmos* of Chalketor to the city so that being in *sympoliteia* on equal and fair footing it shall have a share in the same things as us, and for everything that may need some administering he says that the general Iason will settle things and further tells all the citizens to [swear] with one mind to protect the city and laws [eagerly according to] the arrangement with him (or “with it,” i.e., the *dêmos* of Chalketor) and to preserve [in the same way?] their good will and friendship [toward him] and . . . [concerning] our agreement.

Commentary: Lettering third/second century

7Iason could be the same man as a general of the same name honored

in an inscription found in Halikarnassos (but originating from Theangela, according to Marek). Of which king he was a subordinate we do not know, but Boulay and Pont have argued convincingly in favor of Antiochos III.¹⁰⁵

Essentially every piece of information that could serve to date the inscription is missing from what survives. The letter-forms are third-century in style, and slightly earlier than another text inscribed on the same stone.¹⁰⁶ Because of our ignorance of the precise date that Hydai joined the Mylasean state (which would be necessary for Chalketor to merge with Mylasa), scholars identify the other community in the *sympoliteia* as either Mylasa or Euromos. While there is nothing to suggest the former other than geography and Mylasa's track record for *sympoliteiai* with its neighbors, Euromos' interest in Chalketor can be linked to the renaming of Euromos as Philippoi in the late third century.¹⁰⁷ Blümel thus envisions Philip V as the impetus behind the arrangement, and sees the assignment of Chalketor to Euromos as part of the "re-founding" of Philippoi/Euromos.¹⁰⁸ Neither option is overwhelmingly convincing, and the recent publication of additional evidence from Chalketor has elucidated the picture. It is clear from these texts that Chalketor's *sympoliteia* was with Iasos. All three are dated by the Iasian stephanephorate, and give evidence for the presence of a Iasian *stratêgos epi chôras* in Chalketor.¹⁰⁹ The second-century BC document—the other two are of imperial date—is of particular interest in that the two individuals named are attested in other Iasian inscriptions, at least one of whom is clearly of elite status. Theodoros son of Melanion gives contributions for the Dionysiai as an *agonothetê*, *chorêgos*, and secretary of the Council.¹¹⁰ Thus, not only did the *sympoliteia* between Chalketor and Iasos last, but it provided further political opportunities for Iasian elite and possibly for Chalketorean elite as well, if Drakon son of Herodes was originally from the smaller city, as his adoption by Her(mias?) could suggest. Moreover, the desire to publicize one's status in Chalketor as late as the second century AD testifies to the vitality of the Chalketorean community within the larger Iasian polity.¹¹¹ This impression is possibly strengthened by a decree of the Chalketorean *dêmos* that may date slightly later than the inscription quoted above.¹¹²


There are two possibilities for how Chalketor came to be included within Iasos. If a third-century date for the quoted inscription is correct, then the royal authority behind Iason was the Ptolemies, since Iasos lay within their sphere of influence until Antigonos Doson's 227 BC campaign.¹¹³ On the other hand, Boulay and Pont make a convincing case for seeing the *sympoliteia* as contemporary to Antiochos III's capture of Iasos in 197, and Iason as the son of

Minnion, Seleukid benefactor of Theangela. Indeed, Laodike describes Antiochos as having increased the civic body of Iasos (συναύξειν τὸ πολίτευμα) and refers to it as *sympas dêmos* at this time (*Iasos* 4.10–16).¹¹⁴ This augmentation need not only be understood in terms of civic population, considering the fertile land of Chalketor and that the territory of Iasos was not especially fertile: Strabo tells us that the Iasians made their living primarily from the sea because of this (14.658).

It is interesting to note the emphasis in the text on the egalitarian status of the Chalketoreans in the new polity.¹¹⁵ Presumably, no Hellenistic king would have an intrinsic interest in a *sympoliteia* as opposed to a completely one-sided absorption, and thus any motives he had in the union were tied to his relationship with the involved *poleis*, Iasos in particular. In fact, this is exactly what the text (almost) says: “valuing [something presumably about the attitude of the city to the king], he is assigning the *dêmos* of Chalketor to the *polis*.” Thus, regardless of the causal role of the (probably) Seleukid king in ordering the *sympoliteia*, the true motivation for the arrangement must clearly be sought in the communities involved. That the accord benefited Iasos is implicit in the fact that the king links his injunction to a concern for the affection of this city. Without engaging in too much speculation, especially since so little of the text is preserved, the absence of any allusion to concerns over security is striking. At the same time, the very involvement of a third party in the “agreement,” in the form of the king’s letter and then Iason’s administration of the details, implies some unwillingness on the part of Chalketor. The other matters under Iason’s responsibility (ὅσα ἂν προσδέηταί τινος ο[ἱ]κ[ο]νο<μ>ίας) were no doubt similar to the issues addressed in the clauses of the *sympoliteiai* accord between Miletos and Pidasa, specifically directed to the different wants and needs of Chalketor and Iasos. Yet, in this case, the presence of a higher authority was needed to ensure the enactment of these stipulations. Concern for the permanence of the *sympoliteia* is further revealed by the use of *homonoëô* and the force of “all the citizens” in the injunction to safeguard the city and its laws, itself a sort of summary of the language of the oath that typically concludes a *sympoliteia* agreement.

On the other hand, if my reading of αὐτόν in line 10 as referring to the *dêmos* of Chalketor is correct, then Iasos did, or was planning to (once Iason arrived) arrange the *sympoliteia* with Chalketor. Despite the seeming unorthodoxy of the reading, there are good reasons supporting it. First, although αὐτόν would most naturally refer to its closest masculine singular antecedent, Iason, we would not expect anyone to swear to a king’s subordinate, but to the king himself, yet αὐτόν cannot refer to the unnamed king (and subject of the finite

verbs φησιν and λέγει) since this would require the reflexive pronoun ἐαυτόν. The only alternative is τὸν τῶν Χαλκητορέων δῆμον. We need not restrict ourselves to negative arguments. In favor of this interpretation is the parallel language of the *sympoliteia* between Smyrna and Magnesia on the Sipylos. The phrase “. . . with one mind to zealously protect the city and laws [according to] the arrangement with it (i.e., the *dêmos* of Chalketor) and to preserve [in the same way] their good will and friendship [toward him]” compares closely with the oath of the Magnesians: “I will abide by the arrangements that we made with Smyrna forever, and I will observe my alliance and good will with king Seleukos and the city of Smyrna.”¹¹⁶ In both instances, the wording effects a symmetry between the arrangement with the partner city and the community’s relationship with the king. Accordingly, it is possible that Chalketor, even if reluctantly forced to accept membership within a larger *polis*, was able to take an active role in determining the nature of its new status. The only concrete evidence of this role is the *sympoliteia* itself—one might call it the best option for subordination. Yet the language of the text suggests that some matters had already largely been agreed upon, and only needed a “mop up” job. The king sends Iason in case there are still matters to be managed, and the verb describing Iason’s involvement, διεξάγω, carries the sense of completion. Iason is to make sure that this is a done deal, in case it already is not. Given this reading, we cannot ignore the possibility that the two communities had decided on the *sympoliteia* and then requested the king’s sanction, since both were (apparently) in a dependent relationship with him. What, then, of our earlier inference that the agreement needed the presence of a third party to enforce a potentially unstable situation? The involvement of the king and his representative could simply be a symbolic reminder of royal power: the *poleis* in his empire could do what they liked among each other, as long as they realized that every action was dependent on his good graces. Alternately, the need for Iason’s management may reflect internal divisions within Chalketor over the issue of the *sympoliteia*. Such a merger only needed the consensus of the officially sanctioned parties to the agreement.




Map 2.3 Halikarnassos, Theangela, and Mumcular plain. *Source:* Tina Ross Archaeological Illustrations.

KILLARA(KILDARA) AND TH(EANGELA?)/TH(ODASA?)

In the inscription attesting to a *sympoliteia* involving Kildara and community whose name does not survive (see below), two other settlements, Theangela and Thodasa, are mentioned. Unfortunately, it is impossible to ascertain the location the latter, as its name appears nowhere else in surviving evidence. Killara/Kildara has been located on the basis of epigraphical finds near the modern village of Kuzyaka, situated in the northwestern part of a not insubstantial elevated plain along with several other villages.¹¹⁷ Whether the city controlled this entire agricultural zone is unclear, though the “pinching” of the plain in its middle may suggest that it was politically divided along this north-south vertical, and Hydissos’ position on the slopes to the east of this plain makes it likely that it controlled the area around it.¹¹⁸ For Killara, however, outlets to the northeast and southeast would have formed the most traversable routes of communication out of the plain. To the west, a small mountain chain peters out at both ends, allowing for minor routes to the northwest and the southwest, both leading to the Karova plain dominated by Mumcular today, which due to its elongated shape was doubtless home to more than one polis. Certainly, it makes sense to see the northern part of this plain as part

of Bargylia and Kindya (Kemikler), but the southwestern extension is quite far from either center and, as with Chalketor in the southern Euromid plain, would have on geographical grounds accommodated another community. This community was Theangela, whose ruins sit atop the mountain delimiting the plain to the south, thus orienting the city northward.¹¹⁹ While we can only speculate about the borders to the north, it seems probable that Theangela's territory stretched at least as far as the route leading east and northeast toward Killara, thus making them potential neighbors. Yet the discovery of previously unknown polities like Thodasa remind us that we are far from possessing a comprehensive picture of the political landscape of Karia. Surveys such as that conducted by the research team behind *HTC* make clear the vast number of concentrated settlements in a relatively small area that may or may not have fallen prey to centralizing forces. Besides the almost certain contiguity with Kindya to the northwest (and thus Bargylia), Killara, thus also bordered several communities to the east and southwest. If it did not have an eastern neighbor within its own plain, it would have been in communication with the two smaller plains adjoining it to the east. Theangela may have been its neighbor to the southeast, but only if Kildara's territory extended far enough to the south to connect it with the pass leading to Karova. Geography mirrors the epigraphical ambiguity discussed below in providing too many options of equal merit for the other member of the *sympoliteia*.



A highly damaged but significant inscription found in Bargylia attests to a *sympoliteia* involving the nearby community of Killara. The text has been subject to much discussion, some of which bears directly on the context of the *sympoliteia*:

VIII. Blümel 2000, 94–96; Wiemer 2001, 1–14.

Cf. Blümel 1998, AST 15: 391f.; Dreyer 2002, 119–28; Reger 2004, 147.

Found: Hasan Colak, Dorttepe Koyu (near Bargylia), originally under ruins near harbor to NE of inlet across from ancient Bargylia

Currently: Milas Museum 2521

Description: Rectangular white marble block, with anathyrosis on top, right side flat, left and bottom roughly hewn and broken on the edges. Right upper corner broken off.

Dimensions: H .25m × W .65m × D .29m

	] <td>] <td></td> </td>	] <td></td>	
	] ΣΤΑΤ[5-6]ΓΕ[.]ΜΩΝ [</td <td>] <td></td> </td>	] <td></td>	
	] ΩΡΙΣ[4-6 ἀ]γτικατέστα ΕΠΑ[</td <td>]<!--ΗΤΑ[</td--> <td></td> </td>	] ΗΤΑ[</td <td></td>	
4	] ΗΜΑΙΟΣ εὖ ΒΕΒ[</td <td>]<!--ΤΟ[</td--> <td></td> </td>	] ΤΟ[</td <td></td>	
	]. Σ[.]Α[	] ΕΒΛΗ[]Α[</td <td></td>	
	] ΘΙΗΣ[</td <td>]<!--ΩΣ των δικαίων Τ[</td--> <td>]<!--ΡΤΟ[</td--> </td></td>	] ΩΣ των δικαίων Τ[</td <td>]<!--ΡΤΟ[</td--> </td>	] ΡΤΟ[</td
	] ΟΙΣ .[</td <td>]<!--γίνεσθαι Ν[</td--> <td>]<!--ΑΝΤ[</td--> </td></td>	] γίνεσθαι Ν[</td <td>]<!--ΑΝΤ[</td--> </td>	] ΑΝΤ[</td
8	[εὐχρ]ηστήκειν πολλὰκις αὐτοῖς καὶ εἰς [χρείας τὰς πο]λιτικ[ὰς αὐ]των [ἄ- [τοκα] δεδανείκειν καὶ τὰ ψαφίσματα τὰ ὑπὲρ τοῦ[τ]ων παραν[εγν]ώσ- [θειν. σ]υνστάντος δὲ πολέμου βασιλεῖ Αντιόχοι ποτὶ βασιλῇ Π[το]λεμ[αῖ]- [ον τὸν] νῦν βασιλεύοντα, κυριεῦσαι τοὺς παρὰ βασιλέως Αντι[ό]χο[υ]		
12	[4-5]ρων καὶ Θεωδᾶσων πρὸ τοῦ παρὰ βασιλέως Φιλίππου παρα[1-2]Ο[2-3] [4-5]ΝΤΙ[.]Ω[.]Θεαγγέλα καὶ συμπολιτεῦεσθαι Κυλλαρεῖς καὶ Θ[] ΙΕ[]ΣΕΩΝΚΑ[]ΣΑ[...]ους εἰς τὰν αὐτὰν [</td		
	] Ν[βα]σιλε[</td <td>παρανα]γινώσκοντας ἐπιστο[λὴν</td> <td></td>	παρανα]γινώσκοντας ἐπιστο[λὴν	
16	]. .[	] ΤΟ Κυλβισσεῦ[σι</td <td></td>	

The text follows that of Wiemer, except where indicated. L. 1: ΘΕΑΥΤ[----]Ν.Ι., Blümel. –L. 2:]ΓΓ[----]Ν[----, Blümel. –L. 3: ΑΤΕΣΤΑΕΠ[----, Blümel; κατέστα ΕΠ[----, Wiemer. –L. 4:]ΟΣΕ.ΒΕΒ[-----]ΤΟ[--, Blümel. –L. 6: βασιλέως γ[υ]ναῖκα Γ[.]ΝΤ, Blümel. –L. 9: κατὰ, Blümel. –L. 9-10: παραν[...]ώ[-, Blümel; παραν[εγν]ώ[σ]θη, Wiemer. –L. 12:]ρων, Blümel 1998, Reger (citing

Crowther);]σων, Blümel 2000. –L. 12–13:
 παρα[γεν]ο[μένου?|--]NTII[..]Ω, Blümel; παρα[δ]ο[ρή]μειν
 Άντι[ό]χωι, Wiemer.

Translation:

- 6 . . . of the just things . . .
 . . . be(come) . . .
 have often been of service to them and for their civic needs
 9 have made loans without interest and the decrees made on behalf of these
 things
 were read publicly. And when war arose between King Antiochos and the
 king Ptolemy
 who now reigns, the soldiers (*vel sim.*) of King Antiochos took control of
 12 _____ and Thodasa before the officer of King Philip . . .
 . . . Theangela and the Killareans and Th[. . .] arranged a *sympoliteia* . . .
 . . . into the same . . .
 . . . king reading publicly a letter . . .
 . . . to the Kylbisseans . . .

Commentary:

3The eta at the end of the line could also be a nu.

4HMAI: The discovery in my photograph of these four letters makes it probable that we have here the ending of a name or proper noun (-ημαίος). Moreover, my discovery, again from a photograph, of an upsilon in between the epsilon and beta makes it likely that we have an adverb followed by a perfect tense verb, as later in the text.

8εὐχρ]ησότηκειν: Although this verb can also mean “to loan,” I have given its more literal meaning in my translation to distinguish it from δεδανείκειν, which may have been intended as a specification.

9–10παραν[εγν]ώσ[θειν: My photograph confirms the restoration of the sigma at the end of line 9. Wiemer restores παραν[εγν]ώσ[θη], but this fails to recognize that the entire document, insofar as we have it, uses the historical infinitive rather than finite verbs. It also posits three letter spaces at the beginning of the line 10, where above he restores four, below five. In my restoration, I give five, with one being an iota. Moreover, the “incorrect” form of the verb is consistent with the non-Attic perfect infinitives that precede it.

12My photograph confirms Blümel’s initial reading, seconded by Crowther, that the first visible letter in this line is a rho.

παρα[: As discussed below, no definitively satisfactory restoration is possible here

13Ω[.] : The missing letter space here has so many marks in the stone that it is impossible to tell which were from the mason and which from the ravages of time. From the photograph it is tempting to restore an alpha, but an iota is just as likely (following a different cut) and therefore I leave the space unrestored.

Before discussing the date and context of this *symboliteia*, it is necessary to first review the restorations in Wiemer's text. The most crucial of these is the verb παραδοθήμειν, on which hinges the value of this inscription as supporting evidence for the "Raubsvertrag" between Antiochos III and Philip V regarding the division of the Ptolemaic empire. The photographs provided by both Blümel and Dreyer display a sizeable gap between the last alpha and the top portion of the omicron in line 12, leading Dreyer to reject Wiemer's restoration, alleging that this space would have accommodated more than simply a delta.¹²⁰ However, a close look at the stone reveals that approximately half of the gap is not damaged, but simply blank. It seems that we have a slightly drastic instance of the irregular spacing between letters that prevails over the entire stone. In any case, considering the unscribed section of the gap, Blümel's suggestion of a gamma, epsilon, and nu in succession is untenable. Dreyer's second objection to παραδοθήμειν is the presence of the top curve of a letter where the eta should be.¹²¹ However, this curved stroke, which appears of the same quality as a letter stroke in the photograph he provides, is clearly an incidental mark when looked at with the naked eye.¹²² But this is not grounds for accepting παραδοθήμειν, for it is unnatural for the preceding preposition παρά to indicate agency; avoiding this irregular reading is especially desirable since a parallel for παρά as an indicator of origin ("from whom one was sent") exists in the same inscription, a mere line above. Moreover, if the word in question were an articular infinitive, one would expect the subject accusative (θεαγγέλα) to come before the infinitive.

The appeal to Wiemer of παραδοθήμειν is linked to his second major restoration: Ἀντιόχῳ. This suggestion, unfortunately, is even more problematic. Dreyer maintains that the letter at the end of this word cannot be an iota, due to the perceivable slant mark where one would expect a horizontal bar. Based on first-hand observation, it is impossible to distinguish incidental marks from the mason's cuts, and a digital photograph reveals both slant marks and a vertical stroke.¹²³ A stronger objection to the restoration of "Antiochos" is the absence of βασιλεῖ before the name. This seems to have been a necessary part of a king's epigraphical appellation, judging from the repetition of the term with Antiochos in lines 10 and 11. In light of these observations, the most accurate reading of the beginning of line 13 is still Blümel's:

.]NTI[.. Ω [.].



Figure 2.5 First Half of Lines 10–14 of Inscription VIII. *Source:* Photo by Jeremy LaBuff.



Yet in avoiding an exact restoration of the text we can still infer information from the damaged section. The use of the preposition παρά in the inscription suggests that, although Blümel’s suggestion of παραγενοένου (sic) is incorrect, the presence of a participle complimenting the sense of τοῦ παρὰ βασιλέως Φιλίππου is most likely: “the man (sent) from King Philip” (cf. τοὺς παρὰ βασιλέως Ἀντι[ό]χο[υ in the line above) At the same time, the word at the beginning of line 13, if a name in the dative, is mostly likely a person to whom the inscription has already referred, since it is not qualified by a patronymic or title. As this is a Rhodian decree, we can infer that the man is a Rhodian general (perhaps being honored?) recovering territory taken by Philip during his Karian campaign. The alternative is to take the word as ending in the legible omega. In this case, the name becomes a genitive, declining similar to the Karian Ἐκατόμνω-Ἐκατόμνω. The name would then go with the article τοῦ as the object of the preposition πρὸς, and give the following reading: “. . . those (sent) from King Antiochos took control of the [community X] and the Thodaseans before [Y] (sent) from King Philip [verb] Theangela . . .”

In either case, Θεαγγέλα’s proximity to the clause regarding the *sympoliteia* makes it surprising that the suggestion of Θ[εαγγελεῖς as a restoration for the unknown community has not been taken more seriously.¹²⁴ Reger dismisses this possibility as being too long, but there is certainly space at the beginning of the next line before the first discernible letter (thus Θ[εαγγελ|εῖς]).¹²⁵ Although our ignorance of the location of Thodasa makes it a candidate *ex silentio*, we have seen that Theangela possibly shared a border with Killarean territory. Moreover, the withdrawal of Philip’s troops from Theangela could have occasioned more autonomous decisions by the city, including an attempt to recuperate from any damages that an invading army, whether hostile or “friendly,” may have incurred, by combining resources with another community. In the end, however, we must echo the caution of Reger, who rightly points out the many Karian toponyms beginning with theta.¹²⁶

Less controversial is the date of the *sympoliteia*. The presence of both Antiochos III and Philip V in Karia provides a date between 203 and 197 BC.¹²⁷ From this we can infer a communal motive for the merger. Reger suggests the benefit of increased defensive capabilities during a period when, regardless of which imperial power one backed, a considerable enemy force was always a nearby threat. He offers as a parallel the repopulation (*synoikisthênai*) of Theangela, also at the turn of the century.¹²⁸ Since Theangela retained its identity in the realm of


foreign affairs into the imperial period, we can infer that it would have been the dominant partner in the *sympoliteia*. Accordingly, this merge would have similarly augmented the Theangelean *dêmos*, whereas the inhabitants of the lesser partner may have preserved a local identity but were able to act on the international scene only as Theangeleans. While Reger promotes the idea that Antiochos prompted the union, the king is no more connected to this event than Philip or Ptolemy by the language of the inscription. Syntactically, the *sympoliteia* is one of a list of events and the only one, so far as we can tell, that is *not* tied to a king. Insofar as the text comes from a Rhodian decree, it is mentioning events that affected territories of interest to Rhodes and the dispute it seems to have been arbitrating, at a time, convincingly argued by Wiemer, when it controlled Karia (188–180 BC).¹²⁹ Thus, the activities of the kings are of interest insofar as they affected the communities involved, but other events, like the *sympoliteia*, were also important to recall, even if the kings were not involved, precisely because local concerns were at issue, not royal history per se. It is more probable that one or both sides of the agreement instigated the merger, and if a king were involved, it was insofar as the communities sought regal approval as a gesture of good faith. This may have been especially important during such a volatile period. Unfortunately, given the state of the evidence, it is impossible to go beyond these generalized considerations in discussing motives.

HALIKARNASSOS AND THEANGELA

We have discussed Theangela's location in relation to its northward orientation, but it remains to determine its geographical relationship with Halikarnassos. In the absence of survey work, we must rely on modern roads. Two roads lead out of the southern Karova plain. The southern route arrives at the village of Çiftlik, which sits at the northern end of a narrow north-south plain leading down to the inhospitable coast. From Çiftlik, the road meets up with an east-west road that, after passing through several villages set in small valleys, leads meanderingly to Bodrum. These intervening modern settlements may or may not suggest distinct political entities in antiquity. The area of Çiftlik seems large enough to support an autonomous community, but Theangela's position on the mountain may have allowed it to control this area in addition to the Karova plain before it. Our ignorance of the extent of the Halikarnassian *chôra* also complicates matters. On the other hand, the route leading from Karova westward, while tortuous, does not lead through any significant agricultural zones before arriving at Kızılağaç, whose

extent I think Halikarnassos must have controlled. Geography, then, does not contradict the indication of Kallisthenes that there were no autonomous communities in between Halikarnassos and Theangela. Strabo cites the fourth-century historian as claiming that the Mausolean *synoikismos* included all but two of the original eight Lelegian towns (which formed a united territory called Pedasia), Myndos to the west and Syangela (Theangela's earlier name) to the east.¹³⁰ It seems that Halikarnassos, thanks to Maussollos, absorbed its neighbors up to but not including Theangela.

Against this background, the evidence for a *sympoliteia* between Halikarnassos and Theangela remains inconclusive. The prevailing opinion maintains that the two cities were joined at least during Philip V's control of the area.¹³¹ The main basis of the argument for a *sympoliteia* is a ca. 200 BC decree, now in Athens but claimed to be from Theangela, which is dated by a Halikarnassean priest.¹³² There is also epigraphical evidence from the late second century for Halikarnassan citizens whose ancestor, Aristides son of Neon, was Theangelean.¹³³ Jean and Louis Robert also point out the lack of coinage in Theangela during this period.¹³⁴ However, the first inscription's provenience has never been satisfactorily ascertained, and its status as a decree from Theangela has been called into question, since Halikarnassos remained a Ptolemaic possession until 197, while Theangela seems to have entered the Seleukid sphere of influence by 203.¹³⁵ The presence of a former Theangelean family in Halikarnassos can certainly suggest a *sympoliteia*, but without other evidence there is nothing to guarantee that Aristides or his descendants were not individually granted membership in Halikarnassos through a *politeia* award, as several Pidaseans (and many other foreigners) were by Miletos (see [chapter 3](#)). Moreover, reliance on the *absence* of coin issues is ultimately an argument from silence. On the other hand, the existence of Theangela as a polity independent of Halikarnassos is suggested, though not guaranteed, by the inscription regarding a *sympoliteia* with Killara, discussed above, as well as by two late third-/early second-century Theangelean decrees. One mentions the repopulation of the *dêmos*, attributing responsibility for this act to the honoree of the inscription, and the other includes an injunction to set up a stele in a foreign city, thus advertising its identity outside the boundaries of its own territory.¹³⁶ Furthermore, an epitaph in Athens names Menekrates son of Menekrates the Theangela. Attributed to the first century BC, the contestation of this date rests on the circular assumption that Halikarnassos absorbed Theangela at this time.¹³⁷ All things considered, there is no reason to infer a *sympoliteia* between these two cities.



Map 2.4 Stratonikeia Valley. *Source:* Tina Ross Archaeological Illustrations.

STRATONIKEIA AND KO(A)RA(N)ZA, PANAMARA ET AL.

By the end of Rhodian control of Karia in 167 BC, Stratonikeia had come to control most of the upper Marsyas river valley, as well as the smaller agricultural zones leading into the valley near the road from Mylasa (see [chapter 1](#)). This valley had in the fourth century been home to at least three independent *poleis*—Ko(a)ra(n)za, Koliorga, and Hierakome—as attested by *HTC* nos. 90 & 91. Only Koraza has been located with any certainty: from *IStratonikeia* 502 it is clear that it was the settlement that controlled the important regional sanctuary to Hekate at Lagina.¹³⁸ It was placed to dominate the northern part of the valley, making it likely that the other communities, whether two or four (the total number of demotics attested for Stratonikeia is 5), were located to the south along the valley or the road to Mylasa.¹³⁹ We have already noted Stratonikeia's routes of communication to the west (Mylasa) and the south (Mobolla and Pisye); to the north lay Alabanda and the east, Hyllarima. If Debord is right in locating the demes of Stratonikeia, however then the southern areas of the Marsyas valley were not under its control. Instead, one can see this as the start of a landscape of predominantly smaller communities, often referring to themselves as *koina*, who by end of the third century were part of the Rhodian sphere of influence, if not control. As van Bremen notes, we know much more about such communities further to the south, in the area systematically surveyed and published in *HTC*.¹⁴⁰

Within this context, nestled in the mountains west of this valley (and south of Stratonikeia) lay the sanctuary of Panamara, together with the communities that had formed a *koinon* around it.¹⁴¹ The mountains here are even more imposing than those of western Karia, and so the territory of Panamara could not have offered much in the way of resources, unless of course some its territory included the southern Marsyan plain. In any case, Panamara represented the most significant neighbor in terms of distance, communication to the south, and, as we will see, religion.

We have already seen the difficulties surrounding the founding of Stratonikeia, both in terms of its date and constitution. The colony's relationship to its demes was one either of absorption or original *syνοικισμος* (founding the city from the surrounding settlements). If we can take the case of Koraza as being typical, following Gabrielsen, most of the eventual demes of Stratonikeia acted independently until the second century, with the exception of Hierakome, which Debord must be right in identifying with the site of Stratonikeia itself.¹⁴² This reconstruction makes sense of the Seleukid willingness to give up the colony—at this point it was hardly a dominating presence even at the local level—as well as Rhodes' desire for the acquisition, seeing in it the means to control more Karian communities, of which it had plenty of experience already in the Peraia. Be that as it may, if Stratonikeia did come to absorb its neighbors, this alerts our attention to the possibility of *sympoliteia*. Although we have no evidence for the means by which the Korazeis, for example, were incorporated into Stratonikeia, that this occurred through a *sympoliteia* is suggested by the fact that they continued to exist as a subset of the Stratonikeian *dêmos* with full citizenship rights.¹⁴³ In addition, the roughly contemporary acquisition of Panamara could provide insight into Stratonikeia's absorption of the less well-attested demes, as well as the city's elusive relationship to the Chrysaorean *koinon*.

Panamara was organized communally as a *koinon* around the sanctuary of Zeus Karios and preexisted the foundation of Stratonikeia. The cult enjoyed royal and/or satrapal privileges, and was possibly the main sanctuary for southern Karia south of the Stratonikeian plain.¹⁴⁴ This orientation away from the Macedonian colony and toward a number of non-polis communities is essential for understanding the relationship between the two settlements, since at the start of the second-century Panamara was not a logical extension of Stratonikeia on any level: politically it was in a Rhodian sphere of influence that predated the latter's acquisition of the Seleukid foundation, and geographically and culturally it belonged to a "more indigenous" area of Karia, whose settlements were structured as *koina* rather than *poleis*.¹⁴⁵ One would not expect Stratonikeia to assert

control over the sanctuary-community until it had secured its hold over communities of the plain like Koaraza, that is, in the second century. More debatable is the influence of Rhodes on Stratonikeia's expansion. On the one hand, Rhodes' control of the city and probably the *koina* of and around Panamara could have prevented any political unification (following a strategy of "divide to keep conquered"). On the other hand, it seems just as plausible that Rhodes utilized Stratonikeia's familiar administrative structures and lack of a tradition of freedom to manage the surrounding communities, thus influencing or even bringing about the growth of the settlement. A happy, if uncertain, compromise between these options is possible if we make a distinction between the *koina* of the plain (Stratonikeia's "logical" *chôra*) and communities farther afield, who likely remained outside Stratonikeia's ambition until after 167.¹⁴⁶ Yet is there anything besides probability to support this conjecture?

Our evidence for an arrangement between Stratonikeia and Panamara, a *koinon* of settlements centered on the sanctuary of Zeus Karios, comes mainly from two inscriptions honoring the Stratonikeian Leon son of Chrysaor son of Zoilos son of Polyperchon.

X. Cousin 1904, 350–51; *IStratonikeia* 7 (Şahin 1981, 6–8 = van Bremen 2004, Appendix).

Cf. Holleaux 1904, 361–63; Oppermann 1924, 24–31; Robert 1945, 37; van Bremen 2004.

Found: Sanctuary of Zeus Panamara

Currently: Unknown

Description and Dimensions Unavailable

- [πα]ρασκευὰς ... Α ..
 []Ε συμμέτρων αἵ[ς] συντε-
 [ψή]φισμα ἀποδοὺς καὶ παραθεῖς ἕκ τε [τ]ῶ[ν]
 4 [ἱστοριῶ]ν καὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων γραμμάτων καὶ συστήσα[με-]
 [νος τὰς ἄν]ωθεν τιμὰς καὶ ἀσυλίας ὑπαρχούσας τῷ Διῷ
 καὶ Παναμαρεῦσιν ἔπεισεν τὸν σύνπαντα δῆμον εἰς [τὸ]
 τὰς θυσίας ἐπιφανέστερας καὶ μείζονας συντελεῖν, ἐ-
 8 πελθὼν τε ἐπὶ τινὰς δῆμους ἔπεισε καὶ ἐκείνους συνθύ-
 εῖν, καθόλου τε ἔσπευδεν ὑπὲρ τε τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τοῦ κοινοῦ
 τοῦ Παναμαρέων, οὔτε κίνδυνον οὔτε δαπάνην οὔτε [κα-]
 [κοπ]αθίαν οὐδεμίαν ὑφορώμενος· ὅπως οὖν καὶ Παναμα-
 12 ρεῖς φαίνονται τοῖς καλοῖς καὶ ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσιν τὰς
 καταξίας χάριτας ἀποδιδόντες· δεδόχθαι τῷ κοινῷ·
 ἐπληρῆσθαι Λέοντα Χρυσάρορ τοῦ Ζωίλου τοῦ Πολυπέρ-
 χοντος καὶ στεφανῶσαι αὐτὸν χρυσῷ στεφάνῳ ἀρετῆς
 16 ἕνεκεν καὶ εὐσεβείας, εἶναι δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ ἐκγόνοις πολιτεί-
 αν καὶ μετουσίαν πάντων ὧν καὶ Παναμαρεῖς μετέχουσιν,
 στήσαι δὲ αὐτοῦ καὶ εἰκόνα χαλκῇ ἐν ᾧ ἂν αὐτὸς βούλη-
 ται τόπῳ, καὶ ἐπιγράψαι ἐπιγραφὴν τήνδε· τὸ κοινὸν
 20 τὸ Παναμαρέων ἐτίμησεν ἱερατεύσαντα Λέοντα
 Χρυσάορορ τοῦ Ζωίλου τοῦ Πολυπέρχοντος ἐπαίνῳ, χρ[υ-]
 σῷ στεφάνῳ, εἰκόνι χαλκῇ ἀρετῆς ἕνεκεν καὶ εὐσε-
 βείας· ἀναγράψαι δὲ *vac.* {δὲ} τόδε τὸ ψήφισμα εἰς
 24 στήλην λιθίνην καὶ ἀναθεῖναι ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ τοῦ Δι-
 ὸς τοῦ Καρίου ἐν τῷ ἐπιφανεστάτῳ τόπῳ, τὸ δὲ τέ-
 λεσμα τὸ εἰς τὰ προγεγραμμένα ὑπαρχέτω ἐξ ἐπαγγελίας·
 ὅπως δὲ καὶ ὁ σύνπας δῆμος ἐπὶ γινῶι τὰ δεδογμένα τῷ[ι]
 28 κοινῷ τῷ Παναμαρέων, ἐλέσθαι ἄνδρα· ὁ δὲ αἰρεθεὶς ἀ-
 ποδότω τόδε τὸ ψήφισμα καὶ ἐπελθὼν ἐπὶ τε τὴν βουλὴν
 καὶ τὸν δῆμον διαλεγέτω ὑπὲρ τῶν δεδογμένων
 τῷ κοινῷ. Ἡρέθη *vac.* Καλλιμήδης Πολυάρχου

The text is that of Şahin, except where noted. L. 4: restoration from Opperman; ἐπιστολῶ]ν, van Bremen. –L. 4–5: restoration from Robert; συστήσα|[ς, Cousin. L. 5: ΤΩΙΑΗ restored as τῷ δῆ[μῳ, Cousin; τῷ Διί, Oppermann.

Translation (see also van Bremen 2004):

returning the decree and providing accompanying evidence from [inquiries] and the old records and establishing the above-mentioned honors and rights of

asylia that pertain to Zeus and the Panamareis, he persuaded the collective *dêmos* to perform better and more conspicuous sacrifices, and he went to certain *dêmoi* and persuaded even them to participate in the sacrifices, and he strove in every way on behalf of the god and the *koinon* of Panamareis, not shrinking from risk nor expense nor any personal loss; therefore, so that the Panamareis also appear to give back worthy rewards to noble men, the *koinon* has decided:

- To crown Leon son of Chrysaor son of Zoilos son of Polyperchon and to crown him with a gold crown on account of his excellence and piety.
- That he and his descendants have citizenship and a share in everything in which the Panamareis have a share, and to set up a bronze statue of him wherever he wants, and to inscribe the following:

The *koinon* of Panamareis honored Leon son of Chrysaor son of Zoilos son of Polyperchon while he was priest with praise, a gold crown, and a bronze statue on account of his excellence and piety.

- To record this decree on a stone stele and set it up in the temple of Zeus Karios in the most conspicuous spot, and let there be payment for what has been written above from a promised contribution.
- So that the collective *dêmos* may recognize the decisions of the *koinon* of Panamareis, to choose a man, and let the one chosen produce this decree and go before the council and *dêmos*, proclaiming it on behalf of the *koinon*'s decisions. Kallimedes son of Polyarchos was chosen.

Commentary:

5Δι: Opperman's correction of Cousin's δή[μωι]. This correction is troubling if the eta read by Cousin, as well as the spacing after it, is as clear as his drawing indicates, but until the verification of autopsy or a photograph, I prefer the better sense of the god's name.

In this text, the Panamareis lavish Leon with praise, citizenship, a crown, and a statue for his conspicuous service as priest of Zeus Karios. Among his pious deeds, he persuaded both the collective *dêmos* (τὸν σύνπαντα δῆμον, l. 6) and certain *dêmoi* (τινας δῆμους, l. 8) to participate in the sanctuaries' sacrifices. The other honorific, voted by the city of Kallipolis, identifies Leon as a Stratonikeian (*IStratonikeia* 1401). We can infer, then, from the Panamarean decree that Leon is

not a foreigner in Panamara: although a Stratonikeian, he is not identified as such (similar to the citizenship grants by Olymos to Mylaseans, for which see above). In addition, he holds the priesthood of Panamara, yet not as a Panamarean, since he can be given citizenship by the *koinon*. Finally, the context surrounding the phrase σύνπας δῆμος implies that Panamara belongs to it. From these facts the following situation can be reconstructed: Stratonikeia formed a *sympoliteia* with Panamara, the terms of which included the ability of the city to appoint one of its citizens access to the priesthood of Panamara, while the *koinon* of Panamara was able to preserve its physical and political community as a unit of the larger Stratonikeian state. The date of this *sympoliteia* is usually placed after 167, the *terminus post quem* suggested by the freedom from Rhodes implied by the inscription and confirmed by several decrees honoring Rhodians from the early second century (*IStratonikeia* 5, 6, 8, 9). For a *terminus ante quem*, two late second-century decrees from Stratonikeia using *Panamareus* as a territorial identifier have been found (*IStratonikeia* 227, 615). A more precise date of 150-48 can perhaps be derived from the amphora handles dated by Finkielsztejn, for a third decree honoring Leon in his capacity as priest at Panamara, discussed below, is dated by the Rhodian eponymous priesthood of Eudamos.¹⁴⁷

As persuasive as this scenario is, a number of problems still need to be resolved. First of all, who are the “certain *demoi*” that Leon also persuaded to join in the sacrifices? Debord assumed that the collective *dêmos* is Stratonikeia, from which it would follow that these *demoi* are other independent communities (villages, cities, or *koina*) that had an interest in a prominent Karian sanctuary.¹⁴⁸ Yet in a later article, Debord develops the idea that *sympas dêmos* and *tines demoi* must be related, and thus that the latter communities were members of the former entity. Accordingly, he suggests that the collective is the *koinon* of Karians, revitalized, he imagines, in the wake of freedom from Rhodes by our very own Leon, and that this federation was centered on the cult at Panamara.¹⁴⁹ A lack of evidence, however, for the subsequent existence, or failure, of such a movement toward federation, as well as the attestation of the term *sympas dêmos* in other non-federal contexts, should make us cautious of adopting such an intriguing proposal.¹⁵⁰ Another problem presents itself: if Stratonikeia and Panamara are now one political unit, why give Leon *politeia*? This can be answered by the simple supposition that the arrangement between the two communities created unity in terms of sovereign politics, but preserved a subunit of local political administration under the sole control of the smaller partner, which could only be accessed by original Stratonikeians as a privilege gained from Panamara.¹⁵¹ Perhaps in exchange for this right, the Panamareans allowed

Stratonikeians the right to serve as priest. Whether such an arrangement is unique in the history of *sympoliteia* is impossible to determine from the evidence available.

A more problematic obstacle to our suggested Stratonikeia-Panamara *sympoliteia* is yet a third honorific for Leon, by the *koinon* of Laodikeis (*IStratonikeia* 1402). Again, a community honors him for his services as priest *en Panamarois*, but whereas Leon is identified by the autonomous *polis* of Kallipolis with the adjective *Stratonikeus*, and the lack of this qualifier in *IStratonikeia* 7 is taken to indicate the political unification of Stratonikeia and Panamara, the *Laodikeis* also fail to call Leon a Stratonikeian. This suggests either that a community could fail to identify a foreigner by his ethnic, or that Laodikeia was yet another community in the Stratonikeian state.¹⁵² Unfortunately, this inscription is our sole evidence for the *koinon* of the Laodikeis. Without entangling myself in the uncertainties of identifying this community,¹⁵³ I wish to merely point out that whatever the status and relationship of the *koinon* to Stratonikeia, the omission of *Stratonikeus* by a non-*polis* settlement could be just that: an omission by a community not as entrenched in the epigraphic habits of the day.¹⁵⁴ The same argument could not apply to the decree from Panamara, since the Panamareans granted Leon citizenship and thus would have been more likely to identify the latter's homeland if this was entirely distinct from the issuing polity (in favor of this argument also speaks the fact that the inscription was only to be set up in Panamara, not in Stratonikeia). Furthermore, our inference of *sympoliteia* comes less from the lack of *Stratonikeus* in the decree from Panamara than from the fact that Leon was appointed to the priesthood by Stratonikeia, as well as from the later certainty of Panamara's inclusion within Stratonikeia by the early second century.¹⁵⁵

If, then, Stratonikeia absorbed Panamara through an arrangement of *sympoliteia* at some point during the last two decades of the second century—yet the latter community was still able to function with some level of autonomy—this may provide insight into the nature of Stratonikeia's expansion in general. The key to this reconstruction is Rhodes and its relationship with the communities of the Peraia. The incorporated Peraia contained at least 4 *koina*, and a number of other *koina* is known to have been controlled by the island state at one point or another. From this, might we see the term *koina* as functioning not only as a descriptor for a non-*polis*, and perhaps indigenous, settlement, but as a term specific to Rhodian-held lands that involved autonomous communities? Perhaps the term was used as an ideological means to justify the Rhodian Empire while maintaining a commitment to Greek freedom. In other words, a *koinon* was a community without the right to freedom, and thus could be

subjugated without the dominant party appearing to violate an important “international” value. A connection between the political terminology of Rhodes and areas (once) under its control has been recently demonstrated by Schuler in Lykia and the area around Stratonikeia for the terms *dêmachos* and *peripolion*, and Wiemer in the same volume has convincingly argued that the term *koinon*, attested in over 20 communities in and around Rhodian controlled territory, is to be linked to this island’s method of ruling.¹⁵⁶ The flip side of (and probable inspiration for) this phenomenon is the use of the term *polis* by a number of Karian communities in the late fourth century, no doubt attempting to include themselves in the privileges enjoyed by Greek *poleis* that eventually led to the famous declarations of freedom promulgated by Antigonos Monophthalmos and then Ptolemy I.¹⁵⁷ Many of these communities later styled themselves *koina*, in some cases possibly after falling under the sway of a more powerful neighbor.¹⁵⁸ All this evidence suggests that Rhodes created or made use of an embedded terminology that contrasted the status and rights of *poleis* and *koina* in order to legitimate its control of the Peraia.¹⁵⁹

It would come as no surprise, then, if Stratonikeia, once itself under the dominion of Rhodes, came to use the same language to express its relationship with the neighbors at whose expense it began to expand.¹⁶⁰ As we have already noted, three of Stratonikeia’s demotics were fourth-century *poleis*. Rhodian influence on Stratonikeia’s expansion becomes even more likely due to the possibility that Rhodes controlled the city *from* Panamara via an *epistates*.¹⁶¹ If this inference is valid, then we have striking evidence for administrative links between Panamara and Stratonikeia introduced by Rhodes and perhaps paving the way for a future *sympoliteia*. Did this Rhodian official exercise authority over the sanctuary and thus provide a parallel for the future access to the priesthood at Panamara for Stratonikeians?

All these considerations make a discussion of motives rather complicated. One aim that seems to be separate from any interpretive choice regarding the issues presented above is Stratonikeian control of the sanctuary of Zeus Panamaros. As with Labraunda and Mylasa, and Plarasa and Aphrodisias below, the influence of such an important sanctuary extended beyond the political boundaries of its *koinon* or of the city that controlled it. Yet I would argue that that this influence created opportunities for prestige and even power not so much for Stratonikeia as a whole, but only insofar as a citizen could identify with an elite like Leon, for he alone directly enjoyed all the rights, privileges, and elevated status that pertained to the priesthood at Panamara. In other words, control of the sanctuary took concrete form only through the involvement of the Stratonikeian elite, unless Leon’s

family was able to monopolize the office. Leon's status is unquestionable: his wealth was the *sine qua non* of the deeds for which he was honored, and such behavior no doubt created, or perpetuated, the expectation that future holders of the office would act likewise.¹⁶² Control of the sanctuary by the Stratonikeian state, then, was mediated entirely through one individual, and in the official language, both within and outside of the *polis* territory, his actions are understood entirely in terms of the interests of Panamara only. Whether this was the case or not—that is, whether or not Leon acted also in the interests of the Stratonikeian *dêmos*, either by command or tacit assumption—the attraction of the priesthood, and hence the *sympoliteia* with Panamara, existed primarily for a small subset of Stratonikeia.

If the *sympoliteia* was also an effect of Stratonikeia's drive to expand, we should consider the city's potential desire to achieve a dominant position in the Chrysaoric League, in conjunction with the absorption of Koaraza and perhaps other communities in the same century. As Strabo informs us (14.2.25), the city was able to control this *systema* by the first century BC on account of the number of *kômai* in its territory. However, linking results with motivation smells of teleology. Just because Stratonikeia eventually achieved a leading position in the league does not mean that this was its intention in the early and mid-second century. For this to have any likelihood, some evidence suggesting the internal dynamics of the Chrysaoric League before Strabo's period is necessary. Unfortunately, this body only presents itself as an entity (the *koinon* of the *Chrysaoreis*) consisting of *poleis* in the Hellenistic Period, preventing any insight into the internal workings of the league. Furthermore, if Stratonikeia's control of the league was a function of its position within the Roman empire—that is, the league and Stratonikeia's position within it became tools of imperial administration—then it would be a mistake to assume continuity between this situation and any period before the Aristonikeian War, and probably before Sulla's Asia Minor campaign. That matters had changed with the imposition of Roman rule is suggested both by Strabo's use of the term *systema* rather than *koinon*, and by the fact that prominent members of the Hellenistic league—Mylasa and Alabanda, for example—do not seem to play a role in Strabo's *systema*, although he by no means fails to discuss these communities with regard to other matters.¹⁶³

The motives of the Panamareans likely related to their own *koinon*'s position bordering on or within Rhodian-controlled territory. Although Rhodes had been forced in 167 to relinquish Karia, the sanctuary-community was close enough to lands “traditionally” part of the subject Peraia that its complete autonomy may not have been a

certainty; or, if it did participate in the region-wide freedom granted by the Romans, perhaps it became a target for the reassertion of Rhodian control when Rome had turned its eye to more pressing matters. Either way, a *sympoliteia* with Stratonikeia would have allowed the members of the *koinon* to participate in a free and autonomous city-state as full-fledged citizens, rather than enduring a dependent status with no access to the sovereign assembly in Rhodes. Hostility toward the island is clear from an early second-century inscription from which the name of the Rhodian *epistates* has been erased.¹⁶⁴ Although the assumption is that this defacement occurred in or just after 167, it is just as probable that the Panamareans gave vent to their disgust once they joined Stratonikeia.

KERAMOS AND (RHODES?)

It should be clear from our treatment of Stratonikeia above that a second-century merger with Keramos is impossible on purely geographical grounds. The city's lines of communication to the south through Rhodian-held territory and, after 167 BC, presumably to independent communities like Pisye-Pladasa, before arriving at the territory of Keramos. To the west of Stratonikeia ran the road to Mylasa, and while we are ignorant of many of the communities in these mountainous areas, we can affirm that any turn to the south from this road before reaching Mylasa would have taken one into the territory of Hydisos, and doubtless several other communities, before reaching the coast. Keramos itself dominated the alluvial plain on the southern coast of Karia that is entirely enclosed by mountains (Marçal Dağ) rising up two kilometers distant. It was also one of the few cities in Karia deliberately settled on the coast as a port town.¹⁶⁵ Its nearest known neighbors were Pladasa to the east, Hydisos to the north,¹⁶⁶ and Ouranion to the west, the latter being both the closest community and the least separated by natural (i.e., mountainous) barriers, especially if it overlooked the western edge of the alluvial plain.¹⁶⁷ Survey work has revealed several settlements located in the interval between Keramos and Hydisos, including the site of Sekköy that has yielded several important inscriptions; whether these were independent communities or village extensions of a larger polity is impossible to determine from the current state of our evidence.¹⁶⁸ Finally, directly south of Keramos, across the Ceramic Gulf, lay the Rhodian Peraia.

The evidence for a *sympoliteia* involving the city of Keramos comes from a decree to honor an individual, presumably one of its citizens, for a number of services rendered:

20 [βευτῶ]ν ἐνδόξως εἰς τὸ μήτε κατὰ κοινὸν μήτε [κ]ατ' ἰδίαν μηθὲν[α αὐτῶι
 ἔχειν
 [ἀντιστ]ῆναι, πολλὰς καὶ ψευδεῖς κατηγορίας ποιησαμένων τινῶν, ἀξίως δι-]
 [αλεξάμεν]ος τῶν ἐξαποστειλάντων σὺν [
 [ἄ]λλὰ καὶ πεπολιτευμένους ἐν Α[
 24 δ]ιὰ παντὸς ὑπάρχειν [

Text is that of Michel, except where indicated. L. 3: ὑφορώμενος, περὶ πλείστου δὲ ποιούμ[εν]ος, Hicks, Şahin, yet based on Paton's facsimile, the three letters dotted by Michel are uncertain. –L. 12: καὶ] scripsi.

Translation:

he lives pleasantly(?), he offered himself eagerly and desirously [in the] most [urgent] times, taking thought of neither danger nor misfortune, but valuing fame among the most noble; and during the time of the *sympoliteia* he continuously did and said everything on behalf of what was beneficial, producing the strongest proofs of his own goodwill to the entire multitude and in private he affectionately behaved toward those of the citizens who came to him concerning the matters about which they had to make a decision; and after these things, during the difficult establishment of the existing constitution, not being surprised at the ever more steadfast persistence of some, he attempted to increase his goodwill to the multitude wisely and truly in everything that he said and did. Wherefore, in accordance with what is best for one to attain, he happened to share the same circumstances as the *dêmos*, and when invited by the citizens he nobly consented to face events, putting all his own affairs second to the good of the community, [and] he shrank from none of those contending with the citizens for honor and fame, [and when] the *dêmos* judged the alliance between it and the Rhodians to be most urgent, he was chosen as ambassador and offered himself zealously, and carefully applying himself for a long time with his fellow envoys he disposed the Rhodians to make the alliance, on account of which not only has the security for the citizens resulted for all time, but also for those inhabiting the city and surrounding country; and again, when sent as an envoy to the Herakleians, he delivered a reputable defense [with his fellow envoys], so that no one could oppose him either publicly or in private, though [some] made many false accusations, [and he spoke worthily] of those sent out [as fellow envoys] . . . but having been a citizen in . . . through everything to be.

Commentary:

1Hicks could not see the ΑΛΟ of καλο[on Paton's copy.

2ἡδυπαθεῖ: Hicks reads this word as “probable” if suggested “but faintly” by the squeeze.

9καταστάσει: Can also be translated “restored.” Unfortunately, the context is not decisive: while this “establishment” comes after the “time of the *sympoliteia*,” one would also expect an adjective such

as προῦπαρχοντος if the *politeuma* instituted had pre-existed the *sympoliteia*, not the forward-looking γενομένου.

12καί]: It is clear that the text's lines are not of the same length—that is, that the last letters of each line do not align—since lines where we know there are no letters missing (ll. 6–8) are shorter than, for instance, line 3. Nonetheless, as restored, lines 11–15 are exceptionally short and we should not rule out the possibility that more words should be restored here, and possibly elsewhere as well. To that end, I have added a conjunction at the end of this line, which also improves the grammatical sense of the long sentence.

Recent scholarship has focused on tying the date of this inscription to the ever-shifting political situation in Karia from the late third-century to the mid-second century, under the assumption, nowhere earnestly disputed, that Stratonikeia is the unnamed participant in the *sympoliteia*. Hicks, followed by Robert, favors a date shortly after 167, when Rome removed Karia from Rhodian rule, thus freeing Stratonikeia to pursue its own foreign policy for the first time. I argue below that there is little to support the supposition that Stratonikeia was in fact Keramos' partner in the *sympoliteia*, but an early- second-century date is still compatible with the significant involvement of the Rhodians, the presence of Herakleia, and the “Polybian” language of the above-quoted decree.¹⁶⁹

Within this window, however, it becomes more difficult to support a more specific date following Karia's liberation from Rhodes against alternatives. Reger points out that the alliance with Rhodes mentioned in the inscription is incompatible with the anti-Rhodian sentiment that he assumes to have infected all of Karia prior to liberation, animus inferred by the revolt of Kaunos and Rhodes' intervention in the war between Euromos and the Mylasean-Alabandan alliance prior to liberation (Polyb. 30.5.11-15). In an initial publication on the arrangement, he suggests a mid- to late third-century date, thus before the (reconstructed) re-granting of Stratonikeia to Rhodes by Antiochus III. This would make sense of the events following the *sympoliteia* as mentioned in the inscription: a new constitution (one presumably re-establishing full sovereignty) and a need for an alliance with Rhodes. According to Reger, then, Keramos was worried about its status in the face of Stratonikeia's absorption by Rhodes, due to the fact that it was in a sense part of Stratonikeia when the latter became part of the Peraia.¹⁷⁰ However, several problems result from this reconstruction, apart from the probability that Keramos was not within Stratonikeia's sphere of influence until the first century (see below). First, Reger—and everyone before him—speaks of Stratonikeia as the larger

member of the *sympoliteia*, but is this a justified assumption?¹⁷¹ The Macedonian foundation does not seem to have ranked on the same level as the independent *poleis* of Asia Minor, since it was given to another Greek state—as opposed to a Hellenistic monarch, where inclusion within an empire and autonomous existence were not mutually exclusive. A parallel for this can be found in the grant by Philip V to Magnesia on the Maeander of Myous (Polyb. 16.24). As we have seen, Myous was by 200 BC a second-rate *polis* (cf. Strabo’s use of *polichnion* to describe Keramos in the Augustan age), and only participated in a *sympoliteia* as a lesser partner. Yet unlike Myous, Stratonikeia was a royal foundation, and thus part of the Seleukid empire from its inception rather than as a formerly independent city. To consider Stratonikeia as involved in a *sympoliteia* so early would seem on the one hand anachronistic, since later it did absorb Keramos and other cities, and on the other a misunderstanding of the colony’s relationship with its neighboring villages (see above). The absorption of a nearby village *koinon*, while possibly taking the form of a *sympoliteia*, was to some extent a reinterpretation of the relationship between *komê* and cult/administrative center that had prevailed before the Hellenistic period, that is, a mapping onto the Karian political landscape of Greek political form and function (the *polis* serving as central settlement).¹⁷² By contrast, uniting with another city required contiguous borders, and (if the larger partner) status as a “major *polis*,” something Stratonikeia did not possess given its relationship to the Seleukid Empire and the Rhodian state.¹⁷³ As we have seen, the topography of the region shows that the major route from Keramos to Stratonikeia went first *northwest* to Mylasa before turning east, while the road directly east was not a major route and had to go through several autonomous territories, including that of Pisye-Pladasa, before reaching the Macedonian colony.¹⁷⁴ Thus, it would seem highly unlikely that Keramos would, or even could choose to unify politically with Stratonikeia and become, in sense, politically bound to the Seleukid Empire, and even less probable that it was the lesser partner in such a hypothetical arrangement. On the other hand, Keramos’ prominence, and therefore its insusceptibility to Stratonikeian ambitions, in the third and second centuries is suggested by its relationship with Knidos, as well as its relations with a city as important and far away as Ephesos.¹⁷⁵

There are further reasons for questioning an association between Keramos and Stratonikeia in the early second century. Both Hicks and Robert inferred this association from two later references to the dependence of Keramos on the Seleukid foundation: the *senatus consultum* of 81 BC, which ratified Sulla’s grant of Keramos to Stratonikeia; and Strabo’s description of Keramos as part of the

Stratonikeia-dominated Chrysaoric League.¹⁷⁶ In the end, however, neither text justifies a retroactive application of this dependent relationship into the past. To treat Sulla's assignment of Keramos to Stratonikeia first, one would expect the mention of a restoration of lost territory or a claim to previous possession of Keramos somewhere in the lengthy inscription if Keramos was once part of Stratonikeia; instead, the Senate simply gives the order for Stratonikeia "to have" Keramos (ἐχειν, l. 58). The missing sections of the text are too small to accommodate a reference to a previous possession of Keramos, and if the restoration in line 57 of προσόρτισεν is correct, then it is much more probable that an augmentation of territory is here intended. It is this augmentation, then, that likely gave rise to the dynamics of the Chrysaoric League described by Strabo. Given the reasons enumerated above against seeing Stratonikeia as the unnamed partner, the aftermath of the Mithridatic Wars was probably the first time that Keramos found itself under the authority of Stratonikeia.

To better understand the circumstances of Keramos' *sympoliteia*, we need to reconsider Keramos' relationship with the Rhodians. The four men from Keramos honored by Ephesos were living in Rhodes (διατρίβοντες ἐν Ῥόδῳ, *IEphesos* 15, l. 4) when they benefited the Ephesians. Other Hellenistic inscriptions, unfortunately without precise dates, attest to citizens of Keramos on the island, and examples of Rhodians in Keramos abound.¹⁷⁷ While much of this evidence may be attributed to the period of Rhodian dominion over Karia, the Ephesian decree does not, and it seems that either Keramos was on rather intimate terms with Rhodes, or was controlled by the island even before it controlled the entire region from 188–167 BC. The assumption that Keramos was included in Seleukos' initial grant of Stratonikeia to Rhodes in 237 BC, and thus in the repeat gift by Antiochus III in 197, fails for the same reasons that eliminate Stratonikeia as a candidate for the *sympoliteia*, as well as because Keramos was probably never part of the Seleukid empire.¹⁷⁸ Seleukid influence in Karia was restricted to the hinterland and the western coast, while the settlements on the southern coastline were either Ptolemaic (like Halikarnassos and Kaunos), Rhodian (the Peraia), or independent (for which, see [chapter 1](#)). Finally, Spanu's observation that Keramos provided the closest harbor to Stratonikeia is true according to a measuring tape, but overlooks the mountains that made the major route to the sea the road southwest toward Idyma and the Rhodian Peraia, with a branch to Pladasa.¹⁷⁹ Thus, more suitable access to Rhodes' inland acquisition already existed.¹⁸⁰ It seems probable that Keramos entered Rhodes' sphere of influence at some point in the second half of the third century, but when and on what terms remains unclear.

What is certain is that the relationship between the two cities appeared to be a good one. The Kerameans in Rhodes were thriving enough to do Ephesos a service, and Keramos sought an alliance with Rhodes, presumably either before 188 or after 167. In light of this, I would like to suggest that Keramo-Rhodian relations were even more tightly knit before the alliance, and that the unnamed partner of the *sympoliteia* referred to in *IKeramos* 6 was in fact Rhodes. One can imagine a scenario in which, in the face of Rhodian expansion of its subject Peraia, Keramos foresaw the need to broker some sort of deal with the larger power and initiated the favorable arrangement of a *sympoliteia*, whereby it could preserve its identity but enjoy more privileges (in particular, citizenship in Rhodes itself) than the dependent communities of Rhodes. That Keramo-Rhodian relations were not of the same nature as those between the island and the Peraia communities (or Stratonikeia) is suggested by the activity of its citizens in Rhodes in relation to Ephesos, as well as its ability to make an alliance with Rhodes after the *sympoliteia* had ended. Of course, the Kerameans citizens could simply have been of metic status, but why bother to mention their residence? Conversely, if Keramos was just Rhodian territory, why bother to include the origin of these men unless both residence (in Rhodes) and origin (from Keramos) were somehow important? Kerameans origin and Rhodian residence are only pertinent if the individuals in question had some special status (*proxenia*, *politeia*) in Rhodes. While these men could have obtained either of these privileges via individual grants (which would imply an independent Keramos), they could also have attained *politeia* through a *sympoliteia* between their city and Rhodes.


This scenario has several advantages to recommend it. First of all, it accounts for the events following the *sympoliteia* in *IKeramos* 6. We can see this arrangement ending due to the incursions of Philip V in 201, when Rhodes lost the Peraia. Doubtless Keramos also fell under Philip's control and either repudiated or was forced to end the *sympoliteia* and adopt another (its former?) constitution. Yet Rhodes was not absent from the Peraia for long, retaking much of its mainland possessions by 198 (see [chapter 1](#)). This back-and-forth warfare perhaps finds echoes in words like δυσχερεῖ and ἀν[αγκαιο]τάτοις, as well as in the implication that the events suffered by the honoree and the Kerameans *dêmos* were not peaceful. In the face of a second, much more rapid, expansion by Rhodes, Keramos would have every reason to want, and perhaps need, an alliance.¹⁸¹ That the *sympoliteia* was not renewed could have been due a number of factors, including preference for the new constitution, the difficulties involved in “revolution,” or even Rhodian unwillingness to re-grant such a privilege to a recalcitrant city. A Rhodes-Keramos

sympoliteia also provides a single explanation for the presence of Kerameans in Rhodes and Rhodians in Keramos, while allowing for Keramos to be the “lesser” partner, as has been assumed by scholars linking the city with Stratonikeia. Finally, this interpretation possesses a certain flexibility, in that it can fit just as well chronologically into a later period, namely the end of Rhodian dominance. Accordingly, Keramos would have negotiated a *sympoliteia* as an alternative to direct rule from 188 to 167. Freedom would have brought about the difficult establishment or restoration of the constitution, which would have led, either through internal *stasis* or external conflict, to the chaos of freedom (usually associated with Stratonikeia, though, as we have seen, on tenuous grounds), which the Kerameans would have sought to alleviate through an alliance with Rhodes, with whom they, perhaps uniquely of Karian cities, had maintained good relations even during the period of Rhodian domination, due to the *sympoliteia*.

Nevertheless, proposing Rhodes as a candidate for the unnamed partner is not without its problems. If Keramos and Rhodes were now one single political entity, why did the Ephesians not simply call them Rhodian? This obstacle is overcome either by preferring a second-century date for the *sympoliteia* or by recalling that the preservation of identity was important in other *sympoliteiai* (see especially Pisye/Pladasa and Plarasa/Aphrodisias below). Another objection points to the lack of precedent: why would Rhodes treat one community in southern Karia differently from the rest? Since Keramos was a larger community than its neighbors—Strabo attests (14.2.25) to the city’s control of more villages than other members of the Chrysaoric League—Rhodes may have found it easier to go the route of a *sympoliteia*, thereby avoiding the need for military action and promoting involvement in the island’s civic life of only Kerameans well enough off to travel to and set up shop in Rhodes.

Granted, it is not impossible that the unnamed partner in *IKeramos* 6 was a smaller community bordering Keramos. Ouranion is one such possibility: the discovery of Ouranion decrees near the harbor city could be explained by a political merger between the two communities.¹⁸² Pladasa is also a candidate, if the reference to the “Pisytans and the Pladaseans with them” implies that there were other Pladaseans who existed outside of this larger community (see below). Even Knidos is a possibility, given the statement in Pomponius Trogus. In these scenarios, Keramos would be the larger partner—another testament to the prominence of the city before the first century BC. In this case, a date could still be linked to the Rhodian alliance, which, in addition to being possible in the wake of Rhodes’ reconquest of the Peraia in 198 or after the island’s loss of Karia in 167, could have occurred in the late half of the third century or even

when Karia was a Rhodian province (i.e., Keramos negotiated a favorable position *vis-à-vis* Rhodes as an alternative to direct rule, thus explaining the urgency of said alliance). Nonetheless, these suppositions seem to me less preferable given the evidence that directly links Rhodes and Keramos in the Hellenistic Period.



Map 2.5 Highlands of Southern Karia. Source: Tina Ross Archaeological Illustrations.

PISYE AND PLADASA

As was the case with Robert's description of Latmos/Herakleia, my visit to "les hautes terres" of Karia—the highland region of southern Karia east of Keramos, west of Kaunos, and north of the Chersonese—did little to alter the clear impression given by Brun's account of the sites and environs of Pisyë and Pladasa.¹⁸³ The plain controlled by Pisyë is the second largest in the region and the most fertile, producing wheat, millet, tobacco, legumes, and, unlike the more elevated neighboring areas, olives. Although surrounded by mountains on all sides, the plain is connected to the outside world in three directions, thus making it a local crossroads today. By far the easiest route is that which leads north to Mobolla (modern Muğla), or more accurately, to the road connecting Mobolla to Stratonikeia. Also connecting Pisyë to the latter city was a less accessible western route

past modern Tınaz. This western route also eventually led south toward Pladasa, but Pisye was primarily connected with its eventual partner by the direct souther route, which led to the plain of Yerkesik “sans beacoup de difficultés” and then along the Kocaçay valley to Pladasa.¹⁸⁴ As for Pladasa itself, the city seems to have been situated inland on the Hayıtlı plateau, which was oriented to face southeast toward its harbor at Akbük. External communications, as has been mentioned, were mainly directed to the northeast, most immediately toward the site of Sarnıç, and more distantly, to Yerkesik and Muğla. A lesser route led west to Keramos as well.

The above description may make it seem unlikely, on geographical grounds that a *sympoliteia* would have occurred between the two cities, between whom a considerable distance and not untroublesome terrain intervened. Yet from *HTC* #1 and the intense surveying of the region, Debord et al. have shown that Pisye’s control of the *koina* of the Leukodeis, Londeis, and Koloneis is probably to be associated with the inhabitable areas to the west and south of the city (modern Çırpı, Çiftlik, and, more tentatively, Yeniköy).¹⁸⁵ At the same time, the case for Pladasa’s *chôra* consisting not only of the Hayıtlı plateau and Akbük but also the surrounding villages, including Sarnıç, is convincing. Thus, while precision is impossible, it is all but indubitable that Pisye and Pladasa were in fact contiguous, making possible the merger between the important inland crossroads and the significant harbor town.¹⁸⁶

The union of Pisye and Pladasa is an interesting case in that the Pisyetans never appear alone in the decrees they publish, but as individuals are always described without reference to Pladasa by the outside world. Our earliest documentation is a decree by “the multitude (*ple]thos*) of Pisyetans and the Pladase[ans with them]” which indicates an autonomous community in the mid-third century. I give this as well as the other epigraphical references to this joint community:

XII. *HTC* nos. 1, 3–5, 37.

A. *HTC* #1 (Bresson et al. 2001, 95–105); Varınlıoğlu 1997, 297–307.

Found: Arslanlı, in the masonry of a stairway.

Currently: town square of Yesilyurt.

Description: Gray marble stele, inscribed on front and left side. Upper left part survives, broken on the right and at bottom.

Dimensions: H .60m × W .36m × D .13m

[ο]ἶδε[]
 ἐπαγγειλάμενοι τ[ῶ]ι δήμῳ[] εἰς τὴν]
 [τῶ]ν νεωρίων κατασκευὴν Δ[] καὶ βουλόμενοι φανεράν]
 4 ποιεῖν ἣν ἔχουσιν αἵρεσιν εἰς ++[] καὶ τὸ πλῆ-]
 θος τὸ Πισυητῶν καὶ Πλαδασέ[ων τῶν μετὰ Πισυητῶν ἔδωκαν]
 χρήματα δωρεάν· ν.
 κτλ.

The text is the first 6 lines of Face A of Bresson et al. The rest of Face A and all of Faces B, C, and D are lists of names and contribution amounts. L. 1: οἶδε, Varinlioğlu. –L. 2-3: ἐπαγγειλαμέν[ων] καὶ ΔΗΜΩ[--- λιμένων|κ]αὶ, Varinlioğlu. –L. 3: εἰς T, Varinlioğlu.

Translation:

promising to the people . . . [for the] equipping of the dockyards . . . [and wishing] to make [clear] their will that they have toward [. . . and the *ple*]thos of the Pisyetans and the Pladaseans [with them, they gave] as a gift the following sums: (there follows a long list—lines 7–35 on face A, lines 2–38 on face B survive—of names and contributions)

B. HTC #3 (Bresson et al. 2001, 106–7).

Found: Arslanlı

Currently: town square of Yesilyurt

Description: White marble base with core.

Dimensions: H .25m × W .78m × D .78m

τὸ κοινὸν τὸ Πισυη[τῶν καὶ Πλα]δασέων τῶν [μετὰ]
 ν. Πισ[υ]η[τ]ῶν ἔθαψε[ν δημοσίαι] Ἀρτεμίδωρον
 Μενίππου τοῦ Ἡρακλε[ίδου Κελιμ]αρή, ἀνδρὰ ἀγαθόν,
 4 [εὐνοία]ς ἔν[εκα εἰς α]ὔ[τόν].

Text is that of Bresson et al., restorations based on comparison with *ibid.*, #10.

Translation:

The community of the Pisyetans and the [Plad]aseans [with] them buried [at public expense] Artemidoros son of Menippos son of Herakleides, of the *koinon* (?) of [Kelim]ara, a good man, on account

of his [good will toward it].

Commentary: 14 men from Kelimara are recorded as making contributions in *HTC* 1. Debord & Varinlioglu conclude that this *koinon* was one of the two main *koina* of Pisye, located near the city, possibly to the south.

C. *HTC* #4 (Bresson et al. 2001, 108–10); Benndorf 1892, *AAWW* 29: 63–64 (van Gelder 1896, *Mnemosyne* 24: 193–94; *idem* 1900, *Geschichte der alten Rhodier*, 443); *IRhod. Peraia* 751 (Blümel 1991, 166–67).

Cf. Meyer 1925, 57; Robert 1937, 563 n. 3.

Found: under remains of Ionic temple at Arslanlı

Currently: Izmir Museum

Description: Base with core for circular altar and moldings.

Dimensions: H .30m × W .80m × .D 80m

[τ]ὸ κοινὸν τὸ Πισυητῶν καὶ Πλαδα[σσε-]
[ω]ν τῶν μετὰ Πισυητ[ῶ]ν καὶ τὸ κοινὸν τὸ Ταρμ[ια-]
[ν]ῶν ἐτείμησε καὶ ἐστεφάνωσε χρυσέῳ στεφά-
4 νῳ καὶ ἔθαψεν δημοσίᾳ ταφῇ Μόσχον Ἀντιπ[ά-]
[τ]ρου τοῦ Μόσχου Ῥόδιον ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα καὶ εὐ-
νοίας, ἣν ἔχων δειτέλει εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τὸ Ταρμ[ι-]
[α]νῶν καὶ εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τὸ Πισυητῶν καὶ Πλα-
8 δασσέων τῶν μετὰ Πισυητῶν.

The text is that of Bresson et al., based on a squeeze and facsimile from Vienna. L. 1–2: Πλαδ[ασσέ|ω]ν, Benndorf. –L. 2–3: [Ταρμια|ν]ῶν, Benndorf. –L. 5–6: ε[ὐ]|νοίας, Benndorf. –L. 6–7: Ταρμ[ι|α]νῶν, Benndorf. L. 7–8: Πλ[α]|δασσέων, Benndorf.

Translation:

The community of Pisyetans and Pladasseans with them and the community of Tarmianes honored and crowned with a golden crown and buried with a public funeral Moschos son of Antipatros son of Moschos, a Rhodian, on account of his excellence and the goodwill he continually had for the community of Tarmianes and toward the community of Pisyetans and Pladasseans with them.

Commentary: The *taphê dêmosia* involved not only post mortem honors (like a golden crown) but probably burial in the public sector of the city (Bresson et al., 109f.), a supposition supported by the find spot of the inscription in Pisye.

D. *HTC* #5 (Bresson et al. 2001, 110–11)

Found: Arslanlı

Currently: Muğla Museum

Description: Marble base with core for circular altar.

Dimensions: H .25m × W .67m × D .67m

τ[ὸ] κοινὸν τὸ Πισυητῶν καὶ
Πλαδασσέων ἔθαψε δημοσί-
α Ἀντιοχίδα Θευδώρου Ῥοδίαν.

Text is that of Bresson et al.

Translation:

The community of Pisyetans and Pladasseans buried at public expense
Antiochis daughter of Theodoros, a Rhodian.

E. *HTC* #37 (Bresson et al. 2001, 144–45)

Found: Yeşilyurt

Currently: Muğla Museum

Description: Gray marble base, broken in two joining fragments,
ornamented above the text with a garland of leaves.

Dimensions: H .55m × W .34m × D .25m




Figure 2.7 Top Half (Lines 1–10) of Inscription XII.E. *Source:* Photo by Jeremy LaBuff.

- τὸ κοινὸν τὸ Πυσυτῶν (*sic*)
καὶ Πλαδασέων τῶν
μετὰ Πυσυητῶν (*sic*) ἔ[θ]α-
4 ψεν δημοσίᾳ Διοκλῆν
Ἀριστάρχου Ῥόδιον
γενόμενον ἐν παν-
τὶ ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν ν.
8 καὶ Ἄρτεμις Μενίππου
Λευκοιδίς ὑπὲρ τοῦ
υἱοῦ καὶ Ἀριστάρχος
καὶ Διοκλῆς Διοκλέ-
12 ους Ῥόδιοι ὑπὲρ τοῦ<ς>
πατρὸς μνήας ἔνεκεν.

Text is that of Bresson et al., except where indicated. L. 1: Πυσυτῶν, Bresson et al. My photograph and autopsy show a small at the top of the line next to the *sigma* but no damage below that would mask an *iota*. –L. 1, 3: (*sic*) scripsi.

Translation:


The community of Pysyteans and Pladaseans with the Pysyteans buried at public expense Diokles son of Aristarchos, a Rhodian who was in every way a good man. Both Artemis daughter of Menippos, a Leukoidean, on behalf of her son and Aristarchos and Diokles sons of Diokles, Rhodians, on behalf of their father (set this up?) as a memorial.

Commentary: The fascinating use of two variant spellings for the Pisyetans only two lines apart is a clear example of iotacism (cf. Bresson et al., 145).

The combination of Pisyte and Pladasa (or a section of Pladasa) likely occurred some time during the early to mid-third century, since Pladasa appears in the late fourth century as an independent and *kyria* polis in its decrees (*HTC* nos. 47, 48). That we are dealing here with a *sympoliteia* rather than some other form of combination (*synoikismos* or conquest) is strongly suggested by the fact that the names of both communities are used when mentioning the polity for over 300 years of documentation.¹⁸⁷ This contrasts with the subordinate *koina* that we know comprised Pisyte. In a decree listing the contributions made by the various subunits of Pisyte-Pladasa for the construction of dockyards, eight communities besides Pladasa are named, half of which are identified as *koina* in other inscriptions.¹⁸⁸ Although Pladasa clearly enjoyed a privileged position relative to these other settlements, it still appears to have been the “lesser” partner, not only because the Pisyetans are always named first, but also because the Pladaseans are, with one exception, described as “with the Pisyetans.” This language denotes Pisyte as the locus of the political union, even if it also qualifies a particular group of Pladaseans (rather than all members of the formerly independent Pladasa, for which see below).¹⁸⁹

All other decrees issued by this polity, which date from the second century BC to the first century AD, use the label *koinon*.¹⁹⁰ The change in appellation from *plêthos* to *koinon* could indicate a change in status in relation to Rhodes (see above). Although the damaged state of *HTC* #1 makes it impossible to determine what other party, if any, was involved in the construction of the dockyards—the *dêmos* of Rhodes, King Ptolemy, or King Seleukos/Antiochos all can be restored in the lacuna of line 4—we need not imagine this involvement (even if by Rhodes) as necessarily one of direct mandate or even of a military nature.¹⁹¹ Other scenarios, such as allied compliance or trade-promoting benefaction, are just as likely. In any case, we know that by the end of the third-century Pisyte had passed under Rhodian control, as we learn from *IG* XII 1036, which describes how its general Nikagoras “recovered” the territory of Pisyte by 197 from Philip V, implying that the island possessed this community prior to the

Macedonian king's incursions.¹⁹² Gabrielsen objects to this inference mainly on the basis that ἀνακτησάμενος could mean “to win back for another.” Yet this argument not only fails to provide reasons why a Hellenistic Rhodian would understand this tertiary sense of the word over its more common meaning, but it also overlooks the fact that the inscription lacks crucial aspects that are present in all the instances that Gabrielsen cites for his preferred translation (which are all, strangely enough, from Diodoros). In all three passages (Diod. 11.79.6, 13.96.1-2, and 16.14.2), the groups for which the commander in question has recovered the object in question (τὰς πόλεις or τὴν ἐλευθερίαν) are specifically named in the dative (the Dorieis, the Syracusans, and the cities of the Thessalians, respectively).¹⁹³ In the Nikagoras inscription, by contrast, no dative of reference is used, and instead we find the Rhodian general planting garrisons in the conquered territory.



Map 2.6 Plarasa and Aphrodisias. *Source:* Tina Ross Archaeological Illustrations.

The context for the *sympoliteia* is more difficult to determine. The financial difficulties of Pladasa mentioned in *HTC* #48 have led scholars to imagine a nearly bankrupt state seeking union with the neighboring Pisyetans. Some postulate from the partition implied by “the Pladaseans with the Pisyetans” that something like a *stasis* occurred, whereby one segment of Pladasa joined with Pisyte, while the other either remained a separate community or combined with another neighbor, such as Keramos.¹⁹⁴ Reger suggests that Pisyte’s motives were to gain a harbor—hence the privileged status of Pladasa

in comparison with the other communities known to have been absorbed by Pisye.¹⁹⁵ It may not be going too far to see a desire to access networks of economic and social capital behind the arrangement, at least from the Pisyetans' point of view. On the other hand, if indeed the Pladaseans were led by financial difficulties to join with Pisye, perhaps they were motivated by the hope that a union would allow them better access to the richer agricultural resources of their inland neighbors. A parallel for the attractiveness of this area to settlers is the (presumably later) settlement by Rhodian individuals.¹⁹⁶ Thus, the interests of both communities may have been complementary in this instance.

PLARASA AND APHRODISIAS

The most easterly of the communities under consideration, both Aphrodisias and Plarasa were located far from the heartland of Karia, closer to Phrygian towns such as Hierapolis, Laodikeia, and Colossae, or to Tabai, than the Karian cities discussed above. The area also seems to have maintained close cultural and linguistic connections with Lydia.¹⁹⁷ The main road in the area ran from the Meander Valley to Tabai; thus, communication with western or southern Karia was only indirect.¹⁹⁸ Aphrodisias controlled the fertile valley of the Morsynos (Dandalos) River, with Plarasa located in a neighboring valley 14 km as the crow flies to the southwest and separated by a small mountain chain (thus modern routes are over twice as long). Both valleys ran at a southeast-northwest axis, with routes leading to the northwest being the most accessible, though the Morsynos also connected Aphrodisias to the southeast. Ignorant as we are of any smaller intervening communities, we can at least say that Aphrodisias' communication was oriented toward Antioch on the Meander and Herakleia on the Salbake, while Plarasa may have had a route to Harpasa as well. Although the intervening mountains certainly formed a barrier between the two communities, this was clearly not enough of an obstacle to allow for close ties that must have been a precondition to the *sympoliteia*. The initial results of the survey currently being done in the region suggest that, at first, Plarasa was the largest town in the area, while Aphrodisias was a small sanctuary settlement.¹⁹⁹

We now know that a *polis* community existed during the period of Rhodian rule in the area of Aphrodisias. Whether this was Aphrodisias itself, Plarasa, or the combination of the two that is later attested, is not clear from the fragmentary inscriptions recently discovered.²⁰⁰ Like the union of Pisye and Pladasa, our main evidence for the joint state of Plarasa and Aphrodisias comes from several coin issues and

inscriptions mentioning the *demoi* or *koinon* of Plaraseans and Aphrodisians, the earliest of which I provide here.²⁰¹

XIII. Reynolds 1982 #1

Cf. Robert 1977, 76; Reynolds 1985.

Found: re-used in the north parodos of the theatre of Aphrodisias

Currently: in Aphrodisias dig house, inventory number 69

Description: Marble altar molded at top and bottom of the front face, both moldings badly damaged, the face chipped all along the right edge and approximately in the center of the left.

Dimensions: H .55m × W 1.09m × D .44m

- Διὰ Φιλίῳ καὶ Ὀμονοίῳ κα[ῖ]
Θεᾷ Ῥώμῃ οἱ δῆμοι ὁ τε [?ν.]
Πλαρασέων καὶ Ἀφροδι[τ-]
έων καὶ ὁ Κιβυράτων καὶ ὁ Τα-
5 βηνῶν ποιησάμενοι καὶ ὄρκα[α]
καθ' ἱερῶν νεοκαύτων καὶ σφ[ά-]
[για] ὑπὲρ τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους φ[ύσ-]
[ει] ἰσχυμαχίας καὶ ὁμονοίας
[αἰ]ωνίου καὶ ἀδελφότητος κα[ῖ]
10 [ὑ]πὲρ τοῦ μηθὲν ὑ<π>εναντίον
[π]ράξειν μήτε Ῥωμαίοις μήτ[ε]
αὐτοῖς καὶ μήτε τινὰ γράψαι, μ[ή-]
τε εἰπεῖν, μήτε εἰσαγγεῖλαι, μ[ή-]
τε ἀναγράψαι κατὰ τῶν ἐν τοῖς
15 ὄρκοις ἀναγεγραμμένων [?ν.ν.]
τὸν δὲ πράξαντά τι κατὰ τοῦτ[ων]
ἐξώλη εἶναι, καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ γε[νε-]
άν, καὶ ἔνοχον εἶναι θανάτῳ, καὶ [εὐ-]
θύνεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ βουλομέν[ου]
20 καὶ κατὰ τὰς κοινὰς συνθήκ[ας],
ἀγαθὰ δὲ ἀλλήλοις ὅσα ἂν δ[ύ-]
νατον ἢ συνπράξειν ἀπροφασί[σ-]
τως καὶ τὰ συνωμολογημένα τη[ρ-]
[ή]σειν

Text is that of Reynolds, except where indicated. L. 2: οἱ τε, Reynolds.

–L. 7-8: φ[ύσ|ει], Robert.

Translation (adapted from Reynolds 1982):

To Zeus Philios, Homonoia, and Dea Roma; the *dēmoi* of Plaraseans and Aphrodiseans and the (*dēmos*) of the Kibyrians and the (*dēmos*) of the Tabenians take oaths over sacred, newly-burnt offerings and make blood-offerings for their natural alliance, eternal *homonoia* and brotherhood with each other; and in order that they shall take no action in opposition either to the Romans or to themselves, and that no one shall draft, advocate, introduce a proposal or record anything contrary to what has been written in the oaths; and that anyone who does anything in contravention of these shall be utterly destroyed, himself and his family, and that he be liable to death and open to prosecution by anyone who wishes and in accordance with their common agreements, and that they shall jointly promote each other's advantage in every possible way, unreservedly; and that they shall observe what has been agreed.

Commentary:

- 1Neither Zeus Philios nor Homonoia are attested in any other treaty-oaths; their particular selection here seems to emphasize “the family relationship between the contracting powers.” (Reynolds 1982, 7f.)
- 2ὁ τε: Reynolds gives οἱ τε, but autopsy and both her photograph and mine unambiguously show the absence of an iota on an undamaged surface.
- 7, 9φύσει, ἀδελφότητος: The latter term explains the former and both words suggest blood relationship between the communities. Reynolds notes (10) the legend that the brothers Kibyras and Marsyas founded Kibyra and Tabai (Steph. Byz., s.v. “Kibyra”), though no tradition is known linking Plarasa/Aphrodisias to them.
- 10–11Cf. the treaty between Pharnaces of Pontos and Khersonnesos in 179 BC enjoining the citizens to protect their friendship with Rome and to do μηδὲν ἐναντίον αὐτοῖς (*IOSPE*² I.402)



Figure 2.8 End of lines 1–4 of Inscription XIII. *Source:* Photo by Jeremy LaBuff.

During the first century BC, the community played an active role in Rome’s assertion of power over Asia Minor, militarily assisting the legions against Mithridates and maintaining communication with Octavian and the Senate.²⁰² From the documents attesting to this activity, it can also be inferred that the polity possessed *archontes*, a *boule*, an assembly, a common civic center (Aphrodisias), and a united *chôra*.²⁰³ However, the most relevant inscription for our purposes is the treaty between the Plaraseans and Aphrodisians, on the one hand, and the separate states of Kibyra and Tabai on the other.²⁰⁴ The lettering of the pact is second century, and the text contains two striking references to Rome: the oath deities are Zeus Philios, Homonoia, and *Thea Roma*, while all three parties pledge to do nothing contrary to the Romans (μηθὲν ὑ<π>εναντίον [π]ράξειν μήτε Ῥωμαίοις μήτ[ε] αὐτοῖς). Assuming that the formation of the *sympoliteia* did not precede the treaty by too many years, the two most likely dates for the event and its recording are the years after 167 BC and the Aristonikeian War, respectively.²⁰⁵ Errington points out that the primary function of a cult for the goddess Roma was an “institutionalisierte Danksagung,” and that Plarasa-Aphrodisias had little to thank Rome for after Apamea, when the Romans placed them under Rhodian domination.²⁰⁶ On the other hand, both the freedom granted to Karians after the Third Macedonian War and the crushing of Aristonikos in ca. 130 BC may have warranted a gesture of gratitude. Errington argues persuasively in favor of the earlier date,

comparing the alliance and the *sympoliteia* (whatever its date relative to the alliance) to Rome's involvement in the territorial expansion of Antiocheia on the Maiandros in the 160s. According to his view, the Romans sought to influence and stabilize "die Gestaltung der nachrhodischen Neuordnung."²⁰⁷ Thus Rome seems to have favored not only inter-state alliances in Karia, but combinations like that between Plarasa and Aphrodisias.

Yet to understand this *sympoliteia* from the top down only would be to ignore the communities involved.²⁰⁸ Rome may have approved of the union, and as the greatest power in the known world would have been seen as deserving of thanks for this approval, but what difference in their eyes would the existence of two separate communities make as opposed to one larger, yet still to them insignificant, polity? The will to combine almost certainly originated in one or both of the communities themselves. Reynolds suggests the need for increased strength, drawing attention to the important office of *stratêgos epi tês chôras* and its implications for the control and security of the community's territory.²⁰⁹ The status of Aphrodisias as the site of an important local sanctuary may offer an additional motive. The order in which the names of the two communities are listed suggests that Plarasa was, initially, the dominant partner. We have seen how Stratonikeia eventually absorbed Panamara, while Mylasa's struggles to control the sanctuary at Labraunda have been copiously studied elsewhere.²¹⁰ Presumably in both cases the goal was an increase in prestige and influence over the foreign communities to whom the sanctuary was important. Perhaps the village (or *polis*) of Plarasa had similar aims in seeking a union with Aphrodisias, which seems to have had little significance beyond that of its sanctuary to Aphrodite until the first century BC.²¹¹

In any case, a potentially unprecedented development occurred in Plarasa-Aphrodisias. The formerly minor partner became the dominant partner, and eventually the sole identity-marker of the arrangement. The explanation for this development comes only indirectly from the importance of the sanctuary of Aphrodite. As we have noted, the polity possessed a civic center, and there is no reason to think that this was ever located anywhere but Aphrodisias, chosen "because of its sanctity . . . perhaps, because they (sc. the Plaraseans and Aphrodiseans) were already accustomed to assemble there for cult purposes."²¹² Yet the very need to choose a civic center, a non-factor in the relations between the dominant cities Stratonikeia and Mylasa and their dependents Panamara and Labraunda, means that neither Aphrodisias nor Plarasa possessed an urban center previously. They were most likely organized as villages (or *koina* of villages).²¹³ The rise of Aphrodisias within the *sympoliteia*, then, is equivalent to the

urbanization of the new polity. In effect, the history of Plarasa-Aphrodisias is the story of becoming a *polis*, the final step being the assumption of a single name by the turn of the millennium.²¹⁴ One could hardly doubt that this process was in large part due to Rome's relationship with the embryonic city; still, it is unlikely that the attainment of *polis* status was in the mind of the Plaraseans, Aphrodisians, or Romans in the mid-second century BC. In fact, the success of the combination may be due to the changing goals of the participants: what began as an attempt to strengthen security or gain local prestige turned into a transformation of identity and status, and hence resulted in prominence on an international scale that both Plaraseans and (original) Aphrodisians could enjoy. The significance of the polity as one centered on Aphrodisias is clear from a mid-first-century decree of the *koinon* of Asia, which requested the participation of two Aphrodisians in an embassy to Rome, but no Plaraseans.²¹⁵

A fairly recent, excellently published decree by Plarasa/Aphrodisias sheds further light on the *sympoliteia* between the two settlements. In the mid-first century BC (or perhaps earlier), the joint community voted posthumous honors to Hermogenes Theodotos.²¹⁶ Although the text does not explicitly name Aphrodisias or Plarasa, the mention of τὸν συνπαντα δῆμον in line 10 strongly weighs in favor of a time in the city's history that maintained a memory of the dual nature of its origins, as per our discussion of this term above.²¹⁷ What is most interesting, however, is the allusion to Hermogenes' ancestors as συνεκτικῶτων τὸν δῆμον (l. 5). This phrase is the earliest known reference to the "founder families" that are mentioned in later inscriptions, mostly of Roman Imperial date. If, as seems likely, this act of founding refers to the *sympoliteia* of the second century, then we have evidence for the prominent role of a certain number of leading families in the merger of Plarasa and Aphrodisias.²¹⁸ Indeed, the language of the decree suggests that these men were entirely responsible for the union.

The legitimacy of this text's claim about the community's leading citizens cannot be reasonably contested. We must, nevertheless, remember that we are dealing with a memory at least two generations (potentially a full century) after the event in question. As such, regardless of the correspondence between fact and remembrance, the account on the stone was constructed amidst the particular social and political environment of the first century BC. By this time, the rise of a class of "notables" in Hellenistic cities, documented by Quass, had become a well-established fact, and may have projected itself into versions of the past in which elites played an influential role without having achieved the level of hereditary political privilege that we witness at the end of the Hellenistic period.²¹⁹ Thus, to label the

group of men, among whom was counted Hermogenes' ancestor(s?), with the phrase "fellow founders of the *dêmos*" does not prove that the second-century *sympoliteia* was the exclusive feat of the leading citizens of Aphrodisias and Plarasa, but that their prominent role was remembered as the most important detail of the city's incipient past.

This prominent role is still a significant testimony regarding the combination of Plarasa and Aphrodisias, supporting as it does the hypothesis that a city's elite often had a hand in, and therefore a particular interest in, the choice to combine with another city. What this interest was may have coincided with the more general concerns over territorial security that Reynolds supposes (see above), but it is also possible to imagine more specific motives for the leading men of Plarasa. Based on the parallel mentioned above with the *sympoliteiai* of Stratonikeia and Panamara (as well as the relationship between Mylasa and Labraunda and Olymos), that is, a larger city looking to capitalize on the prestige and influence of a prominent if sparsely populated sanctuary, the Plarasean elite may have sought to bolster their "credentials," so to speak, in the eyes of their peers throughout the region. Bound as one's identity was, regardless of wealth, to hearth and homeland, adding the important Aphrodite sanctuary not only to their territory, but also to their community's name would have certainly drawn more recognition for individuals from a town unattested before the second century. Perhaps this explains the choice of Aphrodisias as the locus for the urban center of the joint community, as well as the anomalous displacement of the dominant Plarasa by Aphrodisias at the end of the first century. It may also shed light on why no Plaraseans, but only Aphrodisean individuals appear in the historical record: inhabitants of Plarasa seem to have assumed an "Aphrodisean" identity abroad, where the distinction between Plarasa and Aphrodisias, and the preservation of local identity it implied, was less relevant.

I have been referring to the combination of Plarasa and Aphrodisias as a *sympoliteia*, despite the fact that this term is nowhere attested for the union. Errington prefers to call it a *synoikismos*. However, several reasons favor my choice. First, the Romans call the joint community a *politeia* (A&R 3). This term is rarely, if ever, used to describe a foreign polity and may indicate an attempt to distinguish Plarasa/Aphrodisias from less equitable *sympoliteiai*. Since the identity of each community was preserved even on stone, unlike the onomastic absorption of the lesser partner in other bilateral unions in Karia (with the exception of Pisyse/Pladasa), the Romans may have opted for an alternate descriptor. Secondly, our first mention of Plarasa/Aphrodisias, the second-century alliance text, refers to the polity as *dêmoi*, suggesting simultaneously the ideas of joint-ness and separation. Although one

political entity, both communities within it remained governmental subunits with local administrative structures, as is confirmed by the appearance of the *dêmos* of Aphrodisias alone in *A&R* 8 (see above).

KOS AND KALYMNA²²⁰

The union between these two island states is interesting not only for the term used to describe the merger, *homopoliteia*, but also because it involves two noncontiguous (albeit still neighboring) Greek states. Although the agreement itself has not survived, an inscription bearing the oath to uphold the arrangement is extant:

XIV. Herzog 1942, #2; Segre 1944-45, 9–10.

Cf. Klaffenbach 1953, “Review of Segre 1944–1945,” *Gnomon* 25: 455–58; Sherwin-White 1978, 124–29; Gauthier 1996, 47; Habicht 2007, 140; Walser 2009, 149.

Found: baths of Asklepios on Kos

Currently: Kos Museum depot

Description: White marble stele, broken away at bottom

Dimensions: H .57m × W .56.5-.59m × D .115m-.12m

Στασίλας Λυκόφρονος εἶπε· ἐλέσθαι ὀρκωτὰς δύο ἐξ ἐκάστας
φυλᾶς, οἵτινες ὀρκιζεῦντι τοὺς πολίτας ἐν ταῖς ἀγοραῖς
πρὸ τῶν ἀρχείων, καὶ γραμματῇ ἐς ἐκάσταμ φυλὴν καὶ τὸν
ὑπαγορεύοντα τὸν ὄρκον· ἐλέσθαι δὲ καὶ εἰς Κάλυμναν ἓνα
5 ἐξ ἐκάστας φυλᾶς καὶ γραμματῇ τούτοις· ὀρκιζόντων δὲ
τούτοις εἴ καὶ ὁ στραταγὸς ὁ ἀποσταλεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ δάμου

- ποτιτάσσει· τοὶ δὲ πωληταὶ μισθωσάντων ἤδη διζὰ ὄρκω-
 μόσια παρασχεῖν τοῖς πολίταις αὐτεῖ τε καὶ εἰς Κάλυ-
 μναν· τὰ δὲ ὄρκωμόσια ἔστω ταῦρος κάπρος κριός, τέλεα
- 10 πάντα· τοὶ δὲ πωλῖται(*sic*) πάντες ἡβαδὸν ὀμνύνοντω, πρᾶτοι
 τοὶ προστάται καὶ τοὶ στραταγοί· τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ὅσσοι μὲν
 ᾧδε, ἐπιδαμεῦντι, ποτὶ τοὺς ὄρκωτάς τοὺς αἰρεθέντας
 ᾧδε, τοὶ δὲ λοιποὶ ποτὶ τοὺς εἰς Κάλυμναν ἀποστελλομέ-
 νους· ὀρκιζόντω δὲ τοὶ ἄνδρες τὸν ὄρκον τόνδε· ἐμμενῶ
- 15 τᾷ καθεστακυῖαι δαμοκρατίαι καὶ τᾷ ἀποκαταστάσει
 τᾷς ὁμοπολιτείας καὶ τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς ἐγὼ Κῶν πατρίοις
 ὑπάρχουσι καὶ τοῖς δ' ἔγμοις τᾷς ἐκκλησίας καὶ ταῖς δια-
 γραφαῖς ταῖς ὑπὲρ τᾷς ὁμοπολιτείας· ἐμμενῶ δὲ καὶ τᾷ
 ποτὶ βασιλῇ Πτολεμαῖον φιλίαι καὶ συμμαχίαι καὶ ταῖς συνθή-
- 20 καὶς ταῖς ποτὶ τοὺς συμμάχους τῷ δάμῳ κεκυρωμέναις·
 ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ οὐδὲ τύραννον οὐδὲ ἄλλο πολίτευμα ἔξω δαμο-
 κρατίας οὐ καταστασῶ παρευρέσει οὐδεμιᾷ οὐδ' εἴ τις καὶ ἄλλος
 καθιστᾷ, ἐπιτραψῶ, ἀλλὰ κωλυσῶ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, οὐδὲ τῶν
 φρουρίων οὐθέν οὐδὲ ἄκραν καταλαψεῦμαι οὔτε αὐτὸς ἐξί
- 25 διαζόμενος οὔτε ἄλλῳ συνεργῶν παρευρέσει οὐδεμιᾷ
 οὐδὲ τὰ γὰρ Κῶιαν ἐλάσσω γινομένην περιοψεῦμαι, ἀλλ' αὐξήσῶ
 κατὰ δύναμιν τὴν αὐτοῦ· ἐσσεῦμαι δὲ καὶ δικαστὰς δίκαιος
 καὶ πολίτας ἴσος χειροτονῶν καὶ ψαφίζόμενος ἄνευ χάριτος
 ὃ καὶ μοι δοκῇ συμφέρον ἦμεν τῷ δάμῳ· ἀλαθῇ ταῦτα ναὶ τὸν
- 30 Δία καὶ τὴν Ἥραν καὶ τὸν Ποτειδᾶ· εὐορκεῦντι μέμ μοι εὖ
 ἦμεν, ἐπιορκεῦντι δὲ τὰ ἐναντία. τοὶ δὲ ὄρκω[ταὶ ὀρκιζόντω]
 παραχρῆμα ἱερῶν ἐν τᾷ ἐκκλη[σίαι] καιομένοις κατὰ τὰ δό-
 ξαντα τᾷ ἐκ[κλησία]ι Δ----- βα-]
σιλευ[ς?

Text is that of Segre except where indicated. L. 31: [ἀναγνόντω], Herzog. –L. 32: ΙΕΡΩΝ corrected to ἱεροῖς Herzog, followed by Segre; [τά τε], Herzog. –L. 33: ἐκ[κλησίαι καὶ τὰμ φιλίαν καὶ συμμαχίαν, ἂμ], Herzog. –L. 34 [Πτολεμαῖος συνέθετο ποτὶ Κῳίους, καὶ τὰς συνθήκας| τὰς ποτὶ τοὺς συμμάχους κτλ.], Herzog.

Translation:

Stasilaus son of Lykophron made the proposal: to choose two *horkotai* from each tribe to swear in the citizens in the *agora* before the magistrates, and a scribe for each tribe and a man to dictate the oath; and to choose also for Kalymna one (*horkotas*) from each tribe and a scribe for them; let them administer the oath wherever the *strategos* sent by the *dêmos* ordains; and let

the *poletai* sell the contract for providing twofold oath victims to the citizens here and in Kalymna; and let the oath victims consist of a bull, a boar, and a ram, all full grown; and let all the citizens who are of age take the oath, first the *prostatai* and the *strategoi*; of the rest let as many as dwell here swear before the oath takers chosen here, but let the rest swear before those sent to Kalymna; and let the men swear this oath:

“I will abide by the established democracy and the restoration of the *homopoliteia* and the ancestral laws that exist in Kos and the decisions of the assembly and the ordinances about the *homopoliteia*; and I will abide also by the friendship and alliance with King Ptolemy and the agreements that the *dêmos* has made with its allies.

–I will not set up an oligarchy or tyranny or any other form of government except a democracy on any pretext, and if another does so, I will not tolerate it, but I will hinder him as much as I can, nor will I assault any of the garrisons or the acropolis, either acting alone or in collaboration with another, on any pretext, nor will I look on if the Koan territory is reduced, but I will increase it as much as I can.

–I will be a just judge and a fair citizen, voting and deciding impartially whatever I deem best for the *dêmos*.

These statements are true by Zeus, Hera, and Poseidon. If I hold to my oath, may I fare well, but if I foreswear, the opposite.”²²¹

Commentary: Lettering end of third century (Klaffenbach, 456).

31–34: I have chosen not to give a translation of these lines, since they rely largely on conjectural restorations and an emendation of the text (see following comment).

33ἱερόϊς: The stone reads ἱερῶν, but Herzog presumably made his correction due to the assumed lack of a preposition or verb to introduce the genitive. However, this assumption in turn relies on his restoration in the previous line.

It is generally agreed that this decree was published at the very end of the third century BC, just after the expulsion of Philip V's forces from the island in 201/200.²²² The text seems to belong to a series of inscriptions, both honorifics and subscription lists, which attest to the local consequences of Philip's Asia Minor campaign and the First Kretan War that had preceded it. For our purposes, these documents reveal the inclusion of Kalymna within the Koan state during both events: a Kalymnian decree honors Lysandros son of Phoinix for his role as a commander in the Koan fleet in the Kretan war and speaks of

the *sympas dêmos* as distinct from the δᾶ[μος] (Syll.³ 567); a Kalymnian war subscription list, dating to 201/200 and found in the temple of Apollo at the Koan deme of Halarsana, includes two of the proposers of the honorific for Lysandros (*Tituli Calymnii* 85); a contemporary Koan subscription list contains five men who are also inscribed on the Kalymnian list (*ICos* 10). From these it is clear that Kalymna was actively and intimately involved in the wars with the Kretans and Philip as part of the Koan *polis*. Accordingly, the text of the *homopoliteia* oath given above, with its mention of a restoration (ἀποκαταστάσις), likely falls around the same time as the subscription lists, when Kalymna re-entered the Koan state after briefly being occupied and liberated by Philip.²²³

On the other hand, the date of the original arrangement between the two island states has proved more elusive, coming no later than the First Kretan War but with no clear *terminus post quem*. Herzog's theory of a late fourth- century/early third-century date has been discounted, since Kalymna made vase dedications in 278 and 250 at Delos and issued its own silver coinage in the same century.²²⁴ Baker and Reger, followed by Bencivenni, favor the Kretan War itself as the cause of the union, but ultimately it must be admitted that no certainty can be achieved, especially since the evidence for Kalymna's third-century independence, not merely chronologically vague, is just as much a testament to our ignorance of the island's history during this period.²²⁵ The desire to link the *homopoliteia* to the First Kretan War, on the other hand, seems motivated by the tendency to construct a narrative that is centered on the Hellenistic kings. The demand that the Koans and Kalymnians both swear to abide by their alliance with Ptolemy, which Bencivenni takes as a clear sign that the agreement originated with the Lagid monarchy, indeed speaks to the importance of Kos' relationship with the Ptolemies and perhaps the role of the king in supporting the agreement.²²⁶ Yet both parties must also swear in the same sentence to abide by the agreements made with Kos' other allies, suggesting that what is at stake here is a transfer of all of Kos' allegiances to the Kalymnians.²²⁷ It is, on the other hand, hard to fathom that the Ptolemies would have been able to impose this merger, when only a few years later they needed Rhodes to ensure that Antiochos III did not deprive them of Kaunos and Halikarnassos.²²⁸ It seems safer to assume that the impetus for the arrangement came from the communities themselves (see below), and to conclude with Sherwin-White that the initial incorporation occurred in "the latter years of the century."²²⁹

The unprecedented term *homopoliteia* to describe the arrangement between Kos and Kalymna merits discussion. Sherwin-White, following Herzog, seeks to draw a distinction between this word and

both *isopoliteia* and *sympoliteia*, since it is neither “a mutual grant . . . between cities” nor “the union of two cities . . . on an equal basis.”²³⁰ Despite her misconstrual of *sympoliteia* as egalitarian, Sherwin-White illuminates a striking ambivalence in the choice of the word *homopoliteia*. On the one hand, the prefix *homo-* implies synonymity with *isopoliteia*, since forms of *homoios* and *isos* are often paired in inscriptions to express the egalitarian status of new citizens.²³¹ At the very least, a sense of cooperation was intended.²³² On the other hand, the language of the oath defines a much more stringent relationship between the two states than mere *isopoliteia*, at least in the manner in which the latter term is normally used, that is, in the context of an alliance between two peer, and still autonomous, states.²³³ This difference is confirmed by the evidence for Kalymna’s dependent status cited above.²³⁴ Yet all things considered, the ambiguity of the term is only problematic if we maintain the complete exclusivity of the categories *isopoliteia* and *sympoliteia*. The line between the two is only clear when dealing with two non-contiguous states. The forms and consequences of the *isopoliteiai* between, for instance, two Kretan states were vastly different than an accord of the same name between Miletos in southwest Asia Minor and Kyzikos on the Bosphorus.²³⁵ The position of Kos (and Kalymna) between what I see as two different but related *isopoliteia* traditions could account for the novel term. In any case, what is certain is that the idea of cooperation implied by *homopoliteia* is entirely compatible with the absorption of Kalymna into the Koan state: as we have seen in numerous instances of *sympoliteia*, the ideal of equality was attained with respect to every admitted citizen (also true for *isopoliteiai*), even if the incorporated community no longer possessed the same status as the larger partner. On the other hand, while the term *sympoliteia* could refer to a situation in which there existed an equal share in the running of the state by two communities, it much more commonly reflected a political merger on less egalitarian terms, as most of the instances in this chapter have demonstrated.²³⁶

What, then, is the significance of *homopoliteia*, if it is just a stand-in for *sympoliteia*? The key to this question appears to lie in the better established tradition of autonomy enjoyed by each participant.²³⁷ This accounts for the fact that the same oath is to be sworn by both communities, in contrast to the oaths sworn in other *sympoliteia* arrangements: Pidasa alone is to swear an oath to confirm its pact with Miletos, and when Smyrna and Magnesia on the Sipylus agreed to merge, each had to swear separate oaths.²³⁸ Every citizen, whether Koan or Kalymnian, had to commit himself to identical responsibilities and concerns. It is this sameness, perhaps, that identified the union of Kos and Kalymna as *homoios* rather than joint but more obviously

unequal incorporations (*sympoliteiai*). That both terms described a relatively similar political reality serves as a healthy reminder that ancient Greeks were not as committed to terminological consistency and uniformity as one might wish.

At the same time, the arrangements for administering the oath make it clear who is the predominant partner. Not only is there a disparity between the officials involved (twice as many *horkotai*, multiple secretaries versus one, and the assignment of a herald to proclaim the oath in Kos only), but a Koan general is to determine where in Kalymna the oath will be sworn, and Koan *poletai* were in charge of selling the contract for oath victims in Kalymna as well. The predominance of Kos becomes more obvious in the text of the oath itself: only Koan laws and territory are to be upheld and protected, and the interests of the Koan *dêmos* are primary. Clearly a *homopoliteia* involved the same ambiguity between equality (on an individual level) and imbalance (between the two communities) as a *sympoliteia*, despite different emphases and modes of expression.

The text of the oath does not provide much information on the details of the *homopoliteia*, but does shed light on a primary concern of the community: the coherence of the state. The language of the oath more specifically addresses potential threats to the arrangement, such as revolution or armed rebellion, than the oath taken by the Pidaseans upon entering the Milesian state, which only uses the imprecise notion of transgression. On the other hand, there is a strong parallel here with the oaths found in the *sympoliteia* of Smyrna and Magnesia by the Sipylos, where citizen harmony with the laws and democracy are stressed.²³⁹ At the same time, the Smyrnan text in particular seems to anticipate problems arising from an unwillingness on the part of the Magnesians to acquiesce to the *sympoliteia*—the latter are not to alter the wording of the agreement, cause faction, or harm the citizens of Smyrna—whereas the actions forbidden by the Koan oath are in a sense both more general and more specific in terms of what they target: more general in that they address almost formulaic concerns (*stasis* and garrison revolt); more specific because most citizens were not capable of these actions—that is, only a select few could even hope through influence and wealth to install a new government (the two specifically mentioned are *oligarchia* and tyranny) or incite a garrison to rebellion. By contrast, the injunction of the Magnesians' oath is centered on the individual: "I will be a harmonious citizen."²⁴⁰ So, while the oaths sworn by the Smyrnans and Magnesians seem to aim at concerns that involve the entire citizen bodies of both communities, the joint oath of Kos and Kalymna is implicitly directed at an elite.²⁴¹

The importance of the prominent members of the two island states

is further suggested by the honorifics and subscription lists mentioned above. Of course, this is in a sense begging the question, since these documents are *ipso facto* about individuals. However, their suggestive potential lies not in their existence, which is better explained by the circumstances of the wars with the Kretans and Philip V, but in that they testify to the integration of certain Kalymnians into key positions in the Koan state. Lysandros was placed in command of a ship in the Koan navy, and five other Kalymnians made contributions to the Koan war effort, despite the fact that Kalymna had a local subscription as well. One can infer two things from this involvement: first, although Kalymna seems to have had charge of its own defense, certain of its citizens were able to participate in the war as Koans as well; consequently, the *homopoliteia*, in its first phase, either existed long enough for this level of integration by wealthy Kalymnians to occur, and thus preceded the outbreak of the Kretan war by at least several years, or the desire of the Kalymnian elite to integrate was an impetus to the union of the two *poleis*. It seems probable that both options are, in fact, right.

These inferences allow the motives for the *homopoliteia* to be discussed. Although it is tempting to explain the combination as a response to the external threats of the First Kretan War (see above), this is unlikely not only because of the capacity for Kalymnians to penetrate to the highest levels of Koan citizenship already in 205, but also because the brief allusion to the initial attack of this war in the honorific for Lysandros makes clear that Kalymna was part of Kos when the attack happened: the Hierapytnians commenced the war against τῶι σύμπαντι δᾶμωι.²⁴² Perhaps some other external danger encouraged one or both communities to seek unification, but without evidence it is impossible to know. On the other hand, the participation of at least six Kalymnians of means in the public life of Kos strongly suggests that the elite of Kalymna were chief actors in the arrangement, either as instigators of an offer to Kos or as supporters of a proposal originating in Kos itself, who clearly benefited from the resources that the leading men of Kalymna possessed. While an independent Kalymna was clearly considered a member of the peer polity network of Greece city-states—making vase dedications at Delos and inviting Knidos to arbitrate a dispute between it and Kos—it also seems to have lacked the same opportunities as its more populated and politically significant neighbor. What these opportunities were is suggested particularly by the activity of five Kalymnians in the Koan subscription list. The voluntarism of their donations is striking, since they could have limited their generosity to the local subscription on their home island. One assumes from this uncompelled liberality that these men aimed at more prestige and sense of belonging within Koan

society; apparently Kos provided better access to the kinds of activities that marked and elevated status throughout the Aegean. This was no doubt in part due to the greater reputation that the city enjoyed as ἰδέσθαι τοῖς καταπλέουσιν ἡδίστη.²⁴³ At the same time, we would do well to notice the clearly privileged position that Kalymna enjoyed within the Koan state. That it was able to preserve its identity into the Imperial period—the *dêmos* of the Kalymnians *begins* at this time to issue decrees—speaks to the privileges that served as a concession to a loss of autonomy that resonated in Kalymna’s main sanctuary to Apollo, where public decrees of the *dêmos* promptly ceased to be set up.²⁴⁴

CONCLUSION

We are now in a position to compare our findings with the conclusions on *sympoliteia* reached by Robert and Reger, as well as with the typology developed by H. Schmitt.²⁴⁵ Our discussion has shown that Schmitt’s distinction between “incorporating” and “identity-preserving” *sympoliteiai* is superficial: smaller communities that were “incorporated,” such as Pidasa and Olymos, to name only two, worked hard to maintain their identity and even their authority over local sanctuaries. Reger has rightly pointed to the eventual suppression of this identity in permanent *sympoliteiai*, but this applies just as much to the “identity-preserving” Plarasa/Aphrodisias, which became simply Aphrodisias by the common era. We have also seen, from the case of Pisyse and Pladasa, that the preservation of the smaller partner’s name was compatible with a clearly dominant partner (in this case, Pisyse). Moreover, a community with a double onomastic can be explained just as easily by other factors: less disparity in size between the two settlements, different aspects of prominence (Plarasa was perhaps larger, while Aphrodisias possessed a prestigious sanctuary), or lack of *polis* status by either community at the inception of the arrangement. In the context of Karia the nature of a *sympoliteia* seems to have been fairly uniform in terms of the power relationship established between the two states. We can, however, draw distinctions in terms of the privileges maintained by the smaller partner. Although many of these communities may have lost the right to grant and possess local citizenship, this was not true in every case.²⁴⁶ Both Olymos and Panamara continued to grant *politeia* to individuals after their incorporation within Mylasa and Stratonikeia, respectively, and Euromos granted something very close to citizenship to a Mylasean as well. In all three of these contexts, the existence of *dêmoi* as sub-*polis* institutions within the larger *sympas dêmos* suggests some sort of

institutional precedent for the persistence of the local identity of the absorbed community.

In terms of motives, most of the suggestions put forth in the scholarship on the 14 cases were both plausible and, in many cases, indisputable factors at play in the drawing up of these agreements. Issues of security and/or expansion (territorial, economic, etc.) were certainly in the minds of the citizens of the larger communities in the context of the back and forth power struggles between the Hellenistic empires that simultaneously jeopardized the safety of the inhabitants of Karia and allowed for the long-term, if unstable, freedom of a number of city-states. The fact that all but one *sympoliteia* occurred around roughly the same period, the politically volatile end of the third century and first half of the second, makes this conclusion even more likely. Most citizens in these towns would have wanted to preserve and augment this freedom (to parrot the language of their decrees). This desire coincided at least in part with the interests of smaller communities, whether *poleis*, *koina*, or mere villages. These smaller settlements would have wished for the same security from external threats, and probably were attracted to the privileged status of their larger neighbors. The opportunity to attain equal rights in these cities would have in certain cases been enviable for all citizens, especially if this also meant the increased protection of their properties. In addition, the sacrifices made in terms of autonomy and identity may not have seemed extremely steep, at least initially. Many, if not all, absorbed communities retained the right to look after local properties, especially the sacred, and to publish decrees as a subgroup of the larger state.

However, a close analysis has alerted us to potential problems of interpretation that can arise when identifying these factors as causes. First, the notion of expansion needs to be considered more closely in relation to the situation of the city to which it is applied. We must avoid the assumption that expansion for its own sake was a sufficient cause for action, and instead uncover as best we can the reasons that made expansion desirable to the specific community in question. While this is not always possible with the available evidence, such investigative persistence was far from unfruitful. For example, Miletos and Iasos looked to improve their access to agricultural, and perhaps demographic, resources by incorporating the fertile territory of Pidasa and Chalketor, respectively. Next, we should refrain from giving *carte blanche* to the idea that the smaller partner was motivated by a desire for greater defensive capacity where contextual support is lacking. We were justified in inferring the Pidaseans' concern for security from the text itself as well as from historical context, but in most of the *sympoliteiai* under study, this concern is absent. Finally, the efforts of

the smaller community to preserve its own identity, though downgraded to sub-*polis* status, merit consideration. Where the evidence is at all plentiful, this seems to be a priority in formulating a *sympoliteia*. For Pidasa, Olymos, Hydai, Euromos, Chalketor, Panamara, Pladasa, et al., inclusion in a larger state did not mean the dissolution of her local structures, either political or religious. Through the preservation of these focal points for identity, these former citizens of the smaller partner would have been able to maintain, at least for a time, associations peculiar to their once autonomous city.

At the same time, there is suggestive evidence in certain cases for an interest in *sympoliteia* that was peculiar to the elites of both communities. On the one hand, by considering the activity of the individuals who feature in each arrangement, either explicitly or by inference, we found the possibility that men of means were among the primary instigators in political unions a strong one. Certain clauses in the agreement between Miletos and Pidasa speak to this, as do the careers of men like Kalymnian Lysandros, commander of a ship in the Koan fleet. The memory of Plarasa/Aphrodisias about its founding moment (i.e., the *sympoliteia*) also merits a place in this discussion. Although this memory is vague and unspecific in articulation, it clearly suggests the prominence of certain leading men in the decision to unite. Quite possibly, Leon son of Aristetas reached the office of *archon* in Mylasa after this city had absorbed Hydai, if he is indeed from this latter community. On the other hand, other *sympoliteiai* reveal an interest on the part of elites of the larger community in the public life of the smaller, at least where a prominent regional sanctuary was involved. This is most clearly inferred from Leon of Stratonikeia, who attained the priesthood of Zeus Panamareus after the *koinon* around this sanctuary was absorbed into his home city, but it is also suggested by the honoring (and desire to be honored) of Mylaseans at Olymos and by the appeal of Aphrodisias to Plaraseans. As suggestive as all this evidence is, a detailed look at the prosopography of the region ([chapter 3](#)) will help to complete the picture.

Finally, the language of networks and access to them, whether in terms of the community as a whole or of the elite within the community, raises questions about urbanization and, insofar as Greek culture was expressed and defined through this, Hellenization. To what extent inhabitants of the smaller partners came to adopt the habits and way of life of *polis* dwellers is undetectable. Some individuals moved to the larger city, but how many and to what social strata they belonged are questions with no definite answer. If the accord between Miletos and Pidasa can be taken as at all

representative, then it appears that some, if not most, inhabitants of the absorbed community remained *in situ*, and thus preserved the same lifestyle as before the *sympoliteia*. This was certainly true in the case of Chalketor, still a venue for self-advertisement during the reign of Hadrian. A gradual shift in population toward the new urban center is possible, but cannot be demonstrated without better and additional survey and excavation work. The problem of Hellenization is even more difficult. The desire to participate in the discourse between Greek *poleis* implies a certain expansion of Hellenic culture, insofar as the community, or its elites, has bought into the value of this culture and seeks to identify with it. Yet was this value understood in terms of its “Greekness” or as something whose worth was independent of any ethno-cultural associations? The propaganda of the Hellenistic kings, which often demanded that a city must be Greek to be “free,” suggests that culture was an important factor in political identity, but also one subject to conscious manipulation. Yet it is important to keep in mind that the identification of a city as “Greek” is almost always an etic categorization in the context of both *sympoliteia* (the agreement between Miletos and Pidasa serving as a notable exception) and interstate interaction more broadly.²⁴⁷ At the same time, the role of indigenous sanctuaries in several *sympoliteiai* raises the possibility that more local forms of identity were also on the minds of the participants in these arrangements. To what extent these sanctuaries represented a specifically Karian identity is, however, a question that lies outside the scope of the present work.

NOTES

1. Bibliography for individual inscriptions will be given below. The best general treatments are Reger, “*Sympoliteiai* in Hellenistic Asia Minor,” Robert, *Villes d’Asie Mineure*, 54–64, and H. Schmitt, “Überlegungen zur Sympolitie,” in *Symposion 1993: Vorträge zur griechischen und hellenistischen Rechtsgeschichte*, ed. G. Thür (Köln: Böhlau, 1994), 35–44.

2. Miletos and Mylasa both exhibited this tendency, for which see the relevant sections in the first two chapters of this work.

3. See esp. L. Robert, “Documents d’Asie Mineure,” *Bulletin de Correspondence Hellénique* 102 (1978): 515.

4. See G. Reger, “Mylasa and its Territory,” in *Hellenistic Karia*, ed. R. van Bremen and J.-M. Caron (Bordeaux: Ausonius, 2010), 43–58. In the case of Labraunda, however, Mylasa’s claim to the sanctuary is phrased, and accepted by both Seleukos II and Philip V, in terms of ancestral possession (τὸ ἱερὸν ὑμέτερον εἶναι ἰδρυθῆν ὑπὸ τῶν προγόνων, l. 22, *Labraunda* 5), suggesting reassertion of control rather than expansion. The uniqueness of Labraunda as a non-community sanctuary controlled by one family—the Mylasean dispute is with the priest Korris, who published decrees as if he were a *polis* (δεδοχθαι τῷ ἱε[ρ]εῖ Κόρριδῷ in l. 3 of *Labraunda* 11)—argues for a distinction between expansion via sanctuary control and

more politically focused absorptions.

5. Ma, *Antiochos III*.

6. The only "exception" is Lykia, though the communities of this region combined as a federation, and much later. However, see now Schuler, "Sympolitien in Lykien und Karien," 394–98 for new evidence that at least some bilateral *sympoliteia* relationships existed in Hellenistic Lykia.

7. Teos-Lebedos and Alexandria Troas (Antigonos); Ephesos/Arisonoe (Lysimachos). For bibliography, see Reger, "*Sympoliteiai* in Hellenistic Asia Minor," 150 nn. 20–24.

8. At least, when the evidence is rich enough to permit such advanced conclusions.

9. Billows, *Antigonos One-Eyed*, 213–15 plausibly suggests that the earthquake of 304/3 (FrGH 239B F24) destroyed much of Lebedos, prompting the *synoikismos*. He also argues for the possibility that the two cities wanted the union, and that "Antigonos was merely helping them achieve their aim."

10. Schmitt, "Überlegungen zur Sympolitie," 35–44.

11. The third type of *sympoliteia*, attested by the single case of Myania-Hypnia in eastern Lokris, preserves the equal political status of each *polis*.

12. This is possibly the case with the *sympoliteia* between Miletos and Myous as well, but the dearth of evidence for this arrangement prevents a fruitful discussion in this direction.

13. It should be noted that much of the geographical description comes from first-hand travels in the region, especially where citation of other scholars is lacking.

14. Robert, "Documents d'Asie Mineure," 504–14.

15. *Ididyma* p. 53. Cf. A. Peschlow-Bindokat, "Zur Gründung der karischen Stadt Latmos," in *Frühes Ionien: Eine Bestandsaufnahme*, ed. J. Cobet et al. (Mainz am Rhein: Philipp von Zabern, 2007), 419f., who describes the walls of the town as seeming to rise out of the granite itself.

16. *Op. cit.* Cf. Wiegand, *Milet* III.1, 1–17. For the third-century inscription, which honors two Kalymnians acting as *epistatai* for an unnamed king, probably a Ptolemy, see SEG 2.536.

17. A. Peschlow, "Die Befestigung von Latmos," *Revue des Études Anciennes* 96 (1994): 155–72; cf. G. Reger, "Karia: A Case Study," in *Regionalism in Hellenistic and Roman Asia Minor*, ed. H. Elton and G. Reger (Bordeaux: Ausonius, 2007), 92–93.

18. J.M. Cook, "Some Sites of the Milesian Territory," *Annual of the British School at Athens* 56 (1961): 90–101; cf. W. Radt, "Pidasa bei Milet," *Istanbuler Mitteilungen* 23–24 (1973–1974): 170–74.

19. For a fuller description, see Michael Wörrle, "Pidasa du Grion et Héraclée du Latmos," *Comptes rendus des séances de l'année. Académie des inscriptions et belles lettres* 4 (2003): 1365–66. See below for the road built between Pidasa and Ioniapolis by the Milesians in the 2nd century. The mention of olive production in *Milet* I.3 149 cements the impression that the Pidaseans worked the numerous olive trees in the elevated regions of their territory in the same way that local Turks do today.

20. Radt, "Pidasa," 171, who says the site takes around two hours on foot to reach from the village at the southern end of the tunnel through difficult terrain.

21. The vagueness of *Milet* I.3 149 regarding the ἱερὰ κτήσεις and θεοί which the Pidaseans are permitted to continue to tend prevents us from determining where such cults were located. One imagines that further survey or excavation of the area would yield more informative results.

22. Reger, "*Sympoliteiai* in Hellenistic Asia Minor," 151, developing the conclusions of W. Blümel, "Vertrag zwischen Latmos und Pidasa," *Epigraphica Anatolica* 29 (1997): 135–42. Wörrle, "Pidasa du Grion," 1372 supposes instead that

Asandros wanted to found a new port city to rival Miletos, which he may not have yet controlled. He thus attributes the conception for the relocation of Latmos to Herakleia, which was only carried out later, to Asandros.

23. J. LaBuff, "The Union of Latmos and Pidasa Reconsidered," *Epigraphica Anatolica* 43 (2010): 116–18. Cf. C. Habicht, *Gottmenschen und griechische Städte* (München: C.H. Beck, 1970), 153–55 and, now, Roberta Fabiani's suggestion that the creation of a fifth tribe in Iasos at some point in between the fourth and third centuries was intended to honor a Hellenistic ruler ("Magistrates and *Phylai* in Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Iasos," in *Hellenistic Karia*, ed. R. van Bremen and J.-M. Carbon (Bordeaux: Ausonius, 2010), 477–80, 482).

24. Reger, "Sympoliteiai in Hellenistic Asia Minor," 151.

25. For housing clauses in *isopoliteia* agreements, see W. Gawantka, *Isopolitie: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen in der griechischen Antike* (München: C.H. Beck, 1975), 59–68.

26. See LaBuff, "Union of Latmos and Pidasa," 118–22 for a full discussion of all three points.

27. 6th c. statues: *IDidyma* 12; embassy to Mylasa and Kindya: *SEG* 40.992.

28. Polyainos 7.23.2, 8.53.4; Pimouguet-Pédarros and Geny, *L'archéologie de la défense*, 264–70, 357–67.

29. Cf. G. te Riele, "Hélisson entre en sympolitie avec Mantinée: Une nouvelle inscription d'Arcadie," *Bulletin de Correspondence Hellénique* 111 (1987): 167–90 for an early 4th c. instance of this opening clause.

30. A. Philippson, *Das südliche Ionien* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1936), 12–14, 19f. T. Wiegand (*Milet* II.2, 1–18) notes a number of springs in the area, but supposes that they could not support more than a modest "Gartenkultur." For the fertility of the Kazıklı peninsula and the evidence for it belonging to Milesian territory, see T. Boulay and A.-M. Pont, *Chalkêtôr en Carie* (Paris: Académie des inscriptions et belles lettres, 2014), 67–70.

31. Miletos controlled the marble quarries along the southern banks of the Latmian gulf.

32. VI.1 . . . *Myunta, quae olim ab aqua est devorata, cuius sacra et suffragium Milesiis Iones attribuerunt.*

33. H. Weber, "Myous. Grabung 1964," *Istanbuler Mitteilungen* 15 (1965): 42ff.

34. *Ibid.*

35. The fuller argument (P. Herrmann, "Neue Urkunden zur Geschichte von Milet im 2. Jahrhundert v. Chr.," *Istanbuler Mitteilungen* 15 (1965): 93f., followed by A. Heller 2006, *Les bêtes des Grecs: conflits et rivalités entre cités d'Asie et de Bithynie à l'époque romaine* (Bordeaux: Ausonius, 2006), 34–36) envisions this transfer of territory from Miletos to Magnesia and back again as a major cause of the war between these two states in the early second century (*Milet* I.3 148). Ruge (*RE* 16.2.1434) suggests that the *sympoliteia* occurred later, and that for most of the third and second centuries, Myous was dependent on Miletos but with limited autonomy; yet the presence of Milesians in Myous (or vice versa, for which, see below) during this "pre-*sympoliteia*" existence guarantees a political merger in the third century.

36. *Milet* I.3 33e and p. 200ff. for the inscription and commentary; cf. Ruge, *RE* 16.2.1430. For the regular ethnic Μυήσιος in all official documents, see L. Robert, *Hellenica* vol. II (Paris: Limoges, 1946), 71. For the later ethnic form, see Pausanias 7.2.11, and Steph. Byz. s.v. *Myous*; cf. Herrmann 1965, 93 n. 65. R. Mazzucchi 2008's argument ("Mileto et la *Sympoliteia* con Miunte," *Studi Ellenistici* 20 (2008): 387–407) that the *sympoliteia* occurred in between 234 and 228 relies entirely on the restoration of Μυο[ουσιων without addressing the problems of this reading that in fact make it impossible. The Myesians were still using the earlier form of the ethnic at the end of the third century (Herrmann, "Neue Urkunden," 91 = *SEG* 36.1047)

and one cannot imagine the Milesians using an alternate spelling, an assumption bolstered by the Milesian use of *Myesia* to describe Myous' territory in the 180s (*Milet* I.3 150, l. 79).

37. Emily Mackil, "Wandering Cities: Alternatives to Catastrophe in the Greek Polis," *American Journal of Archaeology* 108 (2004): 495–97 assumes that Strabo and Pausanias refer to the same event, but given the time span between the two authors and the fact that the word *sympoliteia* (as verb or noun) nowhere else refers to a wholesale population transfer, this interpretation is unlikely.

38. See especially the Milesian argument for control of a piece of territory in a dispute with Herakleia in *Milet* I.3 150, claiming that the land was "of Myesia." The claim that Myous was also involved in the grants of sacred land to Miletos in 279/78 (*Milet* I.3 123) and 196 (*Milet* I.3 148) is based on the fact that the land disputed with Herakleia is also called sacred, but this is to infer too much from a term (sacred) that could apply to a number of different land plots (cf. Ruge *RE* 16.2.1432).

39. *Milet* VI.3 1029. Cf. *Milet* I.3 46; 124. Rehm's original date for Apollodoros' term, 206/205, was revised by W. Günther, "Proxeniedekret aus Myus," in *Rom und der griechische Osten: Festschrift für Hatto H. Schmitt zum 65. Geburtstag*, ed. C. Schubert, K. Brodersen, and U. Huttner (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1995), 88 and n. 15.

40. Herrmann, "Neue Urkunden," 94–101.

41. Herrmann's argument (*op. cit.* 101f.), followed in part by Günther (*Milet* VI.3 p. 24), that the Myesians were merely enacting Milesian policy with regard to the priesthood of the cult to Eumenes, suggesting that the locus of the cult was the one known to have existed in Miletos (rather than being housed at a separate cult site in Myous), is entirely unfounded and ignores both the complete absence of Miletos as an authority in the inscription and the active gestures of the Myesian *dêmos*: public inscription and statue. J. Robert and L. Robert, "Bulletin épigraphique," *Revue des Études Grecques* 79 (1966): #375 assume that the decree is Myesian.

42. *op. cit.*

43. Herrmann dismisses this possibility without argument. P. Gauthier, "Bulletin épigraphique," *Revue des Études Grecques* 102 (1989): #255 speculates that Apollodoros was in fact originally from Magnesia, since a man of the same name and patronymic from the latter city was granted Milesian citizenship (*Milet* VI.3 1060 = *SEG* 38.1200). This possibility, while not impossible and quite tempting, remains chronologically problematic. Günther dates the letter-forms of 1060 to the end of the third century or beginning of the second century "mit älteren und jüngeren Schriftformen." It thus shares certain forms with 1029 (dated to the end of the third century by Herrmann), such as A and some Σ with divergent upper and lower lines, and differs with other forms (some sigmas have parallel horizontal lines). While this above all suggests the ambiguity of dating by letter-form, one cannot help but think the citizenship decree, whatever its precise date, is too late for Apollodoros to have served as stephanephor in 212. Perhaps further comparative analysis can help illuminate this issue, once the Milet Museum reopens.

44. *Contra* Isabelle Pimouguet, "Défense et territoire. L'exemple milésien," *Dialogues d'Histoire Ancienne* 21.1 (1995): 101, who sees Pidasa as "un poste extérieur de défense . . . protégeant les extrémités de l'espace milésien proches d'Héraclée du Latmos et d'Eurômos," without realizing that since it juts out between two stretches of foreign territory, Pidasa brings no defensive advantages to the rest of Milesian territory: Herakleia was closer to Miletos than Pidasa, and Euromos would hardly have been considered a threat.

45. For a treatment of Miletos' specifically military aims in the Hellenistic period, see John Ma, "Fighting poleis of the Hellenistic World," in *War and Violence in*

Ancient Greece, ed. H. Van Wees (London: Duckworth and Classical Press of Wales, 2000), 341, 343, 349–51 *et passim*.

46. Reger, “*Sympoliteiai* in Hellenistic Asia Minor,” 159–60 also stresses the possible role of Milesian underpopulation in the arrangement.

47. A general note on the structure of the agreement, whose order of clauses Rehm accuses of lacking any sense: the text seems to follow a geographical logic, starting with Pidasa (garrison clause, taxes and exemptions, housing for Pidaseans who currently live in Pidasa, clause on sacred and public land/revenues, liturgy exemption), moving to the borders not shared with Miletos (clause for land arbitration, clause for Pidaseans in Euromos), and concluding with Miletos or territory contiguous with it (road from Pidasa to Ioniapolis, Pidaseans in Miletos).

Corrigendum to Rehm’s translation (in VI.1): in his provision 6, the 1% tax goes into effect after five years, not ten.

48. *Milet* I.3 149.10–51.

49. P. Gauthier, “Les Pidaséens entrent en sympolitie avec les Milésiens,” in *Les cités d’Asie mineure occidentale au IIe siècle a.C.*, ed. A. Bresson and R. Descat (Bordeaux: Ausonius, 2001), 117–27; cf. Wörrle, “Inscripfen von Herakleia am Latmos I,” n.92; Reger, *op. cit.*, 156–61. Gauthier, following Wörrle, sees the threat as coming from Herakleia, based on the mention in clause 8 of “restored land” and an earlier grant by the Seleukid general to Herakleia (Wörrle, *op. cit.* = *SEG* 37.859). Yet it is clear from a close examination of the Zeuxis grant it is clear that the Herakleians did not receive land but exemptions from billeting and various taxes (II.15ff.). It is more probable that the Pidaseans received former royal lands (cf. *ibid.*, III.8) and there were individual disputes over who should get what. For fuller discussion of this suggestion, see chapter 3.

50. Note that Pidasa was declared a free Greek city after the Second Macedonian War (Polyb. 18.44.4); however, this was in the context of depriving Philip of his Karian holdings, and we cannot assume that 8 years later the Romans would have remembered or concerned themselves with upholding such a context-specific liberation when rewarding their more significant Rhodian ally.

51. For this last point, see Gauthier, “Les Pidaséens,” 126. Cf. Reger, *op. cit.*, 161. Heller, *La betise des Grecs*, 54–55 connects this concern with a possible threat from Herakleia, who was awarded by Zeuxis ca. 196–193 BC (cf. Wörrle, “Inscripfen von Herakleia I,” *passim*). If this territory was taken from Pidasa, and if it was restored to Pidasa by Rome (and thus is the χώρα ἡ ἀποκαθεσταμένη αὐτοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν στρατηγῶν), then perhaps these are the disputes alluded to in our text as potentially involving a *diakrisis* in need of *ekdikesis*. Beyond the extremely hypothetical nature of the suggestion, I find this argument unconvincing, since there is no mention of Herakleia assenting to Miletos as an arbiter in such dispute. It clearly would not have done so, since Miletos was no longer a third party. The same argument can be made against Wörrle’s suggestion (“Pidasa du Grion,” 1370) that Euromos was the disputant. Rather, the designation of the *dêmos* of Miletos as arbiter suggests that these potential disputes were between members of the Milesian community, most probably between original Milesians and Pidaseans or between individual Pidaseans.

52. For a detailed discussion of the evidence for this, see the relevant section in chapter 3.

53. *Milet* I.3 149, l. 46.

54. It should be noted that Walser, “Sympolitien und Siedlungsentwicklung,” 154–55 makes a similar suggestion, but focuses instead on the appeal of the more impressively urbanized larger partner, who met “den neuen urbanen Lebensstandards” and earned “die Bezeichnung ‘Polis’ auch in den Augen eines kaiserzeitlichen *voyageur* (sc. Pausanias).” This complementary image of the allure of the big city is attractive, but Walser is right to exercise caution given the

preliminary nature of most of the archaeological finds from the settlements involved in *sympoliteiai*. To this I would merely add that the use of Pausanias to retroject a definition of a “true” polis into the minds of Hellenistic Greeks is problematic not only because he is writing in the 2nd c. AD, but especially because his construction of Greece, and thus what is important for his cultured audience to pay attention to, excludes Asia Minor entirely!

55. Heller 2006, *La bêtise des Grecs*, 54 thinks, for example, that the tax exemptions on produce suggest attacks that reduced the productivity of Pidasean agriculture.

56. *Milet* I.3 p. 356f. For further discussion of these links, complete with diagram, see chapter 3.

57. The implications of this, which do not seem to bear directly on the agreement, will be discussed in chapter 3.

58. *Milet* I.3 41, 64, 71, 72, 74a, 75, 77, 79.

59. For the function of *politeia* grants, see Gauthier 1985, *Les cités grecques et leurs bienfaiteurs*, 149–52.

60. Reger, *op. cit.*, 159.

61. M. Piérart, “Athènes et Milet. II. L’organisation du territoire,” *Museum Helveticum* 42 (1985): n. 77 supposes that the Pidaseans sought absorption into Miletos as a result of devastation from war, seeing the tax exemptions, the restoration of land (following Gauthier, *op. cit.*), and the offer of beds as responses to this catastrophe. The only evidence for such devastation, however, is his reading of the verb ἐπισκευάζεται as “repair” in reference to Pidasa’s walls. This meaning can refer to general upkeep (Xen. *Anabasis* 5.3.13) that does not refer to a specific moment of destruction, and given the inscription’s concern with the garrison remaining in Pidasean territory, this seems the best sense in which to take the verb.

62. See below and n. 63 for discussion of the absorption of Labraunda; for Sinuri we unfortunately have no evidence of when expansion in this direction occurred. Cf. G. Reger, “Mylasa and its Territory,” in *Hellenistic Karia*, ed. R. van Bremen and J.-M. Carbon (Bordeaux: Ausonius, 2010), 57.

63. Pierre Debord, *HTC*, 19.

64. Reger, “Mylasa and its Territory,” 46. Given that by the Hellenistic period Bargylia controlled Kindya, I think it within the realm of possibility that it also controlled the southern portion of this vast plain as well, which would have been considerably smaller, however, due to the silting by the Sarı Çay of much of the “Little Sea” of antiquity.

65. Recently, Boulay and Pont, *Chalkêtôr en Carie*, 70–78, have argued that Hydai, whose remains have not been definitively found, is to be located near Olymos, and did not possess access to the “Little Sea.” Their suggestion is attractive for seeing the two communities as sharing a boundary, but in supposing that the plain between the Grión and the Sodra dağ was possibly Iasian, they ignore the need for Hydai to have a cultivable *chôra* and dismiss prematurely the discovery of ruins in this plain by Robert, “Rapport sommaire sur un second voyage en Carie,” 159.

66. G. Cousin, “Voyages en Carie,” *Bulletin de Correspondence Hellenique* 22 (1898): 392.

67. The above description is based on my first-hand travels in the area.

68. W. Blümel, “Ehrendekrete aus Olymos,” *Epigraphica Anatolica* 32 (2000): 98–100, which includes one new text and the republication of *IMylasa* 868 and 872.

69. In Mylasa, *syngeneiai* seem to have been sub-units of the polis that were smaller than its tribes (hence, in terms of size analogous to an Athenian deme or trittys, though it is unclear if tribes consisted of *syngeneiai*). Use of the onomastic form in inscriptions appears to have been optional. For a discussion of why some men identified themselves with their *syngeneia*, while others did not, see chapter 3,

section 2.

70. Reger, “*Sympoliteiai* in Hellenistic Asia Minor,” 164–66. I am, however, hesitant to accept his *terminus post quem* of Mylasa independence, since *sympoliteia*, an act of local politics, seems entirely compatible with the subjection of either or both *poleis* (in whatever form) to an imperial power, for example, Stratonikeia. Furthermore, if he is right about the role of Hellenistic kings in several other *sympoliteiai*, then the *terminus post quem* for the absorption of Olymos cannot be maintained.

71. *Ibid.*, 166–68; see *IMylasa* 869, 870 for Olymean decrees for its own citizens (inferred from the lack of a *politeia* grant, *inter alia*).

72. On the issue of Mylasa’s control of Labraunda, see esp. J. Crampa in *Labraunda, passim*, and more recently, Reger, “Mylasa and its Territory,” 51–53.

73. *Milet* I.3 146.

74. See Reger, “Mylasa and its Territory,” 43–58 for a full discussion of this contested harbor.

75. Bagnall, *Ptolemaic Possessions*, 89–92; Ma, *Antiochos III*, 77, 85, 89, 95, 112, 161, 230, 232, 334–35.

76. See the case of Stratonikeia and Panamara below for a parallel.

77. Reger, “*Sympoliteiai* in Hellenistic Asia Minor,” 167 and n. 82.

78. Boulay and Pont, *op. cit.*, argue that the “sanctuary of Apollo and Artemis” important to both Olymos (*IMylasa* 806) and Hydai (*IMylasa* 902) are not separate temples but one sanctuary common (albeit tensely). This attractive suggestion must remain tentative until the remains of the sanctuary, and thus its location, are known.

79. See discussion in preceding section and Reger, “Mylasa and its Territory,” 46.

80. The above description is based on my first-hand travels in the area.

81. Boulay and Pont, *op. cit.*, 70–80.

82. *HTC* #90.

83. The author was unfortunately unable to locate the stone.

84. *IMylasa* 903. It is also interesting to note the presence in this inscription of a cult to Homonoia. For the use of *koinon*, see below on Stratonikeia and Panamara.

85. Reger, “Mylasa and its Territory,” 54.

86. *IMylasa* 102, 1.4 (see immediately below for a translation of most of the text and commentary).

87. For this road, see *IMylasa* 814.11.

88. That Euromos and Herakleia shared a border is suggested by *IMylasa* 102, quoted and discussed below.

89. The above description is based on my first-hand travels in the area.

90. Blümel’s commentary in *IMylasa*.

91. Reger, “*Sympoliteiai* in Hellenistic Asia Minor,” 168.

92. *SEG* 33.861. This relationship is also the basis for the arguments made by Sheila Ager, *Interstate Arbitrations in the Greek World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), #124 and Heller, *La betîse des Grecs*, 51–54.

93. Robert, “Document d’Asie Mineure,” 578 and nn. 63–65. Ager, *Interstate Arbitrations*, #124 proposes that the arbitration preceded and was the cause of Mylasa’s invasion of Euromos in 167 BC (Polyb. 30.5), a proposition rejected by Heller (see next note).

94. Heller, *La betîse des Grecs*, 53 argues for an earlier date within this range, stressing that chilly relations between Rome and Rhodes from 177 on (when Rome received a delegation of Lykians who had revolted from Rhodes) makes any cooperation between the two powers between 177 and 167 improbable. Yet, while Rhodes was no doubt displeased with Rome’s behavior concerning Lykia, there is no evidence that this caused a shutdown of positive relations; in fact, the very cause of Rhodes’ loss of Karia and Lykia in 167—its attempt to intercede between Rome and

Macedon—assumes that their relationship was still a friendly one.

95. Reger, “*Sympoliteiai* in Hellenistic Asia Minor, 168f., concludes that the *sympoliteia* “excited the hostility of Herakleia”; Blumel in *IMylasa* II, 27 describes “Raub und Plünderung”; cf. Robert, “Documents d’Asie Mineure,” 515–18.

96. Robert, *op. cit.* 516f. The parallels are from Olbia and Kalymna, though of the two examples, one does not even involve specifically sacred equipment.

97. Reger, *op. cit.*, 168f., suggests a possible war between Mylasa and Herakleia, because those who plundered the citizen Leonteus are described as Herakleians; yet the pacific restoration of Leonteus’ goods suggests that these robbers were not acting under state orders: the city ruled in favor of Leonteus and against its own citizens. Cf. Heller, *op. cit.*, 52, who asserts that it is just as likely that the plundering occurred before the *sympoliteia* and was thus its cause.

98. Heller, *op. cit.*, 52.

99. R. Errington, “Inscriptions von Euromos,” *Epigraphica Anatolica* 21 (1993): #7; C. Brixhe, *BE* 1995, 527. The text also uses the term *sympas dêmos* twice, but the inconsistency of “*dêmos*” makes it inadvisable to pin down a semantic distinction between the two terms, at least in this case. The proposed date (late 2nd c.) for this inscription is by no means secure or problematic for our preference of dating the *sympoliteia* earlier in the century.

100. Polyb. 30.5; the invasion, conducted with Alabanda, was defeated by the Rhodians.

101. Cf. Louis Robert, *Hellenica* vol. VIII (Paris: Limoges, 1950), 8–10 & *idem* 1978, 514.

102. R. Pierobon Benoit 2011, “Il territorio di Iasos,” in *Labraunda and Karia*, ed. L. Karlsson and S. Carlsson (Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, 2011), 414.

103. For the ancient route and the extent of Iasian territory along the “Little Sea,” see G. Traina, “Ricognizione del settore Sari çay. Considerazioni preliminari,” in *Sinus Iasius*, I., ed. E. La Rocca (Pisa: 1993), 997; Boulay and Pont, *Chalkêtôr en Carie*, 72–80.

104. Blümel’s apparatus criticus ignores the dotting of letters by Welles.

105. *Op. cit.* (note 30 above), 44–54.

106. *IMylasa* 912, an honorific decree.

107. Robert, “Documents d’Asie Mineure,” 517, n. 68 argues against Mylasean involvement on the grounds that Mylasa and Chalketor were not coterminous, though this was only true before Hydai was added to the former.

108. *IMylasa*, p.109. See also Reger, “*Sympoliteiai* in Hellenistic Asia Minor,” 154f.

109. Boulay and Pont, *op. cit.*, A-C.

110. *Iasos* 193, 194, 264.

111. Boulay and Pont, *op. cit.*, 21 indicates that Robert imagined the find-spot of these inscriptions to be the agora of the town in his notes.

112. Paton and Myres, “Karian Sites and Inscriptions,” *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 16 (1896): #28 = *IMylasa* 912.

113. Bagnall, *Ptolemaic Possessions*, 89–92.

114. Boulay and Pont, *op. cit.*, 44–54. For the evidence of Iason son of Minnion and Minnion of Antiocheia: C. Diel and G. Cousin, “Inscriptions d’Halicarnasse,” *Bulletin de Correspondence Hellenique* 14 (1890): 90–93 (#1); *SEG* 29.1089. While C. Marek, “Ein ptolemäischer Strategos in Karien,” *Chiron* 12 (1982): 119–23 confidently asserts the Ptolemaic allegiance of Iason, J. Robert and L. Robert, “Labraunda,” *Bulletin de Correspondence Hellenique Supplement* 83 (1970): 555 more wisely caution against such an unfounded assumption.

115. Reger, *op. cit.*, 154.

116. *IMagnesia am Sipylos* 1. Note that “[toward him]” is restored, but given the structure of the Magnesian oath, it seems fairly secure.

117. Robert, *Hellenica* vol. VIII (Paris: Limoges, 1950), 14–16. Cf. W. Blümel, “Brief des ptolemäischen Ministers Tlepolemos an die Stadt Kildara in Karien,” *Epigraphica Anatolica* 20 (1992): 128ff.

118. For Hydīs(s)os, see L. Robert, “Rapport sommaire sur un premier voyage en Carie,” *American Journal of Archaeology* 39.3 (1935): 339–40.

119. L. Robert in *Froehner*, 65–69. The “modern” toponyms, Etrīm and Karova, referred to by Robert and anyone citing him to locate Theangela, seem to have fallen out of use.

120. B. Dreyer, “Der ‘Raubsvertrag’ des Jarhes 203/02 v. Chr.,” *Epigraphica Anatolica* 34 (2002): 122–23. I have also had the benefit of corroborating these images with a personal digital photograph of the inscription.

121. *Ibid.*

122. A color photograph also supports my reading.

123. Dreyer also questions the restoration of the χ .

124. H. Wiemer, “Karien am Vorabend des 2. Makedonischen Krieges,” *Epigraphica Anatolica* 33 (2001): 11 finds it “gut möglich, daß es sich um das zuvor genannte, bislang unbekannte Thodasa handelt.” But it is dangerous to assume this, not only because we do not know where Thodasa was located, but also because this is to ignore the community with which it is paired in line 12, which seems to have been located close enough to Thodasa to make it convenient for Antiochos to take both places over together. Killara is not that other community, *pace* Reger, since its ethnic is a third declension noun and the ending $-\rho\omega\nu$ is second declension. Thus, the genitive plural for $\text{Κιλλαρει}\acute{\upsilon}\varsigma$ would be $\text{Κιλλαρ}\acute{\epsilon}\omega\nu$ (cf. $\text{Πιδασ}\acute{\epsilon}\omega\nu$ in Milet I.3 149).

125. Reger, *op. cit.*, 147 n. 9.

126. *Ibid.*, citing W. Blümel, “Einheimische Ortsnamen in Karien,” *Epigraphica Anatolica* 30 (1998): 167. One tempting candidate is Themissos, granted to Stratonikeia along with Keramos by the Roman Senate in 81 BC (*IStratonikeia* 505).

127. Though the inscription itself is later. For discussion of the chronology of the inscription and its content, see Wiemer, “Karien am Vorabend,” 1–14.

128. Reger, *op. cit.*, 147 wants to see Antiochos as the cause of both arrangements; cf. Wiemer, *op. cit.*, 11. For the repopulation of Theangela, see E. Gardner, “Inscriptions from Cos,” *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 6 (1885): 257; *Froehner*, 98.

129. Wiemer, *op. cit.*, 7–9.

130. Strabo 13.59 = *FrGH* 124, F 25.

131. R. Descat, “À propos d’un citoyen de Philippos à Théangela,” *Revue des Études Anciennes* 99 (1997): 411–13, followed by Reger, *op. cit.*, 147 n. 10.

132. A. Wilhelm, “Inscripfen aus Halikarnassos und Theangela,” *Jahreshefte des Österreichischen Archäologischen Institutes* 11 (1908): 61–69. A note accompanying the inscription indicates that it “was brought by Michael Bogiatzi from the *phrourion* of Theangelia (Halikarnassos).”

133. A. Wilhelm, “Zu Josephus,” *Jahreshefte des Österreichischen Archäologischen Institutes* 8 (1905): 238–42; cf. Wilhelm, *op. cit.*, 70–75. Cf. Boulay and Pont, *op. cit.*, 47–49.

134. J. and L. Robert, “Bulletin épigraphique,” *Revue des Études Grecques* 71 (1958): n. 447.

135. Wiemer, *op. cit.*, following G. Bean and J. Cook, “The Halicarnassus Peninsula,” *Annual of the British School at Athens* 50 (1955): 115, argues that the inscription is a decree of Halikarnassos. It is also worth pointing out that the heading of the “decree” is entirely preserved and has no decision-making language.

136. M. Şahin and H. Engelmann, “Inscripfen aus dem Museum von Bodrum,” *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 34 (1979): 213 (#2). See above for the “repopulation” decree.

137. *IG* II² 8831. See Robert, *Hellenica* II (Paris: 1946), 75 for objections to the

date. The graffiti from the Memnonion of Abydos mentioning Antipatros of Theangela is of insecure date in attesting to the later history of the city.

138. M. Şahin, *The Political and Religious Structure in the Territory of Stratonikeia in Caria* (Ankara: Safak Matbaası, 1976), 2. Cf. Robert and Robert, *Amyzon*, 100 and P. Debord, "Essai sur la géographie historique de la région de Stratonicee," in *Mélanges Pierre Lévêque 8: Religion, anthropologie et société*, ed. M. Mactoux and E. Geny (Paris: Centre de Recherches d'Histoire ancienne, 1994), 117–19.

139. See the map in Debord, "Essai sur la région de Stratonicee," 121 for speculation on the location of each deme, which interestingly leaves the southern end of the valley outside of Stratonikeia's core territory. More cautious, but in agreement with the spirit of this reconstruction, is Riet van Bremen 2004, "Leon Son of Chrysaor and the Religious Identity of Stratonikeia in Caria," in *The Greco-Roman East: Politics, Culture, Society*, ed. S. Colvin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 213–15.

140. van Bremen, "Leon Son of Chrysaor," 216–21.

141. For a first-hand description of the site and its location, see A. Laumonier, "Archéologie carienne," *Bulletin de Correspondence Hellénique* 60 (1936): 324–27 (Cf. *Idem, Les cultes indigènes en Carie* (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1958), 221–27).

142. Gabrielsen, "The Rhodian Peraia," 161–67; Debord, "Essai sur la région de Stratonicee," 117f., seems to ignore the independent behavior of the "Stratonikeian deme" Koranzeis in the early second century (*IStratonikeia* 549) in maintaining his belief in an original synoikismos of Karian communities for the founding of Stratonikeia. This is at least in part due to his announcement then of a still unpublished inscription from the period of Rhodian domination mentioning all five demotics. Yet as in the case of Olymos becoming a Mylasean tribe, similar subunit terminology can mask vastly different levels of autonomy within the larger state.

143. *IStratonikeia* 549.

144. van Bremen, *op. cit.*, 215–22.

145. van Bremen, *op. cit.*, 216f. Both the site of the future Stratonikeia and Panamara seem to have been Ptolemaic possessions in the early third century. It is interesting that even Pladasa, a *polis* in the fourth century, appears only as a *koinon* (or *plethos*) in later periods (see below), whereas there is no evidence that any of the 5 central demes of Stratonikeia ever styled themselves as anything but *polis* until their incorporation. The closest mention of a *koinon* to Stratonikeia comes from a 2nd c. inscription (*IStratonikeia* 801), which Şahin (*ibid.*, p. 7) would like to be Koliorga. Yet this could just as easily be another unknown, even independent community. This is more likely the case given that there is no suggestion in the inscription of subordination to Stratonikeia, and because the inscription was to be engraved on the temple of Artemis, whereas in all inscriptions concerning Koliorga the goddess is mentioned with Apollo (*IStratonikeia* 262, 263, 298), making it likely that these two deities shared a temple (as was the case at Olymos and Hydai, for which, see above).

146. van Bremen's acceptance (*op. cit.*, 231) of the use of stephanephoria dating in a Panamara decree during the reign of Philip V (*IStratonikeia* 4) as evidence of dependence on Stratonikeia by 200 BC is inconclusive. For one, it is very possible that the Panamareans lacked an annual office by which to date their decrees. This is the impression one gets from the lack of a dating formula in *IStratonikeia* 3 (also under Philip V) and from the switch to using the Rhodian priesthood of Helios (*IStratonikeia* 9) once the island took over control from Philip. More importantly, dating by the stephanephor was a practice prevalent among a number of Karian communities, and we cannot be sure that the magistrate named in *IStratonikeia* 4 was from Stratonikeia. Mylasa also dated its decrees this way, but never was in a dependent relationship with Stratonikeia. Finally, even if the stephanephor was a

Stratonikeian, this could merely indicate a temporary connection imposed by Philip, rather than the result of a development that would have in any way survived the disappearance of the Macedonian monarch.

147. As cited by an email from van Bremen mentioned in *HTC* p. 214.

148. Debord, "Essai sur la région de Stratonicee," 115.

149. P. Debord, "Questions stratoniceennes," in *Les cités d'Asie mineure occidentale au II^e siècle a.C.*, ed. A. Bresson and R. Descat (Bordeaux: Ausonius, 2001), 33. In support of his association of Leon and the Karian League, he points to the archive work mentioned in *Istratonikeia* 7, as well as the "antiquarian" means of identification (listing his great-grandfather). Likewise, V. Gabrielsen, "The Chrysaoreis of Caria," in *Labraunda and Karia*, ed. L. Karlsson and S. Carlsson (Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, 2011), 343f., proposes that Chrysaorean League is the larger entity referred to, ignoring the fact that this community refers to itself as a *koinon* or a *plêthos* but never a *dêmos*.

150. van Bremen, *op cit.*, 230 and n. 84.

151. Cf. the parallels at Olymos and potentially Myous above.

152. This is the opinion of Reger, "The koinon of the Laodikeis in Karia," *Epigraphica Anatolica* 30 (1999): 15, following M. Holleaux, "Remarques sur les décrets trouvés dans le sanctuaire de Zeus Panamaros," *Bulletin de correspondance hellénique* 28 (1904): 363.

153. Alain Bresson in *HTC*, pp. 212–16 (#89), proposes the most likely hypothesis, identifying the *koinon* with community alluded to in Livy 33.18.1–4 and located somewhere in the subject Peraia, which still remained under Rhodes after 167 (cf. W. Blümel, "Karien, die Karer und ihre Nachbarn in Kleinasien," *Kadmos* 37 (1998): 65–77), a fact cemented by Reger's observation ("The koinon of the Laodikeis," 11–17) that the priest dating the inscription was the Rhodian eponymous priest. For further bibliography, see *HTC* p. 212 and *Istratonikeia* p. 13.

154. Gabrielsen, "Rhodian Peraea," 145–46 argues that the omission makes sense if the inscriptions were abbreviated versions of the originals (set up in the communities of Kallipolis and Laodikeia themselves). Since the decree of Kallipolis and that of the *koinon* of Laodikeia were inscribed on the same stone, the second decree (of the *koinon*) would not have needed to specify that Leon was a Stratonikeian.

155. Van Bremen, *op. cit.*, 230 *et passim*.

156. Schuler, "Sympolitien in Lykien und Karien," 394–403 and Wiemer, "Structure and Development of the Rhodian Peraia," in *Hellenistic Karia*, ed. R. van Bremen and J.-M. Carbon (Bordeaux: Ausonius, 2010), 423–28.

157. W. Blümel, "Zwei neue Inschriften aus Mylasa aus der Zeit des Maussollos," *Epigraphica Anatolica* 16 (1988): #1. While the date of this text (318 BC) precedes Antigonos' declaration of freedom, Alexander's treatment of the cities of Asia Minor, likely followed (if selectively) by his successors, almost certainly differed from his policy toward indigenous communities. That this is not merely an argument *e silentio* is necessitated by the fact that the language of autonomy and freedom was only possible in Greek.

158. Olymos and Hydai are two such examples, discussed by P. Debord, "Cité grecque-village carien," *Studi Ellenistici* 15 (2003): 145; cf. his more extensive presentation at 142–60.

159. Wiemer, "Rhodian Peraea," 426–27. The origins of the term are obscure, the earliest attestation coming from an unpublished decree from Xystis under Ptolemy II (Erhard Grzybek, *Du calendrier macédonien au calendrier ptolémaïque* (Basel: F. Reinhardt, 1990), 124–29).

160. It is doubtful that Stratonikeia as a Macedonian colony was ever relegated to the status of *koinon*; nor would it have been necessary, since the rights of a *katoikia*

in no way involved the same claims as the city-state. The possibility does exist, however, that Stratonikeian expansion began during Rhodian control as a way for the island to more easily administer the surrounding communities.

161. G. Reger, "The Relations between Rhodes and Caria from 246 to 167 BC," in *Hellenistic Rhodes: Politics, Culture, and Society*, ed. V. Gabrielsen (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1999), 81 and n. 15. He infers this locus of control from *IStratonikeia* 9, in which the *koinon* of Panamara honors a Rhodian *epistatês* for ably leading the garrison of the fort (χωρίον) and settling disputes among the citizens. The text could refer to Polykratidas' base of operations, but it could just as easily refer to his sphere of action only insofar as it involved Panamara. That being said, no other texts survive to account for his activities elsewhere in the region.

162. cf. Friedemann Quass 1993, *Die Honoratiorenschicht in den Städten des griechischen Ostens* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1993), 196–210.

163. See Gabrielsen, "The Chrysaoreis," 331–53 for a good introduction to this league, though overly committed to depicting it as a political federation.

164. *IStratonikeia* 9.

165. M. Spanu, *Keramos di Caria* (Roma: L'Erma di Bretschneider, 1997), 61–62.

166. Though connected by a road to Mylasa, even in the late twentieth century the trip from Mylasa to Keramos (50 km) required 3 hours by car (E. Varinlioglu in *IKeramos*, p. 3. n. 4).

167. For the identification of Ouranion with the ancient walls on Dikmen Dağ, see E. Varinlioglu et al., "Ouranion en Carie," *Revue des Études Anciennes* 94 (1992): 155–159. While the discovery of two decrees of Ouranion 4 km from the site (yet only 3 km from Keramos itself) suggests that the community was located in this general area, the remains found on at the site are as of now only defensive walls. These unimpressive, though admittedly surface, finds suggest to me a defensive fort controlled by Keramos, especially since in its currently attributed location, Ouranion would not have had much of a *chôra* to support its population.

168. *HTC*, pp. 68–73. Cf. 216–37.

169. *op.cit.* and Robert, *Villes d'Asie Mineure*, 60f. For diction similar to Polybios, Hicks points to words like ἀνατάσις and περιστάσις.

170. Reger, "Rhodes and Caria," 84–85. Against a date after 167, Reger also adduces the likelihood that Keramos would have referred its internal disputes and security issues to Rome rather than seeking an alliance with Rhodes.

171. Reger, "Sympoliteiai in Hellenistic Asia Minor," n. 87 points out that the theory "stands on the authority of Louis Robert."

172. cf. E. Kirsten and H. Lehmann, *Die griechische Polis als historisch-geographisches Problem des Mittelmeerraumes* (Bonn: F. Dummler, 1956), 31ff.

173. As noted by van Bremen, *op. cit.*, 217f., who goes so far as to describe the city as "on the edge of a region which was almost entirely dominated . . . by Rhodes" until 81 BC!

174. Cf. V. Ruggiero, *Il golfo di Keramos: dal tardo-antico al medioevo bizantino* (Rubbettino: Soveria Mannelli, 2003), 37–67.

175. Pomp. Trog., *apud Iustin.* XXXV speaks of *seditio Cnidiorum adversus Ceramenses* that cannot date to the period of direct Roman rule. For relations with Ephesos, see the 3rd c. Ephesian decree honoring four Keramians (*IEphesos* 15).

176. *Senatus consultum: IStratonikeia* 505; Strabo 14.2.25 describes Keramos as part of this *systema*, which is centered on, and controlled by Stratonikeia.

177. Keramians in Rhodes: *IG* XII.1, 114; Rhodians in Keramos: *IKeramos* 4 (an extensive list of names).

178. See Spanu, *Keramos di Caria*, 17 for the hypothesis that Seleukos gave Keramos to Rhodes.

179. *HTC* p. 19.

180. Cf. P. Fünke, "Peraia," in *Hellenistic Rhodes: Politics, Culture, and Society*, ed. V. Gabrielsen (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1999), 55–75.

181. Cf. Reger, "Sympoliteiai in Hellenistic Asia Minor," 170, n.87 on the alternative of 188 for the urgent alliance, when a number of Karian cities petitioned the island in the face of subjugation.

182. See Varinlioğlu et al., "Ouranion," 155–74 for the decrees.

183. Brun et al., "Les sites," in *HTC*, 26–29, 52–54. Cf. Debord in *ibid.*, 11–19.

184. *Ibid.*, 45–50. Cf. Varinlioğlu et al., "Une inscription de Pladasa en Carie," *Revue des Études Anciennes* 92 (1990): 59–78.

185. *HTC* 43–46, 99–103

186. For the importance of the harbor, described as enjoying traffic in the Hellenistic and Roman periods "qui ne devait pas être médiocre," see *ibid.*, 55–56. For the political unity of the area from Çandüşüren to Akbük to Sarçin, see *ibid.*, 56–64.

187. Cf. the use of *plēthos* to describe the community post-sympoliteia between Smyrna and Magnesia on the Sipylus (*IMagnesia am Sipylus* 1: τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐν Σμύρνῃ καὶ τῶν ἐμ Μαγνησίαι).

188. *HTC* #1 and pp. 99f.

189. *HTC* nos. 1, 3, 4, 37. The exception is *HTC* #5, which can be explained as simply an abbreviated form.

190. *HTC* #1, pp. 95–105; cf. Reger, "Rhodes and Caria," 78. Later inscriptions (2nd c. BC–1st c. AD): *HTC* 3–5, 37.

191. *HTC* pp.101ff. discusses in detail the implications of the involvement of Rhodes, Ptolemy, and the Seleukids, respectively, but without being able to draw any definite conclusions. Van Bremen 2009, "Networks of Rhodians in Karia," 111 feels more confident in using this text as evidence of Rhodian control of the region, despite admitting that the crucial "evidence" is entirely restored!

192. Cf. Reger, "Rhodes and Caria," 79. See also the discussion of the meaning of *koinon* above.

193. Gabrielsen, "The Rhodian Peraea," 153–56.

194. Reger, "Sympoliteiai in Hellenistic Asia Minor," 163f. following *HTC*, pp. 95–105 *et passim*. Cf. Gabrielsen, *op. cit.*, 131–34. The suggestion (J. Robert and L. Robert, "Bulletin épigraphique," *Revue des Études Grecques* 74 (1961): #673) that the polis Pladasa was different than the Pladasa that combined with Pisye is refuted by the coastal location of "Pisyetan" Pladasa (i.e., where 4th c. Pladasa seems to have been located), assured by the mention of shipyards in *HTC* #1.

195. For which, see *HTC* pp. 95–105.

196. Polyb. 21.42.16 & 31.4.3. cf. A. Bresson, "Les intérêts rhodiens en Carie à l'époque hellénistiques," in *L'Orient méditerranéen de la mort d'Alexandre aux campagnes de Pompée*, ed. F. Prost (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2003), 188–89 and Wiemer, "Rhodian Peraea," 427–33.

197. Christopher Ratté, "New Research on the Region around Aphrodisias," in *Hellenistic Karia*, ed. R. van Bremen and J.-M. Carbon (Bordeaux: Ausonius, 2010), 253–67.

198. Kenan Erim, *Aphrodisias: City of Venus Aphrodite* (New York: Facts on File, 1986), 21.

199. C. Ratté, "The Founding of Aphrodisias," in *Aphrodisias Papers 4: New Research on the City and Its Monuments*, ed. R. Smith and C. Ratté (Portsmouth: Journal of Roman Archaeology, 2008), 7–36.

200. A. Chaniotis, "New Evidence from Aphrodisias concerning the Rhodian Occupation of Karia and the Early History of Aphrodisias," in *Hellenistic Karia*, ed. R. van Bremen and J.-M. Carbon (Bordeaux: Ausonius, 2010), 455–66. The two inscriptions are still to be published.

201. A&R 1–11; for the coins, see *BMC Caria*, pp. xxxiif.
202. A&R 2–3, 6, 8; cf. 5.
203. Joyce Reynolds, “The Politeia of Plarasa and Aphrodisias,” *Revue des Études Anciennes* 87 (1985): 215.
204. A&R 1.
205. A&R 7; cf. Reynolds, “Politeia of Plarasa,” 214.
206. The area is included under the *τόποι κατὰ Καρίαν* in two Rhodian inscriptions. Chaniotis, “New Evidence from Aphrodisias,” 458–60 argues that this was likely administrative terminology borrowed from the Seleukids.
207. R. Errington, “*Θεὰ Πώμη* and *römischer Einfluss südlich des Mäanders* im 2. Jh. v. Ch.,” *Chiron* 17 (1987): 97–114.
208. As pointed out by A. Chaniotis, “New Inscriptions from Aphrodisias,” *American Journal of Archaeology* 108 (2004): 383.
209. A&R pp. 1, 13, 41 (#2).
210. For example, by J. Crampa in *Labraunda*. We will also explore the interest of Mylaseans in the Apollo sanctuary at Olymos in chapter 3, section 2.
211. Reynolds, “Politeia of Plarasa,” 216–17.
212. *Ibid.*, 215.
213. I assume here, with Ratte, “New Research around Aphrodisias,” that both settlements involved largely indigenous populations, rather than an immigration of Greek settlers.
214. A&R 6, 8, 9, and 11 all date to in or around the triumviral period and still preserve the dual identity of the community.
215. A&R 8. This is also the implication of the first-century BC inscription identifying the city as simply “Aphrodisias,” not that Plarasa had disappeared (since later inscriptions still include it when naming the community, for which see above note).
216. Chaniotis, “New Inscriptions from Aphrodisias,” 378–86.
217. See also the more extensive argument of Chaniotis, *op. cit.*, 382f.
218. *Ibid.*, 383. Cf. J. Strubbe, “Gründer kleinasiatischer Städte,” *Ancient Society* 15 (1984–1986): 293–95.
219. For “notable” class, see discussions of Quass, *Honoratiorenschicht*, in Introduction and chapter 3; for Aphrodisian notables, see Chaniotis, *op. cit.*, n. 12.
220. I have chosen to omit a prefatory topographical description here, since the two islands were not physically contiguous, and because Kalymna’s relatively infertile soil did not offer any significant resources to the larger isle. For a full treatment of the settlement pattern on the island, see Walser, “Sympolitien und Siedlungsentwicklung,” 148–153.
221. My translation. See Sherwin-White, *Ancient Cos*, 126 for an alternate translation.
222. Sherwin-White, *op. cit.*, 126; P. Gauthier, “Epigraphica 3,” *Revue de philologie, de littérature et d’histoire anciennes* 70 (1996): 47; C. Habicht, “Neues zur hellenistischen Geschichte von Kos,” *Chiron* 37 (2007): 140; A. Bencivenni, “I Tolomei e l’homopoliteia di Cos e Calimna,” *Simblos. Scritti di storia antica* 5 (2008): 191; Walser, *op. cit.*, 149.
223. The two most thorough treatments of the events surrounding the *homopoliteia* are Sherwin-White, *Ancient Cos*, 119–29 and P. Baker, *Cos et Calymna*, 205–200 a.C.: *esprit civique et défense nationale* (Québec: Éditions du Sphins, 1991).
224. Sherwin-White, *op. cit.*, 124–25 and nn. 228, 229.
225. Baker, *Cos et Calymna*, 112; Reger, “*Sympoliteiai* in Hellenistic Asia Minor,” 153; Bencivenni, “I Tolomei e l’homopoliteia,” 199f.
226. Bencivenni, *op. cit.*, 185–208. Her insistence on the possibility that the *diagrapheis* mentioned in the oath could be injunctions from Ptolemy, despite having

herself shown that this term is commonly (and uniquely) used to describe a number of Koan decrees, reveals how strongly the will is to attribute causality to the Hellenistic rulers whenever possible.

227. ἐμμενῶ δὲ καὶ τῇ ποτὶ βασιλῇ Πτολεμαῖον φιλίαι καὶ συμμαχίαι καὶ ταῖς συνθήκαις ταῖς ποτὶ τοὺς συμμάχους τῷ δάμῳ κεκυρωμέναις

228. See chapter 1.

229. Sherwin-White, *op. cit.*, 128f. See especially n. 247 for a discussion of the uncertainty surrounding the dates of independent Kalymna.

230. *Ibid.*, 125–26, n. 233; cf. R. Herzog, “Symbolae Calymniae et Coae,” *Rivista di Filologia e di Istruzione Classica* 20 (1942): 7.

231. For example, the inscription from Chalketor discussed above states that the unnamed city is to form a *sympoliteia* with Chalketor ἐπ’ ἴσῃ καὶ ὁμοίαι.

232. Herzog, “Symbolae Calymniae,” 7.

233. Gawantka, *Isopolitie*, *passim*.

234. For evidence later than the inscriptions discussed above, see Sherwin-White, *op. cit.*, 129.

235. Cf. Gawantka, *Isopolitie*, 215–18 *et passim* and A. Chaniotis, *Die Verträge zwischen kretischen Poleis in der hellenistischen Zeit* (Stuttgart, Franz Steiner, 1996), 101–4, 185–90, 217–22, 234–36, 255–64, 276–78, 285–89, 338–76, 432–39. A look at the text of the treaty between Lato and Olos (Chaniotis #61) shows the different nature of *isopoliteia* in this context. While the mutual status and autonomy of each partner is made clear (every clause includes the privileges a Latian has in Olos and those an Olontian has in Lato), the two communities also share certain rights even if individuals do not activate citizenship in the other *polis*: “foreign” (*xenikai*—or is it “hospitable”?) roads are sacred, all have the right of intermarriage, in transactions citizens of each city are to be *kurion* in the other, and Latians are welcome (ἐρπόντων, “let them come”) to the Theodaisia and Britomarpeia in Olos, just as the Olontians are welcome to the Thiodaisia and another festival in Lato (Il. 61–83). Finally, the term *isopoliteia* is used alongside *philia* and *symmachia* to define the agreement/relationship between the two communities (Il. 186–89), rather than as a component privilege of the alliance, as in non-contiguous examples. The two communities remain independent and distinct, and yet measures are taken to involve the citizens of both in a broader social and economic community. This subject, as well as the relationship between *isopoliteia* and *sympoliteia* (which also seems to have occurred in Krete; see Chaniotis, *op. cit.* 104–108) requires further study.

236. The only clear-cut case of a “balanced” *sympoliteia* arrangement is that between the Phokian towns of Stiris and Medeon (*Syll.*³ 647) in the second century BC.

237. Bencivenni, “I Tolomei e l’homopoliteia,” 202f., following Reger, “*Sympoliteiai* in Hellenistic Asia Minor,” 149, suggests that the term *sympoliteia* was not used because the merger of two islands violated the principle of territorial contiguity that was necessary to *sympoliteiai*. This is to insist on a terminological rigidity that is alien to Ancient Greek institutional thought.

238. *IMagnesia am Sipylos* 1. The Magnesians’ oath: Il. 60–69; the Smyrnans’ oath: Il. 70–78. This also seems to be the case in the *sympoliteia* of Latmos and Pidasa, though only the former’s oath survives in any form.

239. *op. cit.* The oath of the Smyrnans, on the other hand, is focused entirely on forbidding harm to the Magnesians, not the now-enlarged state of Smyrna.

240. *op. cit.* Il. 64–64 (πολιτεύσομαι μεθ’ ὁμονοίας).

241. Bencivenni, “I Tolomei e l’homopoliteia,” 201–7 suggests that the anxiety over unrest may have been directed at internal strife *within* Kalymna, which is suggested by the need to have foreign judges resolve its disputes in the third century

(see chapter 1).

242. ll. 4–5.

243. Strabo 14.2.19; cf. Walser, *op. cit.*, 150–53, who contrasts the significant urban complex in Kos with the lack of an urban center in Kalymna. It is easy to see how such a factor could play a role in actions that were motivated by a desire for prestige.

244. Walser, *op. cit.*, 153.

245. Schmitt, “Überlegungen zur Sympolitie,” 35–44.

246. *pace* Walser, *op. cit.*, 135.

247. Cf. J. Siapkis, *Heterological Ethnicity: Conceptualizing Identities in Ancient Greece* (Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, 2003), esp. Introduction.

Chapter 3

Finding Elite Activity & Motivation

A Prosopographical Analysis

In the last chapter, my suggestion that elite ambitions constituted a principal motivating force in many Karian *sympoliteiai* drew inspiration from several interesting examples of individuals who were active in both communities of a *sympoliteia*. This chapter aims to bring to bear further evidence of elite ambitions, in the hope of being able to generalize from more frequent patterns of elite activity.¹ Ideally, such an approach would organizationally mirror its immediate predecessor, treating in turn each pair of communities in terms of which individuals appear in the epigraphical records of both. Unfortunately, this is not possible for many of the cities and towns under analysis. Most of the smaller partners in a merger lack even a single mention of any of their citizens, while some larger cities, such as Stratonikeia, do not fully adopt the epigraphic habit until the late first century BC, by which time the communities they have subsumed have lost any recognizable identity. As a result, I propose to focus this chapter around the two pairs of cities that do permit an extensive examination—Miletos-Pidasa and Mylasa-Olymos—after which a reconsideration of the instances from [chapter 2](#) will be treated in light of our conclusions here.

These two examples are not just the only unbroken eggs in the carton. Each case sheds a different light on what kinds of factors may have been feeding into elite interests in the other community of a *sympoliteia*. Most superficially, Miletos as a coastal town offered unique opportunities, economic and social, to Pidasa that inland Mylasa did not in relation to Olymos, as discussed in the last chapter. Conversely, the relationship between the two inland settlements can provide insight into other *sympoliteiai* of a similar nature. The feature common to these arrangements seems to be the existence of a regionally significant sanctuary. Moreover, the difference in the nature of the evidence offers two distinct perspectives. On the one hand, all the evidence for elite “exchange” between Miletos and Pidasa outside

of the *sympoliteia* itself comes from the lists of *politeia* grants by the former city. On the other hand, we know of Mylaseans in Olymos through a series of documents from both Olymos and a tribe of Mylasa, the Otorkondeis, rather than the city itself. This suggests that whereas Pidasean elites sought to gain access to the contacts and privileges available only to a Milesian, the process, if we can call it such, occurred in the opposite direction between Mylasa and Olymos. In other words, Mylasean individuals seem to have been involving themselves in the more local scene in Olymos in comparable, if not identical fashion to other subunits of the *polis*. It is the main aim of this chapter to tease out the motivations behind these scenarios, the “ladder climbing” between Pidasa and Miletos as well as the infiltration into Olymos by Mylasean elites.

It will be useful to recall the broader context in which such elite behavior was embedded, namely Aegean peer polity interaction (see Introduction and the conclusion to [chapter 1](#)). The presence of the exchange-network of *poleis* in which was divested a cultural and moral authority is crucial to understanding the appeal of Miletos and other large and well-connected *poleis* for the elite of communities that lacked a legitimate claim to belonging in the system of peer polity interaction. Pidasa’s proximity to Miletos geographically, facilitated by its position along the main east-west trade route of Karia, would have created both awareness of and attraction to the prestige enjoyed by the wealthiest citizens of its western neighbor. This chapter will attempt to find confirmation of this hypothesis in the epigraphical record. Although Pidaseans fail to appear as prominent Milesian officials or benefactors in our surviving inscriptions, at least in a way that we can identify, the citizenship grant lists attest a somewhat consistent tendency to seek Milesian citizenship by a few families leading up to the *sympoliteia* of 188 BC.

The evidence relates to another issue that will be of central concern at the end of this chapter: power. The fact that a small minority of presumably wealthy citizens promoted a decision of major consequences for the community—in the case of Pidasa a change, and threat to, its very identity—raises the issue of the nature and development of democracy in these contexts. The debate surrounding the topic of Hellenistic democracy has been vigorous and often contentious debate over the last few decades.² As we saw in the Introduction, almost every scholar, drawing inferences from the large body of honorific inscriptions or institutional evidence, agrees that by the end of the Hellenistic period, power was firmly entrenched in the hands of the elite within a city. The debate centers on when this development occurred, and has crystallized around the arguments of Philippe Gauthier and Friedemann Quass. Gauthier argues for

continuity between the fourth and third centuries and identifies an important shift around the middle of the second century, pointing to changes in the style and nature of benefactions. His general conclusions are followed by most recent work.³ Quass, on the contrary, finds significance in the rise of stone honorifics at the end of the fourth century, and sees more gradual change that served to cement elite supremacy henceforth.⁴ The current study cannot hope to pronounce definitively on either position, but will consider the extent to which these scholars' views apply to our case studies, and to what extent our case studies confirm their respective visions. Ultimately, I will argue that both interpretations are unsatisfactory, requiring as they do too stark of a choice between a "true" rule of the people and a democracy that is really an oligarchy. This is to misconstrue the nature of power as purely agent-centered and unidirectional, as if the interests of an individual or group were not themselves determined by ideals inseparable from a community-based discourse.⁵ What is more productive, then, is to explore the different forms a democracy could take in the Greek world and to relate these forms across both time and space.⁶

One potential danger in identifying elite motivations is committing the same error with respect to this subgroup of the *polis* that we have repeatedly warned against regarding the community as a whole. Is it not oversimplistic to speak of elite interests in monolithic terms at the risk of ignoring concerns that were specific to individuals or groups within this "class?" This objection is valid, but only if the evidence suggests that there were interests that divided a community in terms other than between elite and nonelite. Such is one of the major arguments of Grieb's recent study on Hellenistic democracies.⁷ However, his identification of divisions *within* the elite of each city on the basis of allegiance (or inclination) toward one Hellenistic monarch or another seems largely unsubstantiated.⁸ He draws this inference from isolated references in Polybios or from the relationship between a prominent citizen of a *polis* and a monarch as elaborated in honorific inscriptions. In both cases, we expect him to justify this extrapolation from the particular to the general. Why should we assume that a few windows are a microcosm for a much vaster landscape? Any literary references to elite rivalries come at moments of intense external pressure, that is, when a dominating foreign presence (usually a king) threatens the security and autonomy of the *polis*. As we have seen in [chapter 1](#) with respect to Karia, such moments, while certainly important in the history of any community, cannot be generalized to include even the majority of experiences that a given *dêmos* would have to encounter. In fact, the rarity of times when faction was even possible along lines of support for various Hellenistic monarch

suggests that whatever local power politics were occurring in a city had much more to do with concerns that fell by the wayside of Polybios' march toward universal history.

Honorific inscriptions for citizens with strong ties to one or more Hellenistic king also present problems, at least for those like Grieb who try to use such documents to argue for a strong external influence on the local politics of a *polis*.⁹ For one, we are again asked to assume a continuity of exchange between king and city when the instances of publicizing such exchanges suggests the opposite: namely that they were rare and therefore worthy of monumentalization. But even more problematic is Grieb's misconstrual of the dynamic between king and *polis*. Grieb still remains attached to a mode of analysis that views an *événement* through the lens of the *moyenne durée*.¹⁰ As such, kings appear much more important in the local politics of far off *poleis* than they actually were. Moments of requesting benefaction from a king or offering honors to him were not on the monthly agenda of any assembly, and when such an event did occur, it was instead a momentous occasion (in part due to its rarity) that warranted visible publication—which, consequently made such a monument more likely to survive two millennia of subsequent history and to be discovered by surveys and excavations of the last century and a half. Once contextualized, royal benefaction becomes not a series of threatening events that needed processing through the language of civic ideology to preserve a sense of autonomy—though such events were certainly processed in this way when they occurred—but isolated instances with different valences depending on the position of and relationship between the parties involved.¹¹ Concerning the cities of Karia that Grieb examines—Kos and Miletos—the evidence that he himself marshals evokes a picture of civic life much more concerned with internal and regional affairs, though exchanges with a Ptolemaic or Seleukid king were certainly important moments in each city's history.

If we cannot deduce the political divisions within a *polis* from the influence of the Hellenistic kings, then there is no evidence against the assumption that the major identifiable sub-communal interests were those of the elite. But is there evidence in favor of this assumption? This is the point where prosopography can provide insight into the internal praxis of the *polis*.¹² Such a study identifies individuals acting in multiple contexts, and thereby reveals patterns of interest for these individuals. Patterns suggest assumed roles and privileges, official or unofficial, for certain men in the community. From this we can deduce, first of all, an interest-group within the community which, based on the leadership nature of its activities, we are justified in calling an "elite," and secondly, where the evidence suggests the monopoly of an office or administrative role by wealthier families or

individuals, an imbalance of power, perhaps, in favor of this elite. Because the activities and interests visible to us are shared by this elite, we get a picture of consensus within this group. Such an image we should view with caution: although in such cases we have no evidence to contradict the impression of an elite, we must remember that we are limited to official versions of highly context-specific events.

The current study aims to distinguish itself not only in its prosopographical approach but in holding itself to standards that prevent the problems of other studies. For one, I have attempted to be as precise as possible in contextualizing the cases under study. Generalizations are to be made only where conclusions and context intersect.¹³ Chronologically, this means acknowledging the distance separating the agreement between Latmos and Pidasa from the other *sympoliteiai*, while geographically we can assume a similar context, up to a point, from the relative proximity of every community in Karia. At the same time, the assumption that Karian *poleis* shared institutional and constitutional structures is to be dispensed with as a starting point. Rather, the evidence itself must suggest similarities between political communities. It is in this spirit that the current chapter looks to examine elites and democracy. In [chapter 2](#), we saw how certain clauses in the *sympoliteia* with Pidasa were aimed at, and therefore identified, wealthy Pidaseans both in Pidasa and in Miletos itself. Connecting the position of the Pidaseans in Miletos to the ambitions of the wealthy Pidaseans in Pidasa, I argued that these elite can be read as influencing a crucial decision of the community, one that in fact impacted the status and identity of that community. Prosopographical analysis, where possible, can help illuminate this scenario by providing further context for the hypotheses set forth in the previous chapter. More importantly, it allows for the contribution of another case study that speaks to the issue of power dynamics within the Hellenistic *polis*, one that takes into account institutional structures but is not reducible to them. As we will see below, such a study is important as part of a debate that is at a point where arguments from institutions are no longer satisfactory.¹⁴ The current chapter does not aim to say anything about the Hellenistic *polis* or Democracy in the third and second centuries, but merely about certain Hellenistic *poleis* and their constitutional nature.

The structure of this chapter is grouped around our two case studies. After a first-level analysis of both Pidaseans in Miletos and Mylaseans in Olymos, entailing both a presentation of the evidence and a drawing out of the most obvious implications of this, I shall conclude with a section that attempts to refer our findings to the bigger picture of *sympoliteia* in Karia, looking for patterns in the

political, religious, and social landscape. Finally, I will discuss the power of the elites in these communities in terms of the nature of city-state government.

PIDASEANS IN MILETOS

Prior to the *sympoliteia* of 188 BC, Miletos granted *politeia* to nine Pidaseans, often extending the privilege to wives and children: Antipatros son of Menippos; Antigenes son of Iatrokles, his wife Artemesia daughter of Antipatros, and their sons Iatrokles and Antipatros; a son of Menekles (name lost), and his wife (name also lost), a daughter of Antipatros, and their sons Antipatros and Menekles; Timias son of Iason, his wife Artemesia daughter of Minnion, their sons Minnion and Iason, and their daughter Meniskê; Meniskê of Euromos, daughter of Apollonios, Pidasean by marriage to Diodoros son of Aristetas, and her bastard Heraiskos son of Boiskos; Apollonios son of Dionysios, his wife Artemesia daughter of Theodoros (from Herakleia), their sons Dionysios and Poseidonios, and their daughter Artemesia; Poseidonios son of Dionysios; and Melan[—] son of Antipatros.¹⁵ We have already discussed how this fact alone suggests, from the perspective of the Pidaseans, an interest in full participation in Milesian civic life. It will be more informative, however, to examine closely the type of individuals who were receiving these grants. The evidence strongly suggests that only a few families received Milesian citizenship, and that these were among the wealthier clans in Pidasa.¹⁶ Moreover, these grants were not given only to Pidaseans. To fully understand the significance of these honors, then, a look at their place in the context of all surviving citizenship awards is necessary.¹⁷ The most interesting thing to emerge from such a study is the surprising prominence of Pidaseans, given the size and importance of the town, relative to other communities whose citizens were honored by Miletos.

Four of the nine *politeia* grants involve potentially related individuals (see [Figure 3.1](#)). Antipatros son of Menippos is thus probably a relative through marriage of Antigenes son of Iatrokles, and perhaps even his father-in-law, as Antigenes' wife Artemesia is the daughter of an Antipatros. The significance of these names is further suggested by the sons of Antigenes: Iatrokles and Antipatros. A familial connection to Antipatros is also possible in #74a, a partially damaged text. The names of the honoree and his wife are missing, but the surviving portion reveals that the latter is the daughter of an Antipatros, which is also the name of one of their two sons. Interestingly, Antipatros is here the eldest son, while Menekles, the

likely name of the honoree's father, is named second.¹⁸ Was Antipatros so prominent a figure that the honor of marrying his daughter meant conceding the right to name the firstborn after the father's father? Clearly, this did not happen with Antigenes, but we can imagine a situation in which the unnamed individual in #74a enjoyed lower standing than Antigenes, and either felt compelled to reciprocate Antipatros' approval of his marriage with a meaningful gesture, or desired to do so of his own accord. In any event, the overall impression is of individuals of high status. A further connection with Antipatros' family may come from Melan[—] son of Antipatros (#86). Perhaps this Antipatros was the very son of Menippos in #41, which seems possible since Antipatros' sons were not explicitly given citizenship in this latter text. It is also possible that this Antipatros was a more distant relative or even completely unrelated.




Figure 3.1 Hypothetical Pidasean Family Trees. *Source:* Figure created by author.

The inscriptions suggest another potential set of relations who succeeded in becoming Milesian citizens. In one text, Apollonios son of Dionysios is awarded *politeia*, as are his wife and two sons, Dionysios and Poseidonios. In a second inscription, Poseidonios son of Dionysios receives citizenship. The coincidence of names strongly suggests that Poseidonios is the brother of Apollonios, especially since

Apollonios' wife is the daughter of Theodoros. In this family, the second son was not named after his maternal grandfather, but his father's brother. Again, perhaps this was due to a perceived status distinction between the two families, and Apollonios and Poseidonios both belonged to the wealthy class of Pidaseans.

Although the three other citizenship grants involving Pidaseans are of individuals from different families, prominent status can be inferred from two of these, since each involves a marriage with a foreigner, one from Mylasa (#72) and the other from Euromos (#77).²⁰ Moreover, the wife of Apollonios son of Dionysios, Artemesia, is from Herakleia. It is doubtful that a person of small means would have the opportunity and connections to arrange such a match, especially in the case of Mylasa, which was not contiguous with Pidasa. In light of this evidence, it seems highly probable that every individual who was granted citizenship was of elite status in Pidasa, including our final case, Timias son of Iason (#75), despite his lack of affiliation with the other families discussed. This conclusion conforms to what we would expect from the granting of privileges, since presumably Miletos gave such awards as a gesture of thanks for some benefaction or at least in the expectation of a future reciprocated favor.²¹

However, these nine grants cannot take on their full significance without an understanding of their relationship to the entire body of surviving *politeia* awards from Miletos (Table 3.1). The first and most important observation to make is how many grants the citizens of Pidasa received relative to cities of much greater size and "significance." Only three cities (possibly four) surpass it, despite the fact that all continued to exist as autonomous *poleis* after 188 (when Pidasa became part of Miletos). Although we do not have dates for most of the citizenship list inscriptions, it is at least possible that Miletos admitted enough Herakleians, Trallians, and Ephesians after Apamea that Pidaseans were in fact the most frequent recipients of such awards prior to this. Furthermore, the *isopoliteiai* treaties between Miletos and both Tralles and Herakleia provided a context for more frequent *politeia* grants than the "norm"—that is, the activation of potential *isopoliteia*.²² This lack of context may explain the difference between both Herakleia and Tralles and the other communities in Table 3.1 in terms of grants, but does not account for the attention paid to Pidaseans.

Table 3.1 Milesian *Politeia* Grants to Foreigners*

<i>City of Origin</i>	<i># of Grants</i>	<i>City of Origin</i>	<i># of Grants</i>
Herakleia on the Latmos	28	Kolophon	5
Seleukeia/Tralleis	15	Ainos [†]	5
Ephesos	11	Samos	4
Antiocheia [‡]	10	Adramyttion	4
Pidasa	9	Mylasa	4
Magnesia on the Maeander	9	Apollonia (on the Salbake?)	4
Bargylia	7	Lysimacheia	3
Halikarnassos	7	Smyrna	3
Sardis	6	Euromos [§]	3
Macedonia [¶]	5	Sidon	3

* Based on *Milet* I. 3 40–93 and VI.3 1055–64, which are lists of *politeia* recipients each year. Not listed in the table are Olynthos, Priene, Mesembria, Thera, Karystos, Paros (2 grants each); Soli, Theodoseia, Iasos, Ouliai, Rhodes, [Magnesia?] on the Sipylus, Myndos, Stratonikeia, Achaia, Syracuse, Knossos, Maroneia, Kyrene, Kyzikos, Thebes, Oroannos, Seleukeia on the Maeander, Chios, Andros, Skepsis, Xanthos, Perge, Kalymna, Eleutherna, Alinda, Korinth, Rhaukos, Malla, Kos, Biannos, Boiotia, Siphnos, Kios, and Eresos. (1 grant each).

† All five from one inscription (#54, 194/93 BC).

‡ It is unclear whether all these grants refer to members of the same community, since there were numerous Antiocheiai, including two in Karia ([Alabanda] and Antiocheia on the Maeander), and the stones are often damaged at the critical line; nor should we discount Syrian Antioch, in light of the three grants to Sidonians.

§ One dated to 57/56 BC (#59).

¶ Includes three individuals labeled by the ethnic *Makedôn* (nos. 43 and 67) and two from Kassandreia (#63).

To properly evaluate the number of *politeia* grants to Pidasians, we would do well to recall the meaning that such grants possessed for bestower and recipient alike. A *politeia* grant to an individual expressed, above all, a reciprocal relationship. The community, in granting this honor, had received or expected to receive some type of benefaction.²³ In this light, we are not surprised to see members of prominent cities with good harbors—Magnesia, Ephesos, Bargylia, Halikarnassos, and Kolophon—or ties to imperial rulers—Tralles, Antiocheia, Macedonia—feature in the lists. Such communities would have housed many citizens capable of offering benefits to Miletos. On the other hand, the honoree was granted a privilege that marked status and offered possible utility. As Gauthier points out, an award of *politeia* was at once highly prestigious and rarely intended to be actualized *at the moment that it was granted*. However, such awards still retained their literal meaning because one could always rely on the option of moving to, and becoming a member of, another city, should the vicissitudes of fortune make such a change necessary or desirable.²⁴ Thus, at the very least, we can infer two highly significant facts. On the one hand, a substantial number of Pidasians were able to achieve recognition via a *politeia* grant as prestigious members of the cultural community in which such honors were bestowed. On the other hand, these Pidasians possessed the means to earn this recognition—whether they had performed a service for the city or merely attracted sufficient attention to create the expectation for such

is irrelevant. Considering the unimpressive remains of Pidasa's urban complex, that so many of its citizens had the resources to stand out among more prominent cities and in a highly urbanized city is stunning.²⁵

This striking impression, drawn from Pidasa's uniquely unimpressive position in comparison with most of the other cities whose members won Milesian citizenship, suggests that unique factors were at play in the awards to Pidasa—whether by their quality or their intensity. Recalling that at least some Pidaseans were residing in Miletos at the time of the *sympoliteia*, one realizes that some of these *politeia* grants must have been actualized (or in the process of being actualized; see note 34). That Pidasa shared a border with Miletos further suggests this, since a *politeia* grant was assumed to be potential when granted because of the inherent obstacles to actualizing it that being a foreigner presented. The nearness and wealth—alluded to in the liturgy clause of the *sympoliteia*—of the Pidaseans inscribed on the lists obviated these obstacles. Thus, the decision by Miletos to grant *politeia* to these individuals must have been made with the awareness that an assumption of this privilege was more likely than when Ephesians or Macedonians were involved. We can in the same vein deduce a greater attraction to the *reality* of Milesian *politeia*, not simply the prestige of the award, on the part of the Pidaseans.²⁶ It is, then, the growing mutual interest between the two communities, expansion by Miletos and access to the network of *poleis* by Pidasean elites—whether as Pidaseans possessing a Milesian *politeia* grant or as newly made Milesians—that explains the nine grants.

Of course, there is no way of knowing whether the names we have are representative of the original number of honorees, or if an ignorance of any chronological trends might have skewed our impression considerably. Yet it is far more unlikely that we have chanced upon most or all of the Pidasean names on the lists to the detriment of individuals from other communities. If anything, the fact that many of the inscriptions date to the period after Pidasa became part of Miletos has altered our impression in favor of citizens whose home cities continued to exist into the first century BC.

Although the evidence is much more sparse, a comparison of Milesian awards of *proxenia* with Table 1 suggests that *politeia* served a different, or at least additional function in terms of interstate relations. No city has more than three grantees, the attention on Karia is much less marked—six of fourteen communities—and every community has either a harbor or a royal association.²⁷ The exception, Mylasa, suggests what distinguished *proxenia* from *politeia*. Mylasa was, like Herakleia and Tralles, a substantial “inland” Karian settlement with ties of *isopoliteia* to Miletos.²⁸ If we see *proxenia* and

politeia simply as means to strengthen relations within another city, then we cannot account for the absence of Herakleians or Trallians among the Milesian *proxenoi*. More probably, the evidence indicates a different relationship between Miletos and Mylasa versus Miletos and the other two cities. By the time of the *proxenia* award, the 160s BC, Mylasa had established itself as an attractive center in ways that Herakleia had not (see [chapter 2](#)).²⁹ Thus, while some Mylaseans were drawn to privileges in Miletos that made possible a potential move there, their own city was an active forum for local ambitions. In this context, Miletos would have been more likely to bestow the privileges of *proxenia* on Mylaseans, thereby ensuring a certain level of goodwill in this peer, and possibly rival, neighbor. A lack of such ties in Herakleia and Tralles, on the other hand, could suggest that Miletos felt less of a need to develop individual allies within these less threatening cities.³⁰ An award of citizenship, then, would have fit well with Milesian ambitions in Pidasa, whereas *proxenia* would have been an empty gesture, because it would have lacked the expectations of reciprocity implied by the institution.

It remains to review more closely the names of the envoys from Pidasa inscribed on the *sympoliteia* treaty with Miletos (see [Figure 3.1](#)).³¹ None of these ten men were recipients of Milesian *politeia*, nor would we expect them to be. There is, however, a possible relation between two of these men—Artemon and Polites sons of Menippos—and Antipatros son of Menippos from the *politeia* lists (*Milet I* 3 41). Perhaps these three were brothers, and Artemon and Polites were leading the whole community to follow in the footsteps of their sibling. Yet caution should be exercised in the face of this tempting scenario.³² For one, the assumption that the citizenship lists and the *sympoliteia* inscription are somewhat contemporary is insecure. More impeding is the possibility that certain names were simply popular choices for parents, and that there is less of an overlap of individuals in the list than it seems. Unless we imagine that Polites father of Demetrios, Melanthos, Hermias, and Melanthios is the same man as either the son of Menippos or the son of Hermias, then there were at least three men named Polites in Pidasa (more if Demetrios et al. had different fathers). This makes the occurrence of a father named “Menippos” in two separate inscriptions less striking.

At the same time, the envoys’ names also indicate a concentration of ambassadorial responsibility in the hands of only a few families. In fact, it could be argued that members from only two families were chosen for the mission. If Polites son of Menippos is the father of Demetrios, Melanthos, Hermias, and Melanthios, then it is possible that the same Hermias is the father of Aison and a younger Polites. In this case, the only other family on the embassy would be that of

Aristeas, whose sons Menexenos and Menestheus are listed first in *Milet* III.1 149. Such an extreme interpretation, however, seems less likely than that of three or four families: Aristeas' sons, Polites' sons, Menippos' sons, and Hermias' sons, with a possible relationship between the second and fourth families through Hermias. It would be strange to list a father (Polites son of Menippos) *after* his sons (Demetrios et al.), as the inscription does. Yet even with a four-family embassy, Pidasa found itself represented by a small percentage of the population, as is confirmed by a glance at the Milesian officials named in the treaty. Of the ten men, we find only two pairs of brothers and no further inferable relationship. This is even more telling since all but the prytaneis were appointed to their posts, rather than chosen by lot. This distribution of responsibility contrasts strikingly with the Pidasean ambassadors, and it seems safe to see these four families as part of the elite of Pidasa.

What we find, then, is a rather strong case for the intense involvement of a small number of individuals in the exchange of services (benefaction, honor, privilege, belonging) between communities. That this segment consisted of the upper echelon of each city's population is suggested not only by assumptions about the correspondence between power and status, but by the nature of the activity engaged in (cf. the liturgy clause in the *sympoliteia* agreement). Presumably, *politeia* (or *proxenia*) was granted in gratitude for (or in expectation of) conduct possible only for the wealthy. The idea of inter-state exchange mediated through elite individuals is a crucial one. Although the citizenship lists give an impression of a relationship between Miletos and each person on the stone, the inclusion of the ethnic is an essential marker of the award, as well as the benefaction it presumes, as an expression of friendly relations with the *polis* from which the recipient hails. In this way, the equivalence of elite and state identities, insofar as they appear on the international scene, becomes clear, and hence the applicability of the peer polity interaction model not just to interstate interaction, as Ma argues, but to the elite activity in foreign affairs of which this interaction consisted. It follows, then, that when we speak of elite interests in the context of such activity, we are in a sense speaking of the community's interests as well. Both Antipatros son of Menippos and Pidasa as a whole were in a sense motivated to donate the golden tripods to Apollo Delphinios that earned the former Milesian citizenship and both individual and community prestige.

When this notion of inseparability between state and elite is realized, we can also understand how the decision to form a *sympoliteia* would have implicated the elites from the community (Pidasa) who initiated the arrangement. It thus makes perfect sense

that its representatives should be among the *polis*' wealthiest members.³³ For one, these individuals may have been the only citizens who could afford the expenses of the embassy, if the state itself lacked the money to fund them.³⁴ More importantly, however, the interest that this class had in the *sympoliteia* was an interest of Pidasa as well. The prestige that elites hoped to win as Milesians would be accessible to all Pidaseans as fellow members of the enlarged Milesian community. One can imagine the success of elite X engendering conversations of pride among his fellow Pidaseans, regardless of status. Of course, other motives contributed to the decision and were perhaps necessary for communal consensus, as discussed in the Introduction and [chapter 2](#). Nevertheless, the cumulative evidence indicates a leading role by elite Pidaseans that requires us to think about individual/group and community motivations as complementary.

MYLASEANS IN OLYMOS

As stated above, both the evidence for and the nature of the activity of individuals who appear in Mylasean and Olymean documents differs vastly from the situation at Miletos and Pidasa. First of all, the inscriptions all date to after the *sympoliteia*, rather than before. Thus, while we are privy to the consequences for individuals of the merger between these two communities, we have no access to any behavior leading up to the event. As a result, our ability to speak of the motives of each community (and their citizens) in forming a *sympoliteia* relies on inference from its effects, and so on the assumption that what resulted was in fact intended. This, of course, need not be the case, as both Olymeans and Mylaseans could have taken advantage of opportunities that had not been anticipated leading up to the arrangement. I find this, however, less probable than its alternative, since already in the third century Olymean *politeia* grants to Mylaseans suggests an early interest in the smaller partner's public life, and for the rest of the chapter I shall assume, though not unquestioningly, that both Olymos and Mylasa had some notion of being able to access the rights, privileges, and offices of the other community.³⁵

Interaction between the two cities also differs from that between Pidasa and Miletos in that we have ample evidence for Mylaseans active in Olymos in addition to, and in abundance to, citizens of the latter appearing in the larger *polis*. This phenomenon requires an explanation different from, though not completely independent of, an account that sees international prestige as a motivator. If Mylasean

Index 805, 814–15, 819, 848, 869–70

Don't forget to get the Kennel

^b IR (KBr): 806, 819, 840–816, 822, 827, 834, 861; 204†.

801p, 803s, 808, 816s, 834, 838, 843; 204†

1528106-s7 Thargelios

Ep3in208s-4† Ouliades

~~ABD:223:~~ Apollonios

858454us206Demetrius

Bob Anderson, Jason

518165; s2P7111 s. Proteas

Notes

BD410 InscrP Deiles IV. 1E442A Æmos

Abipato's 30 Apollonios

882123*: Iatrokles

De las 81.5 Afísticas 462 Melas

~~300682's 634e35dors~~

~~* Indicates testimony from Mylasa rather than Olymos.~~

† Indicates testimony from the tribe of Otorkondeis.

‡ The abbreviation “s.” is used for “son of.”

§ Not a land purchase document.

That these men were part of the wealthier strata of Mylasean society is suggested by several facts. First, Hekatomnos and his son are almost certainly part of a family that extends back into the third century, when another Korris contested with the entire *polis* of Mylasa for control of the sanctuary of Labraunda.³⁹ In the case of Hermias, Demetrios and Antipatros, the involvement of a father and his two sons in similar kinds of activity indicates the importance and resources of their family in the same way as the prominence of Pidasean families in the Milesian inscription lists. This is perhaps also the implication of the extended patronymic given for all three men, as well as to Diodotos, Sibilos, Melas, and Ouliades (son of Pollis): interest in advertising genealogy often corresponded to a sense of family pride in a leadership role in the community.⁴⁰ The types of activities these men were engaged in, both at Olymos and at Mylasa or one of its subunits, can shed further light on their status and interests. We have already discussed the men who held important priesthoods in the Mylasean community. These posts were not only hereditary, but status marking. A case can also be made for Demetrios son of Hermias son of Antipatros as an actual or aspiring priest. Although he is not identified as such, this is the implication of his adoption by Aineas, priest of Apollo Pytheas.⁴¹ However, this very adoption could just as easily indicate that Demetrios was an Olymean ambitious for opportunities outside the gambit of his hometown.

More significant, perhaps, is the specific function that many of these men served for Olymos: as *προδανεισταί* or *κτηματῶνα/μισθωταί*. A look at the text of a land purchase (*IMylasa* 801, ll. 3–8) will make clear the functions of these offices.

it is beneficial [to buy them (the lands) for Apollo and Artemis, gods] of the *dêmos* of Olymeans, from the silver that is sacred to the aforementioned gods, [the silver advanced as a loan by (or deposited with) Sibilos, Euthydêmos, and Hekatomnos. The *dêmos* decrees: to elect men from the *dêmos*, and that those elected purchase the property from Thargelios son of Hybreas, getting for the payment 4000 silver drachmai from Sibilos, [x silver drachmai from Euthydêmos, and from Hekatomnos] whatever payment remains; and that the same men, once they have bought the property for the gods, contract it for a price for which . . . the leaser will possess it either for himself or for his family or for those who inherit his possessions.⁴²

The κτηματῶναι acted as a commission in charge of purchasing properties for a sanctuary, often the former estate of a specific person.⁴³ In this case, the commission represented the interests of the major Olymean cult of Apollo and Artemis. As μισθωταί the same men were responsible for letting out the land on behalf of the temple.⁴⁴ It makes sense that the two functions should have been assigned to the same individuals. The function of the προδανεισταί, on the other hand, mentioned in *IMylasa* 802 and associated by Blümel's commentary with Sibilos, Euthydêmos, and Hekatomnos, is less clear. If we follow Judeich's restoration of παρατεθειμένου, the three men simply guarded the temple funds.⁴⁵ However, several reasons weigh against this interpretation. The title alone indicates that loaning was central to the obligations of the office. As Blümel has shown, προδανεισμένου fits just as well in the missing section.⁴⁶ Moreover, if Sibilos and his fellow contractors were simply in charge of the temple finances, what need was there to elect another board of officials to conduct the purchase, especially since all three προδανεισταί were elected to the commission as well? Care of temple monies was in fact the office of the treasurers, mentioned later in the inscription (ll. 10, 15–17). It seems beyond doubt, then, that the purchase of Thargelios' land was funded, on loan, from Sibilos, Euthydêmos, and Hekatomnos.

From these facts, we can make several important observations. First, the κτηματῶναι were elected by the Olymean *dêmos* as members in the Olymean community ("chosen from the *dêmos*"). We have already seen that Olymos retained the right to grant *politeia* after being subsumed into Mylasa, and did so primarily, if not exclusively, to Mylaseans; yet it is still surprising to see these former outsiders so prominent in such an important transaction. Secondly, these men had money. We have already seen one case in which the temple depended on wealthy individuals to loan it the funds necessary to complete a land purchase. In another such transaction (*IMylasa* 864), only one individual loaned money for the purchase, at interest, but strangely enough the loan was made out to a group of εἰρημένους, who are to write the lender a record of the loan and its terms (ll. 9–11). These

same men are to be paid in the future by the treasurers (Il. 25–29). All of which suggests that the εἰρημένοι, rather than the *dêmos* or the sanctuary, were responsible for the loan and its interest, and would be compensated by the sanctuary from the income gained by the land purchased.⁴⁷ Again, substantial personal resources seem a prerequisite to office.

Yet who were these εἰρημένοι? In most of the land sale inscriptions, including *IMylasa* 801, the term is equated with the κτηματῶναι. In *IMylasa* 864, however, Blümel distinguishes them from this commission, since the κτηματῶναι of this inscription are described as “taking the money” before buying the plot. The source of this money would logically be whoever was mentioned just prior in the text, which happens to be the εἰρημένοι. Yet if we take Ouliades (the lender) as the one from whom the money is to be taken, an equally legitimate inference, then the two groups of men (εἰρημένοι and κτηματῶναι) are equivalent. This reading has the added advantage of agreeing with the use of the two terms in other Olymean inscriptions. Then why use two different terms? The εἰρημένοι were called κτηματῶναι only in their capacity as purchasers of the land. These commissioners could serve other functions and when they did so received a separate title, as when they acted as μισθωταί.

To sum up, a sanctuary required officials to carry out a number of separate functions when purchasing a plot of land. Men were needed to loan out the necessary funds, oversee the actual purchase with the loaned money, and then lease the land to interested parties. The central figures in this process, from the vantage point of the inscriptions at least, were the κτηματῶναι, responsible for the purchase but often in charge of leasing the new property as well. Some of these officials even made the loans that they, as κτηματῶναι, would then manage in the interests of the temple. In such instances, we can see how wealth could act as an argument for election to the board of κτηματῶναι. Given the number of land purchases in which the Olymean sanctuary was involved, combined with the elite status of the commissioners and their recurrence in this role, it seems likely that this was no isolated case.⁴⁸

Finally, we can speculate on the motives that these individuals would have had to involve themselves in the local religious (and hence political) life of the quasi-foreign Olymos. Most obviously, several scenarios resulting in economic benefit for the commissioners present themselves. If these κτηματῶναι were indeed loaning the money to purchase lands for the sanctuary, then they stood to gain from the interest that would accrue on the loans. If, alternately, the commission was funding the transaction as a gift to the sanctuary, as seems the case in *IMylasa* 864, or even as a loan without interest, then

they may have done so with an expectation of a future return of a non-material nature. That being said, some of these men, as μισθωταί, directly administered the leasing process, and the name for this office could have glossed over a financial transaction that netted returns for the individual contractors in addition to the temple.

The principle behind these scenarios—that wealth alone creates opportunities for more wealth—sounds suspiciously modern—that is, capitalistic—and considering the meager amount of evidence, an awareness of their speculative, if plausible, nature is mandatory. That the κτηματῶναι sought honor and prestige in the community, on the other hand, is far less controversial. We have already noted that the repeated appearance of the same men on the land purchase commission suggests a function that the average citizen could not perform due to wealth restrictions. Dignas compares the selling of private land to a sanctuary so that it could then lease that land for income to the Trajanic alimentary scheme.⁴⁹ The men who sold this land and those who loaned the money to enable its purchase were thus benefactors of the temple and the community, insofar as they were helping increase the revenues of an institution that was the focal point for local identity. As such, performing the duties of a κτηματωνῆς merited gratitude from the community in the form of public recognition of some sort, whether a proclamation of services rendered, the granting of privileges, or simply the advertisement of the position held, as we find in the Olymean inscriptions.⁵⁰ Visitors to the temple could see the etched and painted names of each commissioner and understand the type of activity this position entailed. Hence, being chosen to participate in the commission was a means to elevate one's status and fulfill the type of role expected of an elite member of the community. This holds true of other civic and/or religious offices, as indicated in the honorific decree of the Otorkondeis for Antiochos son of Thargelios. The gratitude of the tribe is directed specifically at his activity in particular *archai*.⁵¹ This inscription also points to the multiple ways in which elites were driven to win social prestige from their community (or a segment of it). The text honors Antiochos not only for his *euergesia* toward the Otorkondeis, but to the *sympas dêmos* (i.e., Mylasa) as well. In short, this was a man with his hands in several cookie jars, performing services in a number of roles throughout the city-state. The same can be inferred for the men of the κτηματῶναι commission. Each is attested outside of Olymos, often in important offices such as prominent priesthoods, or on commissions for land purchases by other local sanctuaries. Thus, involvement in the local public life of Olymos enabled certain elites to expand their “résumé” of benefaction.⁵²

Such a reading conforms to what Strabo tells us of the means to

success in first century Mylasa. The geographer tells of two notable contemporaries of Lucullus and Pompey, Euthydēmos and Hybreas. The former achieved distinction from his “great wealth, high repute, and . . . cleverness,” becoming great in Mylasa and “worthy of the foremost honor in Asia.” Hybreas, though of humbler origins, rose to prominence through office holding: beginning as a mere *agoranomos*, he soon rose to stature as the leading politician next to Euthydēmos. The link between *doxa* and power is emphasized with respect to both men, and although Strabo does not explicitly say so, it is clear that the means to fame was public activity, even if in the minor position of “market superintendent.”⁵³ Interestingly, Strabo also intimates a connection between office and financial gain, telling of how Hybreas abandoned the *agoranomia* because it was not lucrative enough (χρηματισιάμενος μικρά). Of course, this entire depiction occurred several generations after the Olymos land sale inscriptions. Nonetheless, the same principles behind both worlds probably held true, though the intensity of their influence no doubt differed. That is, office holding was a means to public recognition and wealth in second- and first-century Mylasa, but the power possible (and perhaps the amount of money accrued) was most likely greater in the first century BC.

Yet did Olymos present unique opportunities as a former autonomous community that sub-units of the Mylasean *polis* did not? After all, *phylai* like the Otorkondeis and even *syngeneiai* formed commissions to purchase land and were capable of voting honorifics to worthy individuals.⁵⁴ Even so, it seems probable that Olymos enjoyed a slightly different status from the original tribes of Mylasa, which perhaps contributed to its appeal as a path to prestige. For one, it preserved the right to grant citizenship, not only to foreigners, but also to Mylaseans.⁵⁵ This would have been unthinkable for the other tribes of the *polis*, since by definition each citizen belonged to only one tribe. It is even possible that each Olymean was assigned a Mylasean tribe at the time of the *sympoliteia*, and the reduction of Olymos to *phylē* status simply emphasized the supremacy of Mylasa in the arrangement, rather than attempting to establish parity between the smaller community and the three Mylasean tribes. This difference would have no doubt made Olymean offices less accessible to Mylaseans, and so more valued, since Olymean self-identity was at stake in a way that it was not with respect to the tribes. Moreover, Olymos’ relative newness as a part of Mylasa surely marked it as less chartered territory. The community would have offered a more conspicuous venue for elite activity in relation to the more familiar tribal entities. Another possible distinction between Olymos and the tribes was its geographical unity. While we cannot be certain that

Mylasa was not divided into three physically distinct parts, each consisting of a tribal unit, if, in fact, the Mylasean population was allotted more randomly into the three tribes, then Olymos would have stood out by comparison.

With these considerations in mind, the relationship between Olymos' utility as an additional, and in some sense unique, means for public recognition and its *sympoliteia* with Mylasa remains uncertain. Not only does the evidence for Mylaseans in Olymos date to around 100 years after the merger, but any elite crossover between the two cities could easily be an unanticipated consequence. Indeed, the fact that Olymos managed to retain its local identity and political government for so long could suggest that Mylaseans were not able to access Olymean posts until much later. Our inscriptions could be testimony for a crucial relaxing of an "exclusivity policy" that resulted, ultimately, in a complete loss of identity for Olymos in the first century.⁵⁶ Nevertheless, as we saw from [chapter 2](#), at least some Mylaseans strove for participation in the Olymean *dêmos* as early as the third century, that is, with the *sympoliteia* fresh off the presses. We need not imagine the flood of non-Olymeans that came to dominate the κτηματῶναι commission a century later; continuity in terms of the interest of Mylasean elites in Olymean public life seems the better conclusion. If this is right, then the upper class of Mylasa probably did play a role in the proposal or acceptance of the offer of a *sympoliteia* with Olymos, and we can see how far individuals from this class were successful in following up on their interest in the smaller community through the inscriptions of the ensuing century.

We can also understand this aim on the part of Mylasean elites as part and parcel of the more general explanation of expansion. It is unclear how much access the Mylasean state had to Olymean resources other than manpower. If the terms of the *sympoliteia* between Pidasa and Miletos were in some sense typical of such arrangements, then Mylasa also expected to benefit economically, through taxes and trade, from Olymos. The activity of elite Mylaseans, on the other hand, suggests an additional answer to the question "Expand in what way?" Wealthy Mylaseans sought additional and uniquely prominent opportunities to gain social prestige, seemingly centered on an important Karian sanctuary. Although Olymos maintained its right to grant the privilege of such opportunities, the *sympoliteia* no doubt oriented the two communities to each other in a way that promoted Mylasean elite interests.

The key to understanding the effectiveness of the public space of a sanctuary to broadcast the name and deed(s) of an elite individual is the role that sanctuaries played in Karia. Many sanctuaries functioned as loci of worship not only for the members of the community in

which they were located. This seems to have had its origins in the “temple-states” that preceded the urbanization of Anatolia, and was never entirely superseded by or assimilated to the system of *poleis*.⁵⁷ Thus Debord draws a distinction between sanctuaries with this broader appeal (regional) and sanctuaries whose constituency was limited to inhabitants of the state to which it was attached (local). Among the former rank the prominent cults of Zeus Chrysaoreus, Zeus Karios/ Panamareus, and Zeus Labraundos.⁵⁸ To this list should perhaps be added the sanctuaries at Sinuri, Amyzon, and Lagina, the latter two dedicated to Artemis/Apollo and Hekate, respectively. With respect to Sinuri and Amyzon, the attention paid to these sanctuaries by the Hekatomnid satraps is rather suggestive.⁵⁹ Although it is difficult to be conclusive for Lagina (at least until the Roman period), two events hint at the importance of the cult beyond the local community. From *IStratonikeia* 504 we learn that the priest of Helios and Rhodes was also the priest of Hekate, indicating that in the early second century the Lagina sanctuary was important enough (i.e., for an area presumably greater than Koaranza alone) to find itself controlled by a high-ranking Rhodian official; secondly, multiple *poleis* from Karia and the broader Greek world recognized the *asylia* of the sanctuary and participated in its festival.⁶⁰

Examples of local sanctuaries, on the other hand, included Mylasa’s Zeus Osogo and Zeus of the Otokondeis, in addition, no doubt, to the number of deities attested to by the priests mentioned above.⁶¹ The cult of Apollo and Artemis at Olymos at first appears to fall into the latter category: *IMylasa* 861 defines access to the rites of the gods in terms of Olymean citizenship.⁶² However, the further clarification of this phrase that follows also reveals that participation could be (and presumably was) attained by men who were not original Olymeans (“through the pre-existing [ancestral *politeia*]”): by means of distinction, purchase, or adoption. Since the decree assumes that some men won their right to the cult from these latter three means, we can infer an interest in the sanctuary beyond the confines of Olymos. Of course, the date of the decree, the second half of the second century, makes it possible that all the “outsiders” who won a share in the sacred rites were Mylaseans, and doubtless most were—this coincides with the impression left by the identity of the κτηματῶναι at Olymos. However, the policy of admitting to participation honorees, men with buying power, and adoptees was surely developed in response to an interest in the sanctuary that went beyond just Mylasa proper.⁶³ That all four paths to a share in the rites, including ancestral citizenship, were “based on lineage” suggests that this policy was a long-standing one. Even more suggestive is the importance of the Apollo and/or Artemis cult to Olymos’ neighbors Hydai and Chalketor.⁶⁴ Although

the latter had its own sanctuary to the god, it is uncertain if Hydrieis worshipped Apollo and Artemis in their own territory or at Olymos. Laumonier makes a compelling case that the cult of these two gods as “ancestor deities” was common to a number of communities in the area around Mylasa.⁶⁵ This picture is strengthened by the fact Apollo and Artemis cults are attested for, in addition to the communities already mentioned, Amyzon, Alinda, Alabanda, and the Stratonikeian valley. Important cities like Mylasa and Euromos either lacked such a cult, or their inhabitants were accustomed to worship these gods elsewhere.⁶⁶ This puts into perspective the importance of controlling a sanctuary that motivated Mylasa’s takeover of Labraunda and the involvement of its elite in the sanctuary of Apollo and Artemis at Olymos.

Activity in Olymean communal life may also provide insight into the way in which social prestige in one’s community played a role in establishing credentials on the international network of Aegean *poleis*. The number of individuals active in Olymos and Mylasa (Figure 3.2) suggests a competitive environment, but also one with many winners. Opportunities to represent the *polis* abroad, and thus gain recognition within the network of Greek *poleis*, were surely far more limited. As a result, a man’s success in fulfilling the duties and expectations of local offices, and so his capacity for local benefaction, became an argument for his suitability in foreign affairs. Unofficially at least, serving as a κτηματώνης, a priest, etc. constituted résumé-building, with the objective of reaching higher levels of recognition, wherein the public the international community of *poleis*. This may have been especially important in a city like Mylasa, where connectivity to this broader world was rather limited in the early Hellenistic period, as we saw in [chapter 1](#).

The draw of the network of Greek *poleis* for certain citizens of Olymos, on the other hand, can be read from the potential cases of Olymeans active in Mylasa. Unfortunately, not one of these instances permits the certain identification of an individual as hailing from Olymos. Two, however, are more suggestive than the others. Theodoros, son of Theodoros adopted son of Isidoros, appears in the inscriptions of Olymos as a witness to a land purchase for the sanctuary of Apollo and Artemis. Since acting as a witness contains no wealth or status requirement, official or unofficial, perhaps Theodoros was chosen in this capacity as an “authentic” representative of Olymean interests. In other words, the Olymean *dêmos* may have made the distinction between Olymeans from Olymos and those who had been added post-birth, and have chosen “their own” where wealth restrictions did not impede. If this is correct, then Theodoros provides striking evidence of the success a small-town elite could have via

sympoliteia in the world of peer polities. Not only did Theodoros, through his adoption, gain the right to serve as the priest of Isis, but we also find him acting as a foreign judge in several states, including Teos (*IMylasa* 632, 634–35).

The other appealing candidate for an Olymean in Mylasa is Polyphemos son of Iason, who is mentioned in the context of a land purchase as the neighbor to the plot bought by Olymos for sanctuary of Apollo and Artemis. One assumes that this land was contiguous to other sanctuary lands or at least within the territory of Olymos. As such, Polyphemos was a resident citizen of Olymos who was able, in *IMylasa* 211 to be chosen as a κτηματώνης by the Otorkondeis in a land purchase of their own. Of course, since Olymos was not another tribe, it is possible that Polyphemos naturally belonged to both Olymos and the Otorkondeis; yet Polyphemos would still have been competing with other Mylaseans to obtain a spot on the commission. The Otorkondeis inscription, then, seems testimony of the success possible for Olymeans in the communal life of Mylasa outside their own community.

CONCLUSION

To recapitulate, we have seen persuasive evidence, on the one hand, for the strong interest of elite Pidaseans in joining the Milesian state during the years leading up to the *sympoliteia* between the two communities, and on the other hand, for an equally intense infiltration into Olymean public life by Mylaseans in the wake of the *sympoliteia* between these latter two *poleis*. Suggestive also were the potential cases of Olymeans active in the larger political arenas of Mylasa and foreign *poleis*. Rather than limit the discussion to these two contexts, it will be profitable to consider the level to which these conclusions speak to other instances of *sympoliteiai* in Karia, and thus exhibit region-wide historical forces of attraction, despite a lack of similarly abundant prosopographical material. In other words, can we infer enough similarities—of geography, of demography, of important cults—to posit comparable motivators behind the decisions of other pairs of settlements to merge?

In the case of Miletos and Pidasa, the key factor that contributed to Pidasean interest in Miletos was the latter's position, both geographically and in terms of status: a major coastal city with unquestionable traditions and identity as an Ionian *polis*, possessing contemporary ties to a myriad of other city-states. Miletos clearly offered opportunities not possible in the small, inland, and traditionally Karian town of Pidasa. Does this situation apply to other

instances of *sympoliteia*? I have argued in [chapter 2](#) for a similar scenario in the case of Miletos and Myous, pointing to the careers of Eirenias and (more tentatively) Apollodoros in both cities. Moreover, the critical events of the war with Krete and Philip V display the deep involvement of prominent Kalymnians in the public life of Kos. Apart from serving as commanders in the Koan fleet, an act bound to the specific context of war, several Kalymnians donated to both the Koan and Kalymnian war contribution funds, suggesting an attempt to advertise their status and means in a larger and more prestige-winning arena. Other cases are plausible but less supported by direct evidence. Regardless of whom we identify as Keramos' partner in its *sympoliteia*—a small neighboring community or Rhodes—improved harbor access seems a factor. If Keramos was the larger partner, then we can imagine the other community's elite hoping that the city's maritime connections would result in the same opportunities (however meager) for international prestige as were capitalized on by the two Kerameans honored by Ephesos. On the other hand, if my suspicion that Rhodes was unnamed partner is correct, then Keramos' relative insignificance compared with larger *poleis* may have encouraged its elite to push for stronger ties with—that is, membership in—the powerful Rhodian state. We need only reiterate the fact that the Kerameans honored by Ephesos were residing in Rhodes to see the importance of such connections. Finally, although a *sympoliteia* between Halikarnassos and Theangela is unlikely, we can still see how the larger coastal city offered attractions for the family of Aristides son of Leon. As discussed in [chapter 2](#), the descendants of this citizen of Theangela became active participants in the civic community of Herodotos' hometown, probably thanks to a *politeia* grant.

Inland from the waters of the Aegean, the draw of the network of *poleis* appears less promisingly factor in *sympoliteia*, but it is not entirely absent. The best evidence comes from Mylasa, where we have explored the possibility that several of the individuals active both here and at Olymos originally hailed from the latter community. Moreover, at Hydai the father of a Mylasean *archon* is found acting as a κτηματώνης. By analogy with Olymos Aristes son of Leon could be originally from Hydai, an elite whose descendant achieved prominence in the new political center of his polity. Also of ambiguous origin is Hermias son of Hekataios, a trial witness at Hydai and an *oikonomos* for the Otokondeis.⁶⁷ Is this a Mylasean in Hydai or a Hydies in Mylasa? Elsewhere evidence is simply non-existent, so that while we can recognize the appeal that Iasos and Theangela, both with at least limited interaction with other *poleis*, may have had for small communities like Chalketor and Kildara, speculation it must remain.⁶⁸ Other *sympoliteiai*, such as those in which Stratonikeia,

Aphrodisias, and Pisye participated, probably occurred without any thought for participation in exchanges with cities farther afield, and this is unsurprising.

Yet this does not end the discussion on motives, since expanding one's horizons was not the only attraction for this interest group, at least in the Karian hinterland, as the case of Mylasa and Olymos proves. The majority of elite "crossover" here involved Mylaseans gaining membership in Olymos' still legitimate public sphere. The locus of the activity of these "new citizens" was the major Olymean sanctuary to Apollo and Artemis. I have suggested two main ways in which this cult may have appealed to Mylasean elites. First, I posited a potential economic gain from making loans with interest. Secondly, and more significantly, I emphasized the advertising power of a prominent sanctuary. The centrality of a main cult to the communal life of Olymeans and, no doubt, many Mylaseans would have ensured a public awareness of the role that these individuals played in the maintenance and flourishing of the temple, and thus the community as a whole. In fact, increasing one's prestige through service to and benefaction of a sanctuary was a strategy implemented by many individuals in and around Asia Minor, most famously by the many Koans who purchased priesthoods from the third through first centuries BC, though here there is no connection to any community subordinated through *sympoliteia*.⁶⁹ I also suggested the more regional appeal of Apollo and Artemis as a motivating factor, based on analogy with other sanctuaries of a pan-Karian nature; such cults pre-dated the "urbanization" of the region under Maussollos and thus developed a constituency that did not coincide with the boundaries of later political maps. There is no reason to think that this situation did not persist into the Hellenistic period. If such was the case for the sanctuary of Apollo and Artemis, Mylasean elites could expect a number of visitors from beyond the *polis* to walk by and see the record of their service to the temple.

Elsewhere in Karia we find other examples of the appeal of a prominent sanctuary as a significant factor in several other *sympoliteiai*. It is entirely possible that Aristeas son of Leon is a Mylasean in Hydai, and this is almost certainly the case for Hermias son of Polites, elsewhere attested as a priest of the Mylasean cult to Apollo Pytheas.⁷⁰ The involvement of Aristeas and several other individuals in the purchase of lands for the sanctuary of Apollo and Artemis is also significant. If Boulay and Pont are right in seeing this sanctuary as the same as the focus of Olymean identity and worship, then this only further supports our supposition that the cult was of regional importance and thus of greater appeal for the purposes of self-advertisement than civic sanctuaries.⁷¹ Panamara's very name

emphasizes the centrality of its Zeus Panamareus sanctuary to the *koinon*, and this importance seems to have attracted Stratonikeia's elite, since after the union of these two communities a Stratonikeian, Leon son of Chrysaor, was able to attain the highest post in Panamara, the priesthood of Zeus. And it was precisely via his performance in this role that Leon won renown both within Stratonikeia (honored by Panamara) and in other parts of Karia (honored by the Kallipolitans and Laodikeians).⁷² Perhaps similar interests affected Stratonikeia's relations with and less equitable absorption of Koaranza and its sanctuary to Hekate. Furthermore, the combination of Plarasa and Aphrodisias surely was influenced by the latter's sanctuary to Aphrodite. If we are right in seeing Plarasa as the initially dominant partner, then presumably the attraction of the goddess' cult for Plarasean elites was the publicity of the sanctuary beyond the borders of the two communities. In this case, it seems that the prestige of the sanctuary, bolstered by amiable relations with Rome, came to define the new *polis*' identity over time, such that Plaraseans chose to appear publicly, at least on stone, as Aphrodisians—assuming that at least some Aphrodisians were originally from Plarasa—as well as deciding to urbanize about the location of the temple.

Other examples for *sympoliteia* in inland Karia lack direct evidence for involvement in, or even the existence of a prominent sanctuary. Did the sanctuary of Zeus Lepsynos at Euromos have a similar draw for Mylaseans as the Apollo and Artemis sanctuary at Olymos? There is no evidence to support or deny this speculation, though it is worth remembering that the *sympoliteia* between the two cities did not last long. Other communities—Chalketor, Killara, Thodasa, Pisyē, and Pladasa—give no signs of a sanctuary in their territory at all. While this must be in part due to a lack of documentation, it also supports a particularly Karian way of conceiving of one's relationship to a sanctuary, namely that where one worshipped was often independent of the community to which one belonged or the assembly in which one voted. In the case of the settlements listed above, worshipping “abroad” was not even a matter of choice. If this is true, then the regional significance of many sanctuaries becomes even clearer, as does the scenario which envisions a strong desire on the part of local elites to participate in the administration and/or financing of a sanctuary's business.

Throughout this chapter, our discussion has considered the *sympoliteiai* that occurred in the third and second centuries, that is, every instance from [chapter 2](#) except the arrangement between Latmos and Pidasa. In my treatment of this fourth-century merger in the second chapter, I spoke little of elite motivation, instead focusing on the relationship between the two communities as wholes. Can we

be more precise about who was behind the decision, in either or both cities? The evidence does not permit any prosopographical inquiry, nor are we aware of any regionally important sanctuaries in either state. Moreover, it is certain that Latmos was not considered a peer to Greek *poleis* of the late fourth century. True, the city interacted on an equal basis with other Karian communities, as a limited number of inscriptions attest; yet, insofar as we have no instances of exchange between Latmos (or Pidasa) and other Aegean cities, it would be wrong-headed to apply the model of peer polity interaction here. It seems best, then, to avoid applying the factors identified in the current chapter to this *sympoliteia*.

It remains to consider to the issue of the power dynamics within the communities where elite motivations are detectable: Pidasa, Myous, Kos, Keramos, Mylasa, Stratonikeia, Plarasa, Olymos, and possibly Hydai. To restate our question from the introduction, what limits were there on individual or (elite) group action on behalf of the community and to what extent were these limits ever transcended? If one looks only at the language and form of the decrees issued—where they issue surviving decrees, that is—the impression is hardly unique in comparison with Greek decrees in general: the *dêmos* and *boulê* authorize all decrees.⁷³ As discussed in the introduction, such formulae mask a multiplicity of actual power relations, and it is these, rather than the question of whether these *poleis* were democracies, that are of interest. Looking at the evidence, what can we say of the four cities featured in this chapter based on the activity of their elites? The activity of prominent Milesians is unsuggestive: as we saw, status could not be inferred from the city's representatives in *Milet* I.3 149.⁷⁴ More telling is the case of Pidasa. As we have already noted, there is a significant coincidence between the interest of wealthy Pidaseans in Milesian citizenship leading up to the *sympoliteia* and the benefits of the *sympoliteia* itself for Pidasean elites not admitted prior to this arrangement, alluded to several times in the agreement and prominent among the ambassadors listed in the inscription. Although no decree from Pidasa survives, references to an authoritative *dêmos* and magistracies in the agreement indicate at least some standard *polis* institutions.⁷⁵ How these forms of governing were interpreted in the specific context of a small Karian settlement remains unclear, but it is worth observing that if “*dêmos*” refers to a general assembly, then this body (a) chose envoys of wealthy means, and (b) voted in favor of an agreement with Miletos that satisfied the interests of its elite. If this decision also benefited the average Pidasean, such profit was not without its drawbacks. Most significantly, a merger with Miletos threatened the communal, religious, and economic identity of Pidasa, and as we have shown in [chapter 1](#), concerns about preserving this

sense of belonging find expression in several stipulations of the agreement. Wealthy Pidaseans did not share these anxieties. For one, Pidasean identity does not seem to have been as important to them as the social prestige to be had at Miletos, since many elites sought Milesian citizenship prior to the *sympoliteia*. Moreover, although the Pidasean minority voice(s) could be drowned out in the Milesian assembly, Pidasean elites at least had the opportunity to acquire the prestige that permitted one to speak in the assembly.⁷⁶ Economically as well, they stood to gain from the new markets available at Miletos.

What we must infer from this is not a specific scenario of control, but rather a bounded range of possibilities, spanning the extremes of a sovereign, fully-represented *dêmos* approving a particular elite initiative and a decision-making process that *de facto* lay in the hands of the wealthiest men of the state.⁷⁷ In either case, and with respect to any middle road between them as well, significant power rested in the hands of every voting citizen. In other words, authority was mediated through the requisite affirmation, presumably via persuasion, of an unconstrained male citizen population, so that if elites “imposed” their will, they depended on an appeal to the interests of the rest of the community to do so. If we consider this situation against Ober’s classical Athens, we find an interesting compatibility between full-fledged democracy and certain forms of elite-determined policy.⁷⁸ For in matters where elites stood to benefit the most, and most citizens only ambiguously, the sovereign *dêmos* expressed the will of its elite. One need only think of Aristophanes’ numerous anti-war sentiments, usually placed in the mouths of “commoners,” to realize the discrepancy that could exist between mass and elite in terms of foreign affairs.⁷⁹ Moreover, it was men like Alkibiades who most stood to gain from Athenian aggression, and only some brilliant rhetoric was needed to construct and insinuate positive benefits for the rest of the community.⁸⁰ The Assembly had the final say, but what is essential at these moments during the Peloponnesian War, like the *sympoliteia* between Miletos and Pidasa, is the element of *consensus* that the appeal of international politics fostered among elites. As Ober argues, democratic ideology, in the mouths of the *dêmos*’ leaders, was formulated because the community’s elites remained divided so as to constitute true representatives of common opinion: aristocratic factiousness led to competition of which the *ekklêsia* became the agenda-setter and arbiter.⁸¹ However, the world of foreign affairs, and international renown, offered an attraction that all elites shared, and thus presented a counterforce to the divisiveness of internal politics. In many matters *agôn* prevailed, as the debates recorded by Thucydides and published by the fourth-century rhetors indicate; yet, the pact between Pidasa and Miletos suggests that such contests could

lead to results in which elites were in fact able to influence state policy.⁸²

This need not—and it seems could not—come at the expense of communal interests. As we have suggested, elite and community-wide interests coincided in the agreement with Miletos, and it is likely that they had to. There is no indication that the Pidasean *dēmos* was opposed to a merger with Miletos, and if we recognize that the common citizen's ambiguous position with respect to *sympoliteia* entailed the acknowledgment of positive as well as negative consequences, and thus produced varying reactions throughout the citizen body—some for, some against, some apathetic or uncertain (and thus swayable to the leaders' position)—then we can see how elite and public will could have coincided without spelling oligarchy. In fact, the details of the agreement and the concerns they represent suggest that various segments of the population had a hand in determining on what terms the *sympoliteia* was proposed to Miletos.

This coincidence of elite and communal interests is worth stressing in the other cases where this can be detected. Regarding Mylasa, Valeri has argued from several fourth-century documents for the constitutionally privileged position of a landed aristocracy. Crucial to his position is the phrase ἔδοξε Μυλασεῦσιν, ἐκκλησίῃς κυρίῃς γενομένης, καὶ ἐπεκύρωσαν αἱ τρεῖς φυλαί, which suggests that at least partial sovereignty lay with the tribal assemblies. And since membership to these subunits of the *polis* was restricted—as Valeri sees it, due to the hereditary nature of the *syngeneiai* that constituted each tribe—elites possessed the constitutional means to control Mylasean policy.⁸³ However, his assumption that a “vincolo di sangue” implies the “carattere aristocratico ed esclusivo dell’antica assemblea tribale” ignores both the lack of positive evidence for this assumption and the importance of genealogy for citizen identity in other *poleis*.⁸⁴ Moreover, the phrase ἔδοξε τῇ Πορμουνου συγγενείᾳ κοινῇ πᾶσι (“decided by the *syngeneia* of Pormounos that is common to all”) from an inscription found at the sanctuary of Sinuri suggests an all-inclusive membership in such bodies.⁸⁵ If we turn to the activity of the Mylasean elite explored above, we can confirm Quass’ more general observation that civic offices in the Hellenistic period became increasingly dependent on the self-financing capacity of the officeholder.⁸⁶ This seems to be the implication of the lending function of the κτηματωναί. We have already expressed our reservations about linking this dependence on wealthy citizens to the decay of democracy. If, however, we assume that from Mylasa came the impetus for its *sympoliteia* with Olymos—a more probable presupposition than its opposite⁸⁷—then we can identify elites as the primary beneficiaries of such a move, especially since Olymos retained

its right to grant inclusion into the Olymean community, and did so only to those with the means to earn it. However the decision was reached in the assembly, the case for approval was led by Mylasa's elites.⁸⁸

Similar conclusions seem to apply in the cases of Stratonikeia and Plarasa. Interest in an important sanctuary seems to be peculiarly elite, particularly in these instances, where the sanctuaries of Zeus (at Panamara) and Aphrodite (at Aphrodisias) were already accessible to Karians outside Panamara and Aphrodisias. As such, the decision to effect a *sympoliteia*, if driven by Stratonikeia and Plarasa, resulted from elite pressure. Yet all the citizens of both new communities stood to benefit from the merger, as our comments in [chapter 2](#) make clear. Stratonikeians would have been able to take pride in the association of the important sanctuary specifically with their *polis* and Panamareans would have become citizens of a *polis* rather than subjects of Rhodes, while Plaraseans and Aphrodisians would have enjoyed a more prominent identity in the region and gained the population and means to develop an urbanized center.

We have pointed also to the presence of Kalymnians in prominent Koan posts as suggestive of the motives of the smaller island's elite in desiring a union with Kos. Nevertheless, they had need to complement interests intricately bound to foreign threats which culminated in wars with Krete and Philip V. Elite motives, while present, were subordinate to a community-wide interest in public safety that primarily motivated the merger.

Far from a quagmire of uncertainty, our analysis has provided important new ways of thinking about the Karian political, social, and religious landscape. Moreover, it raises questions worth asking of similarly arranged and labeled polities beyond Karia, and as such opens up other regions and communities to the kinds of issues that appear to feature in our study. Of course, we have already suggested that certain conditions applied in Karia that created an environment conducive to *sympoliteiai*, and insofar as these conditions were not in play elsewhere, we would not expect our analysis to yield similar results. Yet the role of sanctuaries in the regional and local politics of communities beyond Karia may have been manifested in other ways, and the documents produced by and in these sanctuaries deserve consideration. Moreover, the prevalent interaction between the various *poleis* demands closer study to determine both the boundaries of the network constituted by this interaction and the influence of this network on communities at its periphery.

1. For the value of prosopography in identifying elite social practice, A. Fouchard, "Comment reconnaître les élites en Grèce ancienne?" in *La cité et ses élites. Pratiques et représentation des formes de domination et de contrôle social dans les cités grecques*, ed. L. Capdetrey and Y. Lafond (Bordeaux: Ausonius, 2010), 360f. Cf. J.K. Davies, *Athenian Propertied Families 600-300 BC* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971) and A. Duplouy, *La prestige des élites* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 2006).

2. A most useful summary of this debate can be found C. Mann 2012, "Gleichheiten und Ungleichheiten in der hellenistischen Polis," in "*Demokratie*" in *Hellenismus: Von der Herrschaft des Volkes zur Herrschaft der Honoratioren?* ed. C. Mann and P. Scholz (Mainz am Rhein: Verlag Antike, 2012), 11–17; see also the more focused P. Hamon, "Démocraties grecques après Alexandre," *Topoi* 16 (2009): 347–82.

3. Philippe Gauthier, *Les cités grecques et leurs bienfaiteurs* (Athènes: École française d'Athènes, 1985), followed most recently by P. Hamon, "Élites dirigeants et processus d'aristocratisation à l'époque hellénistique," in *Aristocratie antique: modèles et exemplarité sociale*, ed. H.-L. Fernoux and C. Stein (Dijon: Editions universitaires de Dijon, 2007), 79–100; Volker Grieb, *Hellenistische Demokratie: politische Organisation und Struktur in freien griechischen Poleis nach Alexander dem Großen* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2008; Susanne Carlsson, *Hellenistic Democracies: Freedom, Independence and Political Procedure in some East Greek City-States* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2010). Cf. Christian Habicht, "Ist ein 'Honoratiorenregime' das Kennzeichen der Stadt im spätern Hellenismus?" in *Stadt und Bürgerbild im Hellenismus*, ed. M. Wörle and P. Zanker (München: C. H. Beck, 1995), 87–92, who argues for continuity until the first century BC. For a fuller bibliography, see Mann, "Gleichheiten und Ungleichheiten," 15 n. 11.

4. Friedemann Quass, *Die Honoratiorenschicht in den Städten des griechischen Ostens* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1993). Mann, "Gleichheiten und Ungleichheiten," 13–14 argues that Quass represents the attempt to systematically prove what was until the 1990s the standard opinion, that in the entire Hellenistic period "democracy" is merely a formal mask for de facto oligarchy (see *Ibid.*, n. 7 for bibliography).

5. N. Rose, "Identity, Genealogy, History," in *Questions of Cultural Identity*, ed. S. Hall and P. du Gay (London: Sage, 1996), 128–150, discussing "the subjectification of those who would govern"; cf. M. Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Volume 3: The Care of the Self*, trans. R. Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1988).

6. This is similar to the approach recently advocated by Ma, *Statues and Cities*, wherein he concludes that "elite affirmation had to take place within the constraints inherited from the Classical and Hellenistic polis . . ." (291).

7. Despite the objections to follow, my approach has otherwise much in common with Grieb, *Hellenistische Demokratie*. By focusing on the relationship between the *dêmos* and prominent individuals, he is able to demonstrate a clear dependence of the latter on the former, without denying the concurrent reliance of the entire community on what can be loosely termed an 'elite.' (21–23) Thus, insofar as is possible, he is able to affirm a style of government on par with that of classical Athens for his four case studies.

8. Mann, "Gleichheiten und Ungleichheiten," 18 n. 16 sums up one main criticism of Grieb's methodology as using an oversimplistic model to describe the internal dynamics of a city's politics.

9. Similarly problematic is the connection between a trend toward elite leadership and the fact that citizens of certain *poleis* were friends of kings (Mann, *op. cit.*, 20). It is unclear how typical such cases were even across generations, let alone when thinking about "the Hellenistic polis" as a general phenomenon.

10. This perspective is shared to some extent by all treatments of euergetism (e.g.,

Paul Veyne, *Le pain et le cirque: sociologie historique d'un pluralisme politique* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1976); Ma, *Antiochos III*: it is only by attempting a synthesis of data spread over several generations that one could reach the conclusion that several dozen instances of benefaction between kings (not from the same kingdom) and *poleis* (of varying statuses; cf. Ma, *op. cit.*) constituted a system of quasi-governance, however weak.

11. For the role of the language of benefaction in the assertion of a *polis*' self-identity, see Ma, *Antiochos III*, 214–42. Incidentally, Ma's generalizations here somewhat contradict, or at least ignore, his methodological determination to recognize and account for the diverse political landscape represented by the numerous *poleis* and their various statuses (*Ibid.*, 3ff.)

12. For an excellent example of a study that combines institutional and prosopographical analysis, see Roberta Fabiani, “*Dedochthai tei boulei kai toi demoi*: protagonist e prassi della procedura deliberativa di Iasos,” in “*Demokratie*” im *Hellenismus: Von der Herrschaft des Volkes zur Herrschaft der Honoratioren?* ed. C. Mann and P. Scholz (Mainz am Rhein: Verlag Antike, 2012), 109–66.

13. In light of the fact that temporal developments are so crucial to his project, it is surprising that Quass only rarely ties his evidence to a date. He also ignores geographical considerations, generalizing about the entire Greek world from evidence predominantly from Athens and Rhodes, cases that are problematic as “typical,” Athens because of its past greatness and Rhodes for its contemporary political success. This attempt to answer “the Question” with evidence from specific contexts is just as common among proponents of Gauthier’s “camp,” whether explicitly or implicitly. See Ivana Savalli-Lestrade, “Remarques sur les élites dans les *poleis* hellénistiques,” in *Les élites et leurs facettes: les élites locales dans le monde hellénistique et romain*, ed. M. Cébeillac-Gervaison and L. Lamoine (Rome: École française de Rome, 2003), 52–64 and P. Hamon, “Le Conseil et la participation des citoyens: mutations de la basse époque hellénistique,” in *Citoyenneté et participation à la basse époque hellénistique*, ed. P. Fröhlich and C. Müller (Genève: Droz, 2005), 121–44. This tendency includes statements applied to the entire Greek-speaking world without regard for significant differences between, for example, the mainland and Asia Minor (for this difference, see C. Vial, *Les Grecs: de la paix d’Apamée à la bataille d’Actium* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1995), 88–89, 96, 235–37), or by inference from two isolated cases. By contrast, the recent studies by Carlsson, *Hellenistic Democracies* and Grieb, *Hellenistische Demokratie*, while acknowledging the danger of geographical generalizations and limiting their conclusions to the four cities of their investigation, imply their more general aims through the choice of title. For the argument against synthetic treatments, at least until a foundation of more focused studies on specific institutions or cities has been established, see Hamon, “*Démocraties grecques*,” 379 and Mann, “*Gleichheiten und Ungleichheiten*,” 19.

14. Mann, *op. cit.*, 19–20.

15. In *Milet* I.3 41, 64, 72, 74a, 75, 77, 79, and 86; the name in #72 is entirely missing.

16. My method for identifying familial ties places primary importance on similarity of patronymic, as well as on the habit of naming one’s children after their grandfather(s). Similarities of names only are not secure relation-markers, although I do present them more tentatively in the interests of comprehensiveness.

17. Published as *Milet* I.3 40-93 and VI.3 1055-64.

18. Following Rehm’s restoration. The text has only Me[—

19. This reconstruction is not a claim that every relationship represented in the figure existed in fact; but by “overshooting the mark” I hope to convey the general impression that we are dealing with individuals who moved about in the same

circle(s).

20. #77 contains grants to two separate Pidaseans (and their families), Meniskê and Apollonios.

21. For this type of euergetic discourse (and its unspoken assumptions) see, in the context of *politeia* grants, Ivana Savalli 1985, "I neocittadini nelle città ellenistiche," *Historia* 34 (1985): 396–400, and more generally Ma, *Antiochos III*, 182–214; Veyne *Le pain et le cirque*, 229. There has been relatively little discussion on the background of those granted citizenship by the Milesians specifically, other than to distinguish them from the Cretan mercenaries (Brulé 1990, "Enquête démographique sur la famille grecque antique," *Revue des Études Anciennes* 92 (1990): 238).

22. Wilfried Gawantka, *Isopolitie: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen in der griechischen Antike* (München: C.H. Beck, 1975), 20, 24, 28, 70f., 78–80; although Mylasa also enjoyed *isopoliteia* with Miletos, its relatively low number of *politeia* grants from Miletos can be attributed to its own aggrandizing policy, which directed the energies of its elite elsewhere (see below). Jeanne Robert and Louis Robert, "Labraunda," *Bulletin de Correspondence Hellenique Supplement* 83 (1970): 542–56, hypothesized that the unknown community in the *isopoliteia* agreement attested at Miletos by *Milet* I.3 144 was Antiocheia on the Maiandros, but the supposition is too speculative to maintain as anything other than one possibility among many.

23. Aristotle *Rhet.* 1361 a28–30; cf. note 25 above and Gauthier, *Les cités grecques*, 139.

24. Gauthier, *Les cités grecques*, 150–51, 197–206. Cf. Savalli, "I neocittadine," 387–431.

25. It is highly likely that the Pidaseans in the lists were either already resident in Miletos as metics or would have to live in the city for a specified time before receiving full citizenship rights. In Miletos' *isopoliteia* treaty with Herakleia, Herakleians must reside in Miletos for ten years for their citizenship to become fully activated (*Milet* I.3 150, ll. 50–52). Such metic status is in no way incompatible with eventual elite participation, since there is no evidence that family lineage in any way defined the elite, as our definition in the Introduction suggests.

26. Individuals who lived closer to Miletos, like Herakleians and Tralleans, may have had similar motives as well, further strengthened by the ties of *isopoliteia* between Miletos and these cities (although some of the inscription lists predate the *isopoliteiai*). In fact, one is tempted to see every case in the lists as an instance of actual, rather than potential, *politeia*, given that we know of *politeia* grants from cities other than Miletos through honorary inscriptions rather than lists. This is, however, uncertain, since (a) the individuals on the lists are not allotted into Milesian tribes, (b) they preserve their ethnics, and (c) we do not have any honorary inscriptions from Miletos that grant *politeia* and thus would suggest a distinction between such decrees and the lists.

27. *Milet* I.3 94–119 and VI.3 1065–70: Ephesos (2), Assos, Macedonia, Stratonikeia, Myndos, Syracuse, Alabanda (2), Mylasa (3), Knidos (2; ca. 100 BC), Kolophon, Nikomedeia (3; at least 2 in first century), Apollonia, Kos (3), Hypaipa (2), Elaia, Temnos, Herakleia. In distinction to *politeia* grants, we know of these *proxenoi* from honorific decrees limited to one, or at most two, individuals, rather than lists.

28. Herakleia, while coastal, was clearly not a major port in the region (see chapter 1).

29. For the date of *Milet* I.3 105, see Rehm's commentary.

30. The role of a *proxenos* in attempting to negotiate conflicts between two cities was often noted in Herodotos and Thucydides. For references and discussion, with an emphasis on the continuity of the institution from the 6th through the first

century BC, see Gauthier, *Les cités grecques*, 136–49.

31. Menexenos son of Aristetas, Demetrios son of Polites, Artemon son of Menippos, Melanthos son of Polites, Hermias son of Polites, Melanthios son of Polites, Menestheus son of Aristetas, Aison son of Hermias, and Polites son of Menippos.

32. Equally tempting, but highly irresponsible, would be to see the *Milesian* envoy in the treaty, Demetrios son of Artemon, as the son of Artemon son of Menippos, and thus another former Pidasean who had been granted Milesian citizenship prior to the *sympoliteia*.

33. For Pidasas as the initiator, see Introduction and P. Gauthier, “Les Pidaséens entrent en sympolitie avec les Milésiens,” in *Les cités d’Asie mineure occidentale au IIe siècle a.C.*, ed. A. Bresson and R. Descat (Bordeaux: Ausonius, 2001), 117–27.

34. See especially Quass, *Die Honoratiorenschicht*, 109–12, 192–95.

35. These grants are discussed below.

36. For example, only one Kildarean name has survived (Hyssollos son of Samoos, 4th c.) and none from Chalketor.

37. Sibilos’ full patronymic is not given in *IMylasa* 401. Also of significance is an inscription unearthed in Iasos honoring another member of Korris’ family, his son Hekatomnos (G. Maddoli, “Epigrafi di Iasos,” #20.B; cf. *idem*, “Du nouveau sur les Hékatomnides d’après les inscriptions de Iasos,” in *Hellenistic Karia*, ed. R. van Bremen and J.-M. Carbon (Bordeaux: Ausonius, 2010), 128–29).

38. See chapter 2 and *IMylasa* 806.

39. Pierre Debord, “Who’s Who in Labraunda?” in *Labraunda and Karia*, ed. L. Karlsson and S. Carlsson (Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, 2011), 133–48. Clearly, this former antagonism had not impeded the family from integrating rather successfully into the public life of Mylasa in subsequent generations.

40. Quass, *Honoratiorenschicht*, 59ff., entertaining the additional idea that genealogy documented personal rights.

41. *Ibid.*, 63f.

42. συμφέρον δὲ ἐστὶν [πρίασθαι αὐτὰς Ἀπόλλωνι καὶ Ἀρτέμιδι θεοῖς τοῦ]/ δῆμου Ὀλυμείων ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀργυρίου τοῦ ὄντος ἱεροῦ τῶν προγεγραμμένων θεῶν, [προδανεισμένου παρὰ Σιβίλωι(sic) καὶ Εὐθυδήμωι καὶ Ἐκατό]/μνωι· δεδόχθαι τῷ δῆμωι· ἐλῆσθαι ἐκ τοῦ δῆμου ἄνδρας, τοὺς δὲ αἰρεθέντας κτ[ηματονῆσθαι τὰ ἔγγαια παρὰ Θαραγγιλίου τοῦ Ὑβρέου λαβόν]/τας εἰς τὴν τιμὴν παρὰ μὲν Σιβίλωι(sic) ἀργυρίου δραχμὰς τετρακισχιλίας, παρὰ δὲ Εὐθ[υδήμου] δραχμὰς —, παρὰ δὲ Ἐκατόμνωι/ ὅσον ἂν ἐλλείπῃ εἰς τὴν τιμὴν· τοὺς δὲ αὐτοὺς ἄνδρας πριαμένους τοῖς θεοῖς τὰ ἐγ[γαια] μισθῶσαι αὐτὰ φόρου, ἐφ’ ᾧ — ὁ μισθῶσα]/μενος ἐξὶ αὐτὰ αὐτὸς ἢ οἱ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἢ οἷς ἂν ἡ κληρονομία τῶν ὑπαρχόντων καθήκῃ . . .

43. cf. *LSJ* s.v. κτηματονῆς.

44. *LSJ* gives two possible definitions for this word, calling “hirer” dubious. The context suggests “contractor” rather than “tenant,” the idea that the very men who paid for the land would need to then rent it seeming somewhat ludicrous.

45. W. Judeich, “Olymos,” *Mitteilungen des deutschen archaologischen Instituts, Athenische Abteilung* 14 (1889): 381.

46. *IMylasa* p. 31.

47. *IMylasa* pp. 81–82; cf. A. Persson, “Inscriptions de Carie,” *Bulletin de Correspondence Hellénique* 46 (1922): 420–26 (#24).

48. The inscriptions attest to seven certain and relatively contemporary land purchases, in addition to numerous fragments, at least some of which probably involve further transactions.

49. Beate Dignas, “The Leases of Sacred Property at Mylasa,” *Kernos* 13 (2000): 117–26. She also claims that the men who sold the land were the same men who

leased it from the temple, yet this claim is based on only one example: a non-citizen dynast, Olympichos (*Labraunda* 8). Even this example, however, is based on a misinterpretation of the text. Olympichos, the author of the letter, informs the Mylaseans that he ἐμισθώσατο the lands he is dedicating to the sanctuary of Zeus Osogo, and recommends that they μισθῶσαι these lands at the same rent. Following Crampa's translation, Dignas reads the aorist verb as "to have leased to himself" but the middle voice can also take a more active meaning, "to lease out for himself (i.e., for his profit)." This is in fact the only reading that makes sense. Olympichos informs the Mylaseans of his method of leasing the land *before* he dedicates it to their temple, and then recommends that they lease it at the same rate. This is preferable to having Olympichos promise to lease the land before he gives it to the sanctuary. In the rest of the lease documents from Mylasa, including those involving Olymos, the potential lessees of new sacred land are never referred to.

50. Elsewhere within Mylasa, we find κτηματῶναι honored for their service specifically in this office: Robert, *Sinuri*, #15.

51. *IMylasa* 106.

52. In addition to his activity at Olymos and in the tribal business of the Otorkondeis, Ouliades son of Pollis seems to have involved himself as well at the sanctuary of Sinuri (Robert, *Sinuri*, #16, based on Οὐ]λιάδου τοῦ Πο . . .).

53. Strabo 14.2.24. Hybreas likely had to share the responsibilities (and advantages) of this post with one or more other *agoranomoi*. Cf. s.v. "agoranomoi," *RE* vol. 1.

54. For an example of a tribe voting honors to an individual, see previous note; Hestaios son of Demetrios acts as a κτηματωνής for the *syngeneia* of the Aganiteis in *IMylasa* 220.

55. *IMylasa* 876 (see above on Hestaios).

56. For Olymos' commitment to preserving its identity, in particular access to the temple of Artemis and Apollo, as well as its eventual loss of this identity, see Reger, "Sympoliteiai in Hellenistic Asia Minor," 167–68.

57. Beate Dignas, *Economy of the Sacred in Hellenistic and Roman Asia Minor* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 224–46.

58. Pierre Debord, "Sur quelques Zeus Cariens," *Studi Ellenistici* 13 (2001): 21–35. Herodotos attests to the pan-Karian nature of both Zeus Karios (1.171) and Zeus Stratios at Labraunda (5.119; cf. Strabo 14.2.23); Strabo's comments on Zeus Chrysaoreus' importance for Karians (14.2.25) supports the similar impression of epigraphical evidence on the Chrysaoric League (see chapter 1). For the association of Zeus Karios with the sanctuary at Panamara, see Debord, *op. cit.*, 31–34. We have already seen in the Kallipolitan honorific for Leon (*HTC* #84 and above, chapter 2) how Zeus Panamareus drew attention from at least one community outside the Stratonikeian state.

59. Sinuri: Robert, *Sinuri*, nos. 73–76. Mylaseans and locals dominate the Hellenistic prosopographical record, but this could simply indicate an exclusivity of control rather than access (see, e.g., *ibid.*, pp. 30ff.). Amyzon: Robert and Robert, *Amyzon*; cf. A. Laumonier, *Les cultes indigènes en Carie* (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1958), 429–31. Idrieus dedicated the fourth-century temple building, and the sanctuary obtained *asylia* recognition at the beginning of the third century.

60. *IStratonikeia* 507–8. For Lagina as a sanctuary of Koaranza, see *IStratonikeia* 502; cf. Debord, "Essai sur la région de Stratonicee," 112.

61. Debord, "Zeus cariens," 21–24; for the distinction between the two cults, see *IMylasa* 204.

62. ll. 2–3: ἐπειδὴ καθήκει ὑπάρχειν τ[ὴν] μετουσίαν τῶν παρ'Ολυμ]ευσιν κοινῶν ἱερῶν κατ' ἀνδρογένειαν . . . Laumonier, *Les cultes indigènes*, 723 emphasizes the local association of Apollo and Artemis in central Karia.

63. Such “accommodation” for Mylasa also flies in the face of Olymos’ efforts to maintain a self-identity that was centered on the sanctuary.

64. Laumonier, *Les cultes indigènes*, 161–64.

65. *Ibid.*, 161, n. 5; the argument goes that because the term *progonikoi theoi* is attested not only at Olymos and Hydai, but also at Sinuri, where we know there was no sanctuary to Apollo and Artemis, that that this cult may have been common to all three locales (and likely more) and been located only in Olymos. Cf. Boulay and Pont, *Chalkêtôr en Carie*, 75–76.

66. *Ibid.*, 716–17.

67. IMylasa 904 (Hydai), 201 (Otokondeis, 3rd c.).

68. The Milesian *politeia* grants to Euromians indicate relations between these two cities (see above); Theangela maintained ties with Kos (J. Benedum, “Inchriften aus Kos,” *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 27 (1977): #1).

69. R. Parker and D. Obbink, “Sales of Priesthoods on Cos I,” *Chiron* 30 (2000): 415–47 and idem, “Sales of Priesthoods on Cos II,” *Chiron* 31 (2001): 229–52. Such sales also occurred, in the region in and around Karia, at Magnesia, Priene, Mykale, Miletos, Iasos, Hyllarima, Mylasa, Sinuri, Kasossos, Halikarnassos, and (an aborted sale at) Herakleia on the Latmos (cf. Pierre Debord 1982, *Aspects sociaux et économiques de la vie religieuse dans l’Anatolie gréco-romaine* (Leiden: Brill, 1982), 65).

70. See discussion in chapter 2.

71. Boulay and Pont, *Chalkêtôr en Carie*, 75–76.

72. See chapter 2 for discussion and references. The honorific from the *koinon* of Laodikeians, depending on where one locates this settlement, provides evidence for prestige either in Stratonikeia or abroad. See chapter 2, n. 104 for this problem.

73. Cf. F. Quass, “Zur Verfassung des griechischen Städte im Hellenismus,” *Chiron* 9 (1979): 37.

74. Note, however, Grandinetti’s identification (“Le élites cittadine di Mileto, Priene, e Kyme all’ età ellenistica,” In *La cité et ses élites. Pratiques et représentation des formes de domination et de contrôle social dans les cités grecques*, ed. L. Capdetrey and Y. Lafond (Bordeaux: Ausonius, 2010), 97–101) of Milesian elite families among those holding the magistracies of *stephanephoros* and *prophetês* at Didyma (80% of the former went on to hold the latter) and women serving as *hydrophorai* of Artemis Pythie. His claim that adoption and endogamy was prevalent among these families is rather cavalier (citing inscriptions with no analysis of their contents) and no attempt is made to relate these offices to the level of influence it may have allowed these families to exert on communal decisions.

75. *Milet* I.3 149 (the *dêmos* of Pidasa sends its envoys) and Blümel 1997 (Latmos and Pidasa are to share in the magistracies).

76. One must, unfortunately, think here of Athens, and the clout that its *rhetois* wielded as a result of their social status, both from wealth (expressed in terms of benefaction) and education (i.e., the ability to speak well).

77. Cf. Ma’s narrative of “constant give-and-take between community control and elite affirmation” (*Statues and Cities*, 297 *et passim*).

78. Stressed by Habicht, “Honoratiorenregime,” 87–92.

79. For example, the arguments for peace by the women in the *Lysistrata* and Dikaiopolis in the *Acharnians*, whereas the decision to pursue the war is tied to personalities like Peisander (*Lys.* 490) and Kleon (*Knights*, *passim*).

80. The construction of these benefits does not bear on their reality: to question the validity of the self-perceived interests of the majority is merely to express a differing ideological point of view.

81. Ober, *Mass and Elite*, esp. 293–340.

82. Of course, it is always dangerous to compare Athens and any other *polis*, let alone a small inland Karian town, and I do not wish to imply that Pidasa can on its

own shed insight into the workings of Athenian (or any other individual city's) democracy. On the other hand, the comparison does open up possibilities which may warrant a reconsideration of the evidence—both speeches and *praxis*—for fifth and fourth-century Athens, a task that lies beyond the scope of the present work.

83. Caldesi Valeri, "Le assemblee di Mylasa," *Patavium* 6 (1998): 93–109, who extends this arrangement to the third and second centuries via two arguments. First, because Mylasa has three archons corresponding to each tribe, and in certain tribal decrees an archon is mentioned, each tribe must have selected one archon for the state; secondly, he postulates a *boulê* chosen only from the elite tribes, based on the absence of any division by prytany (a poor argument from silence, one should note). More convincingly, he explains the phrase ἐκκλησίης κυρίας γενομένης as referring to quorum reached, based on a similar use at Magnesia on the Maeander (cf. R. Errington, "Ekklesiás kyrías genoménes," *Chiron* 25 (1995): 23–24 & 36–38).

84. The most well-known case being, as usual, Athens, on which see Nicole Loraux, *Born of the Earth: Myth and Politics in Athens*, trans. S. Stewart (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000).

85. Robert, *Sinuri*, #44, ll. 2–3.

86. Quass, *Honoratiorenschicht*.

87. Although it should be noted that the same was once said regarding Pidasa and Miletos until Gauthier's important proof to the contrary (see chapter 1).

88. It is more difficult to be conclusive in the case of Olymos, partially because our conclusions regarding Pidasa could apply here, though with far less evidential support, but more so on account of the absence of any evidence concerning relations between it and Mylasa before the *sympoliteia*, especially in terms of elite activity.

Conclusions

The focused study of a very specific phenomenon, Karian *sympoliteia*, has permitted a fruitful exploration of the political and social development of the *polis* in Karia of the Hellenistic period. In [chapter 1](#), our examination of the history of the region from the perspective of both the high politics of empire and the local concerns of each community revealed a coincidence in Karia between the proliferation of Karian *sympoliteiai* and a growing freedom of action, official or *de facto*, internally and externally, for a number of city-states. We linked this possibility for action with the network of exchanges between *poleis* in which Karian cities were often involved, observed and described as peer polity interaction. Such a link also helped us become more precise about the nature of this network: while participant communities were “peers” insofar as each exchange was conducted on egalitarian terms, the frequency of participation was found to vary substantially, making it likely, on the one hand, that certain cities were better “connected” than others and possibly, on the other, that they were recognized as such.

[Chapter 2](#) developed this image of a vibrant world of politically and diplomatically active *poleis* in the specific context of the thirteen cases of *sympoliteia* in Karia (subtracting the doubtful case involving Halikarnassos). Building upon and modifying the work of other scholars, we were able to identify in some cases a specifically elite interest and engagement in inter-state exchanges, an interest that contributed to the decision to become a citizen of a better-connected *polis* via *sympoliteia*. Yet in other cases, elite motivation can be detected in relation to more local concerns, especially when control of a prominent regional sanctuary was at stake. We in turn tested these suggestions further through a prosopographical study of the four cities from [chapter 2](#) that are best documented in terms of individual activity. The evidence for Pidaseans gaining citizenship in Miletos prior to the *sympoliteia* between the two cities supports the idea that elites from the smaller Pidasa sought to become part of the Milesian citizen body, and we attributed this desire to Miletos’ geographical,

economic, and social position in the Aegean. Despite the lack of comparable prosopographical data elsewhere, parallel factors seem to have been behind the other *sympoliteiai* in which larger cities—Mylasa, Kos, and possibly Rhodes—were involved.

On the other hand, individuals involved in the business of the temple of Apollo at Olymos reveal a movement of elites in the opposite direction, that is, from the larger partner to the smaller, though only in terms of activity. This, I argue, suggests the role of prominent local sanctuaries as venues for elite self-advertisement and status acquisition/assertion, in addition to any economic benefit that might be gained from loaning to the cult. The sanctuary of Zeus Panamaros seems to have held the same attraction for the leading men of Stratonikeia, and the importance of the cult at Aphrodisias must have also been a factor in the *sympoliteia* between the community here and Plarasa. In these cases, which occur more often between inland communities, we find elites operating in a network, not of peer polities, but of worshippers that may or may not have been equivalent to the inhabitants of the community in which the sanctuary was situated. If the cult in question drew adherents beyond its political boundaries, then elite involvement may have been a way to gain prestige outside of one's own community.

Whether implicated in foreign diplomacy or more localized sanctuary life, such elite activity, when linked to communal decisions affecting the level of autonomy of the community, or significantly increasing the number of citizens in it, raises questions about the level of influence of these elites in nominally democratic cities. Yet rather than indicating a *dêmos* increasingly under the sway of its wealthiest members, the evidence demonstrates how various interests within the community can coexist and contribute toward a decision that mutually benefits multiple interest groups. As long as the ideals of a democratic civic virtue continued to regulate the behavior of the elite institutionally, these individuals needed to couch their proposals in terms that appealed to the good of the rest of the community as well. Whether there was manipulation going on that allowed elites to dictate the decisions of the community “in reality” is a question leading to the cynical expectations of modern democratic experience, and perhaps the history of Hellenistic Athens, rather than based on the slightest hint of an indication from the evidence itself.

Karia, of course, was not the only region where interaction between coastal Greek cities and indigenous communities led to increased urbanization, diplomatic interaction, and cultural assimilation. As such, our investigation of a rather specific body of evidence—the epigraphical corpus of *sympoliteiai* from Karia—proves insightful as further confirmation of the importance of peer polity interaction as a

context for understanding developments in the Hellenistic *polis* or as a regional and period study. Although the specific phenomenon on which we have focused did not prevail elsewhere in Asia Minor, the frequent interaction between Greek cities and communities from other regions—Lydia, Pisidia, Lykia, Pamphylia, *et alia*—suggests a similar spread of Greek *diaitia*, and even identity, that did not necessarily efface the culture and sense of self of the inhabitants of these areas. Such a suggestion calls for further study, one that, though outside the scope of the present work, can take it as a methodological starting point.

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